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Abstract 
Today's processes of cultural globalization involve three major trends: (I)the global 
expansion of transnational communications conglomerates; (2) the global 
implementation of market-oriented cultural policies; and (3) the global diffusion of 
new communication technologies. These processes have set in motion complicated 
consequences and prompted a range of national responses. Both China and Taiwan, 
the two locations which embody the Asian region's largest cultural formation, have 
experienced major shifis in their internal political and economic organisation and 
been significantly influenced by these interlinked global processes since the early 
1980s. Taking the national film industries in both locations as a case study, this thesis 
examines the impact of globalisation on the organisation of national cultural 
production and distribution, and explores the uses of film in representing shifting 
conceptions of national culture and identity. 
Key Words: globalisation, national culture, national cinema, film policy, Chinese 
cinema, Taiwanese cinema, China, Taiwan. 
A Note on Romanisation 
The transliteration system used to romanise Chinese in this thesis is pinyin, which is 
applied in mainland China and most international literatures. However, some names 
of people and places associated with Taiwan (such as Lee Tenghui, Hou Hsioahsian, 
Ang Lee) and Hong Kong (such as Tsui Hark) are kept in their original forms of 
romanisation, which are commonly used in these two locations and known 
internationally. All Chinese films mentioned in this thesis are named by their 
officially released English titles. The romanisations through pinyin system of these 
names and film titles are provided in their first appearances. 
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Introduction 
You, 0 king, live beyond the confines of many seas; nevertheless, impelled by 
your humble desire to partake of the benefits of our civilisation, you have 
despatched a mission respectfully bearing your memorial ... To show your 
devotion, you have also sent offerings of your country's produce. I have read 
your memorial; the earnest terms in which it is cast reveal a respectful humility 
on your part which is highly praiseworthy. 
Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim, namely, to maintain perfect 
governance and fulfil the duties of the state. Strange and ingenious objects do 
not interest me. I have no use for your country's manufactures. It behoves you, 
0 king, to respect my sentiments and display even greater devotion and loyalty 
in future, so that by perpetual submission to our throne, you may secure peace 
and prosperity for your country. Tremblingly obey and show no negligence. 
(Qianlong, quoted in The Economist, December 31 st 1999, Millennium Special 
Edition, p. 76) 
In 1792, the British King George III sent a trade mission to China. The Emperor 
Qianlong apparently was not impressed by the visit and the gifts. He gave King 
George's envoy the message quoted above to take back. For Qianlong, and many other 
Chinese people at that time, China was at the centre of the world. All foreigners were 
peripheral and barbarian. The Chinese had no interest in knowing or understanding 
foreign people and cultures. 
About one hundred years later, the British returned, brining other 'strange and 
ingenious objects'- warships and cannons. This time, they came from the new world 
empire, and along with other Western empires, had no intention of submitting to the 
old Oriental emperor's throne. Instead, they intended to conquer and exploit the vast 
Chinese Empire by means of their overwhelming modem military and technological 
forces. Modem imperialisms almost destroyed the old Empire. Since then, the Chinese 
people embarked on a long journey of national revival and modernisation with 
Chinese characteristics, a journey that at the same time has been profoundly 
influenced by Western styles of modernity. 
This journey is not over yet. The civil war of 1949 divided the country into two 
separate political entities, one located on the mainland and the other on Taiwan Island. 
The exile Nationalist (KMT) government in Taiwan survived by accepting military 
and economic support from the world's new post-War empire, the US. Although the 
US 'betrayed' Taiwan eventually and normalised its relationship with the People's 
Republic of China (PRC), established by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the 
ever-present connections between the island and the world capitalist system together 
with its dependent relationship on the US have been finned up and deepened. On the 
mainland, the CCP chose/its own path to modernisation, which proceeded, after the 
break with Moscow, in isolation from other major powers, but it was not successful. 
Since the late 1970s however, the country has reopened its doors and re-entered a 
world system where Western capitalism has become increasingly dominant. As a 
consequence, current encounters in politics and economy seem more intense, while at 
the same time, Chinese culture, one of the major cultural formations in the world, has 
been unavoidably in transition. 
Chinese Film Cultures in Transition 
The recent consolidation of Western communications conglomerates and the erosion 
of national borders by satellite system and computer networks, has been widely seen 
as a central infrastructure support for a contemporary globalisation processes in 
relation to which national governments are powerless to intervene. Much general 
debate around this issue however fails to take proper account of recent power shifts 
within states while much cultural and communications analysis ignores changes in the 
nature and scope of state intervention in the cultural sphere. 
At the same time, there is no doubt that the accelerating transnational distribution 
of cultural Products has had a significant impact on the structure and content of 
national cultural production, on the maintenance and protection of local cultures, and 
on the redefinition and reassessment of what constitutes 'national culture'. These 
cultural dynamics are increasingly becoming central issues in debates around 
globalisation. Some commentators assert that what we are witnessing now is the latest 
episode in the familiar narrative of cultural imperialism and cultural homogenisation. 
Others argue to the contrary, that globalisation has brought much more diversity, 
variety, and cultural choice. However, whatever its political attractions for both critics 
and celebrants of market dynamics, free floating speculations is no substitute for 
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detailed investigation of what exactly the consequences of increasing encounters 
between global and local cultures are in particular concrete situations. 
Since the early 1980s, both mainland China and Taiwan have experienced major 
shifts in both their internal political and economic organisation and in their relations to 
the global economic and cultural system. Taking the film industry as a particular focus, 
the research aims to shed new light on current economic and cultural transitions in the 
two locations by developing detailed comparative analyses of: 
(1) the impact of multinational enterprise on the organisations of one of the 
region's major cultural industries; 
(2) the development, rationale and implementation of national film policies; 
(3) shifts in the construction of national identity as indexed by themes and 
representations in a sample of recent locally produced films. 
The Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis begins with a critical review of the general debates around 'globalisation, 
focussing especially on the cultural dimension and on the crucial role of multinational 
cultural corporations in global transformation processes. By critically examining 
different theorists of the core dynamics addressed in the thesis, I aim to establish a 
workable analytical framework for empirical research. In Chapter 21 then focus the 
theoretical inquiry on the controversial issues of the changing role of the nation-state 
in the globalisation process. The accompanying debates around the redefinition and 
reassessment of national culture and national identity are also examined in this 
chapter. Based on this inquiry into the question of national culture and national 
identity in the global age, in Chapter 3,1 deal with the topic of national cinema. The 
conceptual reassessment of the notion of national cinema is illustrated by examples 
taken from a variety of contemporary national cinemas. In Chapter 4,1 analyse the 
different ways in which states intervene in cultural and media systems, looking 
particularly at the case of cinema. By investigating examples of the contrasting film 
policies pursued in different countries, I aim to build a general typology of forms of 
state intervention in cinema. I also attempt to identify the basic trends in national film 
policies in the current conditions of globalisation. These discussions provide an 
essential context for the later, detailed discussion of film policies in China and Taiwan. 
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Before analysing the film industries and film cultures of China and Taiwan, 
however I Provide, in Chapter 5, general descriptions of the key political, economic 
and cultural transformations in these two locations in the global era ýmrticularly since 
1980). This material functions as a bridge between the general theoretical inquiries 
that begin the thesis and the detailed case study research that follows. 
In Chapter 61 begin the analysis of the two case study situations by tracing the 
history and the contemporary dynamics relating to the distribution and consumption 
of foreign movies (mainly Hollywood movies) and the patterns and practices of the 
major transnational film corporations in China and Taiwan. 
In Chapters 7,8,9, and 10,1 deal with the three main dimensions to national 
responses to global trends in the film industry and film culture. Chapter 7 focuses on 
national film policies and state intervention in cinema. The organisations; of the two 
local film industries and relevant recent changes are addressed in Chapter 8. While in 
Chapter 9 and 10,1 explore continuities and shifts in representations of national 
identity by examining the thematic organisation and key images of key recent films 
produced in China and Taiwan. The aim of these four core empirical chapters is to 
analyse the impact of globalisation on local cultural productions and to explore how 
societies respond to these dynamics in three inter-linked domains - the political, 
economic and ideological. 
In the light of the empirical findings, the conclusion returns to the general issues 
raised by: (1) encounters between global and local cultures, (2) the changing role of 
the nation-state, and (3) transformations in the articulation of national identity in 
popular cultural products. 
4 
Chapter 1 Global Transformations 
Imagine for a moment that you are on a satellite, ftirther out and beyond all actual 
satellites; you can see 'planet earth' from a distance and, unusually for someone with only 
peaceful intentions, you are equipped with the kind of technology which allows you to see 
the colours of people's eyes and the numbers on their number plates. You can see all the 
movement and tune in to all the communication that is going on. Furthest out are the 
satellites, then aeroplanes, the long haul between London and Tokyo and the hop from San 
Salvador to Guatemala City. Some of this is people moving, some of it is physical trade, 
some is media broadcasting. There are faxes, e-mail, film-distribution networks, financial 
flows and transactions. Look in closer and there are ships and trains, steam trains slogging 
laboriously up hills somewhere in Asia. Look in closer still and there are lorries and cars 
and buses, and on down further, somewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, there's a woman - 
amongst many women - on foot, who still spends hours a day collecting water (Massey, 
1994: 148-149). 
In this quotation Doreen Massey vividly depicts the heaven and the hell - both of 
them real -which characterise the contemporary phase of globalisation. The 
complexity and ambiguity of this process has prompted heated and prolonged debate 
in academic, political, economic, and societal spheres around a series of key questions. 
What is globalisation? What does it bring us exactly? Is the future going to see a 
harmonious cosmopolitan world or a world full of injustice and unfairness? And, of 
particular importance for this thesis, 'What global transformations are taking place in 
the sphere of culture? 'What are the cultural consequence of globalisation and how 
are nations responding? 
The objective of this chapter is to answer these questions and to outline a general 
explanatory framework within which the case studies of China and Taiwan that 
occupy the second half of this thesis can be placed. 
1.1 Globalisation: Debates and Issues 
The first use of the term 'globalisation' can be traced to the 1960s, but public 
discussions of the conception increased enormously after the mid-1980s not only 
among academics but also in the discourses of the mass media, the speeches of 
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politicians, and the strategic reports of business interests. As a consequence, as Beck 
points out, globalisation has been 'the most widely used - and misused - keyword in 
disputes of recent years ... but it is also one of the most rarely defined, the most 
nebulous and misunderstood, as well as the most politically effective' (Beck, 
2000[1997]: 19). 
Why is it so difficult - at least in terms of academic use - to define globalisation? 
It is perhaps because different scholars offer such different accounts of every aspect 
of globalisation from its causes to its consequences and from its origins to its current 
transformative trajectories. Consequently, to arrive at a workable general definition 
and a proper theoretical base for the research that follows, it is necessary to examine 
current debates on globalisation in some detail. 
1.1.1 Globalisation debates 
Held and McGrew have gone to a great deal of effort to map the major academic 
debates on globalisation. In their comprehensive study of the subject (Held et al., 
1999), they propose three ideal typical positions on globalisation. The 
hyperglobafisers 'defme a new era in which people everywhere are increasingly 
subject to the disciplines of the global marketplace'. In contrast, the sceptics argue 
that 'globalisation is essentially a myth which conceals the reality of an international 
economy increasingly segmented into three major regional blocs in which national 
governments remain very powerful'. Finally, the transformationalists assert that 
contemporary globalisation is a process in which states and societies across the globe 
are experiencing profound changes as they try to adapt to a more interconnected but 
highly uncertain world (pp. 2-10). 
Later on in their discussion however, Held and McGrew revise (or simplify, in my 
view) their typology later, into a dichotomy: the sceptics and the globalists; (Held and 
McGrew, 2000). Giddens also uses the terms 'globalists' and 'sceptics' to label the 
two main currents of thought in the globalisation debate (Giddens, 1999), while 
Scholte divides the major positions into 'the globalists' and 'the ultra-sceptics' 
(Scholte, 2000). To some extent these polarised distinctions are helpful in clarifying 
the main contours of the debate on globalisation. But as political economists, Paul 
Hirst and Grahame Thompson, the scholars who are most often labelled as 'sceptics', 
11 See Robertson (1992), p. 8.; Waters (1995), p. 2; Held and McGrew (2000), p. 1. 
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point out in the second edition of their influential book, 'those who see extreme 
globalisers as one pole of the debate and see people who deny globalisation as the 
other, putting themselves conveniently in the sensible middle ground, are thus doing 
us and the issue a disservice' (Hirst and Thompson, 1999: xiii). 
The most important shortcoming of this kind of dichotomous discussion is that it is 
centred solely on one question: Do you agree with the globalisation thesis? As a 
consequence, anybody who doesn't agree with the thesis or rejects to use the term is 
cast as someone who is unable to arrive at a proper judgement and explanation of 
current global trends. The globalisation thesis therefore becomes the only 'correct' 
theoretical framework for interpreting global shifts. Because it denies the validity of 
other positions, either intentionally or unintentionally, this position is not helpful for 
furthering our understanding of current transformations. 
The dichotomous distinction also blurs the ideological and political lines dividing 
different accounts. Held and others claim that their typology does not correspond to 
traditional ideological positions, and point out that neither Marxists nor neo-liberals 
agree among themselves on how to describe and account for globalisation and that 
there are surprising communalities of though across this historic political division. 
Held et al., 1999: 2-3). However, this is something of a slight of hand since their 
typology take no account of the intentions behind different accounts, their political 
and societal consequences, or the appropriate projects for responding to globalisation. 
Therefore, it confuses rather than clarifies the map of the debate. For example, in their 
view, Marxists accounts cross all three categories of thought they describe. In fact, in 
debates on the changing role of the nation-state and the issue of class and social 
movements (see Amin, 1997; Wood, 1997a; 1997b; Du Boff and Herman, 1997; Tabb, 
1997b), leftists consistently focus on the core capitalist dynamics of globalisation 
(even though some of them dislike the term or the conception), the problem of 
deepening world inequality, and the new politics of emancipation. Putting the 
Marxists and neo-liberalists into one category obscures this and produces confusion. 
Thirdly, the dominant typology presumes that the sceptics, globalists, and 
transformationalists will retain a consistent view on different aspects of globalisation. 
For example, Held and others claim that hyperglobalisers of various kinds predict the 
homogenization of the world under American popular culture or Western 
consumerism (Held et al., 1999: 325). But this account seems to be held primarily by 
Marxists whom are described as crossing line dividing the hyperglobalisers and the 
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sceptics. In contrast although they too are often labeled as hyperglobalisers, neoliberal 
commentators obviously do not take the same view on the cultural globalisation but 
assert that the technological 'revolution' in communications has brought diverse 
cultural and informational eichan& and mixture across the globe (see, for example, 
Ohmae, 1990; de Sola Pool, 1990). This rhetoric is indeed much closer to what they 
call the transformationalist thesis of globalisation. 
In sum, the use of polarised distinctions, which takes approval of the globalisation 
thesis as the sole criteria of classification, is little help in clarifying the complexity of 
current global transformations. Instead, taking a critical look at some major accounts 
on globalisation is probably a more productive strategy. 
1.1.2 What is globalisation? Some major accounts 
Basically, the various accounts of the issues surrounding globalisation are based upon 
different definitions of the origin of the process, what exactly is going on, and its 
significance. The discussion presented below introduces some major scholars' 
viewpoints on the general definition of globalisation and serves as a basis for the 
further discussion on major issues in the globalisation debate. 
The Globalisation of capitalism 
Marx and Engels argued over one hundred years ago, in the Communist Manifesto, 
that 'The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a 
cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country'. They point 
out that national industries 'are dislodged by industries that no longer work up 
indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries 
whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe'. 
(Marx and Engels, 1967: 83-84). Some scholars have followed this proposition in the 
study of contemporary globalisation issues. The editors and main contributors of 
North American leftistjournal 'Monthly Review' (Paul Sweezy, Ellen Meiksins Wood, 
Harry Magdoff, and William K. Tabb) are prominent representatives of this current of 
argument. 
In the February and March 1992 issues, the MR editorial tided 'Globalisation - To 
what endT announced formally the editors' position on globalisation supported by 
plentiful data. Firstly, they assert that 'the recent splurge of globalisation' is part of an 
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ongoing process of capitalist expansion that has lasted for a couple of centuries. 
Secondly, they argue that this new stage of globalisation has introduced 'new' and 
'distinct' economic and political features in the countries of both the periphery and 
the core. In the periphery, foreign capital has penetrated more widely and deeply than 
ever before. In the core, credit creation, international flows of money capital, and 
speculation has extraordinarily enhanced the world's key money markets. Thirdly, the 
consequence of this accelerating globalisation is not world harmony but increasing 
contradictions caused by the widening of the gap between the core and periphery 
nations. Fourthly, they see recent globalisation rhetoric as playing a prominent role in 
contemporary capitalist ideology. In sum, as Sweezy notes, globalisation is not itself a 
driving force, rather, the transformations labelled in this way are produced by 'the 
always expansive and often explosive capital accumulation process' (Sweezy, 1997: 4, 
emphasis added). ' 
In common with the MR editors, Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson (although 
they take a position closer to Keynesianism) also see globalisation as a myth. For 
them, the globalisation thesis is a myth because it is empirically untrue rather than 
because it ideologically conceals the truth about the uneven development of 
capitalism. In their widely quoted book (Hirst and Thompson, 1996; 1999), they 
provide comprehensive evidence to argue that there is no such a thing as a 'global 
economy' but there is a highly internationalised economy. They emphasise that 
national and international governance of economic activities is not as some 
globalisation theorists maintain impossible, but still has many possibilities. Though 
they point out that international trade, investment, and fmancial flows are 
concentrated in the Triad of Europe, Japan and North America, they are not 
particularly concerned about the consequent pattern of world inequality and treat the 
available evidence simply as an empirical counter to the globalisation thesis. ' 
World-system theory 
In the same basic academic and political camp as the MR editors, Immanuel 
Wallerstein, probably the first significant scholar to emphasise the transnational 
nature of the modem world, has developed a consistent theoretical framework based 
2 Also see Tabb(I 997), Wood(l 997), Broad(l 995). 
3 Hence, both of these two groups take a negative view on globalisation. I would argue that Hirst and 
17hompson is 'sceptical' while MR editors and other Marxist scholars are better described as 'critical'. 
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on the notion of 'the world-system'. In this conception, the modem world-system is 
rooted in the capitalist world-economy which originated in the sixteenth century in 
Europe (Wallerstein, 1974; 1979) and gave primacy to the accumulation of capital, 
'rewarding those who do it well and penalising all others' (1979: 272). This dynamics 
shapes the system into a three-fold structure, the centre, the semi-periphery, and the 
periphery, and the progress of the capitalist world-economy enlarges the economic 
and social distances between these different spaces. The other consequence is that the 
capitalist economy extends geographically beyond national boundaries to penetrate 
the entire world over time. 
Despite this emphasis on the longueur of history in one of his recent works 
(Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1996), Wallerstein agrees that 'a whole series of 
institutional domains have been constructed and reconstructed in the years 1945- 
1990'. He (with Hopkins) uses Kondratieff s theory of 'long waves' to argue that the 
period 1945-90 is in a cycle in which 1967/73 is the turning point from the A phase to 
the B phase. In the A phase, after the successfid reconstruction of the infrastructure 
which had been destroyed in the Second World War, the world-economy entered into 
a period of unprecedented expansion. The USA played the central role in this process 
6as a generator and promoter of the world-wide economic expansion' and its 
transnational corporations (TNCs) accounted for the overwhelming majority of 
foreign direct investment (p. 210). 
By 1973 however, the expansion of the capitalist system started to slow down the 
rate of profit declined, and the world economy entered into the B-phase. The decline 
in the rate of profit in the production sector had three structural consequences. First, 
corporations try to relocate production in semi-peripheral and peripheral areas to 
reduce cost. Second, there was a considerable shift of investment from productive 
activities to the financial sphere in the search for profit. Third, some countries, mainly 
the USA, started to increase their military expenditure as a counter-cyclical Keynesian 
strategies (pp. 212-3). Wallerstein however asserts that, this period (which other have 
seen as the distinctive origin of modem globalisation) was 'merely the latest period in 
the long history of the modem world-system, a historical social system which 
originated in the sixteenth century' (p. 2, emphasis added). 
Another Marxist scholar, Samir Amin, shares a similar view to Wallerstein. He 
also sees recent acceleration of globalisation as the latest stage of capitalist 
development, though he has not developed a grand theoretical framework to explain 
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the shifts. He argues that the new globalisation is indeed a process of global 
polarisation which deepens the inequality between the centre and the periphery and 
erodes the efficiency of economic management by national states (Amin, 1996; 1997). 
What distinguishing Wallerstein and Amin from the MR editors is that the former 
present a holistic view which combines different social dimensions to explain the 
current transformations while the later mainly focus on the economic sphere and see 
economic factors as determinant. Wallerstein proposes that there are six 
distinguishable but not separable vectors that form the modem world-system: the 
inter-state system, the structure of world production, the structure of the world labour 
force, patterns of world human welfare, the social cohesion of the states, and 
structures of knowledge. These are not autonomous forces but interdependent, 'any 
transformation within any one of them or among them affects all the others' (Hopkins 
and Wallerstein, 1996: 2). Similarly, Amin points out that there are 'five monopolies' 
of the centre that enhance the present trend to global polarisation. They are 
technological monopoly, financial control of worldwide financial markets, 
monopolistic access to the planet's resources, media and communication monopolies, 
and monopolies over weapons of mass destruction (Amin, 1996: 4-5). He argues that 
these five monopolies, 'taken as a whole, define the framework within which the law 
of globalised value operates and become the new foundation of polarisation'. 4 
From imperialism to Empire 
Also standing firmly in the Marxist camp, Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt provide a 
significantly different view of globalisation from the two groups introduced above 
(Hardt and Negri, 2000). They insist on the continuing relevance of a perspective that 
foregrounds class struggle and historical materialism, but argue that there have been 
some substantial recent changes. Unlike many Marxist critics who refuse or are 
reluctant to adopt the key terms in the globalisation theorists' terminology like 
postmodernisation, hybridisation, deterritorisation, and informatisaton (see below), 
4 There are another two variant Marxist accounts should be noted here. Ankie Hoogvelt (1997) takes a 
poststructuralist version of Gramscianism to argue that previous global integration was driven by the 
economic logic of capital accumulation, but today it is the unification of the human condition that 
drives the logic of father capital accumulation. David Harvey, in his influential book (Harvey, 1989), 
also provides a Marxist analysis on late capitalism and proposes a significant concept of time-space 
compression. Ile concept influences many other scholars on theorising globalisation, including 
Giddens who will be discussed later. Taking a non-Marxist position while focusing on the global 
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Negri and Hardt are happy to use these theoretical concepts practically within a 
fi-amework of Marxism to develop a set of new arguments. The present global 
economy, they argue, is not a continuous or latest period in the on-going cycles of 
capitalism, the view the MR editors and Wallerstein hold (ibid.: 239). Instead, they 
stress that there is a break, epistemologically as well as ontologically, between the 
present global order (Empire) and past imperialisms. Today's Empire they argue is 
neither an imperialist project executed by the US nor the outcome of the victory of 
capitalist corporations over the state (pp. 3 05-3 10). 
The corresponding change in production to this new imperial sovereignty is the 
movement from modernisation to postmodernisation or from industrialisation to 
informatisation. The rise of services, in which knowledge, information and 
communication play a central role, in dominant countries means that industrial 
production needs to be exported to subordinated countries and regions. This in turn 
forms new networks within the world market, in which all of the forms of production 
exist, under the domination of the informational production of services (p. 288). 
However, this decentralisation and global dispersal of productive processes and sites, 
rprovokes a corresponding centralisation of the control over production', using the 
new global information infrastructure (p. 297). 
The networks of the new information infrastructure are a combination of 
oligopolistic and centralised mechanisms (such as broadcast systems) and democratic 
and deterritorialised mechanisms (such as the Internet). Along with the mergers and 
expansions of transnational information and entertainment corporations, the promise 
that ICTs will create new forms of democracy and promote social equality have in 
fact created new lines of inequality and exclusion (p. 300). Indeed, for Negri and 
Hardt the quasi-monopoly of communication is central to the ideological maintenance 
of Empire. As they put it, 'communication is the form of capitalist production in 
which capital has succeeded in submitting society entirely and globally to its regime, 
suppressing all alternative paths' (p. 347). 
As Marxists, the ultimate concern of Hardt and Negri's conception of Empire is 
the question of revolution. In their model alternatives and contestation emerge from 
the contradictory constitution of Empire. To capitalise on these fissures they propose 
that 'the multitude' (which they see as made up of a coalition of exploited groups and 
inequality caused by globalisation comes from scholars of international relations, for example, Hurrell 
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as the successor to the industrial masses) make three political demands of Empire. 
Firstly, mobility of labour powers to enable the multitude to claiin global citizenship. 
Secondly, a social wage and a guaranteed income for all. Thirdly, the transfer of 
control over linguistic sense making'and over the networks of communication to the 
multitude (pp. 396-407). 
The consequence of modernity 
Although both Wallerstein and Amin stress that social factors and economic factors 
have interdependently formed present world conditions, they still take capitalist 
economic dynamics as the primary driving force. By contrast, sociologist Anthony 
Giddens proposes a multi-dimensional explanatory framework that follows his theory 
of modernity. He criticises the sceptics of globalisation for only focusing on the 
economic dimension of the global and argues that the world capitalist economy is 
only one of the dimensions of globalisation (Giddens, 1990). 
Giddens argues that modernity is inherently globalising and regards globalisation 
as one of the consequences of modernity. In his schema there are four dimensions of 
globalisation: the world capitalist economy, the nation-state system, the world 
military order, and the international division of labour / global information system 
'which correspond to the four principal institutions of modernity: capitalism, 
surveillance, military power, and industrialism. These four institutions he argues, have 
facilitated the spread of modem institutions across the world. 
In the modem era, the level of time-space distanciation is much higher than any 
previous period, and 'the relations between local and distant social forms and events 
become correspondingly "stretched"'. Giddens thus defines globalisation as 'the 
intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a 
way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice 
versa (p. 64). The definition encapuslates the two major features of Giddens' account 
of globalisation. Firstly, that the transformation of time-space relationship is the 
central feature rather than economic shifts. Secondly, that the globalisation process is 
a dialectical one in which 'local transformation is as much a part of globalisation as 
and Woods (1999). 
5 Giddens switches these two terms in different sources. He uses 'the global information system' in his 
Nation-State and Violence (1987) and uses 'international division of labour' in The Consequences of 
Modernity (1990). He does not put more explanations on that, yet these two systems both connect to 
the development of industrialism. 
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the lateral extension of social connections across time and space' (also see Giddens, 
1991; 1994; 1999). 
Another significant sociologist who shares much the same view as Giddens on 
contemporary society generally as well as on globalisation, is Urich Beck. Beck also 
emphasises the multi-dimensionality of globalisation and the dialectical relationship 
between 'the local' and 'the global' in the globalisation process. He also relates the 
present globalisation phenomenon with the development of modernity although in a 
slightly different way. He argues that the central premise of the modernity project is 
'the idea that we live and act in the self-enclosed spaces of national states and their 
respective national societies' (Beck, 2000: 20). This he calls 'the first modernity'. 
Globalisation calls this premise into question because it 'denotes the processes 
through which sovereign national states are criss-crossed and undermined by 
transnational actors with varying prospects of power, orientations, identities and 
networks' (p. 11). Beck therefore argues that we are now entering into 'the second 
modernity'. ' 
One more important work which should be noted here is Manuel Castells' book on 
the 'network society' (Castells, 1996) which also provides a multidimensional 
analysis on present global transformations. Castells centres his analysis on the role of 
information technology. He argues that it is only in the late twentieth century that the 
world economy was able to become truly global on the basis of the new infrastructure 
provided by information and communication technologies. The new global economy, 
which he calls the informational economy, is characterised by the instantaneous flow 
and exchange of capital and information and leads to greater productivity and 
efficiency, given the right conditions of equally dramatic organisional and 
institutional changes (p. 67). Information technology also helps to achieve cultural 
diversity because the integrated communication system weakens the dominant 
symbolic power of traditional senders and transforms space and time (pp. 374-5). 
While Castells's analytical account of global transformations is quite similar to the 
sociologists introduced above, his attitude to this process is far more positive and 
closer to the position of the neo-liberals that will be discussed later. Full of optimism 
and enthusiasm for the informational global economy, Castells argues that when 
6 Besides, Held and McGrew (1999; 2000) and Scholte (2000) also hold a similar view on globalisation 
that emphasises the multidimensionality, time-space compression, and global / local interaction. 
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critics point out that that the trends he identifies are not yet fully realised, his answer 
is that is 'only a matter of time' (p. 97). 
Global consciousness 
In contrast to scholars such as Giddens and Beck who propose a multidimensional 
framework which links the globalisation process with the development of modernity, 
Roland Robertson, among others, focuses more on the cultural transformation set in 
motion by globalisation processes. Robertson argues that alongside global 
interdependence, there is another no less important core aspect of globalisation: the 
emergence of global consciousness (Robertson, 1990: 22) or the world image 
(Robertson, 1992: 75). He criticises other authors for ignoring the cultural issue (like 
Wallerstein) and conflating these two processes (like Giddens). His own emphasis on 
the role of culture and agency in the making of the global system turns the structural 
approach of world-system theory 'on its head' (Robertson, 1990: 28). 
Unlike Giddens he does not see the global system as an outcome of processes that 
are basically intra-societal in origin. Rather, for him the globalisation process has a 
general autonomy and logic which operates relatively independently of strictly 
societal and other more conventionally studied sociocultural processes. He proposes a 
'minimal phase model of globalisation' which predates the rise of capitalism or 
modernity to the early fifteenth century. The latest phase began in the 1960s when 
global consciousness was markedly extended. (pp. 25-27). 
Another key feature of globalisation emphasised by Robertson is the interaction 
between the global and local. He uses the concept of 'glocalisation', original a 
marketing term, to argue that globalisation and localisation are two sides of the same 
process. The global itself must be localised in order to be effective, while local 
conditions are transformed by globalising process . 
Following Robertson's accounts, Waters defines globalisation as: A social process 
in which the constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede 
and in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding (Waters, 1995: 
3). He recognizes both the structural and the cultural / ideological aspects of 
globalisation but focuses on the later. He notes that material exchanges in the 
economic sphere tend to tie social relationships to localities, political exchanges in the 
political sphere tend to be international, and symbolic exchanges in cultural sphere 
liberate relationships from spatial referents and tend to be global. He thus argues that 
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economic and political spheres will only become fully globalised when they are 
cculturalised' (P. 9). ' 
A prosperous globalised world 
The accounts discussed so far, however they interpret and define globalisation, are all 
agreed that a macro world transition in current in process. However, there is also a 
version of the globalisation thesis that believes that a globalised world has already 
been accomplished. For example, Kenichi Ohmae identifies four key trends (which he 
calls the 4 "1") within the global economy: (1) investment is no longer geographically 
constrained; (2) industry has a far more global orientation than ten years ago; (3) the 
movement of both investment and industry has been greatly facilitated by information 
technology; and (4) individual consumers have become more global in orientation 
because they have better access to information about lifestyles around the globe 
(Ohmae, 1995: 3-4). 
In this newly created 'borderless world' (as he calls it) information and financial 
flow transcend national borders, 'stateless' transnational corporations (TNCs) become 
the major players, and nation-states are increasingly powerless to govern economic 
activities within their territories (Ohmae, 1990). Future forecaster John Naisbitt also 
notes that 'as the global economy gets lager, the component nation players get smaller 
and smaller' and 'as we move toward linking up millions of host computer networks, 
countries will become irrelevant and begin to fade away' (Naisbitt, 1994: 5 1). 
The most important feature of this variant of the globalisation thesis is that it 
considers globalisation a benign process by which leads the world to prosperity and 
harmony. Further, this process is presented as inexorable and government attempts to 
to intervene will either be useless or counterproductive. Ohmae even claims that 
'global solutions will flow to where they are needed without the intervention of nation 
states ... moreover, they 
flow even better precisely because such intervention is absent' 
(1995: 4). 
Despite the conspicuous lack of supporting evidence and systematic analysis, this 
extreme version of globalisation thesis has been closely related with and widely 
accepted by right-wing politicians and businessmen over the past two decades. Beck 
labels usefully labels this view 'globalism' which he deflnes as 'the view that the 
7 For the works that basically follow Robertson's thesis and emphasise the prominence of cultural 
16 
world market eliminates or supplants political actions - that is, the ideology of rule by 
the world market, the ideology ofneo-liberalism' (Beck, 2000: 9, emphasis added). 
This neo-liberalist view of globalisation is also the main target for critical political 
economists. The MR editors, and Marxist political economists, contend that the neo- 
liberal globalisation thesis serves the interests of capital and conceals the reality of 
highly uneven development. Hirst and Thompson also claim that 'this economic 
liberal view is pernicious' (1999: xii, emphasis added). Not only because the thesis is 
founded on a largely erroneous series of factual claims, but also because the policies it 
demands are 'in favour of market-based increases in growth that will prove illusory'. 
1.1.3 Global issues in debate 
The contest between the different definitions of globalisation introduced above has 
provoked fierce debate on a number of on-going processes. Three are particularly 
relevant to the present context: the integration of world economy, the fate of the 
nation state, and the process of cultural globalisation. 
An integrated world economy? 
Most scholars agree that world economic activity has increasingly transcended 
national boundaries and become more comprehensively organised on a global scale 
through overseas production, foreign direct investment and financial flows, the 
immigration of labour, and the rise of trarisnational corporations. However, they 
disagree sharply on the consequences of these processes. As mentioned above, there is 
a clear opposition between neoliberals and critical political economists with the 
sociologists introduced above, generally taking a more indeterminate position on the 
consequence of economic globalisation. Some sociologists simply mention the global 
inequality caused by uneven economic globalisation and then leave the issue behind 
or emphasise that there are emergent opportunities for the countries outside the centre 
in the new global context (for example, Giddens, 1999). Others like Robertson 
basically ignore economic dynamics and mainly focus on the cultural dimensions of 
globalisation (for example, Robertson, 1992). Hence, they not only underestimate the 
power of economic forces and capitalist dynamics, but by ignoring the issue of'justice 
and equality in the global context they also in effect support the neoliberal view. In 
components in globalisaiton process, can also see Tomlinson (1999) and Featherstone (1990; 1995). 
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particular, Giddens in a recent speech (Giddens, 1999) claims that although the 
problem of increasing global inequality is worsening, it is useless to blame wealthy 
Western countries. Because globalisation is accompanied by decenterisation, he 
argues, its impact on the Western countries is as severe as on less developed countries. 
By emphasising the general global - local dialectical processes while ignoring the 
very different nature of the impacts on different countries he in effect denies the 
responsibility of the countries of the center for initiating the processes that are 
deepening global inequality. 
The end of the nation-state? 
As we noted above, neoliberals argue that in the new global economy, the nation-state 
is powerless to govern international and transnational economic activities. Ohmae 
even claims that the traditional 'middleman' role of nation-state is obsolete, and that 
we are witnessing 'the end of the nation state' (Ohmae, 1995: 5). Despite not taking 
such an extreme position, most of authors agree that the sovereignty and legitimacy of 
nation-states are to some extent challenged and eroded in the global age. Nonetheless, 
as Giddens points out, no matter how great the economic power transnational 
corporations have within the world economy, the nation-states are still the only 
political / legal entities having control of the means of violence and administration 
within a given territorial area (Giddens, 1990: 71). 
It has been claimed that thinkers on the Left refuse to admit that nation-states are 
experiencing a crisis (see Held et al: 6-7). In fact, their opposition focuses not on the 
empirical reality of growing corporate power (which they accept) but on the rhetoric 
that claims that nation-states are becoming 'irrelevant' (see Wood, 1997; Tabb, 1997; 
Amin, 1997: Ch. 4). They see the expansive nature of capitalist development 
generating a deepening contradiction between economy and politics. As Wallerstein 
puts it, the capitalist economy is 'primary a "world" structure but political activity 
takes place primarily within and through state structures whose boundaries are 
narrower than those of the economy' (Wallerstein, 1979: 273). In the content of 
globalisation, the logic of the interests of dominant capital requires that priority be 
given to globalised economic management, 'at the expense of the functions of the 
national state' (Amin, 1997: 32). Consequently, the weakening of nation states is a 
consequence of policy choices designed to benefitcapital implemented under the 
pressure imposed by global capitalism rather than an inexorable process. At the same 
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time, these choices also demonstrate that the nation-state has the unique power to 
regulate and intervene in economic activities and that in the global market, 'capital 
needs the state' (Wood, 1997: 12). 
This conclusion echoes the argument advanced by Held and his colleagues, who 
contend that the power of nation-state is not necessarily diminished by gIobalisation 
but is being 'reconstituted and restructured' (Held et al., 1999: 9). However, views on 
how to reconstitute and restructure the role of nation-state are sharply divided. 
Scholars like Held, Giddens, and Beck propose a project of global governance based 
on the construction of new forms of both the supra-national and sub-national 
democracy. In contrast, commentators on the Left tend to reclaim the significance of 
the state and entrust states with new functions (see Wood, 1997; Amin, 1997). 
Global cultural homogenisation or diversity? 
The crisis of nation-state stems not only from the economic sphere. The rise of new 
communication technologies, such as satellite, cable, and the Internet, and the 
increasing volume of international flows of cultural products are influencing national 
identities and national cultures. Debate on these processes centers on the question of 
influence. Do global cultural flows create a global environment of multilateral cultural 
exchanges and facilitate cultural diversity? Or, is the world cultures become more 
homogenised, and for the non-Western countries more Westernised? Or, are the 
consequences is too variable to make a general evaluation? 
The cultural imperialism' thesis argues strongly that the present structure of 
international cultural exchange and global communications serves to sustain the 
imbalances in the world-system and threaten the development of national culture (for 
example, Schiller, 1969; 1979)'. In contrast, cultural theorists who share Robertson's 
concept of 'glocalisation' argue that the globalisation process diminishes national 
cultural control and liberates the various local cultures to interact on a global scale 
creating enhanced cultural diversity and hybridity (see Appadurai, 1990; Tomlinson, 
1997; 1999; Lull, 1995; Featherstone, 1990). 
8 In fact, Wallerstein himself has been trying to propose a more complex account on culture. He also 
emphasises the ideological function of culture but rejects a mechanical perspective on the relationship 
between culture and political economic structure. He argues that the culture area is the 'ideological 
battelground' of modem world-system in which there is a pair of contradictory ideologies - 
universalism and particularism - compete with each other. For Wallerstein, the culture force has its 
autonomy, but it is for constraining us rather than giving us ability to escape these constraints 
(Wallerstein, 1990a; 1990b; also see the collections in Wallerstein, 1991). 
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However, after being under attack for decades (see Tomlinson, 1990), some 
critical communication theorists have been working on reconsidering and adjusting 
the cultural imperialism thesis (see for example, Golding and Harris feds. ], 1997; 
Thussu [ed. ), 1998). They maintain the strong emphasis on uneven development and 
Western domination in the global cultural sphere (see for example Herman and 
McChesney, 1997; Boyd-Barrett, 1997; 1998; D. Schiller, 1999) and point out that the 
globalisation thesis's shortcomings mean that it is unable to grasp the complexity of 
current global cultural trends properly. Firstly, it detaches cultural changes from their 
structural imperatives. Secondly, it underestimates the persistence of the nation-state 
as both a political form and an economic entity. Thirdly, national identity and national 
culture are still securely rooted -in established forms of life rather than withering 
away (Golding and Harris, 1997: 7-8). 
1.1.4 Assessing globalisation theses 
Taking an overview of major accounts on globalisation introduced above, it seems 
that all authors agree with the proposition that there is an emergent process, or set of 
processes, of global transformation. The operations and influences of these processes 
involves all societies and transcends nation-state boundaries. 
Globalisation is a multidimensional process. Even those scholars who focus on 
economic globalisation acknowledge the political, cultural, and societal dimensions of 
global transformations. The key dispute concerns the original driving force of 
globalisation. Some Marxists argue that globalisation is the latest stage of capitalist 
development and that the momentum of capital accumulation of capital is the 
dominant driving force. Other globalisation theorists emphasise that the present 
structures of globalisation are formed not only by capitalism but also by the 
international state system, the rise of information technology, and the international 
military system (i. e. Giddens, 1990). Others again, assert that cultural dynamics and 
agency play a central role (i. e. Robertson, 1992). However, as Wallerstein notes, 
'emphasising "culture" in order to counterbalance the emphases others have put on 
the "economy" or the "polity" does not at all solve the problem' (Wallerstein, 1990b: 
65). Globalisation is an emergent phenomenon and it might be too early to assert any 
definite answer to the key questions. Ignoring or devaluing any major dimension of 
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change is likely to make a comprehensive understanding of today's global 
transformations more difficult. 
Globalisation is a diakctical process which generates four sets of contradictions 
(see Beck, 2000: 49-51; also Hardt and Negri, 2000): (1) universalism and 
particularism; (2) connection and fragmentation; (3) centralisation and 
decentralisation; (4) conflict and balance. Because globalisation involves the 
structuring and restructuring of power relations at a distance and the organising and 
reorganising of complex networks of various social entities, the flow of global 
transformations is by no means one way. Nevertheless, the extent of the variation in 
these shifts is conditioned by the power relations and political economic structures. 
In sum, if it is to be worthwhile, research on globalisation must address four basic 
issues. Firstly, it must examine the interactions and contradictions between the global 
trends and operations of national or local organisations and institutions. Secondly, the 
specific history and conditions of the society being studied should be taken fully into 
account in examining local responses to global trends. Thirdly, research must consider 
the power relations between the location being studied and other significant societies 
or countries and situate the location being studied in the global system. Fourthly, the 
research should be a multidimensional and investigate the complex interactions 
between economy, politics, and culture. For example, when studying the issue of 
cultural globalisation, it is necessary to consider not only the formation of global 
media markets and the rise of transnational media corporations (the economic 
dimension) but also inter-governmental negotiations on cultural issues (the political 
dimension). Similarly, research on national economic transitions could hardly be 
successful if it not pay attention to the global diffusion of neoliberal ideology as well 
as to the operations of inter-national organisations. The multi-directional relations of 
local and global social dimensions in the global age could be depicted in Figure 2. L 
Finally, one more point is often ignored by the globalisaiton theorists and worth 
noting here. That is, the study of global transformations and local transitions should 
not focus on globalisation as the sole global trend at work. As Scholte argues, 
globalisation is not the only, or always the most significant trend in today's society. 
He notes that globalisation 'unfolds alongside - and is closely interlinked with - other 
major social forces, like shifts in structures of production, governance, community 
and knowledge'. (Scholte, 2000: 18) It is thus more useful to see the problem for 
21 
research as one of untangling the interactions between relevant global trends and local 
/ national organisations, institutions and cultural formations 
Figure 2.1 A relational framework of major social dimensions of globalisation 
Economic Globalisation L--[ Political Globalisation L-1 Cultural Globalisation 
National Economy ý--4 National Polity 1-4 National Culture 
1.2 Culture, Media and Globallsation 
The importance of culture as one of the dimensions of globalisation is argued at 
length in John Tomlinson's work (Tomlinson, 1999). Culture, which Tomlinson 
defines as 'existentially significant meaning construction', matters for globalisation 
because cultural signification and interpretation constantly orients people individually 
and collectively towards particular actions and therefore underpins the dialectics of 
globalisation processes. Conversely, globalisation also matters for culture because it 
undermines the thinking through which culture and fixity of location are paired. 
Media, as Tomlinson points out, 'form only part of total process by which 
symbolic meaning construction proceeds and only one of the forms in which 
globalisation is experienced culturally' (p. 20). Nevertheless, media culture is widely 
conceived as a main source and vehicle of cultural globalisation. At the same time 
media technologies, particularly computer systems, satellites, and fibre optic networks, 
also supply the essential infrastructural support for globalising processes in the 
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economic and political spheres (see Harvey, 1989; Castells, 1996; Boyd-Barret, 1997). 
In researching this key issue and dimension of globalisation, the first task is to map 
the problernatics of cultural globalisation. 
1.2.1 The problematics of cultural globalisation 
After examining the range of current positions on the cultural dimension of the 
globalisation process, Held et al. rightly conclude that 'cultural globalisation is 
transforming the context in which and the means through which national cultures are 
produced and reproduced'. But, they continue, 'its particular impact on the nature and 
efficacy of national cultures - on the hold and influence of their messages, values and 
content - is, as yet, harder to decipher' (Held et al., 1999: 328). The key problem is 
understanding the specific contexts in which and the means through which national 
cultures are produced and reproduced and how these contexts and means are 
transformed in the global age. From our discussion of globalisation theses presented 
above, and the multidimensional principle of analysis advocated in the previous 
section, several important issues for research on these dynamics emerge. 
Global media and global media markets 
As in the economic sphere more generally, transnational corporations operating in the 
communications sector are stretching both the scale and scope of their exploitation of 
global media markets. According to Hamelink, communication, broadly construed, 
accounted for $350 billion or 18 percent of world trade in 1980. By 1986, the annual 
output of world communication industries was valued at $1,600 billion and was 
growing rapidly (Hamelink, 1994: 33). The media and communication sector has now 
become one of the core components of the global economy along with financial 
markets. 
This newly developing global media system is dominated by 20-30 large 
transnational corporations which have their home bases in the advanced capitalist 
countries, mostly in the US. All of these corporations have expanded by diversifying 
into a wide range of communication sectors. The latest trend in this process of 
integration is the growing convergence between computing, telecommunications, the 
Internet, and content industries (see Herman and McChesney, 1997; Held et al., 1999: 
Ch7). 
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These tendencies in communications are basically market driven. As Robins points 
out, 
As in the wider economy, global standardisation in the cultural industries reflects, of 
course, the drive to achieve ever greater economies of scale ... the global cultural industries 
are increasingly driven to recover their escalating costs over the maximum market base, 
over pan-regional and world market. They are driven by the very same globalising logic 
that is reshaping the economy as a whole (Robins, 1991: 30). 
However, the marketing of standardised cultural products is only one side of the 
global management strategy of these global media corporations. They also try to 
incorporate local cultural features and repackage them into new commodities for the 
global market. This is the process Robertson and Giddens describe as 'glocalisation' 
or 4global -local dialectic process'. Yet, it is not a process without constraints and 
limits. As Robins puts it, 'the so-called world culture may reflect a new valuation of 
difference and particularity, but it is also very much about making a profit from it' 
(Robins, 1991: 31). Indeed, the global media corporations' pursuit of profit is 
explicitly based on serving differentiated markets and customising products for 
specific market segments. 
New communication technology 
New communication technologies, particularly digital technology, have been playing 
an essential role in the globalisation process. But there is a considerable debate around 
the distinction between carriage technologies and the content transmitted by them. 
Castells basically conflates the two and claims that digital technology and media 
convergence will lead to diverse messages and messages uses and herald the end of 
mass audiences (Castells, 1996). In contrast, Tomlinson argues that culture should be 
distinguished from its technologies and defines culture strictly as meaning 
construction. He argues that while communication technologies are as the transmitters 
of instrumental symbolisation for all dimensions of globalisation they are only one 
source of a globalised cultural experience (Tomlinson, 1999: 20-21). 
These two accounts however misunderstand the implications of the convergence 
between carriage and content in the communications industry. Tomlinson separates 
meaning construction process from the infrastructure that facilitates this production 
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and therefore ignores the question of how the control over infrastructural resources 
may influence or constrain meaning production. Similarly, although Castells notes 
that infiastructure and content production are now converging within a single 
corporation, by failing to recognise the market driving forces and cost reduction 
pressures behind the multimedia corporations he ignores their tendency to provide 
more of the same (with minor customised modifications) rather than greater diversity. 
Thus, we need to consider how new communication technology simultaneously 
provides the media industry and media culture with new opportunities as well as new 
constraints. As Murdock argues, 'new technologies create new opportunities, but 
before corporations can take full advantage of them there has to be a change in the 
political context which extends their freedom of action'. Consequently, we should 'be 
carefid not to overstress the importance of technological innovation or to assign it an 
autonomous and determining role in the process of corporate developments' 
(Murdock, 1990: 2-3). 9 
Nation-state interpention and internationalpolitics 
As we have noted, it is widely suggested that the rise of transnational communication 
corporations and the erosion of national borders by satellite systems and computer 
networks, is rendering national governments increasingly becoming powerless to 
intervene effectively. However, this argument ignores the fact that a government's 
decision to pursue laissez-faire policies is itself a very active intervention. It also 
neglects the many instances where national governments have tried to regulate the 
progress of global cultural exchanges. Many of these initiatives have been developed 
in response to mounting international pressure to relax regulation in the interests of 
'free' exchange. Over the past two decades, one of primary tasks of the US 
government was (and is) to impose pressure on the developing countries to open their 
domestic cultural product markets by attempting to secure more favourable terms in 
bilateral trade and intellectual property rights negotiations and using other economic 
and political measures to penalise non-compliance (see Miller, et al., 2001). In these 
circumstances it is more useful to see the power of nation-state as being restructured 
and reconstituted, as Held argues, rather than diminished. 
9 There are also authors working on criticising the 'innocent optimist version' of the emergence and 
development of the Internet. For example, Golding points out that despite ever existed some sort of 
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Of course, the dynamics of international politics and the position a country 
occupies in the inter-state system largely influences what a nation-state can do about 
cultural regulation within its territory. The multi-directional relationships between 
national government, the governments of other significant countries, domestic capital, 
and foreign or transnational capital, always presents a very array of possibilities 
which range from competition and conflict to cooperation, and negotiation. 
Consequently, the detailed context of any particular case need careful examination. 
The transformations of national cultural industries 
The formation of local cultural industries is shaped both by global conditions and the 
regulations implemented by the local government. It also depends on the nature of 
local cultural institutions -are they public services, private enterprises, or the mixture 
of the two and on local capacity in relation to new communication technologies. The 
organisational formation and operation and of these industries significantly influences 
both the processes and outcomes of cultural production. They simultaneously 
empower and constrain producers and creators. Their relative autonomy to decide 
what to create is always restricted by the operational logic of the industry. This is 
what Pierre Bourdieu calls 'artistic position-takings', the structured set of the 
manifestations of the social agents involved in the field of artistic or literary works 
(Bourdieu, 1993). A similar argument is put by Raymond Williams in his insistence 
that a work of art should be seen not only as an object or text, but also as a set of 
practices shaped by the social conditions of production (Williams, 1980). 
Research on the cultural industries therefore plays as a key mediating role between 
the macro structural factors and the micro cultural consequences but is often ignored 
by many cultural theorists. For example, in the case of film studies, scholars typically 
either attribute the defining features of film text to the film's authors / directors, or 
they relate the film text directly to general societal conditions by-passing any analysis 
of the organisation of film production institutions. 'O. 
progressiveness in the early stage of the development of the Internet, it has been transforming towards 
marketisation and commercialisation (Golding, 1996). 
10 For example, Graeme Turner, in his book Film as Social Practice (Turner, 1988), though includes 
one chapter of film industry but does not link this factor with the following analysis on the signification 
practice and ideology of film. The concrete study with this shortcoming could be seen in Will Wright's 
study on American western movies (Wright, 1975), and White (1987) and Flitterman-Lewis (1987). 
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The contradictory cultural consequences ofg/obalisation 
There is no predetermined consequence of the encounter between the global and the 
national / local. If we take the dialectical features of the cultural exchanging process 
into account, it is clear that the cultural consequences of globalisation in any specific 
location present a complex array of possibilities. Nonetheless, these processes cannot 
be satisfactorily analysed without considering the political and economic forces that 
underpin them or the deepening imbalance of relations in the global cultural sphere. 
The most evident cultural consequence of globalisation is that a few large 
transnational communication corporations, mostly from the West and mainly from the 
US, squeeze the space and resource available for the development of national 
communication industries by maintaining a highly asymetric, trade in cultural products. 
What Herman and McChesney call 'media globalisation' is very real and threatening 
to the majority of countries in the world which are relatively weak in cultural 
production and trade. Cultural globalisation threatens the stability of previously 
constructed national identities and national cultures and prompts three possible shifts. 
Firstly, imported cultures bring new elements into the national cultural sphere and set 
in motion complex re-aligriments. Secondly, they provoke resistance to the ensuing 
crisis of national unity which takes the forms of fundamentalist movements for 
reviving 'tradition'. Thirdly, regional or sub-national cultures are released from past 
national control and reorganise the constituents of national culture. Once again 
however, the salience of these options in any particular instance is strongly 
conditioned by the economic logic of the global market and the political logic of 
international power relations (Robins, 199 1). 
Global trends in communications 
There are two important global trends associated with the current process of 
globalisation in cultural and communication sphere: the marketisation of 
communication institutions and communication technology innovation, particularly 
digitalisation (see Ferguson, 1990a; 1990b; Murdock, 1990; Murdock, 2000). The 
process and implication of digitalisation has been discussed previously so I will 
confi, ne my remarks here to the issue of marketisation. As Murdock defines 
marketisation as, 'all forms of public intervention that increase the size of the market 
sector within the communication and information industries and give entrepreneurs 
operating within it increased freedom of manoeuvre' (Murdock, 1990: 9). The process 
27 
of marketisation is a multidimensional movement with four distinct components. The 
first, de-nationalisation involves selling shares in public companies to private 
Investors. It reinforces and extends the power of leading communication corporations 
rather than dispersing it or creating new sources of countervailing power. Secondly, 
liberalisation is aimed at introducing competition into markets that were previously 
served solely by public enterprise. Thirdly, the commercialisation of public sector 
opens these to commercial activities. Fourthly, de-regulation entails a shift in the 
rationale of policy making away from a defence of the public interest and towards the 
promotion of corporate interests. The cumulative result of these shifts 'has been to 
strengthen and extend the power of the leading corporations and to pose more sharply 
than ever the dilemma that faces a liberal democratic society in which most key 
communications facilities are held in private hands' (pp. 9-15). 
In sum, there are three interconnected trends in the process of cultural globalisation: 
the formation of global media markets and rise of transnational communication 
conglomerates, the spread of market ideology and widespread adoption of 
liberalisation policies, and the innovations in infrastructure, production and 
consumption introduced by new communication technologies. As a consequence, as 
Ferguson argues, 'any analysis of contemporary systems of public communication 
therefore requires that they be located within this context of evolution in the media 
environment' (Ferguson, 1990: ix). 
1.2.2 A framework for analysis 
Although the analytical framework for research adopted here is differentiated from 
the major accounts introduced above, it still critically and reflexively draws someone 
the useful insights they have generated. It opposes the neoliberals' optimistic view of 
cultural globalisation and adopts a critical stance to examining the relevant issues. At 
the same time, it pays more attention to the complex uncertainty and reflexivity of the 
encounter between global trends and national cultural practices than cultural 
imperialism theorists. Finally, it takes the idea of multidimensional analysis and a 
dynamic view on cultural globalisation from mainstream globalisation theorists, but 
corrects their neglect of economic forces and emphasises the exercise of political 
economic structural factors and power relations in the global context. Accordingly, 
the main issues to be investigated are: 
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Global conditions and local history 
The first task is to compile a map of the specific conditions and history of the location 
being studied in the global context. This work should particularly focus on (1) the 
history of cultural exchanges between local, foreign and global actors ; (2) the current 
situation relating to the distribution and consumption of foreign cultural products in 
the local market. 
Local cultural regulation 
The second research task is to investigate the local regulatory environment of the 
cultural industries. It focuses on (1) how national governments have responded to 
global cultural trends and particularly to growing Western domination in domestic 
cultural product market and the pressure from international trade negotiation on 
cultural issues; (2) the rationale underpinning cultural policy making and how they 
may have shifted over time 
Theformation of the local cultural industry 
The third task is detail the transformations that have taken place in local cultural 
industries under the influence of uneven global cultural exchange, shifts in state 
regulation, and the changing political and social dynamics of local society. This 
exercise provides the basis for an account of the local media system that examines (1) 
patterns of ownership and control (2) the productivity and revenue of the major 
industries; (3) the rationale of strategies for resource allocation; and (4) the shifting 
balance of autonomy and constraints imposed on producers and creators. 
The output of the local culturalproduction 
Media artefacts (in our case, feature films) simultaneously articulate imaginative 
responses to macro social changes and provide evidence of the impact on local 
cultural production of global trends. Analysis needs to focus on: (I)what kinds of 
films are produced, what kinds of themes are selected, and what range of discourses 
particular cultural forms allows into play; (2) how the available discourses are 
handled within the text, through the way the story is told and the ideological 
implications it carries (see Golding and Murdock, 1991). In the research presented 
here, the analysis of these two main questions will centre on the transformation of 
national image construction. 
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The general framework of the research is summarised in Figure 2.2. However, 
before we proceed to develop the concrete case studies, there are two general issues 
that require further discussion both theoretically and practically: the transformation 
of national culture and national policy responses to cultural globalisation. 
Figure 2.2 A framework for the research 
Global Context: Economy, Politics, and Culture 
Global impacts on local National cultural regulations 
market and society 
National cultural industry 
The output of national cultural 
industry 
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Chapter 2 Nation-States and National 
Cultures in Transition 
There was once this Englishman who worked in the London office of a 
multinational corporation based in the United States. He drove home one evening 
in his Japanese car. His wife, who worked in a firm which imported German 
kitchen equipmentý was already home. Her small Italian car was often quicker 
through the traffic. After a meal which included New Zealand lamb, Californian 
carrots, Mexican honey, French cheese and Spanish wine they settled down to 
watch a programme on their television set, which had been made in Finland. The 
programme was a retrospective celebration of the war to recapture the Falkland 
Islands. As they watched it they felt warmly patriotic, and very proud to be British 
(williams, 1983: 177). 
The story Williams tells here vividly represents the complexity and ambiguity of 
Gnational identity' under contemporary conditions of increasingly 'diverse' and 
gmulti-national' cultural exchanges and global interactions. ' The recent 
transformations in the world capitalist system, the nation-state system, and the global 
communication and information system, have destabalised established understandings 
of national identity and national culture and altered their significance in people's 
everyday life. What exactly has happened and what the implications of these changes 
are has become one of the centre issues in the debate on globalisation and is the topic 
of this chapter. 
2.1 Nation, Nation-state, and National Culture / Identity 
Nationalism theorist Ernest Gellner has noted that in contemporary human society 
having a nation has come to appear as an inherent attribute of humanity. 'A man must 
have a nationality as he must have a nose and two ears' (Gellner, 1983: 6). What are 
I interestingly, what Williams not mentioned in the story is that all the 'national' cultural products and 
practice involved are all from the 'centre' of the world capitalist system. Intentionally or not, it 
expresses a crucial point that the majority number of countries in the world are very likely to be absent 
in the so-called 'plural' or 'diverse' cultural exchange and interaction in the global age. Many accounts 
ignore the specific situations of many non-centre, or post-colonial, nation-states and attempt to 
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the features of nation and nationalism? Why are nation and nationality so important to 
humans? To discuss these issues, first of all, we should distinguish between 
nationalism, nation-state, and nation. 
2.1.1 Nationalism, nation-state, and nation 
Nationalists tend to claim that nations and nationalist sentiment are natural and 
universal in human societies. However, a number of influential commentators have 
convincingly argued that rather than being the common fate of human societies both 
nations and nationalism are socially constructed under specific social conditions 
(Geliner, 1983; Anderson, 1983; Hobsbawn, 1990; Giddens, 1985). They point out 
that nationalism and nation are distinctively modem productions which accompanied 
the rise of industrialisation and the introduction of universal education systems 
promoting a standardised literate culture ('high culture', Gellner, 1983: 35-38), and 
the spread of capitalism and print media (Anderson, 1983: Ch. 3). 
Nationalism, according to Gellner, 'is primarily a political principle, which holds 
that the political and national unit should be congruent'. As a consequence 
4nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries 
should not cut cross political ones, and, that ethnic boundaries within a given state 
should not separate the power-holders from the rest' (Gellner, 1983: 1; see also 
Hobsbawn, 1990). Nationalism is primarily psychological, Giddens also notes, it is 
'the affiliation of individuals to a set of symbols and beliefs emphasising 
communality among the members of a political order' (Giddens, 1985: 116). Briefly 
speaking, the nationalist thesis argues that cultural similarity is the fundamental 
principle of solidarity in social relationship and that all members of the same culture 
should belong to the same group, namely the 'nation' (Gellner, 1997: Ch. 1). 
Following Max Weber's account, the state is widely regarded as an institution or 
set of institutions specifically concerned with the enforcement of political order. It 
monopolises the legitimate use of violence to maintain order within a given territory. 
However, as Giddens; points out, although 'all traditional states have laid claim to the 
formalised monopoly over the means of violence within their territories, it is only 
within nation-states that this claim characteristically becomes more or less successful' 
generalise the experiences of the developed Western countries (including Japan). Ile alternative 
perspective that concerns the difference will be noted in the chapter and afterwards. 
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(ibid.: 120). For Giddens, a nation-state is 'a bordered power-container', and 'the 
pre-eminent power container of the modem era'. It is the administrative monopoly 
over a territory with demarcated boundaries which makes the distinction between the 
traditional state and modem nation-state (see also Giddens, 1981: 90). 
Accordingly, Giddens defines a nation as 'a collective existing within a clearly 
demarcated territory, which is subject to a unitary administration, reflexively 
monitored both by the internal state apparatus and those of other states'. Both the 
nation and nationalism, he adds, 'are distinctive properties of the modem state' 
(1985: 116). For Giddens, 'a nation only exists when a state has a unified 
administrative reach over the territory in which its sovereignty is claimed' (ibid.: 119). 
By investigating the history of the emergence of modem nation-states, Hobsbawm 
also points out that in order to maintain their legitimacy, states in the nineteenth 
century tried to mobilise the symbolic and psychological power of nationalism to 
create 'nations' as a focus of affiliation (1990: 89-92). He thus argues that 'nations do 
not make states and nationalisms, but states and nationalisms create nations' (ibid.: 
10). 
Gellner also argues that nationalism 'invents' nations (1983: 48-9), but suggest 
that the relationship between nation-states and nations is more complicated. He notes 
that both nations and states are a contingency, but they are not the same contingency. 
It is nationalism that claims that nation and state were destined for each other and that 
either without the other is incomplete and leads to tragedy. In fact, Gellner asserts that 
nations and states emerge independently, 'the state has certainly emerged without the 
help of nation', and 'some nations have certainly emerged without the blessings of 
their own state' (1983: 6). He thus concludes that it is debatable whether the modem 
sense of the nation presupposed the prior existence of the state (ibid.: 6). 
Gellner emphasises the cognitive dimension to the idea of nation. He proposes two 
contingent conditions for forming a nation: (1) Two men[sic] are of the same nation if 
and only if they share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas 
and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating; (2) Two 
men[sic] are of the same nation if and only if they recognise each other as belonging 
to the same nation. Hence, Gellner argues that 'a mere category of persons becomes a 
nation if and when the members of the category firn-dy recognise certain mutual rights 
and duties to each other in virtue of their shared membership of it' (ibid.: 7). It is this 
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recognition rather than other shared attributes that turns them into a nation and 
separates members from non-members. 
Pursuing the same line of thinking, Anderson focuses on people's imagination of 
the nation. He has famously defined nation as 'an imagined political community,. it is 
imaged because 'the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of 
their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives 
the image of their communion' (Anderson, 1991: 6). Anderson however points out 
that Gellner conflates 'invention' with 'fabrication' and that by posing the category of 
a 'true' community implies that there can be 'false' variants. Communities, Anderson 
argues, are to be distinguished not by their falsity / genuineness but by the style 
through which they are imagined. 
Gellner, Hobsbawn, and Anderson all emphasise the constructed nature of 
nationalism and nation. They are collectively categorised as modernist theorists of 
nationalism and nations by Anthony D. Smith, another leading author in the field. 
Smith basically agrees that the nation and nationalism is a modem phenomenon, but 
he points out that the modernist view fails to grasp 'the continuing relevance and 
power of pre-modem ethnic ties and sentiments in providing a firm base for the 
nation-to-be' (Smith, 1995: 40). He thus argues that building the modem nation 
involves reconstructing the traditions, customs and institutions of a specific ethnic 
community or communities as the basis of the nation rather than of inventing or 
imagining traditions (see Smith, 1993). 
Summarising the above discussion, though there are of course differences between 
the authors, four important common elements of their conceptualisations of nation and 
nationalism can be noted here. 
(1) The emergence of nationalism and nations is a modem phenomenon. As 
Hobsbawn puts it, 'the nation is not a primary nor as an unchanging social entity. 
It belongs exclusively to a particular, and historically recent, period' (Hobsbawm, 
1990: 9). 
(2) Nation is a social construct rather than a natural entity. The formation of a nation 
involves the imagination of a category of persons that recognise, each other as 
fellow-members belonging to the same community. However, this construction is 
by no means an arbitrary invention. It relates to the specific history and concrete 
social context of the community. 
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(3) Nationalist sentiments are real and important, though formed through a process of 
imagining and constructing. They are rooted in people's minds and have had 
profound and wide influence (Gellner, 1997: Ch2). The sense of fraternity that 
accompanies national imagination is so real that, as Anderson writes, 'makes it 
possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much 
to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings' (Anderson. 1991: 7). 
(4) Nations should be distinguished from nation-states. Given the preconditions of 
&common imagination' (Anderson) or 'mutual cognition' (Gellner), there can be 
'nations without a state', or 'multi-national states'. This obliges us to look more 
carefully at the important issue of national identity and national culture which is 
the focus of next section. 
2.1.2 Nation and national identity 
The concept of national identity is notoriously difficult and slippery but perhaps the 
best way to grasp its meaning is to analyse the two words separately. Since the idea of 
the 'nation' has already been discussed we turn hereto the concept of 'identity'. 
Social identity is basically a mental map which enables someone to know where 
he/she is, how to act properly, and helps him/her to escape from uncertainty or seek 
for security. In other words, one is willing to belong to somewhere or some group and 
accept the behavioural principles that accompany this belonging. As Bauman writes, 
One thinks of identity whenever one is not sure of where one belongs; that is, one is not 
sure how to place oneself among the evident variety of behavioural styles and patterns, and 
how to make sure that people around would accept this placement as right and proper, so 
that both sides would know how to go on in each other's presence. 'Identity' is a name 
given to the escape sought from that uncertainty (1996: 19). 
In addition, according to Alberto Melucci, 'identity' also involves both the notion of 
the permanence of a subject or an object through time and a unity which establishes 
the limits of a subject or object and which allows it to be distinguished from any other. 
Thus, identity implies 'a relation between two elements which may be recognised as 
identical' (quoted in Schlesinger, 1991: 154). Taken together, the imputation of 
continuity and unity allows someone to distinguish himselfterself from 'the other' 
(see also Larrain, 1994: 143). 
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Identity is not born with the subject. As Castells argues, from a sociological 
perspective, all identities are constructed and the real issue is 'how, from what, by 
whom, and for what' (Castells, 1997: 7). Though the construction is a process of 
individuation and internalisation, it is not completely autonomous. As Castells notes, 
The construction of identities uses building materials from history, from geography, from 
biology, from productive and reproductive institutions, from collective memory and from 
personal fantasies, from power apparatuses and religious revelations. But individuals, 
social groups, and societies process all these materials, and rearrange their meaning, 
according to social determinations and cultural projects that are rooted in their social 
structure, and in their space / time framework (ibid. ). 
For a given individualg or for a collective actor, Castells argues, there may be a 
plurality of identities. 'Such a plurality', he adds, 'is a source of stress and 
contradiction in both self-representation and social action' (Castells, 1997: 6). 
Similarly, Hall also asserts that a subject does not have a 'fixed, essential or 
permanent identity'. Rather he argues, 'identity is formed and transformed 
continuously in relation to the way we are represented or addressed in the cultural 
systems which surround us'. Tlere is more than one potential identity co-exiting 
within a person and they may contradict each other (Hall, 1992: 277, see also Hall, 
1990; Schlesinger, 199 1; Larrain, 1994). 
According to the discussion of nation and identity above, we can define national 
identity as the disposition to recognise oneself as a member of a national political and 
cultural community and to share the same culture together with other people whom he 
she recognises as the fellow-members of the same political community. 
Nationalists not only claim that national identity is natural but also argue that it 
must transcend all other identities. Against this recent theorisations have asserted that 
national identity is in principle the same as other identities (based on gender, religious, 
racial, and class) in being constructed by employing symbolic materials derived from 
official history, collective memory, rituals and customs. They have also emphasised 
that national identity is not necessarily more important than other identities in 
influencing people's behaviours and sentiments. Thus it is possible for a person to 
change his /her national identity and to own a national identity which does not 
coincide with his /her official nationality. 
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At the same time, it is widely accepted that national identity does play a vital role 
in establishing and maintaining the integrity of nation-states. As Giddens notes, one 
of the distinctive properties of the nation-state is that it enjoys an administrative 
monopoly over a bordered territory. But this bordered unity 'cannot remain purely 
administrative'. The formation and maintenance of that unity also involves cultural 
homogeneity. He thus argues that a nation-state is a 'conceptual community' in a way 
which traditional states were not. For Giddens, nationalism is 'the concomitant of the 
co-ordination of administrative power within the bounded nation-state' (Giddens, 
1985: 219) 
However, as Schlesinger points out, Giddens seems to conflate nationalism and 
national identity (1991: 168). He asserts that nationalism as a doctrine tends to carry 
the sense of a 'community mobilised' in the pursuit of a 'collective interest'. By 
contrast, national identity 'may be invoked as a point of reference without thereby 
necessarily being nationalistic'. In other words, whilst nationalism is based on a set of 
relatively constant principles, national identity can be constituted in a range of 
variants Obid.: 173). 
2.1.3 National culture and national identity 
If 'national identity is a socially constructed psychological map that allows people to 
make sense of their membership of a nation, then national culture is the primary 
source for constructing the identity. As Hall argues, national identity is not something 
we are bom with, it is 'formed and transformed within and in relation to 
representation'. National cultures construct identities by producing meanings about 
'the nation' with which we can identify (Hall, 1992: 292-3). 
National culture and national identity is always presented as a unity by nationalists, 
but, Hall argues this cannot be the case for at least three reasons. Firstly, most modem 
nations consist of disparate cultures which were only unified by a lengthy process of 
violent conquest, that is, 'by the forcible suppression of cultural difference'. Secondly, 
nations are always composed of different social classes, and gender and ethnic groups. 
Thirdly, modem Western nations were the centres of empire or of neo-imperial 
spheres of influence, exercising cultural hegemony over the cultures of the colonised 
(Hall, 1992: 296-7). Hall thus concludes that, 
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Instead of thinking of national cultures as unified, we should think of them as constituting 
a discursive device which represents difference as unity or identity. They are cross-cut by 
deep internal divisions and differences, and 'unified' only through the exercise of 
different forms of cultural power (ibid.: 297). 
Therefore, the formation of national cultures involves an ongoing process of selection, 
competition, negotiation, exclusion and incorporation between different social actors 
and cultural elements. As Schlesinger argues, national cultures should 'be approached 
as sites of contestation in which competition over definitions takes place' (Schlesinger, 
1991: 174). Within this process, the most powerful players have traditionally been 
nationalist elites and states. They have dominated the formation and maintenance of 
national culture and national identity - though this historic advantage is now being 
seriously doubted in the context of globalisation and I will come back to this issue 
later. 
What is the strategy employed by nationalists and states in constructing an official 
national identity by drawing on elements from national cultures? Hall identifies five 
main elements (ibid.: 293-5): (1) The narrative of the nation. This provides a set of 
stories, images, landscapes, scenarios, historical events, national symbols and rituals 
which stand for, or represent, the shared experiences, sorrows, and triumphs and 
disasters which give meaning to the nation. (2) The emphasis on origins, continuity, 
tradition and timelessnes which presents the essentials of the national character as 
unchanged through history. (3) The invention of tradition. There are some 'traditions' 
presented as originating from ancient times but which are in fact recently invented (on 
this, see Hobsbawrn and Ranger, 1983). (4) Thefoundational myth. This tells a story 
which locate the origin of nation. (5) National identity is often symbolically grounded 
on the idea of apure, originalpeople or 'folk'. 
Of course the significant materials for constructing national identity are far more 
diverse than these. In particular, there is one kind of narrative not mentioned by Hall 
but no less important. It is about the future rather than the past: the narrative of 
national mission and destiny, of what kind of the ideal country the nation is going to 
be, and of the communal goal that all nationals are going to accomplish together. 
Sustaining a firm national identity involves not only telling 'where did we have come 
from' but also 'where are we going to'. 
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Some authors focus more on the maintenance rather than the formation of national 
identity, or more on the daily practices of reproduction rather than narrative and 
representation. Billig, among others, argues that 'national identity is more than an 
inner psychological state or an individual self-definition: it is a form of life, which is 
daily lived in the world of nation-states' (Billig, 1995: 69). Nations not only need to 
be 'produced' but also to be 'reproduced'. He introduces the concept of 'banal 
nationalism' to cover the ideological habits and means by which nation-states are 
reproduced (ibid.: 6). Everyday markers such as national anthems, national flags, 
national symbols, and national ceremonies, all act as a reminder to people not to 
'forget' their national identity. By the daily presentations and representations of those 
narratives and practices, a natural, God-given, and unified nation is constructed and 
maintained, constituting Anderson's 'imagined community'. 
Nonetheless, Hobsbawm rightly points out that to inquire into the problems of 
nation and nationalism, we need to see construction and maintenance taking place not 
only from above, but also from below, through 'the assumptions, hopes, needs, 
longings and interests of ordinary people' (1990: 10-1). For Giddens, 'ontological 
security' is one of the essential preconditions for people to live in a society. He argues 
that in modem society, the 'ontological security' of the individual in day-to-day life 
is more fragile than in societies dominated by tradition and the kinship ties that endure 
across space and time. In these conditions, the 'feeling of "belongingness" in a 
national community, and the ability to 'share a series of other cultural elements or 
styles of behaviour with others' (1981: 194; emphasis added) provide essential point 
of psychological reference and the communality provided by national symbols 
dsupplies one means of support for ontological security' (Giddens, 1985: 218). 
It should be noted that national culture and national identity is only one means of 
meeting people's need for 'ontological security'. They may become primary in 
circumstances of radical social disruption or mobilisation for war, when 'regressive 
forms' of identification will tend to come to the fore (Giddens, 1981: 194). But, 
Giddens argues, in 'normal' times 'nationalist sentiments tend to be fairly remote 
from most of the activities of day-to-day social life' (1985: 218). 
Schlesinger also argues that 'we need to distinguish between the initial creation of 
identity-conferring cultures and the problem of their persistence through time' (199 1: 
160; and 174). He notes that, once the political boundary of the nation-state have been 
achieved, national identity with all the accompanying mythico-cultural apparatus may 
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be in place and is not necessarily identical with nationalism (ibid.: 168). In other 
words, during the earlier period of nation building, national identity and national 
culture are presented in stronger forms and more closely identified with the principles 
of nationalism, than they will be afterwards. 
Tomlinson also writes, 'for most people, most of the time, their national identity is 
not at the forefront of their lived experience' (1991: 87). Most people's mundane 
concerns are quite distant from their sense of national cultural identity, and closer to 
immediate needs like 'their state of healthy, their family and personal relations, their 
finances and so on' (ibid. ). Tomlinson depicts the mainstream cultural experience of 
the developed capitalist West as the 'stable mode of capitalist modernity'. In this 
mode, he argues, 'we need to see national identity as a potentially powerful sentiment, 
but one usually "backgrounded" in consciousness and remote from the needs and 
concerns of habitual-routine modernity' (ibid.: 89). 
In sum, national culture is indeed a site of contestation. It is always undergoing a 
process of destruction, construction and reconstruction. Its constitution is not unified 
and fixed. However, the cultural practices and elements which are defined as 'national 
culture' or used to constitute and maintain 'national identity' are really existing in 
people's daily life and have their material and psychological roots and distinct 
significance in concrete social contexts., However it should be noted at this point that 
most of the recent arguments over nation and nationalism have focused on the 
developed Western countries (including Japan) and ignored the specificity of the 
social contexts of non-Westem, or post-colonial nation-states. 
In addition, the composition and definition of national cultures are not determined 
only by the state or by nationalist elites. These actors may dominate the process but it 
is always the outcome of the interaction between states and civil societies (see 
Castells, 1997: 8-9). Civil society, which we define as those institutions that are 
relatively independent from the state apparatuses, is made up of a series organisations, 
such as unions, civil organisations, churches, schools and the mass media. Among 
these, schools and mass media, because they involve practices of signification and 
representation, are probably the most important in the construction and maintenance 
of national identity. The importance of education system in national building has been 
emphasised by authors like Gellner (1983), but the context of the argument advanced 
in this thesis we need now to focus on mass communications institutions. 
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2.1.4 Mass communications and national identity/culture 
To explain the emergence of modem nations as imagined communities, Anderson 
assigns the mass media, and particularly the print media, a prominent position. ' He 
argues that what made the new communities imaginable was the 'half-fortuitous, but 
explosive, interaction between a system of production and productive relations 
(capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and the fatality of human 
linguistic diversity' (Anderson, 1991: 42-3; 46). The salience of print media involves 
firstly, the development of books and newspapers which use vernacular or national 
language and secondly, the growth of a mass reading public for these materials. 
Anderson particularly emphasises the role of mass circulation newspaper-'one 
day best-sellers' (1991: 35). He argues that the almost 'simultaneous consumption 
(imagining)' of these artefacts across a geographically dispersed readership creates an 
extraordinary 'mass ceremony': 
The significance of this mass ceremony - Hegel observed that newspaper serve modem 
man as a substitute for morning prayers - is paradoxical. It is performed in silent privacy, 
in the ]air of the skull. Yet each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he 
performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose 
existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion. 
Furthermore, this ceremony is incessantly repeated at daily or half-daily intervals 
throughout the calendar. What more vivid figure for the secular, historically clocked, 
imagined community can be envisioned? At the same time, the newspaper reader, 
observing exact replicas of his own paper being consumed by his subway, barbershop, or 
residential neighbours, is continually reassured that the imagined world is visibly rooted 
in everyday life (ibid.: 35-6). 
We should notice that the process Anderson depicts mainly focuses on the emergence 
of nations and the initial formation of national identity. Nonetheless, Thompson 
argues that the main problem with Anderson's argument is that the precise nature of 
the alleged link between the development of print and the rise of nationalism is never 
spelled out in detail. He points out that, 'there is a considerable gulf - historically as 
2 Though Gellner focuses more on the education system rather than mass media, he indeed mentioned 
about it in his book. He argues that the media themselves, 'the pervasiveness and importance of 
abstract, centralised, standardised, one to many communication, which itself automatically engenders 
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well as conceptually - between the emergence of a plurality of reading publics in 
sixteen-century Europe, on the one hand; and the emergence of various forms of 
national identity and nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, on the 
other' (Thompson, 1995: 62). 
Schlesinger also points to shortcomings in modernist theorists, like Anderson and 
Gellner, on the mass media and national building. Firstly, he argues that both Gellner 
on 'high culture' and Anderson on newspaper reading regard the mass media as a 
mechanism for forming an imagined community only inside the community. This 
internalist line of argument, Schlesinger notes, fails to consider 'the import of what 
lies outside and how it may affect the interior' and 'ignores the "otherness" that may 
well substantially condition any given national identity' (Schlesinger, 2000: 22). 
Secondly, Schlesinger asserts that the implications for nationhood of the post- 
Gutenberg media technologies, like cinema and television, are not addressed in the 
modernists' account (Schlesinger, 1991: 164). Anderson in fact has said something 
about the role of radio and television in the process of post-colonies' nation building. 
He notes that 'in the first place, advances in communications technology, especially 
radio and television, give print allies unavailable a century ago, ' and he continues, 
'multilingual broadcasting can conjure up the imagined community to illiterates and 
populations with different mother-tongues' (Anderson, 1991: 135). In other words, 
Anderson seems to regard the electronic media as an enhanced and enlarged version 
of print media in constructing national imaginaries. 
In some specific contexts and conditions however, particularly where there are 
monopoly national broadcasting systems (including public system and authoritarian 
state-controlled systems), electronic media may have a more far -reaching influence 
than print in the process. In BBC's early years, Morley and Robins argue, first radio, 
then television, became the central mechanism for reconstructing the collective life 
and culture of the nation. Even the commercial broadcasting system in the United 
States, they add, had a similar role in its founding days (Morley and Robins, 1995: 
10-1). 
Yet, Schlesinger argues, although this account is probably true national situations 
are generally much more complicated and need ftu-thennore examination (Schlesinger, 
1991: 165). Indeed, the various mass media may well play different roles in 
the core idea of nationalism'. The most important message was the language and the communication 
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establishing and maintaining national identity in different nations at different stage. 
But, again, this process involves not only how the media function in constructing 
national identity but also how people receive mediated discourses of national identity. 
As Tomlinson argues, in the context of the habitual, routine, consumption of media 
products, if most people's focus of meaning is in the family, personal-sexual relations 
and other concrete aspects of everyday life, their reception of the mass media texts is 
likely to more thoroughly shaped by these concerns rather than abstract narratives of 
national identity (Tomlinson, 1991: 87). 
The more important points to notice here are firstly, that the mass media are only 
one source contributing to the construction and definition of national culture and 
national identity, and secondly, that mediating selected elements of national culture 
and national identity may not be the most important role the mass media play in the 
modem world, particularly in the 'peace time'. In addition, the issue ftirther 
complicated in the present global context where national communicative space is 
increasingly affected by transnational flows of media products and the controlling 
power of states over domestic communication institutions is diminishing. 
2.1.5 When national cultures meets 'foreign' cultures 
In the early works of the cultural imperialism thesis, 'nation' is the main unit for 
analysing the phenomenon of international cultural domination through which the 
6centre states' in the modem world system, mainly the US, dominate the international 
communication order and exercise cultural power over other countries, particularly 
the developing or, newly independent nation-states. Schiller has explained that the 
thesis was produced against a specific political economic background, which saw 
more than ninety countries attaining political independence after the Second World 
War but experiencing another stage of dependency, particularly in relation to their 
economies and cultures (Schiller, 1976; see also Schiller, 1969; Nordenstreng and 
Schiller, 1979). As He writes, 
Though the economic measures of domination - control of capital and markets and of the 
infrastructure of international finance - are increasingly well understood, the cultural- 
communications sources of power are just beginning to be faintly perceived. The forces 
style the media used, rather than what exactly be transmitted (see 1983: 127). 
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that influence consciousness are decisive determinants of a community's outlook and the 
nature and direction of its goals. Thus, communications and the flow of messages and 
imagery within and among nations - especially between developed and dominated states - 
assume a very special significance. What does it matter if a national movement has 
struggled for years to achieve liberation if that condition, once gained, is undercut by 
values and aspirations derived from the apparently vanquished dominator? 
For this reason, attention in many nations is beginning to focus on the sources, character, 
and content of the communication stream that passes between nations and on the flow that 
is generated inside national states (Schiller, 1976: 1-2). 
Thus, the issue of 'national sovereignty' became the main point of reference for 
resisting the uneven information flow among countries, while communication in turn, 
came to play a vital role in the struggle to achieve 'meaningful national autonomy' 
(Nordenstreng and Schiller, 1979: xi). At the same time, from the mid-1970s to the 
mid- I 980s, many so-called the Third World countries organised a series of alignments 
and movements most notably the New World Information and Communication Order 
( NWICO) with the aim of pursuing better conditions for their national cultural 
development. The main stage for these actions was the UN agency responsible for 
international communications, UNESCO (see Roach, 1997). 
The policy consequences of the thesis of international cultural domination and 
national cultural autonomy can be clarly seen in the discussion on the final report of 
the UNESCO 1982 World Conference on Cultural Policies (ref Schlesinger, 1991; 
Tomlinson, 1991). Tomlinson notes that while cultural pluralism is an essential part 
of the UNESCO discourse it is pluralism strongly disciplined by nationality. 'Many 
delegates considered that one could not speak of cultural identity without reaffirming 
the fundamental concept of national sovereignty and territorial independence' (quoted 
in Tomlinson, 1991: 72). For Tomlinson (and Schlesinger as well), national culture is 
the mould into which, by the very nature of UNESCO as an inter-national body, 
cultural identity tends to be squeezed. 
Given our previous discussion, this position emerges as problematic since cultural 
identity is not synonymous with national identity, nor 'culture' with 'national culture'. 
But some of the arguments advanced by the cultural imperialism thesis and the 
discourse of UNESCO, tend to conflate and assimilate these two concepts analytically 
and practically, and 'treat the issue as one of domination of national culture by 
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national culture' (ibid.: 73). As Schlesinger notes, this kind of discourse assumes that 
we can speak intelligibly of some 'effects' on a clear-cut 'object', and takes 'culture' 
as a finished product and the nation as a stable given (Schlesinger, 1991: 141-3). 
Tomlinson also argues that this conceptualisation can only be strictly coherent where 
we can speak of a 'unified national cultural identity' in the supposed invaded culture 
(1991: 73) and concludes that the discursive focus on external attacks on 
national/cultural identity, conducted around the binary opposition of 'us and them' is 
a gmyth' and as such more of a hindrance than a help to analysis (ibid.: 90). 
This debate continues and is now even more intense in the present context of 
globalisation, as we will see later. Before entering the next section however, one 
further point however needs to be noted here. As mentioned above, the cultural 
domination thesis centred on the axis of nation and nation-state had its specific 
historical necessity. Yet, it never assumed that national cultures of either the 
dominating or the dominated were unified and stable. For example, in the preface of 
their edited book, National Sovereignty and International Communication, 
Nordenstreng and Schiller note that to describe the current situation in the 
international information sphere as an opposition between a unified group of 
dominators and another unified group of the dominated nations, is misleading. The 
real relations among different countries are more complicated and full of disputes. In 
addition, inside the national boundaries 'reside social classes whose material and 
nonmaterial interests differ and usually are incompatible with each other'. They thus 
argue that the present information condition, locally and globally, 'can only be 
appreciated in terms of these conflictual interests' (Nordenstreng and Schiller, 1979: 
xi). 
Clarifying the misunderstandings and false perceptions between scholars and 
academic groups in the debate over cultural imperialism is not the main concern here 
(for this issue, see Tomlinson, 1991; Golding and Harris, 1997; Boyd-Barret, 1998). 
However, it does seem that in the present global context, marginalising the notion of 
(nation' in the study of international cultural encounters has become a widespread 
practice among critical scholars. 
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2.2 Nations and National Identity in the Global Age 
In the age of globalisation, we can see simultaneously the crisis of nation-states and 
resurgence of essentialisms. In particular, we are witnessing a rebirth of ethnic 
nationalism, of religious fundamentalisms, and of group antagonisms (Castells, 1997; 
Smith, 1995). These historical trends have challenged not only the widespread 
simplistic view which declares that nationalism, along with nation-state, has 
diminished because the globalisation of economy and culture, but also modernist 
theories of nationalism which argue that nations are relatively settled imagined 
communities How then do we interpret these transformations and reassess the 
concept and practice of nation and nationalism? How do these trends influence the 
construction and maintenance of national culture and national identity? What is the 
implication of the globalisation of mass communications for 'traditional' national 
cultures? 
2.2.1 Nations and globalisation 
For Hobsbawrn and Gellner, the heyday of nationalism has passed. In the present 
global age and the near future, they are convinced that the influence of nationalism is 
very likely to decrease (Hobsbawm, 1991; Gellner, 1997: Ch. 6). The collapse of the 
former Soviet Union and the recent severe ethnic and national conflicts in the Balkans, 
Hobsbawm argues, are in fact the historical product of unsolved national problems 
which were created in the territorial restructuring of the European Continent between 
1918 and 1921 (Hobsbawm, 1991: Ch. 6). 
In response, Castells asserts that this argument fails to explain the complexities of 
the present development of nationalism properly. He argues that this is because 
modernist theories of nationalism 'assimilate nations and nationalism to the 
emergence and consolidation of the modem nation-state after the French Revolution' 
and stresses that 'to reduce nations and nationalisms to the process of construction of 
the nation-state makes it impossible to explain the simultaneous rise of postmodem 
nationalism and decline of the modem state' (Castells, 1997: 3 1). 
Castells raises four major points that need to be emphasised when discussing 
contemporary nationalism. (1) Contemporary nationalism may or may not be oriented 
toward the establishment of a sovereign nation-state. In other words, nations are, 
historically and analytically, entities independent from the state. (2) Nations and 
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nation-states are not historically limited to the modem nation-state as constituted in 
Europe in the two hundred years following the French Revolution. (3) Nationalism is 
not necessarily an elite phenomenon, rather it is more often a reaction against global 
elites. (4) Contemporary nationalism tends to be more oriented toward the defence of 
an already institutionalised culture than toward the construction of a state (1997: 30- 
31). 
Castells argues that only by taking these points into account can appropriately 
explain various 'peculiarities' in current national problems. For example, there are 
nations without states (Catalunya in Spain, Quebec in Canada, and Scotland in the 
UK), states without nations (Singapore and South Africa), pluri-national states (the 
former Soviet Union, Belgium, Spain, and the UK), uni-national state (Japan), shared- 
nation states (South Korea and North Korea), and nations sharing states (Swedes in 
Sweden and Finland, Irish in Ireland and the UK) (ibid.: 5 1). 
It is true that Gellner and other modernist theorists of nationalism tend to relate 
nationalism and nations closely with the building of modem nation-states in 
explaining the origins of nations. But, they never assimilate nations with nation-states 
and admit that, establishing a nation-state may not be the only political project of a 
nation (see discussion in section 2.1). 'Me main reason why modernist theories of 
nationalism cannot properly explain and predict the development of contemporary 
nationalism, in Smith's view, again, is that they ignore the continuity and significance 
of ethnic characteristics. (Smith, 1995). 
For Smith, there are two types of current crisis that the nation-state is facing. The 
first comes from external shifts, the crisis of the state's military and economic power 
in a world of giant transnational companies and international political and economic 
organisations linked together by communications system. The second crisis is internal, 
(a challenge both to the efficacy of the national state and its legitimacy and 
representativeness as a national state answering to the needs and interests of its 
citizens' (Smith, 1995: 96). Smith argues that while most modem nation-states have a 
plural ethnic character they are nonetheless based on a dominant ethnie. When the 
state gradually loses its power and legitimacy to maintain an 'ethnic majoritarian 
democracy' or fulfill the expectations of minority ethnies, the revival of minority 
ethnic nationalism is very likely to occur. Therefore, Smith concludes that, although 
'the preeminence of the national state as a general norm has not been seriously 
challenged', what is increasingly questioned is 'the behaviour and effectiveness of 
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individual states and their regimes, and the distribution of powers and resources 
between the constituent ethnies of a national state' (ibid.: 105). 
Despite his acknowledgement of external pressures Smith seems to explain the 
situation primarily from within and doesn't provide a more comprehensive 
explanation in which the interaction and mutual influence between the external and 
internal crisis are dynamically considered. Actually, the current legitimacy crisis the 
nation-state faces within its territory is closely interconnected with the intensification 
of external challenges.. In addition, the emphasis on ethnic characteristics also leads 
Smith to ignore the wider constitution of the perceptual aspect of nationalism and 
nationand to miss the fact that crisis of nation-states is strongly related to the crisis of 
national culture. 
2.2.2 National. identity/ culture in the global age 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the crisis of nation-state in the global age, or more 
precisely speaking, the reconstitution and restructuration of the power of nation-state, 
has profound implications for national cultures and national identities. However, the 
exact consequences and impacts still remain to be further observed and investigated. 
One view on this issue is to claim that a new global culture is emerging out of the 
increasingly rapidity of cultural transactions and exchanges on a global scale. This 
account simplistically following Anderson's concept of 'imagined community', 
predict that a 'global identity' will eventually be consolidated within the new global 
cultural marketplace and will replace national identities. 
Is a 'global culture' possibly forming in any meaningful sense and is it becoming a 
substitute for 'national culture' in the age of globalisation? Smith doubts this 
statement from his theory of nationalism. He admits that there indeed emerging a 
eclectic global culture made up of a mixture of mass standardised commodities and 
denationalised ethnic or folk motifs, and that a series of generalised human values and 
interests together with a uniform scientific discourse is being underpinned by the new 
transnational information and communications systems (1990: 176). Yet, he argues 
that today's emerging and widely diffused global culture is cut off from any past, 
4context-less, a true melange of disparate components drawn from everywhere and 
nowhere', a totally constructed culture (ibid.: 177). Though national culture is also a 
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construct, its construction is historically specific and spatially limited and relates to 
the common memory of a specific community. Smith thus asserts that, 
Unlike national cultures, a global culture is essentially memoryless. Where the 'nation' can 
be constructed so as to draw upon and revive latent popular experiences and needs, a 
4global culture' answers to no living needs, no identity-in-the-making..... the central 
difficulty in any project to construct a global identity and hence a global culture, is that 
collective identity, like imagery and culture, is always historically specific because it is 
based on shared memories and a sense of continuity between generations (Smith, 1990: 
179-180). 
In contrast to Smith's scepticism about the viability of a global culture, Tomlinson 
argues that an alternative perspective beyond 'embedded statism' is needed for 
considering the issue of global culture appropriately. He argues that 'globalisation 
does not look set to usher in a single global culture on the model of particular, 
historically specific national cultures' (Tomlinson, 1999: 104-5). He notes that global 
cultural exchanges and experiences are not necessarily confined within the frame of 
the nation-state, rather, they involve in a process of 'deterritorialisation', a cultural 
condition in which a stable sense of 'local' cultural identity is increasingly difficult to 
maintain, 'as our daily lives become more and more interwoven with, and penetrated 
by, influences and experience that have their origins far away' (ibid.: 113). 
The mass media, Tomlinson argues, play a pivotal role in deterritorialising cultural 
interactions and experiences. The new communication technologies, like cable and 
satellite television and the internet, provide 'more choices' and extend people's 
horizon beyond the local and national. As he puts it; 
There is a sense, then, in which this very choice provided by new media technologies 
contributes to deterritorialisation. Being 'better informed' implies having available a 
range of perspectives on events beyond that of the 'home culture', being able to situate 
oneself at a distance from the (national, local) 'viewpoint'. Whatever this may promise for 
the development of cosmopolitan cultural dispositions, it also represents a loss of the 
cultural certainty, even of the existential 'comfort' involved in having the world 'out 
there' presented to us from the still point of an unchallenged national/local perspective. 
Deterritorialisation in this sense of opening up to the world and expanding cultural 
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horizons via globalised media maY thus be an ambiguous condition (Tomlinson, 1999: 
116). 
In his view, the process of dissolving the link between culture and place will lead to 
increasing 'cultural hybridisation', characterized by 'the mingling of cultures from 
different territorial locations brought about by the increasing traffic amongst cultures' 
(ibid.: 142). Hybridisation implies a globalised culture that is fluid, dynamic, protean, 
ever-changing, and is different from the integrating, static, and 'essentialising' nature 
of national cultures (ibid.: 141 -149). Furthermore, Tomlinson stresses that the 
complex hybrid nature of contemporary global cultures will potentially generate the 
'ideal' outcome of cultural globalisation, that is, a cosmopolitan culture which avoids 
the exclusivity of national or ethnic divisions (Tomlinson, 1999: Ch6; see also 
Tomlinson, 1997). This positive line of thinking on the globalisation of culture and is 
accompanying hostility to 'national cultures' is shared by many globalisation 
theorists (see, for example, Lull, 1995, Featherstone, 1990). 
On the other hand, for the Left, particularly those scholars whose arguments 
remain based on the cultural imperialism thesis, although contemporary international 
cultural conditions do exhibit some essential changes, continuities are more important. 
For example, Schiller points out that the view arguing that recent transformations of 
global politics and economy have increased cultural diversity and plurality of 
audience reception flies in the face of 'the actual context of observable conditions'. 
For him, uneven cultural exchange and cultural domination not only still exist, but 
have become even more intense. Furthermore, effective popular cultural 'choice' has 
diminished rather than increased due to the concentration of media ownership and 
privatisation (Schiller, 1991, see also Herman and McChesney, 1995; Golding and 
Harris, 1997; McChesney, 2001). 
Schiller admits however that there have been important changes in international 
cultural conditions in the past decades. The first is the trend towards convergence 
across a wide range of media. Television is no longer the primary channel of 
international cultural exchange but one element, albeit still influential, in 'an all- 
encompassing cultural package' which may cover films, news, television programmes, 
print, sports events, food, and shopping behaviour. Secondly, today's transnational 
media conglomerates are owned not only by Americans (though many of them are 
American based) but also by nationals of other advanced capitalist countries. Thus, 
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'American national power no longer is an exclusive determinant of cultural 
domination' (ibid.: 15). 
Schiller thus suggests that today's cultural domination, though still bearing a 
marked American imprint, is better understood as 'transnational corporate cultural 
domination' (ibid. ). The transnational corporations have become the major players in 
the international arena and the logic of capitalist accumulation is the primary engine 
propelling the current surge of economic globalisation. The culture transmitted by 
these corporations is rooted in a consumerist ideology which will impair the ability of 
people to act for their own community's social benefit. As Schiller puts it, 'although 
the super-companies are owned for the most part by national groups of investors and 
are based in specific national settings, national concerns are not necessarily primary in 
the calculations and decisions of these enterprises' (ibid.: 21) 
Similarly, Herman and McChesney argue that the primary effect of recent 
advances in media globalisation and centralisation is 'the implantation of the 
commercial model of communication' which erodes the public sphere, treats audience 
as consumers rather than citizens, and creates a 'culture of entertainment' that is 
incompatible with a democratic order (1997: 9; see also McChesney, 200 1). 
The transition to digital communication, centred around computer systems and the 
internet, has also been widely regarded as a powerful instrument for creating diverse 
cultural representations and breaking down information monopolies. The reality 
however is that the internet is more likely to provide a new outlet for existing media 
giants to generate profit than a mechanism to improve political democracy and 
cultural plurality (Golding, 1998, McChesney, 1998). 
For the left, what is threatened by the current structures of cultural domination 
centers on political democracy and cultural diversity in general rather than on a 
specific 'national culture'. Tbough the role of 'nation' in resisting and balancing 
uneven international cultural exchange is acknowledged, it is not the central concern. 
in the age of globalisation, pursuing national cultural independence and sovereignty 
may not be the primary task as it was in the 1960s, instead, what needs to be noticed 
and resisted is the cultural domination produced by transnational media companies 
and the trend towards privatisation. 
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2.2.3 In defence of nation 
Despite the fact that the idea that nations and nation-states are becoming irrelevant or 
obsolete is now widely accepted, Smith insists that nation and nationalism remain 'the 
only realistic basis for a free society of states in the modem world' (Smith, 1995: 147). 
He sets out three arguments in defence of a plural order of nations (ibid.: 153-159): 
(1) Nationalism is political necessary. The principles of nationality provide the only 
widely acceptable legitimation and focus for popular mobilisation as long as the 
global order remains based on the balance between competing states. A pluralist 
system of nations and nation-states is also the only safeguard against imperial tyranny. 
(2) National identity is socially functional. Nationalism is functional for a modem 
industrial society which requires armies of mobile and literate citizens for its effective 
operation. The 'national' myths, memories, symbols and ceremonies also provide the 
primary basis for social cohesion and political action. 
(3) The nation is historically embedded. The nation remains embedded in the ethnic 
past that shapes its future as much as any present global trends. Nationalism can be 
regarded as a 'religion surrogate' and the nation as a continuation, but also a 
transformation, of pre-modem ethno-religious community. 
Although it is true that for most people, national cultural identity is quite remote to 
them in day-to-day life - as Giddens and Tomlinson argue, nationalist sentiment 
remains a permanent resource that can be mobilised in certain critical circumstances. 
For example, the increasingly comprehensive extension of Western cultural goods and 
practices to every country in the global age and the consequent squeeze on the space 
and resources available for local cultural production, is very likely to prompt 
nationalist opposition and resistance to foreign importation. Hence, it is necessary to 
identify these concretely existing problems and to investigate them in the contexts of 
their specific histories. To advance the argument we need more and better case studies 
as well as more adequate general theories and conceptual schema. Claiming that the 
discourse of national culture and national identity is a 'myth' and then turning instead 
to the facile idea of 'constant cultural changing' (Tomlinson, 1991: 93) is both easily 
appropriated by the discourse of neo-liberalism and not helpful for understanding 
concrete situations. 
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Tomlinson has claimed that the discourse of nations and nationalism poses 
particular difficulties for Marxists. Because nationalism is usually regarded as the 
doctrine of the right wing the defence of 'national cultures' is thus 'in certain senses 
ideologically problematic for the general left-wing perspective from which cultural 
imperialism arose' (Tomlinson, 1991: 68). However, nationalism does not have to 
serve conservative interests. As Ahmad notes, nationalism is neither always 
progressive nor always retrograde. 'What role any given nationalism would play', he 
writes, 'depends on the configuration of the class forces and sociopolitical practices' 
(Ahmad, 1992: 11). 
Schiller and others had their particular strategic reasons for discussing the issue of 
cultural domination in terms of nation and national culture in the 1960s and 1970s. By 
the same token, the importance of a discourse of nation and nationalism remains in 
the age of globalisation, particularly for nations in the post-colonial condition and the 
backward zone of the world system. For them, Ahmad argues, there is no way of 
breaking out of the overwhelming imperialist influence and dominance without 
pursuing national projects while at the same time pressing for a revolutionary 
restructuring of one's own nation-state. Therefore, to resist imperialism, and to avoid 
serving the national bourgeoisie's interests it is important to relate nationalism to the 
principle of socialism (Ahmad, 1992: Ch8; see also Mosco, 1996: 207-209). As 
Mosco argues, nationalism can be regarded as a form of local opposition to the power 
of globalising capitalism to rationalise and homogenise spatial difference. But, if 
nationalist opposition looses its socialist character it all to easily creates a local form 
of successful Western capitalism, which benefits local and global capital, and 'the 
socialist alternative of growth and the redistribution of power in land, industry, 
communication, and culture all but disappeared' (Mosco, 1996: 208). 
In sum, though nation and national identity are undoubtably constructs, the 
discourse of nation and nationalism remain significant and useful to projects aimed at 
resisting the uneven patterns of cultural exchange within the current global political 
and economic context. As Ahmad puts it, 
[To] the extent that contemporary imperialism's political system takes the form of a 
hierarchically structured system of nation-states, it is only by organising their struggles 
within the political space of their own nation-state, with the revolutionary transformation 
of that particular nation-state as the immediate practical objective, that the revolutionary 
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forces of any given country can effectively struggle against the imperialism they face 
concretely in their own lives (1992: 3 17-8). 
Articulating a variant of nationalism consonant with a progressive project can only be 
ensured however, by simultaneously developing a progressive programme of 
generalised political reform within the national territory. In particular, a strong and 
relatively autonomous civil society which can act as a significant counter to the state 
and major corporations and help maintain political democracy and social equality is a 
necessary precondition. Conversely, if we give up the national perspective completely, 
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to interrupt present global cultural conditions 
and resolve the problem of cultural domination. Thus, no matter what the 
relationships obtain among the state, the market, and the civil society a close 
examination of the discourse of nation and nationalism remains pivotal in analysing 
the cultural consequence of globalisation. 
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Chapter 3 National Cinema 
in the Global Age 
Based on our previous discussion of the concepts of nation, national identity and 
national culture in Chapter 2, we can now focus on the concept of national cinema. As 
Hayward notes, the cinema was born in the age of nationalism and had close 
connections with the process of nation-building from the outset. She points out that in 
case of French cinema, almost as soon as cinema was bom, 'books were being written 
entitled LHistoire du cinema, and by the 1920s, calls were being made for a truly 
national cinema as a defence against the American hegemony' (Hayward, 1993: 5, 
emphasis added). 
Along with general ideas of nation and national culture, the idea of national 
cinema has usually been employed unproblematically to refer to distinctive style of 
cinema that is seen to belong and relate to a specific nation, such as American cinema, 
French cinema and Chinese cinema. More recently however, the viability of the 
concept has been seriously challenged and reassessed in parallel with the revival of 
debate on the idea of nation and nationalism (see Crofts, 1993; Hjort and MacKenzie, 
2000). As Schlesinger points out, in the context of globalisation, inquiry into national 
cinema ought not only to converge but also to be thoroughly integrated as a part of a 
broad programme of work on nation and culture' (Schlesinger, 2000: 29). 
3.1 General Definition of National Cinema 
Most authors use the term 'national cinema' in two main senses simultaneously. 
When the term 'cinema' refers to the institutions of film production, distribution and 
exhibition, the phrase 'national cinema' is synonymous with 'the domestic film 
industry'. At the same time however, the term also refers to textual features, to themes, 
contents, and styles which are deemed to express distinctive national cultural 
characteristics, which are to some extent different from 'other' national cinemas (see, 
for example, Hayward, 1993; 0'regan, 1996; Dissanayake, 1994: xiii-xiv). 
Within the industrial and economic approach, strictly speaking, films produced in 
the national territory, financed by domestic capital, made by a working team of which 
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the members are all nationals, and distributed and exhibited by domestic companies 
owned by nationals, can be defined as 'national cinema. However, this definition can 
easily become ambiguous and contradictory In discussing the subject of Canadian 
cinema, Dorland poses a series of questions which reveal the shortcomings of the 
industrial perspective on national cinema: 
After all, what is a Canadian film? A film with Canadian story? Any story with a 
Canadian producer? Any film with a Canadian director? Any film with a Canadian 
crew? is an American television program like 'V' somehow Canadian because its 
producer/director, a Czech immigrant named Reitman, went to school in Canada 
before moving to Los Angeles? Does the fact that many Canadians live and work 
in Hollywood somehow Canadianise the American film industry such that its 
cultural production becomes metaphysically Canadian? (Dorland, quoted in 
Collins, 1990: 254) 
These questions imply that the idea of national cinema cannot be properly and solely 
equated with 'domestic film industry. As Hill argues, in the age of transnational 
communication corporations, it is hard to identify a specifically national cinema in 
organisational terms. In addition, the precise value of a film industry to the national 
economy is also difficult to count (Hill, 1992: 10). He therefore suggests that the 
definition of national cinema should largely depend on cultural considerations (ibid.: 
11). However, defining national cinemas in cultural terms raises other questions, no 
less difficult to answer. 
one of the most significant accounts of national cinema to combine the economic 
and cultural perspectives is the classic cultural imperialism thesis. The thesis, as 
discussed in previous sections, argues that the growing volume of imported films 
(mainly from the US) has seriously threatened both domestic film production systems 
and the development of national film cultures. For scholars working in this tradition, 
ensuring the independence and development of national communication industries 
(including national cinema) is the only way to maintain a distinctive national cultural 
identity and a specific national culture. The assumption underlying this argument is 
that pursuing an independent national film industry and a specific national film 
culture are two sides of the same national cultural project. 
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For example, in examining the domination of Hollywood cinema in the Europe 
market in the post-war era, Guback suggests a project of establishing a 'European 
cinema'. 
in terms of European cinema, I think the objective must be the creation of film 
production and distribution independent of foreign interests, not only to guarantee 
flexibility and economic autonomy, but to provide the conditions in which the 
expression of indigenous cultures can take place and thrive ...... Toothpaste can be 
made in a factory anywhere, following a general formula. But the motion picture is 
different. If you believe, as I do, that each culture has something distinctive to say, 
and a distinctive manner of saying it-if you feel that your culture has its own 
stories and aspirations to tell in its own way-then it does matter where, how, and 
by whom films are made. (Guback, 1974a: 16-7) 
However, Guback's account faces a series of awkward questions. First of all, how 
exactly does an 'independent' film industry guarantee a 'distinctive' and 'authentic' 
expression of national culture in film texts? Guback does not argue for a reductionist 
relation between film infrastructure and the film content., but he does emphasise that 
an 'independent' film industry can generate the 'conditions' in which the expression 
of national cultures can develop and thrive. Yet, this still leaves open the question of 
the meaning of the 'national' in a given national cinema. If a nation is an imagined 
community, what kind of cultural signs and characters in films can be recognised as 
'national'? Who has the right to define them? How is the competition of definition 
organised? 
Secondly, the approach tends to focus on the 'production' and 'distribution' 
sectors of national cinema Yet, shouldn't film exhibition and consumption also be 
taken into account in any comprehensive cultural definition of national cinema? As 
we have discussed in connection with the construction of nation and national identity, 
it is a process not only from above but also from below. Thus, in defining national 
cinema culturally, how do we consider the role of the national audience? 
3.2 The Scepticism of the Concept of National Cinerna 
As Hill points out, the challenges to the established concept of national cinema are 
fuelled by two more general intellectual trends: (1) A growing critical scrutiny of 
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traditional conceptions of the nation, national identity and nationalism. (2) An 
increased emphasis, within media studies, on the moment of reception and the active 
role played by media audiences (Hill, 1992: 11). 
In brief, there are three main arguments arising out of recent reflections on the 
concepts of nation and national identity. Firstly, there is the now well established idea 
of the nation as 'an imagined community', and the argument that national culture and 
national identity must not be seen as naturally given, but as continuously constructed, 
redefined and even invented. Secondly, there is the recognition that a national culture 
should not be regarded as distinctive and bounded but rather as a product of 
interactions and exchanges with 'foreign' cultural factors from the beginning. Thirdly, 
there is the acceptance that national culture and national identity cannot be seen as 
unproblematically unified but rather as being full of struggles and repression among 
different social groups within a given national territory. 
Following this line of thinking, the cultural imperialism thesis which defends 
existing national cinemas conceptually and practically seems to be no longer viable. 
For example, Higson contends that, 
To identify a national cinema is first of all to specify a coherence and a unity; it is to 
proclaim a unique identity and a stable set of meanings. The process of identification is 
thus invariably a hegemonising, mythologising process, involving both the production and 
assignation of a particular set of meanings, and the attempt to contain, or prevent the 
potential proliferation of other meanings (Higson, 1989: 37). 
Moran also argues that because there is no such thing as a single national cultural 
identity, there is no such thing as a national cinema 'if the phrase is used to designate 
a single, unitary object' (Moran, 1996: 10; see also Higson, 2000). Consequently, 
some critics (in common with commentators on the issue of national culture more 
generally) adopt a positive attitude to imported films/cultures (mainly from the US) 
and argue that the 'diversity' and 'popularity' of foreign cinemas/cultures can 
challenge the 'rigidity' and 'restrictiveness' of the 'national' cinema/cultures 
(Nowell-Smith, 1985: 152; Higson, 1989: 3940). Furthermore, some go further and 
question the legitimacy and necessity of a national cinema. For example, in discussing 
the situation of contemporary British cinema, Nowell-Smith asks of. 'But do we need 
itT (ibid. ). 
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Critics of the idea of national cinema not only concentrate on its rigidity and 
mythological character, but also on its elitist style and aesthetics. This argument 
relates to debates around of high/ mass culture, to the role of popular audience in 
forming national film cultures, and to the dominance of Hollywood movies worldwide. 
Crofts for example argues that the production strategies of national cinema are often 
formed primarily in relation to Hollywood, prodicing three main responses which he 
calls, imitation of Hollywood, competition with Hollywood in the domestic market, 
and differentiation from Hollywood (Crofts, 1993). Neale also notes that in some 
western European countries (specially France, Italy and Germany), countering and 
competing with the American films in their domestic markets and fostering their own 
film industry and film culture, inevitably means that films produced by these national 
film industries have to differentiate themselves from Hollywood. He argues that, 
One way of doing so is to turn to high art and to the cultural traditions specific to the 
country involved. Either way, the films will be shown in different cinemas and be 
distributed by different textual characteristics. In constructing and sustaining such 
differences, the films will almost certainly tend to coincide with and to become supported 
by discourses functioning to define and perpetuate art and culture (Neale, 1981: 15). 
in his pioneering work on the international domination of Hollywood, Guback 
champions the films of Chaplin and the Italian neo-realist films for their ability 'to 
convey a human message in terms understandable to people everywhere' and 'struck a 
chord of human sensitivity' and contrasts this genuine internationalism with standard 
commercial international films (mainly Hollywood productions) that have 
(shallowness and cardboard characters' and are 'anti-culture' and 'the antithesis of 
human culture' (Guback, 1969: 198-9). 
As Moran notes, this kind of argument for supporting national cinema is difficult 
to maintain and falls into the mass culture/high culture dilemma (Moran, 1996: 10). In 
his book on the domination of American audio-visual products in the Canadian 
market, Collins also argues that, 'there are no grounds for disqualifying one 
individual's aesthetic response as invalid', and 'one person's great art may be 
another's daub' (Collins, 1990: 263; for the relevant debate, see Tomlinson, 1991). 
In the case of Britain for example, Nowell-Smith argues that 'the hidden history of 
cinema in British culture', has been the history of 'American films popular with the 
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British public' (1985: 151-2). He asserts that American cinema tends to be more 
'democratic', 'open', and is more 'popular' in America as well as other countries. By 
contrast, British films 'come across all too often as restrictive and stifling, subservient 
to middle-class artistic models and to middle- and upper-class values' (ibid. ). Though 
Nowell-Smith's evaluation of British cinema is of course arguable, most national 
cinemas have rarely achieved sustained domestic popular success and have generally 
been unable to compete with Hollywood movies nationally and internationally 
(Higson, 1989: 41, see also O'Regan, 1996: 46; Elsaesser, 1993). 'Unpopular' local 
productions may be shown in particular exhibition outlets, like the art house circuit, 
interriationallY and nationally to maintain their economic viability (Hill, 1997). 
However, art house national cinemas, by serving the minority of international and 
national cultural elites rather than the majority of the national audiences reinforce the 
uneven and stratified structure of cultural development nationally and globally. 
Accordingly, Higson suggests that national cinema needs to be explored not only 
in relation to production, but also in relation to the questions of distribution and 
exhibition, audiences and consumption (Higson, 1989: 42). For Higson, as well as 
Nowell-Smith, the fact that Hollywood has become a part of the popular imagination 
of British audiences (and audiences in other countries whose domestic film markets 
are dominated by Hollywood) leads him to argue that it is inadequate 'to reduce the 
study of national cinemas only to consideration of the films produced by and within a 
particular nation-state' and he suggest that the following issues should be addressed: 
The range of films in circulation within a nation-state - including American 
and other foreign films. 
(2) The range of sociologically specific audiences for different types of fihn, and 
how these audience use these films in particular circumstances. 
(3) The range of and relation between discourses about film circulating within that 
cultural and social formation, and their relative accessibility to different 
audiences. 
Echoing Higson's account and coupled with certain aspects of the globalisation 
theses, Hedetoft argues that in the context of globalisation and Hollywood's 
competitive advantage, a new cultural hybrid integrating and reflexive process will 
generate a 'third' culture forged by the collision of the 'sending' Americanness of 
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Hollywood films and the 'receiving' indigenous frarne of national reference (Hedetoft, 
2000). He rightly concludes that national cinema in the age of globalisation should 
reappear as a changeable and non-permanent notion and a transboundary process 
rather than a set of fixed attributes (ibid.: 282). However, because he only focuses on 
the dimension of reception and expects the process of reinterpretation to create a 
4newl prosperity of cultural exchange he ignores the real impact of Hollywood 
domination on the production base of national filmmaking. 
3.3 In Defence of National Cinema 
With the intellectual fashion for deconstructing the notion of nation, national culture, 
and national identity, and more recently arguments claiming a diminishing role for the 
nation-state in the context of globalisation, the necessity and viability of a national 
cinema has been severely challenged. In addition, many national cinemas seem to 
exhibit rigid, homogenising, and elitist characteristics in their themes, styles and 
aesthetics. As we have just noted, this has led some authors to argue that analyses of 
national cinema should shift from 'film production' and 'film text' to Tlm 
consumption'. 
However, not all critics have joined this project. The trends towards the 
concentration and centralisation of the transnational audio-visual market are 
increasingly powerful in the global age. For most countries and cultures, the available 
space for maintaining basic and self-reliant audio-visual production that can meet the 
specific needs of their own society is shrinking rather than growing. Against this 
background, as Hill argued in the early 1990s, 'the importance of being able to argue 
successftilly the case for why a national cinema is necessary or desirable has thus 
become all the more urgent' (Hill, 1992: 10). This argument is strongly echoed by 
King who writes on the history of Latin American cinemas. He maintains that in the 
present changing international order, 'an awareness of the culturally specific is all 
important and an approach that considers the pressures on national cinemas' would 
seem the best way to 'keep the picture in focus' (King, 2000: 255). To achieve this, 
we can firstly re-examine the problematics of the 'national' in the issue of national 
cinema, and then discuss the problem of the role of national audience and of dominant 
foreign cinemas. 
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Hill argues that whilst it is true that many national cinemas have often depended 
upon and promoted restricted notions of national identity, the idea of a national 
cinema does not in itself necessarily imply the sense of 'fixity' many critic imply 
(ibid.: 15). He rightly points out that one of weaknesses of Higson's arguments is that 
'he simply runs together "national specificity" with "imaginary coherence" and "a 
unique and stable identity ... (ibid.: 16). For Hill, 
[ ... ] it 
is quite possible to conceive of a national cinema, in the sense of one which works 
with or addresses nationally specific materials, which is none the less critical of inherited 
notions of national identity, which does not assumethe existence of a unique or unchanging 
6national culture', and which is quitecapable of dealing with social divisions and 
differences ...... national cinema can, 
in factý be neither nationalist nor homogenising in its 
assumptions about national identity if it is to address successftilly the complexities of 
nationally specific social and cultural configurations (ibid.: 16-7). 
Of course, the question of whether particular national cinemas have traded in the 
(restricted' national images Higson describes, or have shown the complexities of 
national cultural life as Hill proposes, can only be established by detailed concrete 
investigations of individual national cinemas. But, as long as we accept that the 
definition and type of a national cinema proposed by Hill is both necessary and 
desirable, the concept and the institution of national cinema are still worth defending. 
Moreover, once we endorse this argument, Guback's assertion that 'each culture has 
something distinctive to say, and a 
distinctive manner of saying it, which is 
mentioned above, immediately becomes 
both relevant and practical. 
However, in line with our previous discussion of the debates on nation and 
national culture, the definition of 
'national' and of an 'ideal' national cinema needs to 
be further clarified and that is not comprehensively done in Hill's article. Three main 
aspects should be noticed here. 
First, a nation is always an imagined community but not always a geographical 
space. There are nations within a nation-state and there are also nations without states. 
Hence, a national cinema does not have to correspond to a specific national culture 
defined in territorial terms. It could function instead as a site in which different 
national and cultural identities can be expressed and interact and compete with each 
other. The 'national' in national cinema is therefore both relative and contingent. The 
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emphasis on defending a national cinema is strategically and practically necessary for 
resolving the increasingly serious situation of cultural domination by foreign (mainly 
American) cinemas. In other words, the main goal for maintaining a national cinema 
is not necessary to serve national unity and rigid national identity but to establish the 
conditions in which articulations of the complexities of social and cultural 
configurations within a national territory could take place and thrive. 
Secondly, expressions of various sub-national and non-national cultural identities, 
coming from the religious groups, regional communities and different social fractions 
based on race, gender and class, may be blocked as well as encouraged in a national 
cinema depending on its organisation. 
Lastly, maintaining a national cinema does not necessarily imply isolation from 
interaction and dialogue with foreign cinemas that includes exchanges of films and 
cooperation in film production and distribution between nation-states and between 
non-governmental organisations. It was and is impossible and unnecessary to prevent 
the exchange and interaction of different cultures within and without national 
territories, particularly in the present context of globalisation. But exchange and 
cooperation must be established on two fundamental conditions. First, a viable and 
self-reliant national cinematic system must exist. Second, the exchange and 
cooperation process has to be fair and free, and the specific needs of any nation-state 
for developing its own film culture recognised and respected. 
But, if an existing domestic cinema is not as popular as imported foreign cinema, 
is the legitimacy of national cinema in crisis? Higson argues that imported Hollywood 
films and American culture can 'broaden the cultural repertoire available to 
audiences' (1989: 39-40) may be partially true. 
Yet, this is not a sufficient reason to 
accept the present situation of international 
film market as natural and neutral and to 
give up the defence of national cinema. The major transnational 
film companies that 
produce, distribute and exhibit the 
bulk of commercial films circulating around the 
globe have no motive or responsibility to examine or to present the social 
complexities and contradictions of the specific national communities where their 
products are consumed. As Guback reminded us many years ago, the global flow of 
films is guided by simple profit imperatives. That means, 'the films which are 
available at any moment on screens are there as a result of commercial decisions 
rather than of considerations of aesthetic quality or more detached concerns about 
where a society ought be going and how it can get there' (Guback, 1974b: 91-2). 
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Moreover, Higson's suggestions of considering the concept of national cinema 
from the consumptive rather than from the productive perspective and focusing on 
'the activity of national audiences and the conditions under which they make sense of 
and use the film they watch' weaken the case for maintaining a space in which an 
ideal national cinema can survive. Rather, his account strengthens the existing 
advantages enjoyed by American movies worldwide and makes it more difficult to 
argue for the conditions that will allow different types of films with specific social, 
cultural and aesthetic concerns to thrive. As Hill notes, in the case of Britain, what 
Higson does is to elide the distinction between the cinema in Britain and British 
national cinema. This seems not only to be 'conceptually unhelpful', but also to 'blur 
the arguments for film production which is specifically British rather than North 
American' (Hill, 1992: 14). 
Clearly in defending an ideal national cinema, we cannot ignore the sectors of film 
distribution and exhibition and the role of national audiences but recognising the 
significance of consumption does not necessarily entail abandoning arguments about 
the cultural value of national production (Schlesinger, 2000: 27). An 'ideal national 
cinema' must not only present and express the complexities and contradictions of the 
society it must also reach the local audience efficiently, pursue popularity and interact 
with them organically. Otherwise it will fall into a the marginal or elitist position that 
many national cinemas have already experienced and which provide reason for critics 
to keep on opposing or doubting the idea of national cinema. Yet, the problem of 
distribution and consumption of cinema is more complicated than the critics argue. 
There are three points that need to be discussed here. 
Firstly, the popularity of Hollywood films in many national markets cannot be 
used to legitimatise the international domination of Hollywood and devalue the rights 
of national cinemas. The advantage enjoyed by Hollywood mainly derives from the 
long-term occupation of the international film distribution, exhibition and marketing 
sectors and the consequent effects of taste and aesthetic assimilation. As Collins 
argues, 'the symbol system articulated, the language of the work, is one that requires 
skill and an educated consumer to read or decode'. For example, the conventions used 
in the popular American television series Dallas are widely generalised in the 
representations we have been educated to decode since infancy (Collins, 1990: 265). 
Under these circumstances, national film production which self consciously sets out to 
differentiate itself from Hollywood in story-telling style and in film language is very 
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likely to be unfamiliar and strange to a mass national audience. Furthermore, the 
'facilities' that national production needs to communicate with a national audience, a 
mass and effective distribution and exhibition system, are exactly what is missing in 
societies where cinema chains are mostly controlled by transnational corporations. 
The situation is quite evident in the cases dealt with in this thesis and I will come back 
to this issue later. 
Secondly, in promoting a national cinema, many nation-states' film policies tend 
to focus on the production sector and ignore reforms to the distribution and exhibition 
sectors. To maintain a viable national cinema it is not sufficient to concentrate on 
subsidy to film production, interventions are also needed to establish an effective 
distribution and exhibition mechanism for national products. That is the key to 
transforming the film culture and movie-viewing habits of national audience. In 
addition, a film literacy education project is also important but has been often ignored. 
It should be operated in both local communities and within the mass educational 
system to sustain the interaction between national cinema and national audience. 
Thirdly, due to structural and historical factors, the aesthetic and formal space of 
national film productions tends to be squeezed. Nevertheless, the choice of content 
and style is not a zero-sum question. It is not a dichotomy. It is not a choice between 
completely accepting mainstream popular taste and imitating Hollywood commercial 
films at one end, and adopting the aesthetic taste of educated elites and film creators 
and removing expression from the popular audience's viewing experiences at the 
other. An ideal national cinema ought to be able to find a balance point between these 
options and offer diverse and distinctive themes and styles that facilitate 
representations of the full complexities of the society. 
3.4 State, Market, Civil Society and National Cinema 
Certainly, an ideal national cinema cannot be achieved in a vacuum. In pursuing 
'better' national cinemas, examining the historical relationships between present 
national cinemas and their political and economic contexts is a vital task. 
In the historical context of American domination of the international film market, 
as Elsaesser argues, other national cinemas (with the possible partial exception of 
Indian cinema) have two apparently incompatible objectives-'to be economically 
viable but culturally motivated' (Elsaesser, 1989: 3). O'Regan also notes that the goal 
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of national cinema is 'one of producing a local presence alongside the dominant 
imported presence in both the local and international market' (O'Regan, 1996: 48). In 
other words, national cinema needs to be not only 'nationally specific' but also 
'internationally recognisable' (Elsaesser, 1989: 322; see also Higson, 1989). A 
national cinema that meets these ambitions is likely to have more opportunities to 
achieve international market success and to obtain investments from national and 
international capital. 
However, as Hill argues, 'a nationally specific cinema characterised by 
questioning and inquiry is not the kind of "national cinema" which is encouraged by 
the market-place'. On the contrary, the marketing of national specificity for 
international consumption is more likely to encourage 'the use of the most 
conventional or readily recognisable markers of nationality and national identity'. 
(Hill, 1992: 17) For example, the internationally popular films Crocodile Dundee and 
Four Weddings and a Funeral were criticised at home for providing a 'tourist's-eye 
view' of Australia and Britain respectively. And the worry is that, as O'Regan notes, 
the imagined Australia' and the 'imagined Britain' presented in these productions 
will directly shape future domestic film production as film-makers and investors seek 
a ready-made formula for market success. (O'Regan, 1996: 60) As Hill argues, this 
situation provides a finther reason why a cultural rather than an economic definition is 
the most important basis for a defence of national cinema. As he notes, 'the type of 
British film which is most able to exploit international economic opportunities is not 
necessarily of the type most capable of making a valuable contribution to British 
cultural life, (Hill, 1992: 17). 
At the same time, the maintenance and pursuit of a national cinema largely 
depends upon intervention by nation-states. From around the mid 1910s onwards, 
many governments have recognised that the potential ideological power of cinema 
could be harnessed to promote national unity in a context where foreign films were 
widely circulated within a nation-state and assumed to harin the national economy - 
and therefore the society's core ideologies and values (Higson, 1989: 43). As Neale 
puts it, 
[ ... ) Hollywood's 
international dominance is nearly always conceived by countries whose 
markets it dominates as a specifically national problem. Because of this, policies 
articulated as a solution to the problem nearly always involve the construction and 
66 
reconstruction, firstly of a national industry to whose experiences they can refer and to 
whose structures, practices and problems their statements can be addressed, and secondly 
of national cultural and cinematic traditions which the measures embodied in such policies 
are expected to foster, through protection, encouragement, and incentive. (Neale, 1981: 34) 
Historically, in attempting to maintain the unity of the nation and the legitimacy of the 
state itself, states have tended to promote a culturally restrictive version of national 
cinema, grounded in variants of the selective tradition as defined by cultural elites 
Otherwise, it does not function efficiently as a national identity promoter. This is the 
main reason why scholars like Higson and Nowell-Smith criticise the idea of national 
cinema. The situation is worsened by the contradictions embodied in most state's film 
policies. That is, though states pursue some measures such as subsidy and quota 
systems, the cinematic system is basically seen as a market-oriented institution. 
Consequently, states concentrate support on production and adopt a non-interference 
policy in relation to distribution and exhibition. The criteria to evaluate achievement 
are therefore profitability and efficiency, which leads national cinema further away 
from the ideal model discussed above (see Hill, 1992: 17-8). 
Despite the possible 'risks' to freedom of expression entailed in state efforts to 
maintain a national cinema and facilitate a national film culture, state intervention 
remains a necessary condition for national cinema's viability. There are at least two 
reasons to suggest this. Firstly, as mentioned earlier in the Chapter 1, though the 
power of state has been increasingly influenced by processes operating beyond its 
national territory in the age of globalisation, it remains the main, and arguably the 
only, actor capable of regulating market forces and creating the condition in which the 
ideal national cinema can thrive. Secondly, the market is not the only social force 
influencing the conduct of the state. The institutions of civil society can also play a 
vital role in the construction of national cinema and national culture. It is the civil 
society that can provide different perspectives from those of the market to film policy 
makers and prompt film makers to take on the task of representing the real 
complexities of the society. 
New Latin American Cinema provides an example of national cinema which is 
both more 'popular oriented' and different from European art cinemas. In the early 
post-colonial era, Latin American cinema served national 'consolidation' and 
'integration' and later national 'development'. But after three decades of profound 
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political and economic transformations, a new cinematic practice has emerged in 
some Latin American countries, most notably Brazil, Argentina and Cuba, since the 
1950s (see King, 1990; Burton-Carvajal, 2000). It was followed by a more active 
cinematic movement which obtained national, continental, and international attention 
in the 1960s and 1970s, This New Latin American Cinema was formed with the 
intention of combining popularity and seriousness. ' The movement emphasised that 
there is no clear line separating authors and audiences. The cinema is neither pure 
entertainment nor art but a social practice for connecting members in the society and 
for reforming and improving the society (Lopez, 1997: 137; Martin, 1997b: 18). For 
example, in his 1969 manifesto in pursuit of 'an imperfect cinema', Cuban filmmaker 
Julio G. Espinosa argues that, 
Imperfect cinema finds a new audience in those who struggle, and it finds its themes in 
their problems. For imperfect cinema, 'lucid' people are the ones who think and feel and 
exist in a world which they can change; in spite of all problems and difficulties, they are 
convinced that they can transform it in a revolutionary way. Imperfect cinema therefore 
has no need to struggle to create an 'audience'. On the contrary, it can be said that at 
present a greater audience exists for this kind of cinema than there are filmmakers able to 
supply that audience (quoted in Martin, 1997a: 80). 
We can also see similar thinking from the other main activists of New Latin American 
Cinema, such as Birri, Solanas and Getino in Argentina, Rocha in Brazil, and Sanjines 
in Bolivia (see their major documents in Martin, 1997a; and the in Burton, 1986). All 
of them, as Willemen notes, 'stress the need for a cinema of lucidity' (1989: 6). They 
have actively reflected on the possible biases inherent in their own social and 
educational formation and tried to develop 'effective modes of expression capable of 
connecting to actual audiences and reception practice' (Burton-Carvajal, 2000: 197). 
Apart from adjusting the form and content of film, these film-makers also sought to 
change distribution and exhibition practices in order to increase audience participation 
I Of course there are differences between every national new cinema in film production, content and 
form. For example, Brazilian New Cinema followed the thoughts of Italian New Realism cinema, 
emphasised the importance of the 'author' and received 
less support from the state. By contrast, Cuban 
cinema was mainly supported by Cuban government and the filmmakers focus more on revolutionary 
change of cinematic practice (see King, 1990; Burton, 1986). 
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and feedback. To this end they brought mobile cinema projectors to remote places and 
local communities and organise discussions and debates (ibid.: 204). 
Unlike many European countries which have much longer history as independent 
nations, Latin American countries have a long history of being colonised and are still 
experiencing the dependency of the post-colonial period. It is against this background 
that the filmmakers and intellectuals of Latin American countries have developed 'a 
different concept of nationalism and nationhood in the cinema' (Lopez, 1997: 142). 
They refuse the rigid and official concept of nation and embrace a dialectic 
relationship with national audience Whilst at the same time trying to form a pan-Latin 
American solidarity which reaches beyond national territories. Though both the 
external and internal conditions of the film industries in Latin American countries 
have experienced significant changes after the 1970s, New Latin American Cinema 
has provided an alternative, viable and progressive pattern of national cinematic 
practice, especially for the post-colonial societies. 
3.5 Alienated National Cinemas 
In contrast, there are also national cinemas which are relatively prosperous at the 
industrial level but disconnected from the social realities of the societies they inhabit. 
The most prominent examples are Indian cinema and Hong Kong cinema. 
Since the early 1980s, in terms of the number of film produced, the Indian film 
industry has been the largest in the world. On the other hand, while the number of 
Hong Kong film made has been sometimes lower than in America and Japan, it still 
occupies a disproportionately prominent place in the world film market given its small 
territory (see Table I I). ' 
3.5.1 Indian Cinema 
It is widely accepted that Rajah Harishchandra, premiered in 1913, was the first 
feature film to be made in India. However, since 1896 India already had a nascent 
film industry on the periphery of a vast and well-entrenched theatre industry in some 
major cities (Gokulsing and Dissanayake, 1998: 12; Raiadhyaksha, 2000). Indian 
2According to the data source, the number of production of long films in Philippines in 1994 has 
jumped to 428 and 456 in 1995 from 142 in 1989 and exceeded Hong Kong to be the third place of film 
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people started to show their passion for cinema from the outset but the domestic 
Indian film industry only began to prosper after the Second World War. There were 
several reasons for this. Firstly, the Partition of India led to the formation of a nation- 
wide audience for films in Hindi (the major language in India). Secondly the resulting 
aesthetic extended into films made in other Indian languages. In the late 1980s, it was 
estimated that more than 10 million tickets were sold everyday across the 
approximately 13,000 theatres nation-wide. Film output is around 750 to 800 films a 
year which exceeds that of any country in the world, and 'some of the viewers often 
pay a whole day's earnings to sit in the dark for nearly three hours' (Pendakur, 1989: 
69). Given its considerable productivity and popularity, some western critics have 
named Indian cinema 'Bollywood', in homage the major production centre, Bombay, 
and in recognition of a scale of production, which as Table 3.1 shows, that more than 
matches Hollywood. 
Table 3.1 Annual output of some large national film industries in the world (selected years) 
1980 1985 1990 1992 1995 
India 742(739)# 912(905) 948(948) 838(837) N/A(793) 
USA 264 255 276 210 420 
Hong Kong 141 NA 247 239* 315 
Japan 320 319 239 240 N/A 
China 82 127 134 170 146 
#. The numbers shown in the quotation marks for Indian film production are from 
Rajadhyaksha and Willemen (1999), pp. 30-32. They are slightly different from the 
data of UNESCO. 
*. The record of 1991. 
Source: UNESCO Statistics Year Book 1999; China Statistics Yearbook 2001. 
Indian films are made in the 16 officially recognised languages and a number of 
others', which makes Indian cinema uniquely regional. In fact, with the introduction 
of the sound in the early 1930s, Indian cinema experienced two vital changes. Firstly, 
those Indian viewers who desired to see films in their own languages and dialects, 
were catered to by productions even in languages spoken by relatively small numbers 
of people and limited to parts of a state. (Pendakur, 1990: 230) Secondly, as Binford 
points out, India has 'an intensely oral culture' that 'accords great importance to the 
production in the world. This situation is an interesting issue remains to be inquired. 
I For the list of these languages and their numbers of production, see Rajadhyaksha and Willemen, 
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sung or spoken word and to face-to-face communication'. Consequently, with the 
introduction of sound, Indian filmmakers were able to develop what may be termed 
the classic Indian cinematic form. The first Indian sound movie, Alam Ara (Beauty of 
the World), which was released in 193 1, contains ten songs and was an immediate and 
huge success. Almost every popular film since then has featured song and dance 
sequences and these continue 'to be the norm, more and more often as elaborate 
spectacle' (Binford, 1989: 2). The film Indrasabha released in 1932, for example, 
contained 70 songs (Gokulsing and Dissanayake, 1998: 13-4). In addition, most film 
songs went on to become popular music hits in India, 'spreading throughout urban as 
well as rural areas on the wings of the transistor radio' (Binford: 3). 
These particularities have made Indian cinema strongly competitive with imported 
films in its domestic market. As Pendakur notes, 'the phenomenon of dependence on 
foreign, particular American, films found in some other parts in the world is not the 
case with Indian movie-going audiences'. Historically, 'an estimated 93 percent of 
screen time is occupied by regional-language films' (1990: 230-1). In the late 
I 990sthe Indian government lifted restrictions on the importation of foreign films, but 
'Bollywood wins comfortably over Hollywood' (Kabir, 2001: 223). Until now only 
the Hindi version of Jurassic Park has enjoyed the same kind of box-office success as 
locally produced hits. Indian films also have been popular in some foreign markets 
including various countries in the Middle East, Asia, Affica, Latin American, together 
with the former USSR, and the UK and Ireland in Europe. Gross revenues from the 
export of feature films grew from Rs (Rupees) 55 million in 1973 to Rs 150 million in 
the peak year of 1980. In 1987-8,823 Indian films were exported to 48 countries and 
the gross revenue from those sales amounted to Rs 73 million (ibid.: 239-40). Thus, 
from the industrial point of view, Indian cinema without doubt a successful national 
cinema. At the cultural level however, this assertion is more controversial. 
Although as mentioned above, the typical aesthetic styles and forms of Indian 
popular films are drawn from traditional Indian culture, they rarely take account of the 
social realities and complexities of Indian society. Rather they present stereotypical 
characterisation and are 'mostly romantic musicals that offer escapism and fantasy 
worlds to the movie-goers' (Gokulsing and Dissanayake, 1998: 93-96; see also Kabir, 
2001). There are two main reasons that lead mainstream Indian cinema toward 
1999, pp. 30-32. 
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escapism and an a-political stance. Firstly, strict film censorship severely limits 
artistic and political expression in Indian cinema (Pendakur, 1990: 244; Gokulsing 
and Dissanayake, 1998: 51). Moreover, since the process of censorship and the 
possibility of further appeals will delay the timetable of film distribution and 
exhibition, which is very likely to cause loss and decrease profitability, even 
filmmakers sympathetic to more radical styles are inclined to cautious and 
conservative (Pendakur, 1990). This connects to the second reason, which is arguably 
more important, the eagerness or necessity to appeal to the largest possible audience 
and to pursue the maximum amount of profit under the market logic of a commercial 
film system. As Binford argues, 
The more speculative nature of the film industry and the need to appeal to the largest 
possible audience have intensified the most exaggerated and escapist tendencies in the 
popular cinema. As the production of extravagantly budgeted, multi-star spectaculars 
burgeoned, narrative and mise-en-scene became ever more baroque and increasingly 
remote from Indian reality ... the commercial cinema has an ambiguous relationship to the 
pressing issues of social transformation and the tensions between tradition and modernity. 
Even when apparently confronted, such issues are ordinarily dissipated in simplistic 
struggle between individualised. good and evil (Binford, 1989: 4). 
One of the box-office hits in 1993, Darr, provides an example. The story begins with 
a sequence of a valiant Naval officer (Sunil) bravely and magically rescuing a 
kidnapped girl from a nameless criminal organisation on a warship on his own. After 
the mission, he is to marry a beautiful girl (Kiran) from a rich family, who has been 
stalked by a young male psychopath (Rahul). Rahul keeps on harassing the couple, 
kidnaps Kiran and takes her to a boat. The seriously injured Sunil, again, magically 
and suddenly appears, fights with and kills Rahul and saves Kiran.. The film contains 
9 song and dance sequences varying in length from 3 to 7 minutes. Two of these are 
completely irrelevant to the story and are clearly inserted to present the songs and 
showcase the dancing skills of the actors. 
In addition, mainstream Indian movies often imitate and copy ideas and stories 
from Hollywood box-office hits films and combine them with traditional song and 
dance elements to ensure the popularity. In Darr, Sunil is obviously created as an 
incarnation of Sylvester Stallone's character in the Rambo series, particularly in the 
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rescuing sequence. During Sunil and Kiran's honeymoon, she dances to American 
pop dance music to entertain Sunil in the room of a hotel. The sequence imitates what 
Kim Basinger does in another American movie 9 and Y2weeks. Another big hit in the 
late 1990s, Kuch Kuch Hota Hai (1998), combines some elements of American youth 
oriented films, such as campus scenes, cheerleading squads, and student sports games. 
However, there were and are alternative cinematic practices outside the 
mainstream cinema. The Indian New Cinema, which includes the works of Satyajit 
Ray, Ritwik Ghatak, and Mrinal Sen in its early stage of the 1950s and 1960s and 
other successors afterwards, distinguished itself by rejecting the conventions of 
mainstream commercial cinema. Most of the resulting productions were made on low 
budgets, using unexperienced actors, had no song and dance sequences, and most 
important, had their 'roots in a recognisable Indian reality and dealt with characters 
that were close to life' (Valicha, 1988: 127; see also Gokulsing and Dissanayake, 
1998: 30-3). 
There were several historical conditions that supported the emergence of Indian 
New Cinema. Various attempts to adjust mainstream film-making conventions had 
been taking place within the mainstream film industry since the early 1950s, with the 
increasing extravagance and vulgarity of much post-war production (Binford, 1989: 
5). But it was the first international film festival, held in 1952, that opened to 
filmmakers and audiences a whole world of films that reflected new trends and new 
directions, especially Italian neo-realisin (Valicha, 1988: 127). At the same time, 
some state governments started to Promote local languages and various art forms, 
including cinema, after India was reorganised into states based on language groupings 
in the early 1950s (Pendakur, 1990: 236). In was in this context that Satyajit Ray 
made his first film Pather Panchali (The Song of Little Road) in 1955. Ray was 
influenced by Italian neo-realist films, particularly DeSica's Bicycle Thieves in the 
early 1950s. When he decided to make his first film, except for his own money and 
his wife's jewelry, he could only obtain a very modest amount of money from 
production companies. Eventually, it was financial support from the New York's 
Museum of Modem Art and from the state government of West Bengal to make the 
film possible (Robinson, 1989: 83). Pather Panchall is generally recognised as the 
start of Indian New Cinema. As Valicha argues, 'it will not be an exaggeration to say 
that it was Ray who set the tone for the development and evolution of the serious 
cinema in India' (Valicha, 1988: 9 1). 
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The main theme of Pather Panchali, the first film of his Apu Trilogy (the two 
being Aparajito, 1956; and The World of, 4pu, 1959), is the childhood experience of 
an Indian boy named Apu who lives in a rural village. He is about six years old with a 
restless curiosity and he and his sister, Durga, live in their own world, share secrets, 
and embark on adventures. One day they run across the fields around the village and 
out of their familiar world and have their first surprising and exciting encounter with a 
railway train belching black smoke. On their way back home, they experience another 
shock, they see their aunt's death in the forest. Durga dies later because of a serious 
fever and Apu begins to realise the meaning of death for himself. At the end, Apu's 
father, who is away to earn some money but fails, decides to take Apu's mother and 
Apu to a city, Benares, to search for new opportunities. 
Though it has the look and feel of simplicity, Pather Panchali expresses a lyrical 
realist representation of Indian rural life, whose aesthetic style and theme is 
completely different from Indian mainstream commercial cinema. Ray experimented 
with various expressive forms in his later works, but in terms of theme, he moved 
toward a more close examination of the social and political tensions of contemporary 
Indian life, as in The Chess Players (1977) (Nyce, 1988: 3-4). In general, as Nyce 
suggests, the most prominent theme of Ray's films is the process of change, the 
encounter of the old and the new, and the transformation of modem India 
After Pather Panchali was released in the USA and his Aparajito won the Golden 
Lion Award in Venice Film Festival, Ray became the most (if not the only) famous 
Indian director internationally. However, except for some commercial success in his 
home state of Bengal, where most of his films were made, his works, as well as those 
of other New Cinema directors, were not as popular in the Indian domestic market as 
in international art film markets. As Binford says, 'only a small proportion of New 
Cinema films have reached a mass audience' (1989: 6). Two main reasons could 
explain this situation. Firstly, the distribution channels are dominated by mainstream 
films. For examples, as Pendakur points out, Ray's films, which are circulated in the 
West through international film festivals and alternative distribution networks, are 
seldom screened in regular theatres outside Calcutta, the capital of Bengal (Pendakur, 
1990: 23 1). Secondly, the New Cinema tries to avoid the formulas and conventions of 
popular commercial cinema and create new expressive styles and forms. That may 
gain reputations and honours abroad, but their unfamiliarity looses the sympathy of 
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the domestic audience at the same time. Meanwhile, state intervention makes the 
situation worse. As Pendakur argues, 
State intervention, in the name of supporting 'good cinema', may have widened the gulf 
between the commercial and 'art' cinemas of India. What the State has pursued is a policy 
to seek out prestige abroad by encouraging artists who can compete in major international 
film festivals such as Venice, Berlin or Cannes, and to cultivate a certain arrogance on the 
part of the filmmakers who are not subjected to the market test within India (1990: 248). 
Some new directors have started to take on the challenge of finding a balance point 
and have adopted some commercial elements. The popular cinema, in turn, has also 
begun to accept influences from New Cinema (Binford, 1989: 6; Pendakur, 1990: 
249-251). 
Overall however, the differential success of the two Indian cinemas points to a 
paradox of national representation. Indian art cinema has been regarded as 
thematically exploring complex Indian realities and developing an indigenous cultural 
identity in cinematic terms. It recognised as representing the 'best' of Indian creativity 
by international film critics and audiences (and even by the Indian State). But its 
stylistic roots are predominantly Western and it has remained a minority presence 
within the Indian film market (Binford, 1989: 6). By contrast, most of the mainstream 
Indian commercial movies are unknown to audiences outside Indian communities and 
tend to evade the harder edges of contemporary Indian social realities. They however 
have distinctive style and form stemming primarily from traditional Indian cultural 
sources. Moreover, mainstream commercial cinema has shown itself adept at 
effectively indigenising Western influences has remained really 'popular' with 
majority audiences within India. 
3.5.2 Hong Kong Cinema 
Another example is provided by Hong Kong cinema. Although not usually recognised 
as a 'national' cinema, Hong Kong cinema shares a number of characteristics in 
common with Indian cinema. It is a market-driven system. It produces large numbers 
films. It has developed particular aesthetic styles and forms and launched big stars. It 
is popular both in domestic and foreign markets, but does not engage consistently 
with the social realities of its 'home' base. Due to its special status as a colony 
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situated within the complicated political and historical networks of China, Taiwan and 
the diasporic Chinese communities of Asia, however, Hong Kong is more like a 
regional centre of Chinese movie production and exportation than a national cinema 
base (Leung, 1993). 
Table 3.2 The production and exportation of Hong Kong film industry (1970-92) 
Production 
(Number of films) 
Exportation 
Value (million HKS) 
Importation 
Value (million HK$) 
1970 147 10.25 11.76 
1971 126 17.08 21.15 
1972 130 23.38 20.67 
1973 350-400(2) 46.66 19.74 
1974 178 52.79 20.01 
1975 112 35.34 22.91 
1976 104 34.31 26.94 
1977 115 36.69 21.95 
1978 130 50.86 29.25 
1979 137 60.84 28.93 
1980 142 76.03 33.29 
1981 130 85.14 34.20 
1982 129 83.50 36.23 
1983 118 78.68 43.75 
1984 109 62.24 42.73 
1985 105 51.33 33.44 
1986 100 54.49 40.32 
1987 110 57.37 50.15 
1988 139 83.99 52.54 
1989 156 123.14 45.51 
1990 241 102.91 41.84 
1991 211 104.82 29.59 
1992 376 108.50 34.20 
Source: Compiled from Leung(i 993). The authors main data source is Hong Kong Trade Statistics. The numbers 
of production in 1975-1977 are from Unesco Statistical Yearbook. 
Although production has diminished dramatically since the mid-1990s, in its hey 
day in the 1950s and 1960s, the Hong Kong film industry produced an average of 200 
films a year, with some years peaking at more than 300 (Lent, 1990: 95). After 1970, 
even with the influence of the growing television industry, the average annual 
production was still more than 100. In addition, the value of film export s has 
continued to be higher than those of imports since the 1970s. From 1989 to 1992, the 
value of film export averaged three times those of imports. During this same period, 
the value of imported movie products increased by 2.9 times while the value of 
exports increased by 10.5 times (see Table 3.2). In the past two decades, the US 
market share in Hong Kong sometimes fell to less than 30 percent. It was only after 
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1997, that Hollywood producers could claim slightly over half the admission receipts 
(Bordwell, 2000: 1). 
Located in the most laissez-faire economic system in Asia under the British 
colonial government and with an established film industrial infrastructure built on the 
popularity of Cantonese movies in the 1950s, Hong Kong became the favourite place 
for Chinese capitalists to invest in the movie business (see Fonoroff, 1998). For them, 
Hong Kong was simply a base for producing and exporting movies. Their main target 
was the international market, particularly the offshore Chinese communities in every 
part of the world. The Hong Kong domestic market, though the people there displayed 
a passion for movie-going, was of secondary concern. This situation was even more 
evident after the 1970s when the industry enjoyed even greater successes in overseas 
markets. As one executive of the largest film company in Hong Kong, Golden 
Harvest, whose market activities have been international in scope since its founding in 
1970, said in an interview examining their foreign market strategy in the mid- I 980s, 
The problem we face is producing for Southeast Asia and Taiwan markets. The box-office 
guarantee is not safe. It's a gamble. Tastes of Southeast Asia countries have all gone 
different ways. Twenty years ago, we'd do a picture and it would be all right everywhere. 
It's not the case now. We either do a small budget picture now aimed specially for Taiwan 
or Singapore or elsewhere in Southeast Asia, or a big budget film that will hit all countries. 
Nothing in between (quoted in Lent, 1990: 106). 
In order to appeal to and to compete with Hollywood for the various major audiences 
living in very different political, economic and cultural contexts, Hong Kong cinema 
has developed formulas and genres with three main characteristics. First, it draws 
heavily on elements taken from traditional Chinese culture, such as kung-fu, ghosts, 
legends, Chinese gambling games and so on. These are already familiar to Chinese 
audiences living in different societies. The 'Orientalist' atmosphere they evoke also 
attracts audiences from different cultures. Secondly, stories are often framed and told 
in a simple narrative structure to make them accessible to audiences everywhere. 
Thirdly, to avoid any possible political sensitivities and tensions that might affect 
distribution and box-office returns, most films are fiction. They often have only weak 
connections with the particular societal situation and history of Hong Kong, let alone 
taking political and social problems seriously (Yau, 2001). 
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At the industrial level, Hong Kong cinema is thoroughly commercial. The average 
production time is short to allow for rapid returns. Except for some big productions 
featuring major stars such as Jackie Chan or John Woo, it takes only seven to eight 
weeks to complete a film from contract to screen (Stokes and Hoover, 1999: 25). In 
addition, copycating and mimicing are normal. Successful formulas such as A Better 
Tomorrow, Chinese Ghost Story and God of Gamblers are extensively duplicated and 
mined for sequels and series As a result, as Lent has pointed out, escapist, imitative 
and superficial, are the main adjectives that fairly describe mainstream Hong Kong 
cinema (Lent, 1990: 113). 
Both in terms of quantity and performance at the box-office, the most prominent 
genre in Hong Kong cinema is the action movie. Even comedy and other genres often 
contain various elements of action (Chen, 2000: 20-22). Swordplay and martial arts 
films provide a good example of the tradition's major characteristics. Most are set in a 
placeless and timeless ancient utopia. The distinction between good and evil, hero and 
villain, is definite and unambiguous. Ile violent measures which are taken to solve 
personal or family problems are presented as morally legitimate (Teo, 1997). We can 
see all these characteristics at work in most of films in this genre. For example, 
Dragon Innl Longmen Kezhan (1967), a classic of the genre directed by King Hu, is 
about the conflict between a group of patriots and the evil repressive institution of the 
Ming Dynasty. Likewise, The One Armed Swordsmanl Dubi Dao (1967), directed by 
Zhang Che, describes how an orphan suffers physical maiming (one of his arms is cut 
off by a jealous companion) saves his master and family from impending massacre at 
the hands of an enemy and becomes a hero. 
In another popular variant of this genre, a man's parents or master are killed by 
someone(s) when he is not able to resist. He then tries to train and strengthen himself, 
finds a secret guide book of special martial arts, or is taught by an extraordinary and 
wise master. This equipped he kills the villains and achieves his revenge. The films of 
the two major actors in kung-fu films, Bruce Lee and his successor, Jackie Chan, are 
often based on this formula. For example, in Bruce Lee's Fist of Furyl iingwu Men 
(1972), he plays a martial arts student named Chen Zhen in the late Ching Dynasty, 
who avenges the death of his master and recovers the honour of the master's martial 
arts school by defeating Japanese rivals. Similarly, in one of Chan's early films, 
Drunken MasterlZui Quan (1978), Chan learns the special skills of drunken kung-fti 
from a drunkard master and then defeats a villain who is hired to kill his father. 
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In general, these films merely provide their audiences with a space of escape from 
real life, and an opportunity to project their real anger and anxieties onto characters 
who inhabit a utopia and who rescue themselves by superpowers and violence. Even 
so we have to admit, that in terms of cinematic aesthetics and forms, there are some 
significant achievements of swordplay and martial arts films, as well as the other 
genres in mainstream Hong Kong cinema (see Teo, 1997). Certainly they fascinate 
some Western critics who regarded them as 'richly and delightfully artful' (Bordwell, 
2000: 2). However, this does not change the fact that innovations and inventiveness in 
film form and genres are mainly driven by market forces or that the principle themes 
of those mainstream films are remote from the social realities of Hong Kong. 
At the same time, as in India, alternative cinematic practices have also developed 
in Hong Kong. A group of new directors including Allen Fong, Patrick Tarn, Tsui 
Hark and Ann Hui, who were trained abroad or in the television production sector, got 
their start in filmmaking during the late 1970s. They have brought new creative 
energies to Hong Kong cinema.. Their work, known as the 'new wave' of Hong Kong 
cinema, tries to avoid commercial formulas, adopts more realistic expressive forms, 
and pays more attention to real social problems. For example, Fong's Father and Sonl 
Fuzi Qing (198 1) deals with communication difficulties between generations and the 
problems posed by the housing shortage in Hong Kong. Hui's The Boat Peoplel 
Touben Nuhai (1982), is about the Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong (see Law, 
2001; Rodriguez, 2001). 
There were also movies produced in the late 1980s and early 1990s which dealt 
with some issues raised by Hong Kong's reunification with mainland China in 1997. 
Ann Hui's Song of Exilel Ketu Qiuhen (1990), for example, deals with problems of 
national identity and the meaning of 'Chineseness' by exploring a mother and 
daughter relationship. Some younger directors also joined in filmmaking in this 
period. Known as the 'second wave', they include Eddie Fong, Clam Law, Stanley 
Kwan and Wong Kar-wai (see Yau, 2001: 18; Fu and Desser, 2000). They have 
continued to introduce social concerns into Hong Kong cinema, though in a more 
post-modernist way. Law and Fong's Autumn Moonl Qiu Yue (1992), for example, 
embodies the uncertainty and anxiety of the 1997 reversion through a young couple's 
relationship and immigration problems in Hong Kong. Wong Kar-wai's Days of 
Being WMIA Fei Zhenzhuan (1990), which deals with the relationships of several 
lost youths in the 1960s, is also an obvious allusion to the 1997 syndrome in Hong 
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Kong. More recently, The Longest Summerl Qunian Yanhua Tebie Duo (1998), 
directed by Fruit Chan, depicts the transition in the identity and sentiments of Hong 
Kong people by focussing on a Chinese British soldier turned delivery man after 1997. 
However, without substantial state intervention, the 'new wave' and the 'second 
wave" rapidly became an alternative market segment promoted by private 
corporations, and most of the new directors were relatively quickly incorporated into 
mainstream production (Lent, 1990). More precisely, as Law argues, New Wave films 
emerged at a time when the major studios were searching for new talent for their 
productions (Law, 2001: 50). And films dealing specifically with Hong Kong's 
contemporary social realities could not generate a stable resource base because they 
could not attract sufficient domestic and foreign viewers. 
For example, the domestic box-office returns of Autumn Moon were HK$ 209,679 
which gave it 174th place in the year of its release. In contrast, the box-office 
champion of that year, Justice, My Fooff Shen Si Kuang, a film featuring the popular 
comedy star Steven Chiau (Chou Ying-chi), had revenues of HK$ 49,884,734 (Chen, 
2000: 553-8). According to Chen, if we divide all Hong Kong films produced from 
1970 to 1997 roughly into three major genres of action, comedy and drama (defined 
as more serious in content and form, like the works of the 'new wave'), the total 
annual top ten box-office hits contain 121 action films, 91 comedies, and only 26 
dramas (ibid.: 44). As a consequence, the 'new wave' did little to change the main 
themes and structure of Hong Kong cinema. 
The two particular cases we have discussed here - India and Hong Kong - 
demonstrate the core point that, an ideal national cinema cannot be achieved merely at 
the industrial level. It is always and everywhere also a matter of culture and 
representation. Even when we do not see the state or the ruling party promoting a 
specific, rigid and homogenous national identity through cinema, film in its 
commercial forms still plays a major role in maintaining the status quo in an indirect 
way. Its recurrent themes and structures taken together with its major silences and 
elisions, constantly undermine the goal of dynamic and progressive cultural 
development. 
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Chapter 4 State Intervention in the Cultural 
Sphere: The Case of Cinema 
4.1 State, Culture, and Mass Media 
All areas of public policy are fields 'of contestation between rival discourses, 
ideologies and interests' (McGuigan, 1996: 7). In the case of communications and 
cultural policies however, particular complexities and contradictions arise from the 
fact that the mass media are simultaneously significant industrial sectors and the pivot 
of public symbolisation. As Golding notes, 
The reason regimes are involved in both these forms of regulation is that the media 
are at one and the same time cultural institutions providing major and core features 
of the symbolic and normative environment in which we live, while also being 
industries of enormous and growing significance in the changing industrial 
landscape, with substantial command of both the centres of key industrial growth, 
and of large proportions of consumers' disposable spending power (Golding, 1998: 
10). 
In the area of media content states might wish to purse a range of goals. They may 
want to promote particular informational or educational messages that they deem to 
be helpful in pursuing the public good and the development and deepening of 
democracy. They may wish to restrict the circulation of materials judged to be 
harmful to public health or public order or detrimental to the interests of minorities or 
vulnerable groups, such as children. And, perhaps most important of all, they may 
censor materials thought to be explicitly or potentially threatening to the security of 
the state or the political legitimacy of the government of the day (see Golding and 
Murdock, 1991: 24). At the same time, governments may also try to use the media to 
promote a positive picture of their activities and political measures. These activities 
are central to the development of a 'public relations state' (Golding, 1994), and to 
what Raymond Williams calls the 'display' function of cultural policy (Williams, 
1984; also McGuigan, 1998). 
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Interventions in the economic organisation of media are characterised by a similar 
range of objectives. Firstly, states may seek to regulate the structure and operation of 
media markets through licensing, controls on the concentration of ownership, and the 
development of competition and consumer law. Secondly, they may allocate public 
resources to the media by way of subsidies and taxation arrangements on the grounds 
that such measures are necessary to address perceived 'market failures' and ensure 
diversity of production and equality of public access to key cultural and 
communication goods. 
The basic modalities of intervention that underpin these various strategies have 
been usefully codified by Golding in the typology shown in Figure 4.1 (Golding, 1998: 
10). In practice of course, national media policies are less clear-cut than these ideal 
types suggest, not least because they vary considerably from medium to medium 
depending on the medium's specific history and its perceived centrality economic and 
cultural goals. Consequently, we need to pay attention to the 'peculiarities' of film 
policies as well as to their communalities with other media sectors. 
Figure 4.1 A typology of state interventions in media 
STRUCTURE 
Interventionist 
CONTENTS 
Liberal 
Source: Golding (1998: 11). 
Interventionist Liberal 
Authoritarian Free market/ 
strong state 
Regulatory Libertarian 
4.2 Mapping Film Policy 
In common with other media sectors, film is both a significant industry in its own 
right and a major force within the wider configuration of the entertainment industry 
more generally and a primary producer of the images and narratives with which 
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popular culture pictures and explains the social world. Both these characteristics of 
the medium are addressed by film policies. 
4.2.1 Cinema as industry and as culture 
In every country in the world, film is integrated into an industrial system in which 
production, distribution and exhibition are linked together in an economic circuit. The 
surviving socialist countries, Cuba and China, are no exceptions even though the 
cinema still operates under strict state control. When they look at film as an industry 
states tend to focus on its economic roles as a source of employment, innovation and 
export earnings. In capitalist economies, the film industry is unambiguously part of 
the private sector. The major studios, distributors and cinema chains are owned by 
their shareholders and operated first and foremost as means of generating profits. 
State intervention is generally confined to preventing abuses of market power and 
maintaining the sector's commercial viability. In contrast to broadcasting, where a 
number of capitalist states set up public broadcasting institutions funded out of the 
public purse, support for non commercial production and distribution is minimal. 
In his pioneering analysis of the relations between the American state and 
American film corporations in the operation of the film industry and its expansion 
into the international film market, Tomas Guback concludes that state intervention 'is 
a device to protect an economic sector from its own internal weakness and 
contradictions, as well as from pressures of a systemic nature originating in the 
economy at large' (Guback, 1987: 91, see also 1969,1985). The state does this, he 
argues, because it ' shares the ideological commitments of the private sector and 
fosters its activities' (Guback, 1985: 124). 
At the same time, states know very well that film is not simply an industry like any 
other. The fact that its products have the ability to capture popular hopes and fears in 
resonant images invests them with more potential ideological power than a can of 
soup or a pair of shoes. For the state, the ideological power of cinema is a two-sided 
coin: potentially both supportive and threatening to the maintenance of its legitimacy. 
Hoping to disarm the subversive power of images authoritarian regimes mobilise 
cinema as part of the political propaganda machine. They impose strict censorship and 
control of content and carefully monitor the entire chain of production, distribution 
and consumption. In contrast, democratic states pay more attention to the cultural and 
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educational functions of cinema. Film is regarded as an expressive form with the 
power to disseminate 'useful' social and scientific knowledge and to foster social 
cohesion and tolerance by dismantling negative social stereotypes. It is also seen as an 
art form in its own right, with its own traditions, conventions and creative geniuses, 
who deserved to be studied in the interests of fostering a more informed and 
discriminating film culture. Consequently, except for certain minimal prohibitions on 
morally inappropriate contents, such as violence, sex, and racist messages, the state 
normally adopts a supportive and liberal position in managing national cinema. 
Cinema's intimate relation to national culture is a particularly pivotal aspect of its 
cultural role. For nation-states, cinema offers a potent art form capable of representing, 
constructing or maintaining national cultures and identities. From this perspective, 
cinema is positioned on the cultural spectrum closer to institutions like museums and 
national libraries and galleries than other entertainment media. As Johnson points out, 
one of the rationales for state cultural policies is that culture is 'the ultimate guarantor 
of a nation's cultural unity and identity'. Consequently, to ensure the integrity of 
national culture the state has to 'protect society's cultural memory and heritage, to 
defend its cultural values, to stimulate cultural production, and to ensure that culture 
is not defined exclusively by market criteria' (Johnson, 1996: 134). These concerns 
may not always coincide with the priorities of studio owners and film producers 
however. Indeed, because national cinemas are most often supported through 
economic measures designed to favour 'national' productions (defined either 
organisationally or culturally) they may well find themselves in conflict. 
So far we have discussed film policy in very general, synoptic, terms. In order to 
take our analysis further however it is necessary to look in more detail at the specific 
contexts in which the film policy is made and pursued. Here Guback's suggestions 
(1987: 90-1) are particularly helpful. He contends that if state intervention is intended 
to be a solution to a problem, we should ask: 'What is the problem? What are the 
causes of the problemT and, 'Is state intervention capable of eliminating the causes, 
or will it be a mere palliativeT 
4.2.2 Supportive and restrictive intervention 
State can intervene either positively or negatively in relation to both the film industry 
and film culture. I call the negative policies, designed to bind, restrict or limit certain 
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industrial or cultural conditions and practices, restrictive intervention. Conversely, 
positive policies pursued to encourage, lead, and support particular industrial or 
cultural conditions and practices constitute supportive intervention'. Taking this 
distinction and building on our earlier discussion of the dual character of cinema, we 
arrive at the general typology of film policies shown in Figure 4.2. 
Figure 4.2 General types of film policy 
Cinema as Industry Cinema as Culture 
Supportive Establishing a special regulatory Promoting particular themes and 
authority for the industry, contents 
Eliminating barriers to market entry Encouraging the teaching of film in 
Special measures to aid the industry schools 
Public subsidy to film production and 
distribution 
Restrictive Regulating the structure of the industry, Controlling film contents. 
Regulating the operational practices of 
the industry, 
Special taxation arrangements for the 
industry. 
In practice however, the practical consequences of any particular policy may well be 
at odds with the government's overall aims. A restrictive policy may aim to protect 
the national film industry and national film culture from international competition or 
I Schnitnian (1984) has distinguished restrictive, supportive and comprehensive protectionist film 
policies. A restrictive policy includes screen and 
import quotas, import tariffs, and customs duties, is 
designed to give the local industry some space by impeding a complete takeover of the local market by 
foreign concerns. A supportive policy includes film financing, loans, subsidies and training of local 
film industry workers. A comprehensive state policy would include both restrictive and supportive 
measures (ibid: 46). Since Schnitman was 
dealing with the protectionist film policies of Latin 
American countries, in which the film markets are dominated by the US films for a long time, no 
matter the policy is restrictive or supportive, the goal of the policy is to 'support' local film industry. 
This distinction is not helpful when we consider the real restrictive policy to the local film industry, 
like censorship. For a more general review of the film policy as a whole, I suggest the other definitions 
of supportive and restrictive intervention here. 
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incorporation. For example, a quota system, limiting the number of overseas films 
that can be imported and shown can provide tangible practical support for local 
production by freeing up exhibition capacity. At the same time, it does not, in itself, 
guarantee that the national film industry will develop in ways that coincide with the 
government's cultural aims. It could lead to a rash of cheap inferior local productions 
(quota 'quickies') that damage the long term development of the local film industry, 
as happened in Brazil in the 1970s and 1980s (Johnson, 1996: 136-7). 
4.2.3 National film policy 
The general typology of state interventions in cinema shown above is a useful first 
step in analysis but to develop a ftiller account we need to distinguish the different 
levels and patterns of national film policies. In particular, we need to look carefidlY at 
the which particular aspects of the film industry are the subject of intervention. We 
can identify five levels: 
(1) Level one is comprised of the general environment and institutional settings in 
which the film industry operates. 
(2) Levels two to four cover the major operational divisions of the film industry; 
production, distribution, and exhibition. Although in many countries, film 
companies have established vertically integrated structures which combine 
these three sectors, they still have specific function whether they are 
departments within the same corporation or independent companies. Certainly, 
most governments continue to regard them as separate sectors requiring 
specific policies, although because of the degree of structural integration 
policies aimed at one sector usually have knock-on effects on the other sectors. 
(3) Level five is film content. 
Restrictive policies 
Restrictive measures may include: 
, 4. The institutional setting of the 
industry Country's vary considerably in their 
patterns of cultural and media institutions , their administrative structures, and the 
balance struck between private and public enterprise. The USA film industry for 
example, operates in conditions that are overwhelmingly market-oriented and film 
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companies are seen as business organizations to be governed in key areas such as 
trade, competition and anti-trust by commercial law. 
A Restrictions on ownership States in capitalist economies generally impose some 
restrictions on the ownership of film companies In most cases the primary aim is 
to ensure an 'acceptable' level of competition within the industry. In some 
instances however, market goals may be overridden by political considerations. In 
Indonesia for example, the distribution and exhibition sectors are privately owned 
but dominated by a single company, Subentra, owned by a relative of pre-President 
Suharto. Here we have a state sponsored monopoly. (Sen, 1996). 
C. Importation quotas. Importation quota regulate the number of foreign films that 
can be imported into a national market. With the exception of the US (which has 
the strongest film industry in the world), most countries operate some kind of quota 
system to regulate the domestic film market and protect the local film industry. 
Because these interventions involve cross-border cultural, economic and even 
political relationships, they are inevitably the site of international power struggles 
(see Miller, 1996). In some cases, governments may introduce a finther distinction 
and classify imports by their source. In Indonesia, for example, the government 
imposes different import regulations depending on whether films have come from 
China, other Asian markets, or from Europe or America. (Sen, 1996: 176). 
D. Screen quotas. Here again, practices differ from one country to another. In Latin 
American countries for example, quota systems may insist that a set percentage of 
all films exhibited must be locally produced or they may require nationally 
originated materials to be shown on a fixed number of days in any one year 
(Johnson, 1996: 135-6). 
E. Censorship. As mentioned earlier, States employ censorship to restrict or revise 
representations that they feel may threaten or damage either their own political 
legitimacy, or national security, and the public good. In democratic countries 
where the censorship system is operated by a public or civil organisation the 
standards adopted are generally relatively liberal in relation to political content 
except in times of war or national emergency or in relation to tangible threats to 
national security or public safety, as in the case of 'terrorism'. However, decisions 
in contentious moral areas, or in relation to children and other social groups judged 
to be vulnerable, may well be more restrictive. Where the censorship system is 
controlled by the government however, both moral and political content is likely to 
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be subjected to close scrutiny and extensive regulation covering themes, imagery 
and narrative structure. 
Supportive policies 
Measures supportive of the film industry may include: 
A. A Special authority body Some states provide institutional support for cinema by 
establishing a dedicated administrative body . The CNC (Centre national de la 
cinematographle) which was established in 1946 in France is the prototypical 
example. It is charged with 'maintaining control over the financing of films, the 
receipts from box-office takings and statistics pertaining to the totality of film 
practices' (Hayward, 1993: 45). Similarly, the National Film Finance Corporation 
in Britain acted as a film bank and played a central role in financing British films 
between 1950 and 1984 (when it became British Screen Finance Limited) (see 
Guback, 1969: 146-9). 
B. Financial aid As these instances suggest, providing finance to the domestic 
industry, and particularly to film production, by way of direct subsidies, low- 
interest loans or prizes, is perhaps the most important supportive aspect of film 
policy. At the same time, these interventions inevitably raise questions about 'what 
kind, of film should be supported, 'how' decisions on resource allocation should be 
made, and by 'whom'. As Johnson notes, in his discussion of subsidy policy in 
Brazil, these issues 'caused the state, on the one hand, to enter into competition 
with non-favoured sectors of the industry and, on the other, to become a site of 
contention for competing groups' (Johnson, 1996: 142-3). The questions of 
'where' the money comes from also poses problems. One often adopted measure is 
to impose special taxation on imported films or adult films and to use revenues 
raised to subsidise local film production. The French government for example, 
takes four per cent of the box-office revenues of X-rated films to use as subsidy 
(Hayward, 1993: 42). Some raise revenues from other media sectors, most notably 
the video and television industries, by for example, introducing levies on blank 
video tapes that might be used to record films off-air. And some use money raised 
from general taxation appropriations or reallocate revenues raised from other 
financial sources such as the National Lottery in the UK (see McIntyre, 1996). 
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C. International co-production Facilitating co-production and co-distribution 
projects between by two or more countries' film companies can also be a useful 
support for film production. Pendakur defines co-production as that 'the principal 
mechanism used by film and television producers to pool capital and labor from 
around the world and gain market access globally' and he identifies four variants: 
public- and private- sector co-productions in a given country; public- and private- 
sector co-productions of different countries; private capital from different countries; 
and treaty co-productions (Pendakur, 1990: 194-5). Public policies are particularly 
relevant to the second and the fourth of these. Hoskins and his colleagues have 
usefully summarised the possible benefits of international co-production. These 
include pooling of financial resources, access to foreign government's incentives 
and subsidies, access to partners' markets, access to third-country market, access to 
a project initiated by a partner, cultural goals, desired foreign locations, cheaper 
inputs in partner countries, and learning from partners. In addition, co-production 
is widely regarded as an effective way to make films capable of competing with 
Hollywood products. 
D. Promotion in overseas markets Policies in this area mainly help the production 
and distribution sectors. When the governments consider promoting domestic film 
products in international markets, the various kinds of quota system pursued by 
other countries are seen as barriers that need to be eliminated. Action to dismantle 
these barriers can be seen as a supportive measure for their domestic film industry. 
This is particularly evident in countries in which have relatively strong film 
industry, like the US. In fact, there has been a long history of the American state 
using its economic, political and even military advantages to negotiate or enforce 
other countries' governments to remove 'barriers' to the entry of American film 
companies (see Guback, 1985; Jarvie, 1992; Thompson, 1985). 
E. Promoting specific fillnu States may also use prizes or special subsidies to 
promote and encourage certain themes, genres, and political ideologies in films. 
To these five major forms of positive intervention we also need to add support for 
industry training, the encouragement of film archives and education, and subsidies to 
non commercial distribution. 
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The range of possible policy interventions, both supportive and restrictive, are 
summarised in Figure 4.3. 
Figure 4.3 The film industry policies 
Supportive intervention Restrictive intervention 
Institution Establishing a special authority to Setting the institutional frame for the 
aid film industry development. industry, 
Restrictions on ownership, 
Production Subsidies, Loans, Prizes, Licensing production, 
International co-production, Taxation, 
Tax breaks, 
Training, 
State production, 
Distribution Exploiting overseas markets, Taxation, 
International co-distribution, Importation quota 
Subsidies, Loans, Prizes, 
Market research, 
Tax breaks, 
State distribution, 
Nhibition/ Subsidies, Loans, Prizes, Taxation, 
Consumption Tax breaks, Imposing quotas on the import and 
Training, exhibition of overseas films. 
Film literacy and education 
Establishing a National film archive 
and theatre, 
-F, 1-m-c-o nte ýnt Subsidy and prizes for the films with Censorship, 
specific themes or contents Rating systems 
4.2.5 International and Regional Interventions 
Most discussion of film policy focuses on national initiatives. Increasingly however, 
relevant decisions are being made either at a supra-riational level or devolved down to 
regions or even municipalities within a nation state. 
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The audio-visual policies adopted by the European Union to aid the development 
of the European audio-visual industries are perhaps the most prominent example of 
supra-riational action In addition, trade agreements made by international economic 
organisations, particularly the World Trade Organisation (WTO), play an increasing 
important role in established the operating environment of national cultural industries. 
Successive US governments have consistently pressed within the WTO and its 
predecessor GATT, for the removal of trade barriers that they judge are detrimental to 
the economic interests of their domestic media corporations, and have been met with 
strong resistance by some European countries and other Member States. There will be 
more discussions on this issue in the next section. 
The other relevant level of contemporary intervention are the film policies 
implemented by regional or city governments. In England, for example, there were, 
until recently, ten regional arts boards (RABs) that accepted funds from the Arts 
Council of England and the British Film Institute (BFI), and provided production 
funds for regional cultural productions, including films (see McIntyre, 1996). In India, 
several state governments have assisted in developing regional film production in 
local languages by way of low-interest loans and subsidies. Some states have also 
instituted cash awards for meritorious films (Pendakur, 1996: 166-7). 
4.3 Trends in Film Policy in the Global Age 
Taking European countries as examples, McQuail argues that in the post-war period, 
media policy was predominantly 'national' in character, shaped by normative 
concerns relating to the needs of 'democracy', with an emphasis on the role of the 
media in public life'. But today this phase of policy making, he stresses, is over 
(McQuail, 2000: 28). Though neither the emerging structure of new media and 
communications nor the new policy paradigm may not be entirely clear yet, we can, 
he argues, identify several major transitions in media policy (ibid.: 29): 
(1) A process of deregulation spreading from the USA to Europe and further; 
(2) The commercial exploitation of significant new media and key elements of old 
media (broadcasting in particular); 
(3) The deregulation and privatisation of telecommunications monopolies; 
(4) Proliferating impacts from the globalisation of media structures and flows. 
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Though his arguments are based on the European experience, the tendencies he 
identifies within the new media environment and media policies are increasingly 
evident in other regions. Taking his analysis a stage finther we can suggest that 
national media policy today has to respond to the three interrelated global trends in 
the media and communications system mentioned in Chapter 1: globalisation, 
marketisation, and digitalisation. 
The accelerating global exchange of cultural artefacts, and particularly the 
increasing pervasiveness of American brands and products, has created a gathering 
crisis for most countries' national cultural products and national culture. National 
governments are faced with the challenge of devising appropriate measures for 
maintaining both domestic cultural production and national identity. Although 
national governments are still the main actors in the global political economic arena, 
and national media policy still has its irreplaceable significance (McQuail, 2000; 
Collins and Murroni, 1996; Sorbet, 1998), the fact that national sovereignty has been 
progressively eroded by the strengthening web of global economic interconnections 
makes implementing national media policies more difficult. 
Secondly, following the rapid rise of neo-liberal economic thinking in the late 
1970s and 1980s in Britain and the US, media policy has become inextricably caught 
up in the dynamics of marketisation. The concepts and practices of deregulation, 
liberalisation, and privatisation in media and communications have spread all over the 
world and maximizing market 'freedoms' is now widely regarded as the best way to 
advance communications. However, this does not mean that social-cultural goals have 
disappeared altogether. As McQuail points out, they are still important rhetorically, 
but at the same time, the idea of the public interest 'is being significantly redefined to 
encompass economic and consumerist values' (McQuail, 2000: 3 1; see also McQuail 
and Siune, 1998). 
Thirdly, the process of digitalisation and technological innovation has contributed 
to growing media convergence. The boundaries between different media have become 
increasingly blurred. In response, commentators have called for the creation of a 
single regulatory agency to replace the present array of medium specific authorities 
(Collins and Murroni, 1996), a call that is now being heeded in a number of countries. 
However, the process of media convergence has not been oriented to public 
interests On the contrary, it has been driven primarily by the liberalizing and 
privatising tendencies in government media policies. These in turn have paved the 
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way for fiirther concentration and the emergence of huge cross- media conglomerates. 
Faced with these Behemoths., Collins and Murroni argue, national governments 'can 
no longer control all aspects of their media and communications regimes' (ibid.: 15). 
Today's world cinemas and national film policies are also a part of these 
interlinked transitions in the media environment and media policy but with some 
special features. Four major tendencies in world film industries and national film 
policies are particularly important. 
4.3.1 Deregulation/ liberalisation 
Within the accelerating flow of global film and television programs exchange, the 
majority of products traded are still produced by large conglomerates based in the US. 
The global market share of Hollywood movies has constantly increased since the end 
of the First World War. Recognising that the film markets of developed countries 
have been saturated, Hollywood majors have increasingly turned in the last decade to 
the markets of developing countries in Asia, Latin America, Africa and the former 
Soviet-Union. As the data contained in Table 4.1 shows, while US movies have 
enjoyed no significant expansion since the mid 1980s in the film markets of the 
developed Western countries and Japan they have significantly increased their share 
of imported films in a number of countries in the developing and emerging worlds. In 
Egypt for example, a country with a long established and significant film industry of 
its own, the US share increased from 38.7% in 1985 to 70.9% in 1994, while in 
Russia, another country with a strong tradition of national film making, it jumped 
from 14.1% in 1990 to 74.3% in 1994. These changes are partly the outcome of the 
US government exercising its political and economic power to pave the way for its 
locally-based film companies to obtain the maximum market. It usually uses the 
various occasions presented by multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations with other 
countries to place pressure on them to deregulating specific restrictions on film 
distribution and exhibition in the name of 'free trade' (see Comor, 1997). For example, 
in South Korea, the direct distribution of films by foreign companies was forbidden 
until the late-1980s allowing Korean distribution companies to dominate the 
importation and distribution of foreign movies in the Korean market. In the bilateral 
trade negotiations with the US inl987 however, this provision was removed and US 
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companies started to distribute films directly in Korea the following year (see Park, 
2000). 
The ascendancy of neo-liberal economic thinking since the 1980s has also 
encouraged many national governments to adopt liberalizing and commercially 
oriented policies on their own initiative. For example, in the three years between 1983 
and 1985, the Thatcher government in Britain suspended two of the main statutory 
measures protecting the national film industry to set the industry 'free'; the 
importation quota and the Eady levy which returned a proportion of box-office 
takings back to production. In addition, they transformed the public-owned National 
Film Finance Corporation (NFFC), established in 1948 as a specialised bank to make 
loans in support of British film production and distribution, into a private-owned 
company British Screen Finance Limited (see Hill, 1993; 1996). 
4.3.2 Hollywoodisation 
In addition to importing Hollywood films, many countries imitate various aspects of 
Hollywood's operating system, from industrial organisation and the star system, to 
film styles and genres. Nor are these simply ideas and rationales that operate at the 
level of discourse and expression. They also shape the strategies adopted to defend 
and revive national cinemas faced with the threat of Hollywood. 
In the debate over what kind of European audio-visual policy can most effectively 
prevent European audio-visual products and cultures from finther decline, one of the 
most widely voiced suggestions among many politicians and professionals is to 
support European media enterprise and foster corporate integration by loosing 
regulations on ownership and mergers. The aim is to establish several media giants as 
(regional champions', capable of competing with major US companies both within 
Europe and on the world market. However, as some scholars have pointed out this 
strategy is problematic since it mainly benefits media capitalists and offers no 
guarantees that it will serve the public interest by increasing the diversity of 
production (see Curran and Seaton, 1997: 341-3; McQuail and Siune, 1998). 
Some national governments and film industries, particularly in the non-Western 
world, concentrate more on imitating Hollywood. The Indian, Hong Kong and 
Japanese film industries are examples. They adopt major elements of Hollywood 
blockbusters, such as special effects, big stars, simplistic narratives, and vast scenes 
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and mix them with specifially local themes and genres. These might include 
newsworthy social phenomenon (such as gangsters and crime in Hong Kong and 
Japanese movies), local legends (such as the monsters in Japanese movies), and 
traditional cultural practices (such as the dancing and singing sequences in Indian 
movies or the use of kung-fu and other martial arts in Kong Hong movies). 
This strategy of 'hybridisation' enables the national cinemas of Japan, Hong Kong 
and India to compete relatively effectively with Hollywood both in their domestic 
markets and in regional (particularly Asian) markets. The governments in these 
countries pursue a liberal attitude providing some general supporting in the form of 
loans and tax breaks to encourage this tendency without clear guiding policies. 
Though the strategy has been adopted for long time, it is only in the past two decades 
that large film companies have started to see it as a way to survive and have begun to 
implement it more actively. 
Recently, the South Korean film industry has joined in this group. Facing direct 
competition from Hollywood as a result of the opening-up of the film distribution 
market in 1988, Korean film companies adopted the strategy of increasing investment 
to make more 'box office hit-oriented films'. The average production cost per film 
rose from approximately US $140,000 in 1984 to US $206,086 in 1990 (Park, 2000: 
54). The 1999 blockbuster The Spy I Shiri, for example, takes the familiar conventions 
of the Cold War thriller typified by the James Bond series, but focuses on the 
confrontations and conflicts between a North Korean female spy and South Korean 
intelligence agents. With its spectacular explosions and action scenes, The Spy 
enjoyed major success both within Korea and in the neighboring foreign markets of 
Japan, Taiwan, and South-East Asia. It opened in Seoul (the capital city of South 
Korea) in the same week as Hollywood blockbuster Star Wars: Episode I and 
attracted 2.46 million views while Star Wars had approximately 800,000 admissions 
(ibid.: 66). 
Another important aspect of the Hollywoodisation process is that many talented 
film workers leave their home film industry to work in Hollywood. This migration 
has been accelerated in the last decade by the increasingly unequal resource 
allocations among international film markets. The Hong Kong film industry is a good 
illustration with a number of internationally famous directors like John Woo and Tsui 
Hark, and well known stars like Jacky Chan, Jet Li, Chow Yun-Fat, Michelle Yeoh, 
moving to Hollywood in the past ten years. For the Hollywood studios, there are 
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considerable benefits. By assimilating these talented and already famous professionals 
they can provide Western audiences with novelty and Asian audiences with 
familiarity. At the same time, their departure may have serious cultural and economic 
implications for their countries of origin ftu-ther reinforcing Hollywood's comparative 
advantages and weakening the competitive situation of their home cinema industries. 
4.3.3 Internationalising protectionist intervention 
Faced with the continuing expansion of Hollywood all over the world national 
govenu-nents are increasingly tempted to resort to protectionist intervention. However, 
as argued earlier, their relatively weak position in bilateral negotiations coupled with 
the pressure exerted by the coalition of the US state and Hollywood in international 
economic organizations has forced most countries to retreat from protectionist 
measures. The only exceptions are developed Western countries, where a strong will 
is combined with substantial economic resources. One of the most prominent 
examples is the audio-visual policy adopted by the European Union. 
The main objectives of EU audio-visual policies are 'to establish and ensure the 
functioning of a genuine European space for audio-visual services and to contribute to 
develop a strong, forward-looking programme industry that can compete on world 
markets and help European culture to flourish and create jobs in Europe' (Goldberg, 
et al., 1998: 56). These goals are pursued through a combination of defensive and 
active interventions. 
First of all, the European Union has secured a space for the free circulation of 
audio-visual products and broadcasts within the EU itself through the Television 
Without Frontiers Directive (Directive 89/552/EEC adopted in 1989, revised in 1997) 
2. Controversially, the Directive uses a quota system. Article 4 requires Member 
States to ensure that broadcasters reserve the 'majority' of transmission time for 
European works. The fact that a range of programme genres, such as news, sports, 
2 In the EC legal system, the 'regulations' are the highest level legislation that lay down the same law 
throughout the Community and apply in full in all Member States. By contrastý the 'directives', at the 
second highest level right below the regulations, are to reconcile the dual objectives of both securing 
the necessary uniformity of Community law and respecting the diversity of national traditions and 
structures. A directive is binding on the Member States as regards the objective to be achieved but 
leaves it to national authorities to decide on how the agreed objective is to be incorporated into their 
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events, games, advertising and teletext services are excluded from the quota 
provisions, suggests that its major aim is to protect the European film and drama 
production (Goldberg et al., 1998: 61). However, the Article only stipulates that the 
objective should be achieved 'where practicable and by appropriate means' leaving 
individual Member States with a considerable degree of discretion over how 
vigorously they police the target. 
Not surprisingly, the Directive was strongly opposed by the US who claimed that 
the quota contravened the free trade principles of GATT and looked forward to 
stopping the Directive in the Uruguay Round GATT talks held in 1993. This action 
was opposed by most European countries as well as by India, Canada, Japan, 
Australia and some of the Third World countries, who asking for the Directive to be 
considered as an affirmative cultural exception. The negotiations were unable to reach 
an acceptable compromise and the Directive was able to stand, and the issue was left 
to be reconsidered by future WTO conventions. 
Though some sceptics doubt the practical effectiveness of the Directive (see 
Collins and Murroni, 1996: 122-125), the EU opted to maintain it with slight revisions 
after the 1997 evaluation. The sceptics have a point however. Since its adoption in 
1989, the Directive has not increased the proportion of transmission time devoted to 
European works across television broadcasts in Member States. In the survey years 
1992,1993-94, and 1995-96, the percentages of the broadcasters surveyed who 
complied with the quotas were respectively 63.6,61.5, and 66.4. This is not surprising. 
The number of television channels grew from I 10 in 1992 to 214 in 1996. Most of 
these of additional channels are privately owned and tend to rely on cheaper foreign 
programmes. Given this, one might expect that the overall percentage of broadcast 
time devoted to European production would drop. The fact that it has not can be 
counted a success. (Grantham, 2000: 153-62). 
EU audio-visual policy also provides direct supports for developing European 
audio-visual industries The main scheme is known as MEDIA (Measures to 
Encourage the Development of the Industry of Audio-visual Production). The first 
phase of the programme was formally started from 1991 and ran until 1995 with a 
domestic legal systems (Borchardt, 2000: 65). 
3 For the details of the dispute, particularly between the US and France, see Grantham (2000), also 
Miller (1996). 
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budget EUC 200 million, to support production, distribution, training, and financing. 
At the beginning of 1996, another five-year programme, MEDIA II, came in to force 
with the budget increased to EUC 265 million. It focuses on three priority areas for 
support: the training of European professionals, the development of (pre-) production 
projects aimed at the European and world markets, and the transnational distribution 
of European films and television programmes. The latest version, MEDIA PLUS, for 
the years 2001 to 2005, focuses on digitalisation trends in mass media, is currently 
under consideration in the European Parliamene. It is perhaps premature to evaluate 
the effects of the MEDIA programmes but the fact that the EU institutions have 
continually renewed them and increased their budgets suggest that they believe that 
they have positive potential. 
4.3.4 International Cooperation 
Due to the steadily rising costs of production and distribution (including marketing 
and promotion) and the further expansion of Hollywood, international co-production 
agreements have assumed greater relevance as a way to sustain the development, or 
ensure the survival, of many national cinemas. Many governments actively pursue 
this kind of measure by signing treaties with other governments, or providing some 
subsidy or tax concession to encourage their domestic companies to adopt 
international co-production projects. 
France has probably been the most active country in pursuing this approach. 
Together with Italy it was the first country to sign a co-production agreement in 1949 
(jakel, 1996: 85-7, see also Guback, 1969: ChIO). Today, France has co-production 
agreements with almost forty countries. Another prominent example is Canada, which 
has negotiated more than forty treaties (Hoskins, et al., 1997: 100). Films certified as 
official co-productions become eligible for financial assistance from the Canadian 
Film Development Corporation (CFDC) and also qualify for tax shelter provisions. 
(see Pendakur, 1990: 194-22 1). 
The EU authorities see co-production as a major aid to making European films and 
programmes that can compete effectively with Hollywood. Since 1990, the number of 
4 The data about MEDIA programmes introduced here are mainly according to Goldberg, et al. (1998) 
and the official website: http: //europa. eu. int/scadplusAeg/en/s200l3. htm. When there are differences in 
the amount of budget between these two sources then I go with the later. 
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pan-European co-productions has been constantly growing. In the late 1990s, of the 
more than 500 feature films produced yearly, 30 percent were co-productions (Steil, 
1996: 49). The Council of Europe has created a fund called 'Eurimages', which 
provides 10 to 15 per cent of the budget of tripartite European co-productions; (ibid.: 
52). Another project, developed under the umbrella of the MEDIA programme, called 
EURO AIM (European Organisation for an Audio-visual Independent Market), has 
developed a number of communication platforms for fostering dialogue between 
buyers, financiers and producers. It provides spaces for independent producers to 
present their projects and partially financed products in the hope of attracting potential 
co-financiers and other kinds of cooperation (ibid.: 52-56). 
The co-production strategies are informed mainly by economic concerns. They are 
seen as an effective way to gather more financial resources, reach more markets, share 
market risks, and make products more competitive, though the results may not always 
be as good as predicted (see Hoskins et al., 1997: 106-112). Kailas for example, found 
that the costs of recent international co-productions in Europe are normally higher 
than those for national productions and concludes that the strategy 'has most certainly 
not strengthened the European industry'. Though it could be argued that this is due to 
ineffective way the strategy has been operationalised rather than the strategy itself 
(Kailas, 1996). 
In contrast, the cultural implications of international co-production have attracted 
far less debate and research. There are two main schools of thought on the cultural 
significance of European co-productions. One expects that increased co-production 
activity will result in a distinctive 'European aesthetics' or, at the very least, an 
audio-visual industry with 'European specificity' (see Hallenberger and Krewani, 
1996). The other argues that co-production practices could counter the increasing 
fragmentation of the European marketplace by synthesizing different national 
characteristic, producing new hybrid forms that increase overall programme diversity 
(Wieland, 1996). Both these arguments are too simplistic. As Murdock points out, co- 
production is not simply a means of spreading costs butalso a symbolic intervention 
(Murdock, 1996: 107). Because the majority of present co-production projects are 
organised mainly with economic gains in mind, they are likely to look for themes and 
genres that have the maximum potential to cross borders. This means that they are 
likely, firstly to be relatively disconnected from local cultural and societal contexts, 
secondly to feature internationally famous stars with the danger that the production 
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will be designed as a vehicle for their established repertoire of characters, and thirdly, 
to work with already familiar and popular genres and narrative forms. These possible 
cultural restraints imposed by pressures towards 'bankability' deserve more sustained 
analytical attention than they have so far attracted. 
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Chapter 5 China and Taiwan in the Global 
Age: A General Introduction 
Contemporary China emerged out of the unprecedented encounter with the West. 
Some commentators date the emergence of modem China to the long transitional 
period which lasted from the end of the Ming dynasty in 1643 to the end of the Qing 
dynasty in 1911, when European explorers and missionaries began to arrive in 
increasing numbers and Western learning was introduced. Others nominate the Opium 
War of 1839-42 and the consolidation of foreign imperialism as the principle 
departure point of modernity in China (Hsu, 1995: 4-5). However, both arguments 
accurately identify foreign influence as the primary factor behind the profound 
changes that China experienced in the 19th century (see Fairbank, 1983). 
The rise of modem China, however, was not characterised by a passive response to 
foreign forces. Rather, as Hsu argues, it was formed by the Chinese state's struggle to 
'meet the foreign and, domestic challenges in an effort to regenerate and transform 
their country from an outdated Confucian universal empire to a modern national 
state' (Hsu, 1995: 13, emphasis added). This was the major aim of the Chinese 
Nationalist Party (the Koumintang or KMT) led by Sun Yat-sen that established the 
first republican regime in China (the Republic of China, ROC). There are two 
principle forces at play here. The first is imperialism, which was conductive to the rise 
of nationalism, with some scholars regarding the history of modem China therefore as 
a history of nationalistic revolution. The second is modernisation. China was a major 
civilisation that 'suddenly found itself in a minority position in the world' and tried to 
adjust itself to the new system being set in place by the increasing globalisation of 
western modernity (Fairbank, 1983: 1; see also Fairbank and Liu, 1980). 
yet, the end of the imperial dynasty and the establishment of the republic were not 
accompanied with peace and prosperity. Externally, foreign imperialist invasions 
never stopped with the largest threat coming from a newly modernised Japan. 
Domestically, the increasingly bitter struggle between the KMT and the CCP (the 
Chinese Communist Party) became the dominant feature. Consequently, when the 
Chinese eventually won the war against Japan in 1945, the civil war intensified. In 
1949, the KMT was defeated by the CCP and withdrew to Taiwan, an island formerly 
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occupied by the Japanese off the south-east coast of the mainland. There they 
maintained the ROC and claimed sovereignty over the whole of China. The CCP, led 
by Chairman Mao Ze-dong, established the socialist People's Republic of China (PRC) 
on the mainland and China and Taiwan went their separate ways thereafter. 
5.1 The Trajectory of Taiwan's Development 
Taiwan along with South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore are Widely recognised to 
be the world's success stories in relation to economic development over the past half- 
century and are categorised as the Newly Industrialised Countries or Economies 
(NICs or NIEs). From the mid-1960s to 1989, the share of total world trade held by 
the four NICs grew from 2 percent to 10 percent (Shibusawa et al., 1992: 66). 
Between 1965 and 1996, the average annual growth of GNP in real terms for the 
world at large was 3.1 percent. In contrast, South Korea grew at an annual average 
rate of 8.9 percent, Taiwan at 8.7 percent, Singapore at 8.3 percent, and Hong Kong at 
7.5 percent (Castells, 1998: 206)1. Due to this impressive performance, the four 
countries have also been dubbed the 'four Asian tigers' (among Western 
commentators) or the 'four Asian dragons' (by Chinesewriters). 
On the basis of the extensive research literature now available on the East Asian 
NICs (Henderson & Appelbaun, 1992; Castells, 1992; Douglass, 1994; Eun, 1996; Li, 
1997; Castells, 1998), we can summarise some of the critical factors in the emergence 
of these four economies: 
(1) The heritage and influence of the colonial experience (Japan in Korea and Taiwan, 
Britain in Hong Kong and Singapore). 
(2) International politics. From the 1950s to the 1960s, as a consequence of the Cold 
War the US considered the countries of the Pacific Rim as the vital front against 
the expansion of Communist force, and granted them major military and economic 
aid. 
(3) The international economy. From the late 1950s to the 1970s, the world trade 
experienced an unprecedented expansion. The core countries in the world 
economy provided a 'window of opportunity,, particularly in markets for 
'Excepting the data of Taiwan is from the website of the Directorate General of Budget, Accounting, 
and Statistics in Taiwan (DGBAS). See http: //www. dgbas. gov. tw/dgbas03/bs4/ýbstract. htm. 
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manufactured commodities. Then the profit squeezed in the core countries in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s led to a new international division of labour. 
(4) Distinctive cultural features. The common Confucian heritages have supported 
states intervention and management of economic and societal matters. 
(5) The availability of a relatively well educated, disciplined, low wage and high 
productivity labour force. 
(6) Export-oriented economies and corporations with flexible market strategies. 
(7) Strong states taking a leading role in guiding economic development. 
Analytically, the first three factors are historically specific to shifting international 
political and economic conditions. The other four are the outcomes of internal 
interactions between state, market and society. Although all these factors have played 
a role, in the key stage of the emergence of the East Asian NICs, in the 1950s to 
1970s, it was the state's strategic and pivotal role in coordinating internal and external 
forces and orchestrating a 'late development' process that proved crucial. These states 
have enjoyed an unusually high degree of autonomy relative to markets and civil 
societies which has enabled them to dominate the pattern and orientation of economic 
and national development to the extent that some scholars have dubbed them 
'developmental states'. 
5.1.1 The concept of the developmental state and Taiwan 
According to one of the advocates of the concept of the developmental state, 
A state is developmental when it establishes as its principle of legitimacy its ability to 
promote and sustain development, understanding by development the combination of 
steady high rates of economic growth and structural change in the productive system, both 
domestically and its relationship to the international economy (Castells, 1992: 56). 
While he adds that the meaning of 'legitimacy' varies in different historical contexts 
of the birth of the East Asian NICs, which were born out of the need for survival, they 
achieved this 'by affirming the only legitimacy principle that did not seem to be 
threatening for the international powers overseeing its destiny: econornic 
development' (ibid.: 58). Thus ultimately for the developmental state, economic 
development is not a goal but a means. As Harris also points out, the states of the East 
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Asian NICs (though Hong Kong may be a partial exception) faced severe military 
rivalry that drove the early developers to transform their domestic economies. He 
argues that national economic development-as opposed to companies just making a 
profit-is invariably a by-product of the competition of the states, not a spontaneous 
outgrowth of the operation of markets (Harris, 1992: 74). 
In the case of Taiwan, the KMT regime came to full power in 1949 and struggled 
to 'recover' the mainland. However, it was the communist invasion Of South Korea 
that prompted the US to support Taiwan as a political bulwark against the expansion 
of communist power and to support the KMT's efforts to build the island into an 
alternative showcase of an 'authentic' Chinese nation-state. This authoritarian state 
dominated and facilitated economic development firstly by moving the Taiwanese 
economy toward import substitution industrialisation and later, when the potential of 
the domestic market to stimulate growth was exhausted at the end of 1950s, by 
shifting to an exportation orientation. The KMT state also emphasised education and 
implemented a nine-year compulsory education system with the aim of creating a 
highly educated, well-trained, efficient, and disciplined labour force for production 
(see Aldcroft, 2000). 
Another critical features of Taiwan's economic development is that the backbone 
of Taiwanese industry was made up of a large number of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMIEs) rather than large corporations like the chaebol in South Korea (see 
Castells, 1992; Shibusawa, et al., 1992). Most of these local firms were run by 
families or networks of relatives and neighbours. They acted as subcontractors for 
foreign manufacturers located in Taiwan and as suppliers of international commercial 
networks mainly in light manufactured goods, such as shoes, umbrellas, and bicycles. 
Their small size allowed them to respond flexibly to changing world demand and 
variable international market conditions. This type of development also helped to 
maintain a relatively equal income distribution. 
Since the late 1970s, Taiwan has moved from an export strategy based on labour- 
intensive manufactured goods to high technology products, particularly personal 
computers and peripheries. The KMT state pursued a series of plans to upgrade 
Taiwan's industrial environment which included the creation of one of the most 
successful high technology parks in Asia, in Hsinchu in 1979. By 1998, Taiwan's 
hardware information technology industry yielded a total production value of 
US$33.8 billion and has become the country's most important foreign exchange 
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earner. Taiwan has been the world's third-largest computer hardware supplier since 
1995, behind the US and Japan (Government Information Office, 2000). 
Although the term 'developmental state' seems a useful way to characterise the 
pattern of Taiwan's post-war economic transition the concept has attracted criticism. 
For example, Dogulass argues that the term 'developmental' requires further debate 
and interpretation (Dogulass, 1994: 556-7). He notes that the meaning of 
'development' should not be limited to economic growth but should also include 
improvements in the welfare of all citizens, political democracy, and the human 
treatment to labour. Accordingly, the concept of 'the developmental state,, he 
suggests, may be usefully revised to 'the economic developmental state'. Nevertheless, 
critics cannot deny that the concept does explain convincingly the developmental 
trajectory of Taiwan and other East Asian NICs, at least before the mid-1980s. The 
more substantial challenges to the concept are not theoretically from within, but 
practically from the consequences of the changing world conditions which will be 
discussed next. 
5.1.2 The democratisation and liberalisation of Taiwan 
One of the fundamental factors that underwrote the ability of developmental states to 
accomplish their projects was 'their political capacity to impose and internalise their 
logic on the civil societies' (Castells, 1992: 64). This finvolved three movements. 
Firstly, the ruthless repression on political dissents. Secondly, the destruction or 
disorganisation of countervailing sources of power and their total subordination to the 
state. Thirdly, the successful incorporation of the working class by raising living 
standards, providing access to education and health, and ensuring a relatively equal 
income distribution (ibid.: 64-6). 
Nevertheless, the constitution of societies does not remain unchanged nor are the 
relationships between states civil societies fixed. As Castells puts it, 
The process of development in the NICs succeeded in implementing not only transformed 
the economy but completely changed the society. A new, more assertive capitalist class, 
ready to take on the world, emerged in the 1980s, increasingly confident that it no longer 
needed a state of technocrats, racketeers, and political police. A new, consumer-oriented, 
educated, liberal middle class decided that life was all too good to be sacrificed for the 
historical project of an artificially invented nation. And a new, more conscious, better 
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organised social movements, workers, students, citizens, women, environmentalists, 
appeared to be ready to raise questions about the conditions, goals, and sharing of 
development (Castells, 1998: 286; see also Harris, 1992). 
In Taiwan the initial challenge to the KMT's hegemony came from outside the island. 
In 1971, the PRC replaced the ROC to take China's seat in the United Nations. The 
US decision to normalise relationships with the PRC in 1978 followed. These serious 
diplomatic failures frustrated the Taiwanese people and, more important, warned the 
KMT state, as an emigrant regime, that its claim to represent the 'authentic' China 
was no longer endorsed by the world's most powerful political actor. Consequently, to 
maintain its political legitimacy it had to look inward to local society. To this end, 
President Chiang Ching-kuo pursued a series of substantial but gradual political 
reforms aimed at moving towards 'nativistisation'. They included parliament reform 
and recruiting more native Taiwanese into the core of KMT's party apparatus and into 
the central government. 
Alongside these reforms the KMT state also began to gradually loosen its political 
control, with the consequence that long- repressed social forces began to make their 
voices heard. In the cultural field, the 'Native Literature Debate' of the mid 1970's, 
which focused on literature's role in articulating Chinese and Taiwanese cultural 
identities, shifted attitudes to the idea that Taiwan was a part of Greater China in 
academic and literature circles. 
At the same time, political opposition, particularly among native Taiwanese 
dissenters Who were strongly pro-Taiwanese independence, mobilised on an 
unprecedented scale. The major focus for this movement, the Democratic Progressive 
party (DPP), held their first Representative Assembly in 1986. The following year, 
martial law was lifted with restrictions on newspaper publishing being revoked the 
next year. After that the processes of political, economic and cultural transitions 
accelerated markedly. 
political opposition was not the only major force within civil society involved in 
the social change however. The island's capitalists, as Castells mentioned, were 
6ready to take on the world' and no longer needed the state. Indeed, as some 
Taiwanese scholars argue, the political economic transition of Taiwan in the 1980s 
and 1990s can be best characterised as a process of coalition building between the 
state and the capitalist classes in which a new concord was struck and the working 
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class and other civil forces were abandoned. The state helped the leading factions of 
the capitalist class to pursue capital accumulation and they in turn supported the 
government's efforts to maintain political legitimacy and social stability. The 
implementation of 'liberalisation', therefore occurred prior to the movement towards 
'democratisation' (Wang, 1993; see also Hang-zhi, 1990). Furthermore, Taiwan has 
been incorporated more fully into the global economic system through the new 
networks that developed between local and international capital, an issue I will come 
back to later. 
In a truly historic moment, the KMT lost the presidency in the 2000 Presidential 
Election to the DDP, after an unbroken 50 years' reign. Although the DDP had had 
close relationship with and benefited from the support of labour and social 
movements in its founding stages, the new government continued, rather than altered, 
both the coalition with the capitalist classes and the move toward a free enterprise 
state. One of the main reasons why Taiwan's political transition has taken this 
direction was because arguably the issue of national identity and the political tensions 
around unification or independence have been more influential than class relations in 
post-war Taiwanese society. 
5.1.3 Ferment in the field of national identity 
The issue of independence or unification has been the most significant influence 
shaping every aspects of social life, from politics and economy to people's everyday 
activities, in contemporary Taiwan. The origin of the problem stems from two 
historical circumstances. 
First, until 1945 Taiwan had had no real connections with mainland China since 
the Qing dynasty handed it over the imperial Japan in the late nineteenth century. 
Over this period, substantial changes were taking place in mainland China. Added to 
which, whereas mainlanders had experienced ruthless invasions and massacres by 
Japanese troops, during the fifty years of colonisation the islanders had displayed no 
such extreme hostility to imperial Japan. Furthermore, the colonial Japanese had kick- 
started the process of modernisation in Taiwan, moving it ahead of the mainland in 
key areas of infrastructure such as the railway, telegraph and electricity systems. 
These achievements had positive connotations in many Taiwanese people's memories. 
108 
Second, when the defeated KMT state retreated to Taiwan it insisted that it still 
had sovereignty over the whole of China although the mainland was by then 
effectively under control of the CCP. The only point of agreement between the KMT 
and the CCP was that Taiwan was one of the provinces of China and that its people 
were 'Chinese', both in terms of ethnicity and culture. In addition, since PRC took 
over the ROC's seat in the United Nations in 1971, Taiwan has been relatively 
isolated from international society. Except by a few small developing countries, most 
of them are in Latin America and Africa, ROC has not been recognised as a nation- 
state internationally. According to Giddens; (1987), its formal absence from the inter- 
state system increasingly called the viability of ROC into question. 
Before the late 1980s, the authoritarian KMT state used both violence and ideology 
to maintain its political hegemony. The massacres and violent repression that occurred 
during the late 1940s and the 1950s sowed the seeds of distrust and hatred between 
the mainlanders (people who moved to the island after 1945 at the end of Japanese 
colonisation) and the islanders or 'natives' (people who had themselves moved or 
whose families had settled before 1945). At the same time, the KMT exercised tight 
control over the education and media systems in an effort to convince the Taiwanese 
people of their officially defined 'Chineseness' and to mobilise support for the 
national mission to overturn the Communist regime and recover mainland China. In 
the process it oppressed not only emergent native identities but also any alternative 
channels for understanding the real situation obtaining in Communist China. 
As mentioned above however, the ever-present tensions between mainlanders and 
islanders fuelled political forces supporting Taiwanese Independence while 
simultaneously eroding the authority of the KMT. As a consequence, since the 1970s 
the opposition between independence and unification has become the dominant theme 
of Taiwan's politics. This antagonism also distorts and conceals the real social 
contradictions embodied in the neo-liberal process of development. At the same time, 
'Taiwanese identities' have undergone a process of recreation and the cultural 
connections with the colonial Japanese have been re-invented. Non-governmental 
exchanges across the Taiwan Strait, particularly the thickening web of economic links, 
have also made the issue more complicated. If a nation is an imagined community, the 
national identity of Taiwanese people has now become the site of intense contestation 
and imaginative reorganisation (see Wang, 2000). 
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5.2 The Socialist Journey of China 
The two main issues in the rise of modem China, as already mentioned, are 
nationalism or anti-imperialism and modernisation. For first time since the Manchu 
rulers lost power in 1911 the Chinese Communist Party, which was established in 
1921, achieved a unified China (except for Taiwan). In his speech delivered at the 
First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in 
September of 1949, Mao Ze-dong made a particular point of emphasising this new 
unity: 
[ ... ] The 
Chinese have always been a great, courageous, and industrious people. It was 
only in modem times that they have fallen behind, and this was due solely to the 
oppression and exploitation of foreign imperialism and the domestic reactionary 
government. ... We have united ourselves and 
defeated both our foreign and domestic 
oppressors by means of the people's liberation war and the people's great revolution, and 
we proclaim the establishment of the People's Republic of China. ... The era in which the 
Chinese were regarded as uncivilised is now over. We will engage in the world as a nation 
with a high culture (quoted in Shram, 1971: 167-168). 
Castells accordingly argues that the Chinese revolution was not a socialist revolution, 
but 'primarily a nationalist revolution with socialist characteristics' (1998: 303). in 
fact, some scholars note that the CCP adopted the Soviet Model of development as 
much for its emphasis on industrialisation and modernisation as for its communist 
features. More importantly, the CCP was constrained by international political 
conditions. With the Cold War at its height the new government entered into a war 
with the US in Korea within months of its establishment (Riskin, 1987; Amako, 1994). 
Under these conditions, it is not surprising that the CCP adopted policies 'for 
maximum control and an approach to political organisation and economic planning 
that would benefit from close alliance with the Soviet bloc' (Riskin, 1987: 3). 
Yet, the great experiment led by Mao seemed not to be successful in terms of 
making China strong and catching up with the world's most advanced countries. 
Economic growth in China in terms of net material products in comparable prices had 
been fairly rapid during the period of the first Five-Year-Plan (1953-1957), reaching 
on annual average almost 9 percent, but after that the growth rate slowed down 
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significantly and averaged annually only about 5 percent during the two decades 
between 1957 and 1978 (Chai, 1997: 2). The distance between the living standard 
enjoyed in China and in its neighbouring Chinese societies, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and particularly Taiwan, also widened during these years. All these factors seriously 
eroded the credibility of the CCP government. Indeed, another group of the CCP 
leaders, including Deng Yjao-ping and Liu Shao-qi, regarded Mao's strategy to be 
seriously wrong and had their own answers to the question of how to make China 
strong (Castells, 1998: 304-5; also Riskin, 1987: 3). After Mao's death in 1976, these 
reformists led by Deng seized their chance to give economic modernisation priority 
over the building of socialism and the market-oriented reforms started (see Lam, 1995: 
chapter 1). 
5.2.1 The Reforms: from planned to market economy 
17here are two major elements in China's reform programme after 1978. The first is 
the introduction of market mechanisms into the economy. Relevant measures include; 
the reduction in the scope of planning; increasing the autonomy of enterprises; the 
liberation of product and factor prices; and the creation of both product and factor 
markets. The second is to the adoption an open door policy focused on the 
liberalisation of foreign trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). The policy has re- 
linked China with the global economic system (see Chai, 1997; Gao, 1996; Mackerras 
et al., 1994). 
In terms of major economic indicators, the reforms in China after 1978 have 
achieved some substantial successes (see Table 5.1 )2. Between 1979 and 1999, the 
average annual growth of GDP was 9.6 percent. In the period of 1992-1996, in which 
Deng reconfirmed his market policies and before the Asian financial crisis of 1997, 
the average annual growth rate even reached 12 percent. At the personal level the 
average consumption level of residents in real terms in 1999 was four times greater 
than it had been in 1978. The open door policy has been relatively successftil in 
As same as the cases of East Asian NICs, the success of China's late development has its specific 
outer political economic conditions. The most important factor, among others, is that the period of first 
stage of reform, the 1980s, was the time when the East Asian NICs started to seek for upgrading their 
industry and lowering costs in labour and land. At this point, China became one of the best countries to 
co-operate with, particularly for Taiwan (see Hsing, 1998). 
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increasing foreign trade and attracting foreign direct investments. By October 1994, 
there were 22,700 enterprises with foreign investment had been established in China 
which together accounted for 34 percent of China's foreign trade (Chai, 1997: 188). In 
addition, with the notable exception of the 1989 Tian'anmen Square Incident, the 
short-term transition costs, in terms of inflation and unemployment and social stability, 
have been lower in China in comparison with its Eastern European counterparts (Chai, 
1987: 192 -199; also Mackerras et al., 1994). 
Table 5.1 The economic performance of China's reform 
- GDP GDP per capita Indices of resident Import and export Realised FD-1- 
(I Oorn yuan) (yuan) consumption level (I 00m yuan) (100m US dollars) 
1978 3624.1 379 100 355.0 8.81 
1999 80422.8 6534 422.3 26896.3 21.28 
* The data of the years 1979-1983. 
Source: Compiled from the wobsfte: www. stats. gov. cn/sgw/ndsyzgnymulu. html. 
The most important feature of China's reform process however, is that the state 
and the leadership of the CCP have taken total control from the beginning. Chinese 
officials have characterised their strategy as 'crossing the river while groping for the 
stone'. They have pursued a gradualist approach in which economic reforms have 
preceded the more sensitive political reforms. In cases of negative effects and impacts 
on society or on the leadership of the CCP, reforms might be halted or even reversed. 
The system was characterised, by Chinese officials, as a socialist market economy in 
which the operation of markets is effected under socialist conditions and based on 
public ownership (Gao, 1996: 5-6)'. Indeed, the most prominent measure adopted in 
East European countries under the impact of the globally spreading neo-liberalism and 
which has had far-reaching negative consequences, the privatisation of state owned 
enterprises, still has not yet been accepted by the CCP state (see Lam, 1995: 73-5). 
From another perspective, as Castells points out, the model China has been 
pursuing is very similar to the model of the developmental state (Castells, 1998: 306). 
The CCP leaders including Deng and his successors Jiang Ze-ming and Zhu Rong-ji, 
I For resolving the potential theoretical contradiction embodied in the model, Deng Xiao-ping has made 
clear during his 1992 'nanrun', literally the imperial tour of the south, that market economy does not 
equate with capitalism and socialism does not equate with planned economy (see Lam, 1995: 19). 
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in fact are on record as particularly admiring the the Singapore model where a 
developmental state has not only taken full control over fostering economic growth 
but has also dominated civil society (see Lam 1995 127 8 Castells 1998 306 7) 
Accordingly Castells argues that those observers who predict that the power of the 
CCP will decline as market reforms are extended misunderstand the dynamics at work 
He stresses that the network of Communist party organisations is still firmly in 
control of most voluntary associations and expressions of civil life For example in 
spite of having some deregulation of its mass media system China is the only country 
in the world which is having some success in controlling Internet websites and hook 
ups He therefore argues that whether civil society can act autonomously and 
democracy develop will depend essentially on how well the CCP is able to keep its 
authority (Castells 1998 317 8) It is too early to predict how China s transition will 
proceed in the near future However Castells argument is limited by his focus on the 
relationship between the Communist state and civil society inside China and his lack 
of attention to the growing influence of external forces particularly the US and 
American based multinational capitals as China is absorbed into the global economic 
system The continuing capacity of the CCP leadership to maintain its authority 
within its territorial boundaries does not mean that it will not be eroded by global 
forces Indeed, this is probably the key factor to note in observing China in transition 
There is one more phenomenon that needs to be noted here Unlike Taiwan the 
national question in China today revolves not around splits in national identity (as in 
Taiwan) but around the rapid revival of nationalism Faced with the dispute over 
Diao Yu Tai Island with Japan in 1996 the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in 
Yugoslavia by the US in 1999 and the crash of the US reconnaissance plane in 
Hainan Province in 2000 Chinese people have responded with mass nationalist 
demonstrations in major cities One Chinese university professor described the date of 
the bombing in Yugoslavia as the day that all Chinese must not forget and the day 
that already resurgent Chinese were once again insulted and humiliated by the West 
(Fang et al. 1999 1) In the summer of 1996 a book titled China Can Say No 
which attacks Americas alleged military and cultural imperialism and expresses 
strong hostility to the West became the best seller in China and prompted a tide of 
nationalistic publications For the Chinese scholar Dai Jing hua the dynamic behind 
this movement lies with the contradictory sentiments of Chinese people generated by 
the simultaneous recognition that China may once again be a major power in the 
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world but still lags behind the advanced Western countries in many respects (Dai, 
1999: 135-66). The possible manipulations of nationalistic sentiments by the CCP 
state or by the rising forces of capital is likely to have profound impacts on Chinese 
society in the future. 
5.3 Facing Global Trends: The Asian Financial Crisis 
in 1997 and 1998, the prosperous Pacific Asian economies were for first time plunged 
into a serious crisis. Some economies almost collapsed (Indonesia, South Korea), 
others went into a deep recession (Malaysia, Thailand, Hong Kong, the Philippines), 
and the leading economy in the region, Japan, was shaken by financial bankruptcies. 
Taiwan and Singapore survived from the crisis but suffered much less. China was 
even stronger and became the major force contributing to the stabilisation of the 
region. As Castells points out, a consideration of the causes and characteristics of the 
1997-8 Asian crisis may be helpful in understanding 'the specific process of 
integration of Asia in global capitalism and the new features of global capitalism 
itself (Castells, 1998: 208). Understanding how Taiwan and China have negotiated 
this crisis is also helpful for finther inquiry on the political economic and cultural 
conditions of the two cases. 
5.3.1 The causes and characteristics of the Asian crisis 
The Asian crisis was basically rooted in a financial panic. It began with the 
devaluation of Thai baht in July 1997, and the ensuring financial instability in the rest 
of Southeast Asia, South Korea and Hong Kong. Foreign investors and lenders 
(mainly American and Japanese banks and funds) lost confidence in the local 
economies and pulled out money suddenly selling 
local currencies and stocks, first in 
Thailand and Indonesia, then moving on to other countries, particularly South Korea. 
These actions prompted further devaluation of currencies and increased debts that 
forced some firms into bankruptcy. Demand contraction and increasing 
unemployment followed. 
There are two main explanations for the formation of this crisis. The first attributes 
it to the internal failures of Asian economies. This view, mainly held by neo-liberalist 
economists, stresses that it was the inefficiency of state-directed economic 
development and so-called 'crony capitalism' that prompted foreign investors to lose 
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confidence and lead to financial crisis. This explanation is both misleading and 
insufficient. It cannot explain why the same institutions held responsible for the crisis 
had earlier been capable of contributing to decades-long rapid and sustained economic 
growth. Secondly, it cannot explain why the crisis swept the whole region and spread 
to the countries outside of the region like Russia and Brazil (Wade, 1998; Lo, 1999). 
In contrast, the alternative explanation places much more emphasis on external 
political and economic factors and on the financial connections between local and 
international economies. It argues that foreign investors and lenders lost confidence 
because domestic firms in Southeast Asian countries and Korea had created high 
ratios of debt to equity in the 1990s and short-term debts exceed foreign exchange 
reserves (Wade and Veneroso, 1998: 10; Tabb, 1998). 'High ratios of bank deposits 
and loan intermediation to GDP, and of corporate debt to equity', Wade and Veneroso 
argue, (make the financial structure vulnerable to shocks that depress cash flows or 
the supply of bank or portfolio capital' (ibid.: 7). This situation however, was a 
product of enormous foreign capital inflows coupled with the deregulation of 
domestic financial and industrial systems. By the 1990s, most states in East and 
Southeast Asia had undergone radical financial deregulation which aimed to attract 
more foreign capital flows and to revive economic growth (Wade, 1998; McNally, 
1998). The lack of appropriate state regulation of international financial flows made 
these economies more vulnerable. In addition, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
intervened to 'solve' the crisis by insisting that these countries opened themselves still 
further to overseas capital (Wade and Venerso, 1998, see also Bullard et. al., 1998; 
Tabb, 1998). The rapid spread of the crisis to the whole region and to other countries 
is therefore most plausibly explained by uncontrollable international capital flows. 
The causes of Asian crisis, in surn, were the downward pressure on prices and profits 
brought on by overproduction on the one hand, and free flows of capital across 
national boundaries without appropriate state regulation on the other. It was, as 
McNally (1998) argues, 'a product of capitalist globalisation, of the extension and 
intensification of capitalist contradictions on a world scale'. 
5.3.2 Taiwan and China in the crisis 
Among the four tigers, Taiwan was the least influenced by the Asian financial crisis. 
In 1998, the country's economic growth rate 4.6 percent, a 2.1 percent decline from 
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the previous year. The rate quickly recovered however and reached an average of 5.6 
percent in 1999 and 2000. There are three major reasons for this ability to weather the 
storm (Wade and Veneroso, 1998; Castells, 1998: 291-2). 
First, substantial foreign exchange reserves, US$122.08 billion bythe end of 1997, 
enabled Taiwan to keep the Taiwanese dollar stable and discourage most speculative 
attacks. Secondly, as noted earlier, the majority of Taiwan's economy was made up of 
small and medium sized enterprises which were more flexible and competitive in the 
changing world market in the 1990s than the chaebol of South Korea and most had 
very low foreign debts. The third and the most important factor was the role of state. 
The Taiwanese government had adopted a relatively moderate stance in relation to 
financial deregulation and had determinedly defended the Taiwan dollar before 1997. 
China too, was less hard hit than other countries. From 1996 to 1999, the annual 
GDP growth rate, although it had slowed down from the two digit growth rate of the 
previous four years, still reached an average of 7.9 percent, the highest in the Asian 
region. The Chinese government even actively saved the Hong Kong dollar from 
devaluation in 1998. Why was China able to absorb the shock of the crisis? The main 
factor was its still limited integration into the global economy (Castells, 1998: 315). 
Since the open door policy was first implemented, local industries remained well 
protected, the banks were not strangled by short-term foreign debts, and the banking 
system was still under full state control. In addition, after the crisis happened, the 
Chinese government embarked on a programme of government spending, estimated at 
560 billion US dollars, to stimulate the economy. 
The cases of Taiwan and China in the Asian crisis illustrate that the state still plays 
a decisive role in managing the impacts of globalisation. Elsewhere, the lack of 
appropriate and consistent state regulation of financial and banking systems and 
international capital flows was the main cause of the crisis in South East Asian 
countries and South Korea. As Castells concludes, 'it was not state intervention that 
caused the crisis, but the inconsistency of this intervention' (ibid.: 292). 
Whether the autonomy enjoyed by states is sustainable in the new century is highly 
questionable however. Increasing involvement in the global capitalist system is 
probably a downward spiral in which a country's deepening participation locks them 
ever more securely into its dominant logic. The more a state obeys the rules of the 
system, the less power it will maintain. At the beginning of the new century however, 
China and Taiwan are both seeking to integrate themselves more securely into the 
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global economy system. Both economies were formally admitted as members of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) on the I lth and 12th of November 2001 
respectively. 
5.3.3 China and Taiwan in the present conditions of globalisation 
The establishment of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) in 1948, 
and the later launch of the WTOJ% were initiatives designed primarily to protect and 
improve the economic advantages enjoyed by the advanced countries, and particularly 
the US. The WTO, in fact, 'is a trade regime which maximises the interests of the 
giant corporations' by eliminating state-imposed barriers which restrain their freedom 
of action (Tabb, 2000). The WTO rules, dominantly set by a handful of the richest 
countries, unavoidably erode the autonomy of other nation-states in managing and 
guiding their domestic economies in line with their own concerns. The WTO has thus 
become the major agent of capitalist globalisation. 
Applying to enter the GATT, and later the WTO, has probably been the most 
important political task for the governments on both sides of the Taiwan Straits in the 
past decade or so. China started its application in 1986 and Taiwan in 1990. It was 
widely argued that participation in the WTO would bring fairer foreign trade 
relationships and guard national economic interest. However, before any real 
advantages can be seen, China and Taiwan have already paid high costs for formal 
entry. During the application process, both Taiwan and China promised a wide range 
of deregulation measures, from lowering tariffs to opening specific markets, and from 
abolishing state subsidy to lifting quotas. Furthermore, these adjustments were not 
limited to economic matters but extended to questions of political co-operation. The 
requests for adjustments to policies and 
laws came primarily from the US. As Bello 
and Rosenfeld argue, 'the United States had 
been transformed by the late 1980s into 
an aggressively protectionist power' (Bello and 
Rosenfeld, 1990). The issues of 
intellectual property right and audio-visual products became a particular concern for 
the US in trade negotiations with both China and Taiwan after the mid- I 980s. 
As a condition of entering the WTO, Taiwan has planned to reduce the average 
nominal tariff rate on industrial products from 
6.34 percent to 4.34 percent and that on 
agricultural products from 20.02 percent to 16-20 percent. Most quota systems will be 
abolished and state subsidy on many products reduced. Constraints on foreign 
117 
investment in the stock market will be revoked. A new copyright law, patent law, and 
trade mark law were passed before 1998 to meet the requests from the US in relation 
to the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreements, TRIPS, sponsored by 
the WTO (Board of Foreign Trade, 1998). 
The impacts of these changes on Taiwan may seem immediately evident however. 
This is because since the late 1980s, the state of Taiwan has adopted a gradual 
liberalisation policy and there has been no significant public debate on participation in 
the WTO and global economic system. Despite the 1997-8 Asian crisis, the Taiwan 
government seems not to have learned the lesson of how crucial the state intervention 
is in managing the economy On the contrary, it has steadily relinquished state power 
to the market. Meanwhile, most Taiwanese firms have developed flexible strategies to 
adapt themselves to the changing world market. Though there have been peasant and 
labour protests over some of the economic and labour policies changes introduced in 
the 1990s, the opposition has been too weak to influence decision making. As a 
consequence, as Castells points out, by the end of the decade Taiwan's enterprises and 
the country as a whole were fully integrated into the rules and procedures of advanced 
global capitalism with all the attendant benefits and risks. 'Taiwan was, by and large, 
globalised' (1998: 327). 
For China, the situation is more complex since its developing market economy has 
a shorter history and is less extensive. China has agreed to reduce average industrial 
tariffs from 24.6 percent to an average of 9.4 percent by 2005. Though quotas 
currently apply to a wide range of products, most of these will be eliminated 
immediately upon entry to the WTO and the remainder will be entirely phased out by 
2005. China has also agreed to apply WTO rules to its huge state-owned and state- 
invested enterprises, which means that these enterprises will be ran according to 
commercial considerations. The regulations governing foreign investment and the 
financial and banking systems will be substantially liberalised (Nolan, 2001: 196-207). 
The US has taken the agreements entered into on China's entry to the WTO very 
seriously indeed by launching, in the words of Charlene Barshefsky, the US leading 
negotiator with China, 'the largest monitoring and enforcement effort for any 
agreement ever' (quoted in Nolan, 2001: 207). 
For two decades the Chinese government experimentally guided its own economic 
reforms. With its entry to the WTO under such detailed and intemationally-set 
conditions, however, as Nolan concludes, 'China would voluntarily give up its 
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autonomy in charting the complex path of economic reform' (ibid.: 196). With such a 
high-speed adjustment to the full force of the global capitalist system, the political, 
economic and cultural transformations of China are likely to be substantial in the 
foreseeable future. The authority of the Communist state, is also very likely to be 
significantly eroded. Indeed, alongside the advancement of business interests, this is 
an explicit objective of the China-US WTO agreement. It is widely assumed that 
opening China's information technology market will increase information flows both 
from inside and outside China and therefore 'promote right kind of change in China' 
(The White House, quoted in Nolan, 2001: 210). 
In sum, given the substantial changes within and without Taiwan and China, the 
model of the 'developmental state' is now no longer viable or appropriate. Global 
political and economic systems have become increasingly decisive to the current 
transformations now taking place in both countries. This is certainly true for the 
transformations which are occurring in the sphere of mass communications and in 
specific cultural practices, such as cinema, the major focus of this thesis. 
5.4 Mass Media in Contemporary Taiwan and China 
Before getting into a detailed analysis of cinema, it is probably helpful to outline the 
current general conditions of mass media in the two cases we are considering here. 
There are two major and interrelated trends in the sphere of media: marketisation and 
globalisation. 
Since martial law was revoked in Taiwan in 1987, the commercialisation and 
marketisation of mass media has been accelerating along with the general 
liberalisation of politics and the economy. Before 1987, the content and pagination of 
newspaper were strictly regulated by the KMT state, as was permission to publish. 
The majority of newspapers were either state / party owned or had a 'Patron-client' 
relationship with the KMT, including the two largest private newspaper groups, the 
United Daily News and the China Times (Lin, 2000; see also Lee, 1994a). Once the 
restrictions were lifted, the market replaced the state as the major censorship 
mechanism. More than 50 newspaper licenses have been granted but most of them, 
including the relatively radical Capital Daily, have been unable to sustain themselves 
in the face of severe market competition. One survivor was an entertainment-and- 
sports-oriented paper, Da Cheng Pao. The pro-unification United Daily News and 
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China Times, along with the Liberty Times which was transformed through 
investments from a native and pro- independence capitalist, have gradually formed an 
oligopolistic structure in the press market. The deregulation of newspaper in Taiwan 
then, has actually fostered coalitions of partisan and economic interests rather than 
contributed to democracy. 
- In television, the situation is even more serious. Three state-owned commercial 
over-the-air television companies, TTV, CTV and CTS dominated Taiwan's 
television market before the 1990S. 4 The significant penetration of foreign television 
channels into households through illegal cable television operating system can be 
traced to the late 1970s. When the Cable Television Law was passed in 1993, the 
coverage of cable television had already reached over 30 percent of Taiwan's 
households. At the same time, over fifty foreign television channels including HBO, 
CNN, ESPN, MTV and Disney from America, Star TV from Rupert Murdoch's News 
Corporation, NHK and TBS from Japan, and even the Fourth Channel of China 
Central Television (CCTV), entered into the market via satellite transmission and 
cable operating systems (see Rawnsley and Rawnsley, 2001). Local companies also 
joined this increasingly competitive but lucrative market and established dozens of 
new channels in the past decade, particularly news channels and movie channels with 
the latter (as we will see later) substantially damaging Taiwan's film industry. 
Without appropriate regulation, Taiwan's cable television has become one of the most 
laissez-faire and disorderly markets in the world. Over 70 percent of household are 
linked to a cable television service delivering an average of 70 channels. The majority 
of these are either foreign channels or local channels showing mainly imported 
materials with most providing highly homogeneous and frequently repeated 
programming (Feng, 1995)'. The progress of deregulation is still ongoing. In early 
2001, the Legislative Yuan passed the amendment to the Cable Law abolishing the 
4 The fourth over-the-air television station, Formosa Television (FTV), was established in 1997 in 
which some leaders of the major opposition party at that time and the current ruling party, the DDP, 
were and still are the major share holders. In retrospect, the establishment was more like political bribe 
rather than democratisation of television. 
'According to the Broadcasting Law, Cable Television Law, and Satellite Television Law, the 
proportion of locally made programme in over-the-air television can not be lower than 70 percent, 
while the proportion of that in cable television is only 20 percent and there is no such quota for satellite 
television. 
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restriction on a single share holder owning a cable operating system and increasing 
permitted foreign investment in ownership from 50 percent to 60 percent (it was 
completely forbidden before 1997). 
Under intense competition from commercial cable television channels, the three 
major over-the-air television companies maintained their market share of advertising 
at 15.9 billion NT dollars (about 530 million US dollars) in 1999. While the total for 
other satellite and cable channels was 14 billion NT dollars (about 460 million US 
dollars) (Fang, 2000). The profit-oriented competition, however, has degraded the 
quality of programming, increasing the amount of entertainment and sensational 
content, and leading to more imported and less locally produced programmes. 
In China, due to ideological considerations, the mass media remains one of the 
most strictly state-controlled spheres. However, after Deng's confirmation in 1992 
that the road ahead led towards a market economy, marketisation of mass media has 
made appreciable progress. Like economic reform in general, media reform in China 
has been trying to introduce market dynamics while at the same time avoiding any 
significant political change or potential threat. The development of the current media 
system has therefore produced a mix of 'Party logic and market logic' and generated 
'contradiction, tensions, and ambiguities' (Zhao, 1998: 2; see also Lee, 1994b; 2000). 
For the CCP leaders, the media are still viewed as instruments of the Party, but they 
are no longer the instruments of class struggle but 'of economic and cultural 
construction, with a new stress placed on business information and entertainment' 
(ibid.: 34). Paradoxically however, once the state introduced market forces into the 
media system it could no longer bend it fully to its own will. 
The pivotal process of marketisation within China's media is that advertising has 
become the single most important non-governmental source of media revenue and 
China's fastest growing industry since the early 1980s. National advertising sales 
grew from 0.118 billion yuan in 1981 to 6.786 billion in 1992, with an annual growth 
rate of 41 percent. The four major media - television, newspapers, radio, and 
magazines-received 64 percent of the total advertising sales in 1992 (ibid.: 57). By 
1999, total advertising sales reached 62.2 billion yuan. The advertising revenues of 
television were 15.6 billion yuan, more than 975 times the amount of 1983. The 
advertising income of newspaper also reached 11.2 billion yuan in that year (Feng, 
2000). 
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Meanwhile, the Chinese government has begun to cutting subsidies to newspapers 
with some loosing all subsidy since the early 1980s (Zhao, 1998: 53). Though the 
privately-owned newspapers and television have still not yet appeared in China, a few 
local private investments have been partially accepted in some newspapers since the 
mid-1990S (Tang, 1999: 259). Whether the transformation in the ownership of 
newspapers continues remains to be seen. Another substantial trend in newspaper has 
been conglomeration. In order to improving the economic efficiency and effectiveness 
of the press, the Chinese governinent proposed a project to guide newspapers toward 
conglomerates in the late 1990s an planned to establish 5 to 10 newspaper groups 
nationwide led by major Party newspapers. 
The competition in television is not as intense as in newspaper. The only national 
television station, CCTV, retains its monopolistic status. From 1990 to 1997, the 
percentage of total television advertising revenues going to CCTV grew from 17.8 
percent to 36.6. While the other 32 provincial television stations accounted 38.8 
percent (Feng, 2000). However, unlike newspapers, which are operated mainly 
domestically, the potential challenges for China's television may, indirectly or 
directly, come from outside its borders. First, in the past three decades, the percentage 
of CCTV's imported programming has steadily grown reaching 16 percent in 1996 
and the percentages in some regional stations, particularly in the prosperous coastal 
areas like Shanghai and Guangdong, was estimated to exceed 30 percent. And the 
nationwide average of imported programming may be over 20 percent. Furthermore, 
imported programmes often occupied prime time slots and enjoyed high viewing 
ratings, particularly during the weekend (Hong, 1998: 70-1). Secondly, despite the 
ban on foreign satellite television broadcasting in China, some foreign channels have 
been trying to penetrate into coastal areas through receiving dishes and cable system. 
It was reported that in 1998 Star TV programmes were being watched in more than 30 
million Chinese households (Zhao, 1998: 173). In the same year, the minister of 
Radio, Film, and Television, Ai Zhi-sheng, said that 'foreign satellite television 
programmes have brought damages ... they are penetrations in culture and 
ideology ... the enforced regulation on 
the viewing of such programmes is needed' 
(quoted in Lui, 1999: 1634). 
in response, the Chinese government has introduced some new measures. First, the 
new Broadcasting Rules limit the percentage of foreign television programming to 25 
percent, and reduced the quota allowable in prime time to 15 percent. Secondly, the 
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ministry of Radio, Film and Television has ordered three domestic satellite 
transmitters to switch from AsiaSatl to AsiaSat2 in order to limit the transmission of 
Star TV content (see Zhao, 1998: 177). Finally, the Chinese government has 
determined to guide the television industry, like the newspaper industry, towards 
conglomeration and to eradicate inefficient units. . 
Overall, China's media reforms have initiated a process of transforming media 
from Party organs into business organisations on the one hand while attempting to 
maintain the leadership of the CCP and ensure societal stability on the other. Whether 
these policies gradually encourage greater democracy or result in commercialisation 
without democracy remains to be seen. But one thing is certain. Along with China's 
entry into the WTO, external pressures from both multinational capitalists and the 
states of countries where these corporations are based, mainly the US, will 
increasingly influence the Chinese government's decision making. In October of 2001 
for example, two multinational conglomerates, AOL Time-Wamer and News 
corporation, have for the first time been allowed to transmit their programmes to the 
cable system of Pearl River Triangle in Guangdong Province. News Corporation 
reportedly claimed that a new television station, owned by Star TV, is currently being 
planning and could be in operation in the near future. If this was to happen, it would 
send the clearest signal yet of the likely future for China's media. 
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Chapter 6 Transnational Interests 
Herbert Schiller has forcefully argued that the central dynamic of media globalisation 
is not 'globalism', but 'corporate transnationalism'. This is certainly the case for film 
where the world market is dominated by a few transnational media conglomerates 
mainly based in the US. For them, Taiwan and China, as well as all other places in the 
world, are markets. China has always been one of the largest potential markets in the 
world and after its moves towards openness and reform since the late 1970s, the 
transnational communication corporations have been eagerly trying to exploit this 
6capitalist virgin' land. On the other hand, despite its relatively small population, 
surprisingly, Taiwan has been on the list of the top 15 overseas market of American 
film industry since 1983 (Pendakur, 1990: 121). And from 1995 to 1997, it became 
the tenth largest along with other comparatively larger countries, such as Japan, 
Germany, Britain, France, Canada, Spain, Australia, Italy, and Brazil (Y. Li, 2000: 
142). ' 
The present chapter begins with a general introduction to the most significant 
globalising force in the world film market at the present time -Hollywood ' and then 
moves on to investigate how foreign films (mainly American) have influenced and 
may influence the domestic film industries of Taiwan and China. 
6.1 Hollywood Empire 
For much of the period before the First World War the American film market was in 
chaotic situation due to patent disputes among film companies and the world film 
market was dominated by the French film industry. The turning point was 1908, when 
the business cartel (the Motion Picture Patents Company) was formed, bringing a 
measure of order to the US market. A steady increase in film production followed and 
the American fihn industry started to move more concertedly into overseas markets 
I The sequence of these countries here was the ranking order of the largest overseas markets of the 
American film industry in 1997 (Y. Li, 2000: 3 63). 
21t is to be known as a group of major film companies located in the US. Although industrial and 
market changes happen almost everyday, Wasko (1994: 41) argues that Hollywood is a three-tier 
society. Some media and entertainment conglomerates constitute the first tier, they are Warner Brothers 
(AOL-Time Warner today), Twentieth Century Fox (News Corporation), Columbia (Sony), Paramount 
(Viacom), Universal (Mitsbishi), and Disney (with ABC). Some secondary majors are in the second 
tier, such as MGM/UA and New Line Cinema. Other relatively-small scale and independent production 
companies compose of the third tier. 
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(Thompson, 1985: 1-28). The European market was their first target. From 1909 to 
1916, a number of American film companies set up distribution branches in London 
to act as centres for overseas distribution. They also gained a 60 percent share of the 
films imported into Britain. Germany was another major market. In both 1912 and 
1913, American films held the largest share of the German market averaging around 
30 percent. However, in the South and East Europe, French and Italian films were still 
in the majority (ibid.: 3546). 
The two World Wars were key turning points for the overseas expansion of the 
American film industry. After the First World War, the production systems of the 
leading European film industries had either been disrupted or forced out of business 
creating a vacuum into which American films flowed. In 1913, the total length of 
American exported films was around 32 million feet. By 1925, this figure had more 
than quadrupled and jumped to 235 million feet. During these dozen years, American 
film exports increased fivefold to Europe and tenfold to the remainder of the world 
including Far East, Latin America and a few areas of Africa (Guback, 1985a: 465). 
By 1925, American films accounted for 95 percent of the total films released in 
Britain. In the two countries whose national industries had been major competitors to 
the American industry before the War, Italy and France, the proportions of total 
screen time occupied by American were 66 and 77 percent respectively (Guback, 
1985a: 466). Thompson even estimated that 82 percent of the films censored in 
France in 1925 came from the US (Thompson, 1985: 125). In most of other European 
countries, American films also occupied over 50 percent of the total films in the 
markets. ' At the same time, 80-90 percent of the films shown in the countries of Latin 
America, Asia, and Africa, including Brazil, Mexico, India, China, and South Affica, 
were American in origin. In general then, except from a few countries (Germany, 
japan, and Russia), the American film industry had established a dominant position in 
the world filin market by the 1920s. 
After the Second World War, war damages further increased the gap in film 
production capacity between the US and other countries. The protective measures 
developed before the War were stripped away, leaving many countries' film markets 
defenceless. Moreover, as the general political and economic power of the US 
3 Germany was the exception during this period. It was probably because Germany's relatively strong 
economic revivals and the German government implemented strict film importation quotas system. The 
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increased so the overseas expansion of the American film industry proceeded even 
more smoothly. All these conditions helped to maintain and enforce America's 
dominant control of the world film market. The situation was evaluated by one report 
prepared for UNESCO: 
The large number of cheap American films available ... apart from adding to the 
dollar deficit, is only one of the factors prejudicing the development of national 
film production industries. These industries, unable to recover their outlay on the 
films which they produce, are stunted in growth and become unable to meet the 
demands of the national market. The exhibitors, therefore, are driven to depend for 
their existence upon foreign, largely American, film (quoted in Guback, 1969: 17). 
In addition to the conjunctural conditions created by the two World Wars, the 
American film industry enjoyed three structural features that made it invincible in the 
world market. First, as many authors have pointed out, the costs of most American 
films are already amortised in the home market because of its massive market 
capacity. As early as the 1920s, it was estimated that the US had about half the 
world's theatres and that the domestic American film market accounted for around 60 
percent of the world film market. This substantial advantage of scale enabled 
American films to be rented cheaply in overseas markets and to compete strongly 
with national productions. (Guback, 1985a: 465; Gamham, 1990; Thompson, 1985; 
Maltby and Craven, 1995). 
The second advantage stems from the strong alliance between the American state 
and the film industry. Many European countries have adopted various quota policies 
to resist the overwhelming expansion of American films since the 1920s. At the same 
time, faced with concerted lobbying from the newly formed trade association of the 
American film industry, the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America 
(MPPDA), the American government set up the Motion Picture Section in the 
Department of Commerce with the aim of helping the companies to solve foreign 
trade problems (see Jarvie, 1992). In 1945, the MPPDA became the Motion Picture 
Association of America (MPAA) and the former foreign department changed its name 
to the Motion Picture Export Association (MPEA). The MPEA was established as a 
share of American films of all films censored in Germany was reduced from over 40 percent before the 
War to 28 percent in 1931 (Thompson, 1985: 125; see also Guback, 1985a). 
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legal cartel under the provisions of a particular trade act, and though it violated the 
antitrust laws in the US, it 'allowed companies supposedly in competition in the 
American market to combine, to fix prices, and to allocate customers in foreign 
markets' (Guback, 1985a: 471). It was strongly supported by the state in its foreign 
negotiations and thus was called 'the little State Department' (Swann, 1991). 
In turn, the American state benefited from facilitating Hollywood's overseas 
expansion. First, the appearance of American products and daily practices in 
American movies educated foreign audiences to consume and therefore promoted 
trade between the US and other countries. In the 1930s, according to a Department of 
Commerce estimate, 'for every foot of film sent abroad, one dollar in other goods was 
exported' (Thompson, 1985: 123; see also Jarvie, 1992: 302-5; Guback, 1985a: 466). 
The second advantage, though substantial, is not countable. It arises from the 
American government 's use of exported American films as instruments of 
propaganda. The post-war international political situation reinforced this stance. For 
American government, the export of media materials which offered an attractive 
vision of the American way of life was a very effective weapon in its efforts to build 
American hegemony (Guback, 1985b, 1986; Swann, 1991). 
The third major competitive advantage enjoyed by American film companies, lies 
with their global network of film distribution. Many authors have argued that 
distribution is the pivotal sector in the contemporary capitalist filin industry. It 
determines where the artefacts made by the production sector are sent and controls 
what will be shown in the exhibition sector (see Guback, 1979; Garnharn, 1990; 
Aksoy and Robins, 1992). As Thompson points out (1985: 91), the key contributing 
factor to the success of the American film industry in world markets after the First 
World war was that it ceased to focus solely on the European market and changed its 
distribution strategy from working out of London as the hub of the overseas 
distribution system to directly establishing distribution branches in foreign markets. 
Local control of film rental, marketing, and release was more effective and boosted 
profits. Hollywood also developed new distribution practices like block-booking and 
blind-bidding to strengthen its advantages in dealing with local exhibitors. According 
to Clarence J. North, first chief of the Motion Picture Division in the Bureau of 
Foreign and Domestic Commerce, writing in 1927: 
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The motion pictures of practically all our larger companies covering perhaps 85 
percent of the total number of pictures that are sent abroad are distributed through 
the branch offices of the firms themselves. Such branch offices are known as film 
exchanges, and are located in the capitals and large commercial centres of 
practically every foreign country. Famous Players (distributing Paramount pictures) 
has over 125 foreign offices and Fox, Universal and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, have 
nearly as many. ... They sell pictures usually in blocks of from a dozen to four 
dozen, although it is possible for a theatre owner to take fewer at a higher price, 
however for each. The terms on which such pictures are sold either a flat rental 
price ... [or] the theatre guarantee 
the exchange a certain amount for the picture and 
a certain percentage of the theatre receipts besides (quoted in Jarvie, 1992: 277). 
Initially, Hollywood set up their overseas distribution branches mainly in Europe. 
After 1916 however, they started to move on to other places. Fox, Paramount, and 
Goldwyn (later MGM) focused on Central and South America and Australia. By 
contrast, Asian and African markets were paid relatively little attention. Universal 
was the only major exception in concentrating initially on the Far East market. It was 
the first American company to open branches in Japan (Asia's most developed film 
market), India, and Singapore, all in 1916 (Thompson, 1985: 72-4). Other companies 
soon followed Universal's lead and set up branches in Japan and by 1928, seven 
American film companies had operations there. 
Today, the American film industry continues to dominate the world film market. 
But the nature of this domination has changed in two major respects since the 1950s. 
Firstly, the film industry has been integrated into an increasingly concentrated and 
converging multi-media industry. Contrary to many early predictions, the 'new' 
entertainment technologies, broadcasting television, home video, and cable television 
have not destroyed the film industry. Even the most threatened sector, theatrical 
exhibition, has survived by altering its operating patterns launching multi-complexes 
and integrating with other leisure activities. Hollywood companies have moved 
beyond film production and distribution and transformed themselves into 
transnational conglomerates. By integrating a wide range of media practices and 
acquiring new media businesses through huge domestic and international mergers 
(particularly in the first flush of the deregulation era in the 1980s), they have become 
the centre of the global entertainment business. Hollywood now is not exclusively 
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American owned, but the key companies are still controlled by shareholders from the 
advanced capitalist countries and the main practices of filmmaking continue to be 
based on models pioneered in the US. In addition, by moving to acquire multiple 
media outlets and taking full advantage of all possible spin-offs such as video games, 
toys, T-shirts, and theme park rides, the domination of Hollywood films in global 
markets has been not only consolidated but extended (Wasko, 1994; Balio, 1990; 
1996). As a consequence, the routes through which transnational media corporations 
penetrate into national societies are now not confined to film and cinema. Hollywood 
has made itself a real empire. 
The second major shift from the 1950's is that overseas revenues have become 
increasingly important. In 1980 the American film industry relied on exports for one- 
third of its annual revenue, the same proportion as in 1950 (Miller et al., 2001: 6). By 
1998, overseas box office receipts reached $6.821 billion a figure that almost equalled 
the domestic figure of $6.877 billion. Recently, most 'star-driven event films' from 
Hollywood have obtained more revenues from overseas than domestically. At the 
same time, the relative strength of other major filmmaking countries has been 
declining. The proportion of total receipts taken by domestic films was down to 2 
percent in Canada, 4 percent in Australia, 5 percent in Brazil, 10 percent in Germany, 
12 percent in Britain, and 26 percent in France (ibid.: 4-5). However, theatrical 
exhibition accounts for only a part of Hollywood's global revenues and that 
proportion has been decreasing since the mid-1980s with the rise of home video and 
cable television market (see Table 6.1, and also Balio, 1996: 25). 
TableM Worldwide revenues for US film companies (selected years) 
Revenues ($billion) % of total 
1986 1991 1986 1991 1999 
Worldwide 
Box-office rentals 2.701 4.629 40.2 34.5 29 
Home video 2.411 5.714 35.9 42.6 25 
Television 1.609 3.075 23.9 22.9 46 
Total 6.721 13.418 100.0 100.. 0 100.0 
Domestic 4.366 7.132 65.0 53.2 50.2* 
Foreign 2.355 6.286 35.0 46.8 49.8* 
Based on 1998 box-office data only. 
Source: Wasko(l 994: 220) and Miller et al. (2001: 4,8-9). 
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Now that foreign markets have become so crucial, Hollywood studios increasing 
devise their managerial practices and marketing plans in the recognition that they are 
operating on a global scale. This is also why the US government and Hollywood 
continue to I assault other countries' attempts to defend national self-determination on- 
screen via barriers to imports' (Miller et al., 2001: 9) and to act aggressively in 
international intellectual right negotiations (see ibid.: Chapter 4). 
These changed circumstances have enabled Hollywood to reach the zenith of its 
influence on other national cinemas, including China and Taiwan. With this in mind, 
we turn now to an examination of Hollywood's operations in China and Taiwan. 
6.2 When China met Hollywood 
In July 1897, an American businessman brought films to make the first film 
exhibition in Shanghai. One press report noted that, 'there is an electronic and lighting 
shadow show come from America recently. It was like shadow light machine. The 
show surprises people with magic and amazing fantasy' (quoted in Cheng, 1981: 8). 
The novel cultural form apparently considerably interested local people. By 1927, 
there were about 106 theatres with 68,000 seating capacity established in major cities, 
and 26 of the 106 theatres were in Shanghai (Lee, 1999: 83). Movie-going was not 
only a new leisure activity but also 'had become part and parcel of the modem way of 
life in the metropolis' (ibid.: 118). 
Although domestic film production began as early as 1905, the shortage of capital 
and the comparatively small scale of operations made the resulting products 
noncompetitive. As a result, foreign films dominated the Chinese market for over 
fifty years until the establishment of the People's Republic of China. In common with 
the early world film market more generally, the majority of imported films were 
French initially but after the First World War, American films took the absolutely lead 
(Wang, 1998; Xiao, 1998). 
in 1923, an American official estimated that US films made up 80 percent of all 
prints shown in the Beijing and Tianjin areas. At the same time, American films were 
reported to make up 90 percent of the films shown in Hong Kong a figure that may 
also have represented the situation in south China. In 1926, a Chinese filmmaker and 
distributor Luther M. Jee estimated that 450 foreign films had been shown in China 
that year of which 90 percent was American. Meanwhile, the Chinese made 57 films 
that year (Thompson, 1985: 143-4). American's domination did not lessen until the 
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Second World War. From 1933 to 1936, the percentage of American films of all 
imported films in China persisted at over 80 percent (see Table 6.2). 
Table 6.2 The proportion of American films of imported films in China (selected years) 
No. of imported films No. of imported American films Percentage 
1933 431 355 82% 
1934 407 345 85% 
1936 367 328 89% 
Source: Wang(l 998: 62). 
During the Pacific War, Western (including American) films almost disappeared from 
China. Films produced by the invaders, Japan, significantly increased their 
penetration but never reached the market share formerly enjoyed by Hollywood. 
When the War ended in 1945, American movies were soon to recover control over 
China's film market (Yjao, 1998: 70). Nevertheless, in the immediate post-War period, 
the domination of American films seemed to gradually decline, mainly due to the 
increasing technical maturity and popularity of domestically produced films (see 
Table 6.3). According to his investigation of cinema programmes in four major cities, 
Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, in the years 1927,1937 and 1948, Wang 
noted that Shanghai showed the largest number of American films. In contrast, 
Beijing showed the fewest American films and the proportion decreased from 50 
percent in 1927 to 22 percent in 1948. Turning from these major offshore cities to 
inland cities, such as Hungzhou, Fuzhou, Nanjing, Chungching, Man, and Wuhan, 
during 1947 and 1948, the decline of American films in the markets was more 
prominent and sometimes Chinese films even occupied all the cinemas in these cities 
(Wang, 1998: 62-3). ' 
There are two explanations for this pattern. First, most early imported American 
were comedy shows with simple stories and documentaries of natural scenery. They 
were easily understandable and brought novelty to the Chinese audience. In contrast, 
feature films, which became the main product later, required audiences to have a 
4 Here Wang uses intended sampling method. The reason for selecting these three years is that 1927 
was the transition period of China's political regime, 1937 was the Most prosperous period after the 
Republic born, and 1948 was the year that China's economy and industry basically recovered from the 
War. The date January the 25th is normally close to Chinese New Year holidays. The numbers of 
different films shown are counted by the cinema advertising on that day's newspapers. The method is a 
practical and relatively reliable as a reference with none record and data left. 
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knowledge of narrative conventions and American societal backgrounds to fully 
understand and enjoy them. This point relates to the second explanation. It was the 
people living in the major cosmopolitan coastal cities, particularly Shanghai, who 
were most familiar with Western cultures and had higher education who were the 
main audience for imported films. 
Table 6.3 Films shown in four major Chinese cities (selected dates) 
Total screens Films shown 
Total Chinese American European 
25/01/1927 37 37 12(32%) 23 (63%) 2 (5%) 
25/01/1937 55 52 23(42%) 28(56%) 1 (2 'Yo) 
25/01/1948 92 65 29(45%) 35 (53.5%) 1 (1.5%) 
Source: Compiled from Wang (1998: 62). 
As more cinemas opened in inland cities and better quality Chinese films began to 
be made, local products gradually became a significant counterpart of American films 
in the market. Here is how one author describes the movie-going situation in Hanko 
(an inland city in Hubei province) in the late 1920s: 
Citizens were really enthusiastic in seeing movies, particularly domestically made 
movies. It was clearly because these movies have Chinese captions. Those who know 
nothing about foreign languages can easily understand the stories. Whenever 
domestic movies are shown, there were always crowds of people filled the cinemas. 
it's smashing! (quoted in Wang, 1998: 60) 
Though the majority of the Chinese audience preferred locally produced films, 
American films still enjoyed vast advantages stemming from historical and political 
conditions. First of all, under the unequal treaties signed with imperialist Western 
countries, China did not have control over the importation of films (Yjao, 1998: 70). 
One critic has ever argued that, 'the main reason why Chinese films could not develop 
prosperously was that the Chinese government did not have autonomy on customs. 
Because of that, Western films entered directly into the market without any barriers. 
In contrast, Chinese films incurred enormous tax duty and various regulations. The 
local film industry therefore yielded to these constraints and pressures' (quoted in 
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Wang, 1998: 59). After the Second World War, most of the old unequal treaties were 
abolished. But, the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the 
Republic of China and the United States of America, contracted by the KMT 
government in 1946, functioned as a new unequal treaty. It permitted the nationals of 
either contracting country to engage in and to carry on commercial activities, adhering 
to the principle of national treatment, throughout the whole extent of the territories of 
the other contracting country. While Chinese film production and distribution had no 
capacity to venture abroad at that time, this agreement empowered American film 
companies to exploit their business more thoroughly in China (and later on in Taiwan 
when the exiled KMT took control of the government of the island). This was not a 
completely novel situation however. Rather, it was the latest chapter in an unfolding 
story of co-operation between local and American interests 
In common with their operations in other places in the world, the Hollywood 
studios adopted specific distribution practices in China. Initially, American films: were 
bought and brought to China by Chinese and foreign traders from the open film 
markets in London, New York and Hong Kong. In the 1920s however, Hollywood 
majors started to give franchises to specific agents to distribute their films. MGM, 
paramount, Fox, Warner, RKO, Universal, Columbia, and United Artists (in that 
sequence) also set up their branch offices in major Chinese cities (Thompson, 1985). 
With the continuing expansion of China's film market, the majors increased their 
branch offices and recruited more Chinese officials in order to achieve better control 
of distribution and exhibition and lower personnel costs. Although Hollywood 
companies did not involve themselves in the theatre business, they dominated 
exhibition through profit-sharing and block-booking. For example, MGM had a 
contract with the Jinsheng Theatre, the largest in Guangzhou, stipulating that the 
theatre showed no less than fifty MGM films every year but only around ten of these 
were likely to be popular and of good quality, The ratio of shared-profit for first run 
films was normally 50 / 50. After the Treaty was signed, Hollywood branch offices in 
major cities established an American Film Board for 'associating members' actions, 
resolving and arbitrating disputes among members, assisting members to enforce 
releasing contracts, to deal with theatres, and to allocate market and releasing 
I it was reported that only till 1946 the fust American-owned cinema, Dahua Ileatre, appeared in 
Shanghai (Wang, 1998: n5). 
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timetable'. As consequence, the relationships between Hollywood majors and local 
exhibitors became more unequal (Wang, 1998: 61). 
Establishing this additional, centralised, arbitration system was partly a response to 
past experience. Trade disputes occurred frequently between Chinese and Hollywood 
film companies before the War. In 1934 for example, the cinemas in Guangzhou 
asked Hollywood films distributors to share the tax requested by the Finance Bureau 
of Guangdong Province but were rejected. Later, Paramount's office in Guangzhou 
refused to pay the film censorship fee and argued that it should be paid by exhibitors. 
The association of exhibitors decided to boycott Paramount films. In the post-War 
period, with Chinese films getting more popular, Hollywood's offices even intervened 
in contracted exhibitors' operations and limited the release opportunities of Chinese 
films in these cinemas. For instance, after recovering from the Japanese occupation, 
the Great Nanjing Theatre in Shenyang (the capital of Liaoning Province) ended their 
contracts with foreign companies and moved to show Chinese films in 1947. 
American companies protested and argued that the action 'violates the principle of the 
US-China Treaty and hinders American films' sale in North - East area'. Similar 
conflicts also happened in Shanghai and 
Beijing (Wang, 1998: 61). 
Apart from developing universal operational strategies, Hollywood has also used 
the advantages stemming from China's specific historical and political conditions to 
achieve and maintain its dominant status 
in China. With the victory of the Mao's 
forces in 1949 however, the story of 'Hollywood in China' develops in very different 
ways on the two sides of the Taiwan 
Strait. 
6.3 Taiwan's Fate of Colonisation 
When the first movie came to Taiwan, the island was still under Japanese colonisation. 
The Japanese colonial government 's film policy restricted indigenous production and 
controlled distribution. The 
film market was therefore dominated by imported films, 
mainly Japanese and secondly American. 
With the end of the War and the withdrawal 
of the Japanese in 1945, the 
KMT regime from the mainland enjoyed a close 
relationship with the new 
imperial power in the Pacific, the US, due to its practical 
need for political and economic support. 
As consequence, Hollywood films started to 
pave their way to dominance on the 
island. Before we look at this process however, 
the situation of Taiwan's film market before 1946 needs to be outlined first. 
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6.3.1 The first contact 
In 1900, two Japanese businessmen, Shozo Matsuura and Inoichi Ooshima, brought a 
dozen of French short films to exhibit in Taipei (the capital of Taiwan). This was the 
first film show in Taiwan (Li, 1995; Ye, 1997: 31-32). Until the first permanent 
cinema, the Fangnai Guan, opened in Taipei, most film shows were presented by a 
mobile exhibition team led by the Japanese entrepreneur Toyojiro Takamatsu. The 
majority of the films he showed were European, particularly French (Ye, 1997: 38-40). 
From 1910 however, with the Japanese film industry starting to develop, the 
majority of films shown in Taiwan became Japanese. Fangnai Guan and other 
subsequently established cinemas were all owned and run by Japanese and were part 
of the distribution and exhibition systems of Japanese domestic film companies. With 
the continuous grow of Taiwan's film exhibition market, by 1923, Hollywood films 
also started to appear (ibid.: 55). The importation of Chinese films however, was still 
strictly controlled. In 1928, Japanese films accounted for 70 percent of the total films 
shown in Taiwan, while American films obtained a 28 percent share. Thereafter 
American films maintained their position as the second largest presence in the market, 
behind Japanese films. Until 1935, the proportion was maintained above 10 percent 
(W. Wang, 1994: 43), and was about 16 percent in 1940 (Lu, 1961: 29). When the 
Pacific War began in 1941 however, the Japanese colonial government prohibited the 
importation of American, British and French films and replaced them with films from 
the two other Axis powers, Germany and Italy (W. Wang, 1994: 44; Ye, 1997: 8 1). 
The film exhibition business had grown significantly since the 1930s in Taiwan. 
The number of cinemas increased from 8 to 20 between 1930 and 1932. By 1941, the 
total had reached 40 not counting many other theatres that showed local dramas as 
well as films (W. Wang, 1994: 70). This 
buoyant situation attracted some major 
Japanese film companies to Taipei to set up their branch offices. Hollywood also 
noticed this development. Paramount and 
Universal particularly instructed their 
branch offices in Tokyo to deal with distribution and exhibition matters in Taiwan 
(sai Ichikawa, 1941). In the late 1930s, the distribution franchise for Hollywood films 
was held by two companies. They were the 
Taiwan Film Company, mainly operated 
by Taiwanese and as distributor of films from MGM, United Artists, and Universal, 
and Taiwan Film Distribution, owned 
by Japanese and holding the franchise for 
distributing Paramount, Warner, Fox, and Columbia films. 
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Fascinated by the amazing novelty, Taiwanese people expressed their enthusiasm 
for watching movies from the outset. (Sai Ichikawa, 1941; Lu, 1961; Li, 1995; Ye, 
1997). However, culturally they turned to China. According to the Japanese author 
Sai Ichikawa, though Japanese films made up the majority of films shown in the 
1920s, most Taiwanese audiences preferred films from mainland China. Some 
Japanese films which adapted plots from Western classic literature also enjoyed good 
.V 
box-office but films with genuine Japanese traditional literature and drama elements 
were much less popular (see also W. Wang, 1994). In contrast, American films 
seemed to obtain more attention because of their simple narratives. It was reported 
that Chaplin films were very popular among a wide range of audiences with different 
ages and backgrounds (Ye, 1997: 67). In addition, with better audio and visual quality 
and more spectacular scenes, Hollywood films gradually became the cinemas' focus 
of promotion (ibid.: 72-82). However, the real success of Hollywood would be 
achieved only after the Japanese had gone. 
6.3.2 Shaping the film business In Taiwan 
The importation of Japanese films was restricted after the KMT Officials took over the 
island in 1945 and Chinese films were brought in. Yet, the limited quantity of 
available Chinese films could not fill the large vacuum in Taiwan, s film exhibition 
market. Westem (mainly Hollywood) films therefore flooded in and expanded their 
market share without any regulations from the Nationalist goven'unent. By 1947, 
Western films occupied 70 percent of total screen time in Taiwan, while Chinese 
films only commanded 20 percent (Lu, 1961: 32-33). Taiwanese audiences 
nevertheless still preferred Chinese films, at least before 1950. In 1948, four out of the 
six major first-run cinemas in Taipei showed exclusively or mainly Westem films. 
The other two mainly offered Chinese films while sometimes showing Western films 
as well (Ye, 1997: 109). In that year, according to press investigations based on 
counting the average attendance in three of Taipei's cinemas, films made by three 
_major 
Chinese film companies, KuenLuen, Wenhua, and Datung, were in the first 
three places, while the most popular American film could only reach fourth place (Lu, 
1961: 34). 
yet, American film's advantages in both sheer quantity and exhibition 
opportunities continued to contribute in cultivating audience's appetites and tastes. Lu 
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observed that after 1950, American films gradually took hold of audiences, 
particularly among young viewers (ibid.: 55). In addition, the American film industry 
had taken the lead in offering color films, which attracted vast Popular attention. A 
senior film distributor recalls that the 'audience at that time thought film is interesting 
mainly by how colorful the film is and how many fighting scenes the film presents 
rather than by the story' (quoted in Y. Li, 2000: 40). 
Table 6.4 The comparison of the box-off ice number ones in Taipei of American, 
Mandarin, and Fulao films (1957-1960, in thousand NT dollars) 
American Film Mandarin Film Fulao Film 
1957 Title The Giant (Warner) Pretty WomanlYaotiao Room 7 CrimelKeelung 
Shunu Qihaofang Canan 
Revenues 1104 506 481 
1958 Title The Bridge over Kwal Diao Chan Singing GirIlGenu 
(Columbia) Bailanhua 
Revenues 1807 748 305 
1 959 Title 4round the World in Empire and Beautyl Snake DevillShelangfun 
80 Days (UA) Xangshan Meiren 
Revenues 961 1287 326 
196o Title South Pacific (Fox) Kuer Liolang X Hugupo 
Revenues 2122 602 251 
Source: Lu (1961: 106; 112-3) 
Take the box-office data for 1955 as example. The total attendance at Chinese 
films was about 3.2 million and at Japanese films about 2.2 million. While Western 
films, of which American film were the majority, sold 10.2 million tickets. The next 
year, in spite of the first successful major Fulao film, Xue Pin9gue and Wang 
Baochan, appearing, American films attracted NT$29 million in revenues while 
Chinese films made NT$16 million (Lu, 1961: 58; 100). Specific Hollywood 'big 
films, also often became box-office champions with much higher receipts than 
Chinese films. In the three of the years from 1957 to 1960, Hollywood productions 
obtained highest box-office takings which were more than two times those of Chinese 
films (see Table 6.4). 
1 
Faced with the tremendous success of American film and the threat to Chinese film 
production, the state of Taiwan started to introduce imported film quota regulations in 
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1954 restricting the annual number of imported films, the number of print of each, and 
imposing screen quotas (also see Chapter 7). However, the importation quota never 
had a significant impact on American film. The main reason was that since the 1950s, 
partially in response to the rise of television, Hollywood had changed its production 
strategy moving towards fewer big budget pictures with more spectacular scenes and 
audio-visual effects (see Balio, 1985: 422-38). Hence, though the absolute volume of 
production decreased the revenues increased and average showing times got longer 
(Garnham, 1990). 
Until 1960, although the proportion of screened American films seemed to 
decrease, they still maintained a 40 percent share of total screened titles and took the 
absolute lead over Chinese films' (see Table 6.5). This situation was the outcome of 
considerable effort over a sustained period. 
Table 6.5 The numbers and proportions of films censored in the 1950s 
American Film Chinese Film Japanese Film European/Others Fihn* 
1950 393 (66%) 185 (3 IVo) 7(10/o) 12(20/o) 
1951 505(66%) 236(31%) 13(20/o) 9(1-/o) 
1954 238 (54Vo) 104(240/o) 23 (5Vo) 77 (17'Yo) 
1956 286(52%) 133(24%) 44(80/o) 84 (16'Yo) 
1957 299(590/o) 119(240/o) 47 (M) 38(8%) 
1958 239 (49*/o) 121(25%) 54(11%) 77 (15'Yo) 
1959 220 (44'Yo) 134(270/o) 58(110/0) 92(180/o) 
1960 182(460/o) 86 (22%) 66(17%) 58 (15'Yo) 
European films included British, French, and Italian films. Films from other countries included South Korea and 
the Philippines and so on. 
Source: Lu (1961: 47; 56; 107) 
Considering Taiwan's film market to be potentially prosperous and lucrative, 
Hollywood had put much effort into developing it since the late 1940s. Following the 
1946 Treaty ofFriendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the Republic ofChina 
and the United States of America, all 
Hollywood majors not only opened branch 
6 'The definition of Chinese films here is needed to be further clarified. The film produced in Taiwan 
were made both in Mandarin and 
Fulao (a dialect widely used among islanders whose ancestors were 
from South Fujian Province). In Taiwan, Fulao is normally called Taiwanese due to the reality that 
Fulao people are the majority ethnic group. Films made in Fulao thus are widely called Taiwanese film 
rather than Fulao film. But 
for avoiding confusion, in the thesis, I name it Fulao film. I take the 
definition of Taiwanese film geographically and organisationally, so Taiwanese films refers to all films 
produced in Taiwan or 
by Taiwanese companies. Imported Hong Kong films also include Mandarin 
film and Cantonese film. The term Chinese films used 
include all Taiwanese films and Hong Kong 
films. 
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offices during 1947 and 1948 (MGM was the first) but also directly dealt with 
distribution matters in Taiwan (Interviews, No. 25,26). In contrast, some film 
companies from Japan and Europe were refused permission to set up branch office in 
Taiwan (Ye, 1997: 200). In addition, Hollywood distribution branches were allowed 
to convert and remit up to 70 percent of their earnings in Taiwan back to the US. The 
remaining 30 percent was basically spent on marketing and operating the branch 
office (Interview, No. 25). That was comparatively good ratio for Hollywood. 7 
Hollywood branch offices were (and still are) powerful in dealing with local 
exhibitors. They dominated scheduling and showing patterns. Profit-sharing was the 
normal practice in distribution and exhibition. However, the proportion going to the 
Hollywood distributor was relatively high. In the 1940s and 1950s, the ratio for 
Chinese film was 3 for the distributor and 7 for the exhibitor. For the average 
American film these ratios were almost reversed, with 6.3 going to the distributor and 
3.7 to the exhibitor. Exhibitors also needed to cover the expense of marketing and 
print transportation (Ye, 1997: 116). Another source from the Association of Cinema 
and Theatre in Taipei also points out that since Hollywood companies set up their 
branch offices, the profit-sharing ratio was normally 4 for exhibitor and 6 for 
distributor. For some expected box-office hits would be 3.516.5 or even 3/7. That was 
much more uneven in comparison with neighboring countries'. Even so, exhibitors 
still preferred to show Hollywood film due to their relatively high profitability. This 
effectively tied up scarce screen space. It was estimated in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, that there were two to three hundred domestically produced films every year 
that found it hard to get an opportunity to be shown (The Cultural Bureau, 1971). 
Hollywood was also tough in its dealings with the KMT government. In 1947, the 
KMT established the Taiwan Film Business Inc. (TFB) and planned to coordinate a 
distribution system which covered most of the cinemas in the whole of Taiwan. 
Hollywood protested the action via their branch offices and threatened to stop 
supplying films (Lu, 1961: 1234). Another example occurred in late 1948, when the 
KMT owned TFB started a promotion campaign which offered people half-price 
71n the post-War (West) Germany, American film companies' revenues were blocked by the Military 
Government. This currency could not be converted into dollars, nor could it be used outside Germany. 
'Me Goverrunent even severely restricted how the MPEA could used in Germany (see Guback, 1986). 
In comparison, Hollywood indeed enjoyed great privileges in Taiwan from the KMT government. 
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coupons to see American movies in its cinema chains. Hollywood branch offices 
opposed this and threatened not to supply films if the coupons could not be retrieved 
with five days. In response, the TFB changed their offer by showing Chinese films 
(ibid.: 34-5). After 1949, when the KMT government entered into a more dependent 
relationship with the US, Hollywood's interests in Taiwan were ensured (the quota 
system pursued in 1954 did not influence Hollywood substantially, also see Chapter 7 
and there were no significant conflicts until the 1980s (see section 6.3.4). 
From the 1950s to 1990s, the annual number of imported foreign films averaged 
about 250, accounting for about of 50 percent of the total Taiwanese film market (see 
Figure 6.1 and Table 6.7). However, the remaining 50 percent was not all preserved 
for locally produced films. There was another significant source of 'foreign' films 
entering Taiwan's film market - Hong Kong film - sharing that 50 percent. 
6.3.3 Another 'foreign' threat: Hong Kong film 
After 1949, the exiled KNIT proclaimed that the ROC's sovereignty still extended to 
the whole China, including Hong Kong. Hong Kong film was therefore regarded as 
driational production. It could be imported without any restrictions and was also 
eligible for all relevant forms of government support and award. Moreover, as part of 
their continuing competition with the Communist government on the mainland for 
political and cultural influence in Hong Kong, the KMT government adopted many 
preferential measures to attract Hong Kong filmmakers to come to shoot films in 
Taiwan. The political climate therefore benefited the Hong Kong film industry's own 
development and helped it to secure a firm foothold in Taiwan's film market. In the 
1950s, Hong Kong film' was increasingly popular in Taiwan. It contributed more than 
seven titles to the top-ten box-office hits almost every year in that decade (Cai, 1985: 
30-47). But, in terms of the number of films submitted to censorship, the position of 
Taiwanese film and Hong Kong film in Taiwan's market was not significantly 
different before 1971. Since 1972 however, the quantity of Taiwanese film has never 
8 The data is quoted in a letter from the association to the Government Information Office (the authority in 
charge of cinema) in 1998 for requesting public intervention in the uneven allocation of box-office revenues 
between distributor and exhibitor. 
9 Here the 'Hong Kong film' mainly refers to the films dubbed or subtitled in Mandarin. Indigenous 
Cantonese film production drastically diminished after the 1960s and disappeared in Taiwan's film market. 
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exceeded that of Hong Kong film, while other foreign films have generally 
maintained their relatively position (see Figure 6.1). 
Figure 6.1 Annual numbers of films censored in Taiwan (1968-85)* 
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The main explanation for this pattern lies in the difference in the industrial 
organisation of the two film industries. The Hong Kong film industry was always 
market-oriented and adopted the model of the Hollywood studio system. Major film 
companies, firstly the Shaw Brothers and Dianmao and then Golden Harvest, started 
their studio productions and established vertical integration systems in the 1970s. 
They successfully transformed and upgraded their production technologies, marketing 
strategies, and overseas campaigns in the age of television and the large corporation. 
in contrast, Taiwanese film companies were still either conservative state 
organisations or small and medium-sized firms. The Taiwan film industry thus lacked 
the dynamism as well as the economies of scale to compete both domestically and 
internationally in the new era (see more details in Chapter 8). For Taiwanese 
audiences the Hong Kong film industry offered products as good as, but not as 
, foreign' as, other foreign films. Since then, on the list of major importers of Hong 
Kong film, Taiwan gradually replaced other South-East Asian countries to arrive at 
the top. From 1984 to 1992, Taiwan was the biggest buyer of Hong Kong film 
(Leung, 1993: 55-66). 
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Yet, this tremendous success in Taiwan had negative effects on both the Taiwanese 
and the Hong Kong film industries. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, major 
Taiwanese film companies reduced their investment in local production and competed 
to pre-buy the distribution rights to Hong Kong films or to directly invest in Hong 
Kong independent production companies to make new films as quickly as possible. 
That caused the costs and prices of new productions to rise to unreasonable levels. 
Moreover, the quality of films fell. Many products unsuitably cast popular Taiwanese 
actors /actresses and roughly added Taiwanese cultural elements. Disputes between 
Taiwan and Hong Kong companies happened frequently while at the same time the 
market performance was not as good as expected and market share was gradually 
nibbled away by American films (see Table 6.8 in the next section). In 1994, after a 
serious dispute between several major companies on both sides, some major 
Taiwanese film companies changed their investment strategy again. The money did 
not go back to local production however. Instead, 
it went into the foreign (mainly 
American) film distribution market, as companies competed to distribute American 
films from non-majors. 
This shift struck the Hong Kong film industry severely. The number of films in 
production shrank drastically. It was 
during this period that many famous and talented 
filmmakers and actors/actresses, such as John Woo, Jacky Chen, Tsui Hark, and 
Chow Yun-fat, went to Hollywood in search of better opportunities. However, after 
through all these years, the Hong Kong film industry leamt the lesson and has revived. 
The quantity has fallen but the quality, at least technically, is being improved and 
Hong Kong remains the most important film production and film exportation base in 
the Pacific Asia region (see Chen, 2000). Over the same period, however, Taiwan's 
film market has fallen completely into Hollywood's hands and the indigenous 
Taiwanese film industry has nearly died completely. 
6.3.4 The overwhelming victory of Hollywood 
Conflicts of interest have existed between Hollywood branch distributors and 
Taiwanese foreign fllm distributors from the outset. In 1983, in response to a local 
distributors' lobby, the government decided to reduce the annual importation quota 
for American distributors from 85 to 50 titles but to maintain the existing quota for 
local distributors. In addition, local distributors requested the government to persuade 
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Hollywood distributors to participate in the Association of Taipei Film Distributors 
and share the same obligations with local companies. For a long time, Hollywood 
distributors were not the members of the Association and therefore did not have to 
pay special tax on imported films which supported local production. The requests 
seemed fairly reasonable but caused intense reactions from Hollywood. 
Firstly, Hollywood distributors stopped supplying films from July 1983 to the 
Chinese New Year Holidays (in January of the next year). This led to a film market 
panic. In response, the exhibitors (many of whom had close ownership ties with local 
distributors) asked the government to relax the quota restrictions. 
Table 6.6. Adjustments on print quotas and cinema quotas 
Date No. of print Cinema quota 
Major Cifies* Odier cities and towns 
01.07.1965 3 N/A N/A 
29-11-1994 4 4 N/A 
17.04.1987 6 4 4 
01.02.1988 8 4 4 
23.02.1991 12 6 4 
15.06.1992 14 6 4 
15.12.1993 16 6 4 
ol. 10.1994 24 9 6 
01.06.1995 28 11 6 
01.06.1996 31 11 6 
oi. 06.1997 38 11 10 
20-11.1997 50 18 10 
15.05.1999 58 18 10 
Taipei and Kauhslung. 
Source: Y. Ll (2000: 134) 
Secondly, Hollywood branches still refused to participate in the Association of 
Taipei Film Distributors which was controlled by local companies. Instead they went 
to Kauhsiung (the second largest city of Taiwan located in the south) and established 
the Association of Kauhsiung Film Distributors. Although Hollywood branch offices 
then started to pay the levy for supporting local film making, that only lasted for half 
of a year and they refused to pay again. Thirdly, and the most importantly, Hollywood 
companies at home appealed to Office of Trade Representative about the situation in 
Taiwan. Consequently, in the 1985 Taiwan-the US Trade Negotiations, the American 
representatives requested the Taiwanese government to revoke the quota system and 
the levy on imported film. In 1986, the government conceded and announced that it 
was abolishing the quota system, which had been pursued for 32 years. The levy was 
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also suspended. The restrictions on the number of circulating prints of an imported 
film (the print quota) and on the number of cinemas showing the same imported film 
(the cinema quota) were also relaxed. This deregulation progress had been ftn-ther 
accelerating since the early 1990s (see Table 6.6). 
As a consequence of the deregulation progress the market share of foreign films 
(mainly American) kept on increasing so that by 1999 there were only 14 Taiwanese 
films shown in cinemas. These accounted for less than 60 thousand admissions and 
receipts of NT$ 11.6 million in Taipei. Hong Kong films did rather better with 85 
films and 379 thousand admissions and NT$ 72 million box-office takings in Taipei. 
In contrast, 239 foreign films were shown accounting for 70 percent of the total films 
in the market. The total attendance at foreign films in Taipei was more than 10 million, 
which accounted for 95.9 percent of entire annual attendance in the city. Gross 
revenues were over NT$ 2.4 billion, which was 96.7 percent of the total box-office for 
the year (see Table 6.7 for the data and Figure 6.2 for trends in market share)". 
Table 6.7 Comparison of local, Hong Kong, and foreign films in Taiwan (1986-1999)* 
No. of films shown Attendance (thousand) Receipts (million NTS) 
Taiwan HK Foreign Taiwan HK Foreign Taiwan HK Foreign 
1986 65 109 212 2,021 4,611 9,730 137.4 315.7 1,006.9 
1987 41 118 186 1,950 4,948 7,625 139.2 359.8 868.7 
1988 49 138 199 930 4,355 5,522 70.9 342.8 646.7 
1989 64 167 296 1,821 5,555 8,744 145.9 436.9 883.6 
1990 51 206 263 1,194 5,525 10,402 104.9 517.2 1,192.8 
1991 21 190 261 560 5,096 9,063 63.7 544.2 1,182.9 
1992 13 225 259 248 7,591 8,044 36.5 1,021.6 1,119.5 
1993 16 192 215 603 4,315 10,232 103.1 720.1 1,662.8 
1994 12 145 216 524 2,376 9,653 84.5 402.3 1,758.1 
1995 14 138 244 188 1,931 10,251 31.0 354.7 1,998.2 
1996 21 89 248 252 1,071 11,872 39.5 188.1 2,489.5 
1997 17 97 233 156 815 11,909 25.4 151.0 2,680.9 
1998 15 59 257 68 441 11,836 12.3 87.7 2,725.6 
1999 14 85 239 58 379 10,265 11.6 72.4 2,438.3 
The data of attendance and receipts are based only in Taipei. 
Source: F. Lu, Taiwan Cinema Database, website: cinema. necu. edu. tw 
to In Taiwan, the ticket Price of foreign film s has been always 20-25 percent higher than Chinese films. 
In 2001, adult's ticket price of foreign films was normally NT$ 230-250 and that of Chinese films was 
NT$190 - 200. 
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Fýure 6.2 The tendency of film market share (in terms of annual attendance, 1986-99) 
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In October 2001, on the eve of Taiwan's entry into the WTO, Taiwan's 
Administration Yuan and Legislation Yuan passed an amendment to the Film Law, 
deleting the articles relating to the print and screen quotas and of the levy supporting 
local production. The reason was 'that is necessary for entering into the WTO'. As 
consequence, Taiwan's film market is now completely open for 'free trade'-'free' 
for Hollywood. 
6.4 China: The Most Potentially Lucrative Zone 
In July 1950, directly after the establishment of the new country - the People's 
Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party introduced the Temporary 
Regulations Regarding the Importation of Foreign Films, which proposed restrictions 
on imported films. Since then, the right to import and to distribute foreign films has 
been exclusively held by the state-owned Chinese Film Corporation (CFC). By the 
time the Korean War began in October 1950, American films were totally banned by 
the PRC government. Instead, films from the former Soviet Union and its East 
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European satellites were imported in bulk. However, because the local Chinese film 
production developed very quickly under the guidance of the state, Soviet films never 
accounted for a majority share of China's film market. As China-Soviet Union 
relations deteriorated in the early 1960s, the number of imported Soviet and East 
European films gradually fell. During the 1960s and early 1970s, there were also 
films from other (former) socialist countries, such as North Korea, Romania, Albania, 
and Vietnam, being introduced into China (Yjao, 1998: 71). 
After the Great Cultural Revolution ended and normal diplomatic relations with 
the US were established in the late 1970s, Western films were reintroduced to the 
Chinese audience. Initially, the films selected for distribution were those critical of 
capitalist societies. Some films with neutral or a-political contents were also imported 
later on. With the start of the economic reform movement at the end of the 1970s, 
restrictions on the importation of foreign films was gradually relaxed. In 1984, the 
PRC government co-sponsored with the US Embassy in China an American Film 
Week. The event featured five films, Star Wars, The Turning Point, On Golden Pond, 
Kramer vs. Kramer, and Coal Miner's Daughter, and went on a five-city tour. 
Interestingly, as Mao notes, it was Kramer vs. Kramer, rather than Star Wars, which 
was the audience favourite (ibid.: 72). 
This was an exception however and the PRC government continued strict quota 
regulations on foreign films. T'he normal distribution practice was to purchase 
distribution rights rather than the profit-sharing arrangements widely used in capitalist 
societies. The quantity of imported films was still low and all imported films were old 
rather than contemporary. From 1980 to 1989, the CFC imported about 470 films 
from nearly 40 countries (Cheng, 1993), giving an average annual number of 
imported films of less than 50. Yet, as the winds of reform blew through the Chinese 
film industry in 1993 (see Chapters 7 and 8), the film importation policy was also 
forced to change substantially. This would be a profound change for the Chinese film 
industry and even for Chinese society. 
6.4.1 Hollywood is coming 
In early 1994, the Film Bureau of the Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television 
(MRFT), the primary authority on film matters, announced a momentous change in 
film importation policy. It said that every year China would introduce ten recent films 
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which 'Rindamentally reflect brilliant civilisations in the world and present the 
contemporary achievements of film art and film technology'. These so-called 'ten 
major films' would be distributed through a profit-sharing agreement between the 
CFC and foreign film companies (China Film Yearbook, 1995: 167-9). In fact, it was 
recognised from the outset that American films would form the majority of the major 
ten. 
The first major film, The Fugitive (Warner Brothers), was released in Shanghai, 
Beijing, Tianjin, Chungching, Zhengzhou, and Guangzhou, in November 1994. It was 
reported that there were long queues in front of cinemas, a scene that had not been 
seen for a long time. The box-office receipts were 6 million yuan in Shanghai, 2.2 
million yuan in Chungching, 0.8 million yuan in Tianjin, and 0.9 million yuan in 
Zhengzhou. All of these figures broke historic records. The CFC subsequently 
released the second major film, the Hong Kong production, Drunken Master II1 
(Golden Harvest). The market performance was not good however, because of the 
wide circulation of pirate copies on disc. The real impact of the 'ten major films' 
policy would start in earnest the next year. 
There were six American, two Hong Kong, and one French film selected as 
shared-profit films in 1995. The first major film, released to coincide with the Chinese 
New Year Holidays, was Jacky Chen's Rumble in the Bronx / Hong Fan Qu. It was 
the first film to be released in China simultaneously with other places in the world 
(including Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South-East Asia). Jacky Chen went to Beijing 
personally for the premier. Simultaneous release avoided pirating and ensured box- 
office success. The receipts in many cities broke historic records. Later, the American 
film, True Lies, produced another movie-going hit. The revenues in Shanghai reached 
a record-breaking 13 million yuan and made 9 million yuan, another historic high, in 
Beijing. One report depicts the situation as follows, 
The major films with magnificent and spectacular scenes effectively re-stimulate 
people, s desire to watch film. Audience is back. Crowds appeared again in front of 
cinemas. Cinemas frequently turn on 'no vacancy' signals. A film ticket becomes 
precious stuff. Long-disappeared 
illegal ticket-brokers get active again. Cinemas 
have been suffered from home video and laser disc for a long time. Now they 
revive. Whenever cinemas are showing the major 
films, the small disc and video 
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playhouses surrounding the cinemas only have few customers and have to close 
earlier everyday (China Film Yearbook, 1996: 200). 
The scene was almost the same as when the Chinese people first saw a movie one 
hundred years ago (see section 6.2). The total box-office receipts of 'major films' 
were 400 million yuan in 1996,300 million yuan in 1997, and 600 million in 1998. It 
was admitted by an anonymous official of the Authority recently, that the market 
share of imported films has already reached over two-thirds (D. Zheng, 2000). 
American blockbusters were the key in this market domination. Films such as Yhe 
Twister, Toy Story, Home None Iff, The Lost World, and Saving Private Ryan 
continued to create new box-office records. Between 1994 and 1998, China has 
imported 45 shared-profit films made up of 31 American films, 13 Hong Kong films, 
and one British film, (China Film Yearbook, 1998/99: 256-7). Four Weddings and a 
Funeral, which was released in 1996 but did not achieve significant success (China 
Film Yearbook, 1997: 195). 
The real 'major' impact from America arrived in 1998 however, in the form of 
Titanic. Titanic was released on the 27th of March 1998 in China. The receipts topped 
a record-breaking 200 million yuan within only one month (Weng, 1999: 59). By 
early May, they had reached 240 million yuan, which was one quarter of the total 
box-office revenues for the previous year, 1997. The release time lasted a couple of 
months and the total receipts were estimated 500 to 600 million yuan (Dai, 1999: 425). 
Another source claimed that the total revenues were somewhat lower, at 320 million 
ff, yuan, but that they still accounted for over one-fifth of the total box-o ice revenues 
for the year (Keshi, 2001). One author describes how enthusiastic the Chinese 
audience was in seeing this film: 'Friends meeting in Shanghai no longer greet one 
another with words: "Have you seen Titanic? " They ask instead: "How many times 
have you seen Titanic? "' (Weng, 1999: 59). Not only was the film itself was 
extremely popular, the theme song 'My heart will go on' (by female singer Celin 
Dion) became a major hit. The main actor Leonardo Dicaprio and main actress Kate 
Winslate were selected as 'the most impressive stars' of the year by a major popular 
magazine (Dai, 1999: 425). Immense numbers of pirated Video CDs (VCDs) and CDs, 
T-shirts, posters, postcards, books, picture albums, badges, balloons, wristwatches and 
other merchandise were widely circulated in cities across the country (Weng, 1999: 
59). ironically, the ticket price for the three-hour-long Titanic experience was 80 yuan, 
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which was accounted one-fourth to one-tenth of the monthly income of a normal city 
resident (Dai, 1999: 425-6) 
The significance of Titanic lay not only with its market success. It was a key event 
that revealed some significant changes in China's film industry and in film policy. 
The monopolistic CFC was active in preparing for the distribution of Titanic since 
January 1998. Firstly, the CFC organised three meetings in which invited film 
scholars, film critics, media executives, cinema managers, and provincial and city 
film authority officials, along with marketing and publicity executives of the CFC 
devised a comprehensive release plan. It also invited the representatives of the 
producer of Titanic, Twentieth Fox, to explain to relevant persons how the film's 
release had operated in America, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Secondly, the CFC put a 
lot of effort into marketing and publicity. It produced enormous picture cards and 
leaflets and created advertising posters and banners on buses and big bulletin boards 
in many cities' centres. National and local state media were also mobilised. 
Magazines and newspapers were encouraged to produce reports. Television stations 
presented tidbits about the making of the film. Radio station played the theme song 
'My heart will go on'. Thirdly, after careful consideration, the CFC decided to release 
the film at the end of March, because it was predicted to win major awards in the 
forthcoming Oscar ceremony on the 23th of March. All these efforts were pivotal to 
the market success of Titanic. On the other hand, the CFC and all local government- 
owned cinemas shared a significant proportion of the huge profits generated. 
According to estimated of the profit-sharing ratio, 35 percent of the proceeds will 
return to the producer, 48 percent to exhibitors, and 17 percent to the CFC (Keshi, 
2001). That means that the CFC obtained over 54 million yuan for its part in 
distributing Titanic. 
This illustrates how the CFC is transforming itself from being a state propaganda 
organ to becoming a state-owned business unit. Dai even argues that the CFC 'has 
successfully transformed the old state power into super corporate capital'. And 
consequently, 'the entry of Hollywood into China has become a collusion between old 
national monopolistic mechanism and Hollywood's global monopolistic system' (Dai, 
1999: 425). 
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6.4.2 Ambitious, but patient 
Indeed, the shared-profit arrangements for the 'major films, was initially proposed by 
the CFC. The film exhibition market had been in a severe recession in the early 1990s. 
Many cinemas had closed or changed into disco pubs or pool rooms. The CFC also 
had a deficit. Its president reported to the Authority in early 1994 and suggested 
introducing contemporary major films according to a shared-profit distribution system. 
The corporation claimed that the plan would not only ensure its own income but 
would be able to support the development and revival of the Chinese film industry. 
The proposal was adopted (see Keshi, 2001). 
The plan also met the needs of the transnational Hollywood corporations. They 
estimated annual box-office receipts 
in China of about I billion to 1.5 billion yuan 
within five years. After that, the annual growth rate was expected to be over 5 percent 
(Liu, 2000). These figures however leave out the vast additional potential profit of 
other media forms. In 1999, the coverage of terrestrial television 
in China was 91.6 
percent and there were 77 million 
households connected to cable television services. 
To be ready to grasp any opportunity to do business in this gigantic market, the major 
transnational media conglomerates, including Sony, News Corporation (Fox), Time- 
Warner (later AOL Time-Warner), Paramount, and Universal, have set up offices in 
China (mainly in Beijing) since the economic reforms began. Although no 
independent business activities have been allowed, the companies have been 
preparing in a very low 
key. They keep on training native Chinese staff, processing 
rnarket researches, understanding every relevant regulation, and most 
importantly, 
establishing Iguanxi' 
(personal relationships). 
They know very well that guanxi is decisive to do business in China. Guanxi 
operates not only 
in relationships with potential partners in business but also in 
relationships with officials at every 
level - including the highest (Interview No. 9). 
News Corporations and Time-Warrier have been among the most active in 
establishing guanxi. 
Fox's Titanic was premiered in front of the central leaders of the 
cCP, including Jiang Zeming, and was much admired. They are also the first two 
foreign companies allowed to transmit their programmes to local cable operating 
systems in Guangdong 
Province. The transnationals are indeed ambitious, but they are 
also considerably patient. 
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The successful opening up of the Chinese market to foreign films however is not 
simply the result of collusion between the state-owned corporations and transnational 
media giants, as Dai argues. In effect, the cultivation of an appetite for movie-viewing 
has been underway for some time although. The role of American product in 
revivifying this habit has undoubtably been increasingly crucial. Although according 
to the Film Administration Regulations the two-third of screen time should be 
devoted to national products, most cinemas in the country do not follow this 
regulation. Indeed, in order to save daily expenses, many small and medium-sized 
cinemas would like to close when the domestic films are arranged and to open only 
when showing foreign major films. In other words, they follow the regulation only 
nominally (Interview No. 20,2 1). 
After the American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, 
American major films were banned for several months. National box-office revenues 
went down by an average of 50 percent during these months. They decreased by 60 
percent in Sichuan Province, 51 percent in Shanighai, 50 percent in Guangzhou, and 
38 percent in Beijing (Keshi, 2001). Under the market pressure, the ban was lifted in 
October - earlier than originally supposed. Notting Hill, Star Wars: The First Episode, 
and The Trap were released subsequently and 'saved the cinemas and the film market' 
by the end of the year. Interestingly, China and the US completed their WTO 
agreements on the 15th of November of the same year. 
In the agreement, China agreed to increase the annual imported number of 'major 
films' to 20 immediately upon entry into the WTO and to 40 five years after entry. 
Secondly, film exhibition units are now open to foreign investment, but the foreign 
ownership of cinemas cannot exceed 49 percent. Undoubtedly, this continuing process 
of opening UP will fiirther strengthen the impact of American films on China. But, 
will maintaining complete control over the production and distribution sectors be an 
effective instrument to protect and develop national cinema in an intensely 
competitive market, or is it just an embryo of the forming state capitalism? The 
question remains to be answered. One thing however is already certain; government 
policy-making will increasingly be influenced and affected by market pressure. " 
11 The latest example was that the CFC was reportedly to give up its monopoly in importation and 
distribution of foreign films in the near future. See http: //shenzhen. sohu. com/20010613/file/ 
1346,744,100019. html 
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Chapter 7 State Interventions 
The year 1949 was a turning point in the fate of the contemporary Chinese people. On 
the both sides of Taiwan Strait, two new regimes had assumed control. Although both 
claimed to be absolutely different from one another (both asserting that 'they are 
wrong and 'we' are right), the KMT and the CCP had at least one thing in common. 
Both were more or less influenced by Soviet and Leninist models of party and state 
operations. The state apparatus of both regimes was dominated by the party and 
enjoyed relatively high autonomy in relation to other social forces. Furthermore, both 
states emphasised the ideological and propaganda functions of mass media, including 
fIlm. Thus, state interventions have significantly affected the developments of both 
film industries. However, after the 1980s, along with the profound changes in political 
and economic conditions, the ways the two states have related to film has also 
changed. 
The chapter is organised to facilitate convenient comparison between China and 
Taiwan. Sections 7.1 and 7.2 trace the histories of film policies in both countries, 
while Sections 7.3 and 7.4 detail the changes that have taken place since the 1980s. 
7.1 Taiwan: Mixing Statism with Commercialism 
The film Policy of the KMT regime, both when it controlled state power in mainland 
China and in Taiwan, recognised both the ideological and industrial character of film, 
like all governments do and combined the two. Because film was seen as a pivotal 
ideological apparatus the content was strictly controlled or even directly produced by 
state/party owned organisaitons. At the same time, 
film was also seen as a commercial 
entertainment business. But 
it was not an entertainment business as it is commonly 
recognised today. Rather, 
it was one of the 'special businesses' which also included 
bars, pubs and nightclubs. In the social context of China and Taiwan in the twentieth 
century, these locales were strongly associated with the sex business and gang 
activities. This led to a duality 
in film policy. The production sector was regulated on 
the basis of its ideological role while the distribution and exhibition sectors were 
regulated as 'entertainment' in the sense 
just defined. The resulting inconsistencies in 
film policy led to the distorted development of the Taiwanese film industry before the 
1980s (see details in Chapter 8). 
152 
7.1.1 Making money from film 
Regarding the film industry as a 'special business' may be traced back to some 
stereotypical ideas in 'traditional' Chinese culture. Being an actor or actress had long 
been seen as a dishonorable vocation, often associated'"rith sex, alcohol, and crime, 
and as entertainers, filmmakers fitted easily into this framework.. Before the KMT 
and the CCP started to use film for ideological struggle in the 1930s, the film industry 
was developed as a pure entertainment industry in China. In major cities, cinemas, 
along with nightclubs and bars, provided amusement and diversion for people's night 
lives. Even when the artistic and ideological aspects of film were recognised later, this 
thinking was carried over by the KMT regime when it moved to Taiwan. 
There were two major planks in policy-making in relation to film as an 
entertainment industry. First, the growth of the commercial film distribution and 
exhibition sectors was promoted for their contributions to the national economy and to 
citizen's leisure activity. In this context, 'how to maximize the exhibition market' was 
more important than 'how to facilitate local production' because imported film could 
also fulfill demand. In the early 1950s, the number of cinemas increased enormously 
while local production had not substantially started to develop before the mid-1950s. 
There were about forty or so cinemas in Taiwan before 1949. The number rose to 122 
in 1951 and to 374 in 1954 and kept on increasing 'till the early 1970s. By 1970, there 
were 788 cinemas in Taiwan (Cultural Bureau, 1971: 18). According to the film 
authority, during the period 1968 to 1973 an applications to open a cinema 'has to 
pass complicated procedures, but never being rejected' (ibid.: 27). 
This relates to the second major focus of policy. As one of the 'special businesses', 
there were over thirty laws and regulations regulating the film exhibition business, 
from opening times to the size of seat. One of the most absurd regulations was that 
before 1978, film ticket saleswomen and cinema waitresses, in common with women 
working in the sex business had to have a regular physical examination by the official 
hygienic units. There was also heavy taxation. In the early 1970s, cinemas had to pay 
three kinds of regular tax, which taken together accounted for nearly a third (32.138 
percent) of the ticket price. In addition, there was a levy for supporting the national 
education service (ibid. ). The taxes on the importation of filming facilities and 
negative copies of films were also relatively high. Unlike the state/party owned 
companies who had plenty of resources, most small and medium-sized private filin 
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companies could not afford these cost and often rented facilities from the state/party 
owned studios. 
7.1.2 Controlling film content 
The KMT government adopted two measures to control film content. The first was to 
establish state/party owned organisations that directly intervened in the film industry. 
The second was strict film censorship backed by a violent state apparatus. 
in 1938, the KMT controlled Military Committee established the China Film 
Studio for filming newsreels. The Agricultural Education Film Company (AEFC) was 
subsequently established in 1945 to promote post-war rebuilding works in rural areas. 
These actions were very likely a response to the CCP's increasingly active use of film 
in propaganda. After their defeat on the mainland however, the KMT pursued much 
stricter control over film and other mass media. 
Their first action in rebuilding the island's film system in 1949 was to make the 
Taiwan Film Studio (which had been established in 1945 by being given the defeated 
Japanese colonial government's film production properties) subject to instructions 
from the Taiwan Provincial Government. Its main task was to shoot newsreels and to 
support propaganda initiatives promoting public policies. The position of the China 
Film Studio also changed as it came under the command of the Ministry of Defence in 
1950. Its duty was making military newsreels and military education films. Finally, in 
1954, the President and the KMT Chairman Chiang Kai-Shek ordered the merger of 
AEFC and the Taiwan Film Company (which had received the Japanese colonial 
government's film distribution and exhibition properties in 1945) to form a new 
vertically-integrated Central Motion Picture Company (the CMPQ wholly owned by 
the KMV. The CMPC was assigned to become a major force in making feature films. 
With this act, the KMT completed the establishment of a film system which could 
exercise ideological functions in the administrative, military, and party sectors. Before 
the 1990s, these state/party owned film institutions, with comparatively plentiful 
resources, significantly influenced the development of the Taiwanese film industry. In 
contrast, the private film companies did not obtain substantial support from the state 
until 1989 (see section 7.3.2). 
The AEFC was governmental institution and Taiwan Fihn Company should also be state property. 
Chiang's instruction simply transformed these two institutions into the KNIT's property apparently 
revealed one of the characters of the 
KMT party-state regime (see F. Lu, 1998: 47). 
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The KNIT was also actively involved in civil film industry activities. The Cultural 
Division of the Party had close relationships with many local and Hong Kong private 
film companies and sometimes directly guided their production strategies. It also 
participated in the organisation and operation of film professional and trade 
associations with the directors of the state/party owned film companies taking key 
positions on the central councils of the major associations and other members of the 
councils also being the KMT members. 
The only film law the Nationalist government implemented before 1949 was the 
1934 Film Censorship Lauý, executed by the Central Film Censorship Committee 
(under the guidance of the Central Propaganda Committee). In 1955, the KMT 
government set up a Division of Film Censorship within the Government Information 
Office (GIO) responsible for the censorship. Film Censorship Standard Regulations 
was released the following year. The 'standards' were actually abstract principles and 
allowed considerable space for interpretation by the people in charge. They covered 
not only moral concerns about violence and sex but also political considerations. Any 
film content that violated the policy of anti-communism, contained poisonous 
communist ideas, damaged national unification, or humiliated the country's leader 
and so stood to be severely cut or 
banned. The arbitrary application of these 
regulations seriously restricted the space available for film creation and resulted in 
fihnniakers' imposing self-censorship for over thirty years (F. Lu, 1998: 71-2). 
Looking at the development of film regulation we can see that for most of the post- 
war period the ultimate significance of film for the KMT regime was ideological 
rather than cultural or entertainment. 
The film industry was governed by the Ministry 
of Interior Affairs when the 
KMT moved to Taiwan. In the mid-1950s, the 
government established a 
Committee for Supporting Film Business within the 
ministry of Education while the Division of Film Censorship within the GIO was 
responsible for film censorship. 
Two years later, the duty of support was moved to the 
GIO. By 1967 however, a Cultural Bureau within the Ministry of Education was 
established and took charge of 
film governance. It was the first time that film in 
Taiwan had been regarded as 'culture'. Indeed, the Cultural Bureau was the only 
governmental unit that has ever taken a serious 
interest in inquiring into and trying to 
2 There was a simpler version, Film Censorship Regulations, implemented in 1920. 
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resolve the problems of the film industry. Unfortunately, this institution was dissolved 
after only six years and the GIO once again took charge, a position it still holds. 
7.1.3 Insufficient protection and biased support 
As mentioned above, the number of cinemas in Taiwan increased enormously from 
1949 to 1954. While in the same period, there were no restrictive measures adopted 
on film importation and substantial local film production had not yet started 3. As a 
result, the film market was flooded with foreign (mainly American) films, a process 
which profoundly structured the formation of film exhibition and consumption in 
Taiwan. 
In 1954, the government finally introduced Regulations for the Importation of 
Foreign Films. These included restrictions on the annual importation number, the 
number of prints allowed of each imported film, and screen/cinema quotas. However, 
the importation quota was set according to the number of films imported in the 
previous year and decreased progressively. For example, there were 349 American 
films imported from July 1952 to June 1953, then the quota for American film in 
1954 was 349. The number of American films imported during mid- 1954 to mid- 1955 
(expected to be fewer than 349) would be the quota for the following year. From 1954 
to 1970, the quota of American film decreased from 349 to 162 and that of all foreign 
films dropped from 444 to 275. These numerical changes, however, did not tell the 
whole truth. 
Firstly, the introduction of restrictions on film importation was relatively late. 
Secondly, as already mentioned in Chapter 6, Hollywood had by then already altered 
their production and marketing strategy to focus on fewer productions with bigger 
budgets. The number allowed to be imported was not therefore the pivotal factor. 
'Seventy or eighty films a year is absolutely enough', said a senior manager of a 
Hollywood branch office in Taiwan (quoted in Y. Li, 2000: 88). Thirdly, American 
films remained the majority of imported films after the quota system was 
implemented. Although the quota of American film decreased gradually, it in effect 
squeezed the number of films imported from other places. And last, but not the least, 
the quota system did not take the real demand of local market into account. In the 
3 The KMT government implemented Measuresfor Dealing Domestic Films in the Period of 
Mobilisation and Suppressing Rebellion in 1949. That was for prohibiting films whose makers had 
yielded to the CCP- 
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1960s, the demand of Taiwan's film exhibition market was about 300 films a year. 
Yet, the total quotas of imported films were over 300 while the average number of 
local productions was about 150 with a similar number being imported from Hong 
Kong films (see Y. Li, 2000: 56). In other words, the quota system did not protect 
local productions effectively at all. 
Active support for local film was also unsuccessful. There were two biases in 
supportive measures. The first was the unreasonable privilege given to Hong Kong 
film. Due to political considerations, the KMT government not only allowed Hong 
Kong film to be imported without any restriction, it also offered Hong Kong films 
support on the same terms as local productions. The government even introduced 
special Supports, such as tax break on negative film importation and financial support, 
to attract Hong Kong filmmakers to shoot films in Taiwan (F. Lu, 1998: 76-7). 
The second bias concerned language. Taiwan's film production substantially 
started with the rise of Fulao film in the mid-1950s and from the late 1950s to late 
1960s, Fulao films made up the majority of films produced in Taiwan (see details in 
Chapter 8). This was to be expected because the majority of residents in Taiwan (their 
ancestors having immigrated from south-east mainland China hundreds of years 
before 1949) spoke Fulao. However, as Benedict Anderson argues the use of language 
is one of the key factors in forming a national community, and the spread and 
reproduction of Fulao works implied a sort of threat to the external and newly arrived 
KMT regime whose working language was Mandarin. The KMT government did not 
formally prohibit or restrict the production and exhibition of Fulao films, but it was 
apparent to everyone in the film industry that it gave preferential treatment to 
Mandarin films in its policies. 
The first relevant financial support measure the 'Programme for Loan of Mandarin 
Film Production' implemented in 1962 was obviously aimed at encouraging the 
production of Mandarin film. In that year, the numbers of Fulao films and Mandarin 
films produced were 120 and 7 respectively. Two years later, the output of Mandarin 
film had increased to 22 and kept on increasing till the early 1970s. Another measure, 
the programme for Rewarding Superior Mandarin Film', on which the Golden Horse 
Award (the major film award in Taiwan) was based, implemented in the same year, 
also regarded Mandarin films as the productions that merited a prestigious award. In 
1974, the government pursued a measure which allocated some quotas for importing 
foreign film to companies that produces film domestically. This programme again 
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favoured the major producers of Mandarin film. As a consequence of these biased 
interventions Fulao film basically disappeared after 1976 4. 
Most of the companies that produced Fulao films were typical Taiwanese small 
and medium-sized firms. Their products were for mass entertainment. Lack of capital 
and obsolete filming technologies made them relatively noncompetitive in the market 
in the age of color film and television. Fulao films, however, did record Fulao culture 
and ordinary people's daily lives. They might be not quality works, but they were 
real -certainly in comparison with the propaganda films made by the state/party 
owned studios. Consequently, the biased film policies that partly caused Fulao film to 
vanish' also killed an important possibility for indigenous cultural expression at the 
same time. On the other hand, the newly risen commercial Mandarin films, although 
they achieved some successes in the domestic market and among overseas Chinese 
communities in South-East Asia, were comparatively isolated from people's real lives 
and concentrated in major genres, ancient swordplay movies and romantic melodrama 
(also see Chapter 8). 
in sum, before the 1980s, the Taiwanese state intervened in the film industry 
through a mixture of statism and commercialism. The artistic aspect of film was taken 
little account of filmmaking was either serving the ideological task assigned by the 
government, or pursuing the current interests prevailing in the mass market. The 
inappropriate film policy neither helped to raise the artistic quality and technological 
standard of film production, nor aided the film industry in competing effectively in 
the changing marketplace. Ironically, when the state earnestly wanted to support the 
fihn industry in the 1980s, as we will see, it was actually losing its power to do so to 
the rapid growth of market forces. 
7.2 China: A Cinema for the People 
I of all the arts for us the most important is cinema' 
- Vladimir Lenin (1925, quoted in Taylor and Christie, 1994: 57) 
4 After 1976, film made in Fulao or uses some Fulao was for the need of the story rather than a 
differentiated product. 
The death of Fulao film was also attributed to the rise of television and low quality of mass-produced 
films. 
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Following Lenin's idea, film has always been particularly significant to the successive 
leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. Even though television has replaced film as 
the principle vehicle for mass propaganda since the mid- 1 980S6, film has remained the 
most important media form that mixes artistic, ideological, educational, and 
entertainment elements and has continued to be a high priority for the CCP leaders. 
Since 1993, the Chinese film system has been profoundly changed but because the 
40-year-history of central control had created many rigid conventions and in deep 
resistance to change there have been almost endless contradictions in the process of 
reform. Before taking a closer look at the present situation however, it is necessary to 
introduce the main features and practices of the old system. 
7.2.1 The position of film 
so far as we are concerned, art and literature are ... intended ... for the people ... All 
revolutionary artists and writers of China, all artists and writers of high promise, must, for 
long period of time, unreservedly and wholeheartedly go among the masses, the masses of 
workers, peasants, and soldiers; they must go into fiery struggles, go to the only, the 
broadest, the richest source to observe, learn, study, and analyse all men, all classes, all 
kinds of people, all the vivid patterns of life and struggle and all natural forms of art and 
literature. --- Mao Zedong 
(1942, quoted in Schram, 1971: 360) 
This quotation, taken from Mao's 1942 speech 'Talks at the Yan-an Conference on 
Literature and Art', dominated the developments of the PRC1s art and literature, 
including film, for over 30 years. Installing the so-called 'two fors', (for politics, and 
for the workers, peasants, and soldiers), as the major guideline of film policy and film 
production. As consequence, the ideological and political functions of film in the class 
struggle were given particular emphasis (Ni, 1994: 6; B. Chen, 2000). He also argued 
in 1957 that 'the policy of letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools 
contend is designed to promote the flourishing of the arts' (the so-called 'two 
hundreds', Schram, 1971: 308). However, political criteria of judgement always 
remained the first consideration and with artistic criteria coming some way behind the 
second. 
6 The development of China's television was relatively late in comparison with neighbouring 
developing countries. In 1980, the national coverage of television set was less than one per hundred 
159 
In 195 1, Mao personally initiated a nationwide political struggle campaign by 
criticising a film titled 'The Life of Wuxun / Wuxun Zhuan'(1 95 1). The film was taken 
as a negative reference point which defined Mao's notion of political correctness in 
concrete terms and the director, writer and actors were punished. In spite of being 
extremely cautious and prudent in making film thereafter, some filmmakers and films 
being attracted critisism or punishment in almost every subsequent political 
movement. These included the Anti-Right movement (1957), the Great Leap Forward 
(195 8), and the rise of 'the Gang of Four ' and the Great Cultural Revolution (1966- 
1975) (see B. Chen, 2000; Xue, 1995; 35-6). 
Although film's key role in political struggles was universally accepted,, not all 
critics shared the same views on film's other potentials. For example, former 
president Zhou Enlai argued that artistic criteria are as important as political criteria. 
He stressed that film should reflect real life via artistic forms and educate people via 
entertainment (ibid.: 12-3). But, this 'comparatively liberal' perspective was only 
realised in practice after Deng Yjaoping came to power in the late 1970s. and the 'two 
fors, were revised as 'for socialism, for the people' and the 'two hundreds' (diversity 
of creation) were re-emphasised (ibid.: 16; Shen, 1993). The present leader Jiang 
Zerning also emphasised the 'two fors' and the 'two hundreds' but argued that film. 
-must continue to 'exalt main-melody" and 'enhance diversity' 
However, the real effect of this liberalisation was minimal. In 1981, the film Sun 
and the ManlTaiyang han ren (adapted from the script Bitter LovelKulian) was 
banned by the Film Administrative Bureau because it containing elements criticising 
socialism. Deng also personally stated that the film had made a mistake. Eventually, 
the author of the script, Bai Hua, wrote an article for self-criticism (B. Chen, 2000: 
17-8). criticisms of socialism and the Party remain a forbidden area. 
For successive leaders of the CCP, the political and artistic aspects of film can and 
must unite. The artistic nature of film is seen as a mechanism through which political 
correctness can be transmitted and ensured. If there was any difference between the 
conservative and liberal camps in their ideas on film, it was that the latter placed more 
populations. See details in Chapter 8. 
7 The concept of main-melody film' was proposed in the late 1980s. It was for advocating the theory 
of socialism with Chinese characters and the current direction of the Chinese Communist Party. 
Actually, it was a sort of propaganda film. In the beginning, most of main-melody films were about key 
historical events and revolutionary figures in the history of the People's Republic of China. By the mid- 
1990s, due to the marketisation of film industry, main-melody films also have changed their stories and 
forms with more entertaining and artistic elements (see Ni, 1994: CM). 
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emphasis on the artistic aspects of film - but still maintained the primacy of political 
concern. 
However, to ignore these disputes is to misrepresent the way film has been seen in 
communist China. It is not reducible simply to a propaganda instrument of the Party 
and the state. Nor has it functioned to convey a single political 'line'. Rather, it has 
been a site of political and ideological contestation. The development of film has been 
marked by every struggle between different political powers and camps and it is this 
sense that we can argue that it was, and still is highly political in China. 
7.2.2 A comprehensive system 
In 1953, under the guidance of Soviet film experts, the PRC government launched the 
first five-year-plan for the film industry. Officials were also sent to the Soviet Union 
to investigate and learn from the practices of its film system in 1954. By 1956, a 
centrally planning and control system for film, known as 'the Soviet model' had been 
established (Zhang, 1993; B. Chen, 2000). This system was maintained for over 35 
years without substantial changes until 1993 (see Figure 7.1). 
The Ministry of Culture in the Department of State was the central regulatory body 
for film and the Film Bureau, under the command of the Ministry of Culture, was the 
practical administrative authority. In 1986, the Film Bureau and its functions were 
transferred to the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television (was renamed The State 
Administration of Radio, Film and Television in 1998, with the Film Bureau being 
renamed the Film Administrative Bureau). However, the local (provincial and city) 
distribution and exhibition units remained under the control of local cultural 
authorities (Cultural Offices). In addition, the film system was, and still is, subject to 
guidance from the Department of Central Propaganda, the main Party body 
controlling ideology. 
In the film production sector, there are 16 state-owned feature film studios, as well 
as three science and education film studios, one newsreel and documentary studio, 
one animation studio and one dubbing film studio, directly all governed by the Film 
Bureau. All of the studios, though operating on different scales, have comprehensive 
filming facilities and workers being able to complete a feature film independently. 
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The Film Bureau assigns the 'annual film production indices' as a mission for every 
studio. The total output from the system was maintained at between 100 and 150 per 
year, while the index for different studio varies according to its production capacity. 
Large studios, such as the Changchun Studio and Beijing Studio, normally are 
assigned to produce 18 to 20 films per year while medium-sized studios have about 8 
and small-sized studios have 3 to 4 (Shao, 1993; Xue, 1995; 40-42). Apart from the 
quantity, sometimes the Film Bureau also allocated the proportions of the themes for 
films. For example, there was a principle of '3,30, and 60' applied in 1993, which 
meant that within the total of annual productions, there should be 3 key films having 
significant political influence and function, 30 films reflecting the achievements of the 
reform, and that approximately 60 percent of films should have modem settings in the 
1980s and 1990s (Xue, 1995: 43). 
The film distribution and exhibition system is a huge and complex network, and 
also state-owned. It is basically a four-tier system. The China Film Corporation (CFC), 
under direct control of the Film Bureau, is the central body responsible for 
distributing films nationally, exporting domestic films and imported foreign films. 
The CFC bought completed films from studios at a fixed price (which was set at 900 
thousand yuan per production in the 1990s) and then distributed them to the first-tier 
of local distributors - operated by provincial and municipal distribution companies. 
These companies had to buy prints of films from the CFC also at a fixed price (10.5 
thousand yuan in the 1990s) but they could decide how many they want to buy 
according to the predicted demand for the film'. The first-tier companies then sent the 
prints to the second-tier distribution companies inside their territories - city and 
county distribution companies - for release to the bottom tier of the system - cinemas 
in cities and towns and projection teams in rural areas. Every provincial and city and 
county distribution company maintained a monopoly in its allocated area. 
Film censorship is executed by the Film Bureau with the Ministry having the final 
decision power. The censoring procedures are applied both before and after 
filmmaking. Very few film have been completely banned because self-censorship is 
very commonly practiced among filmmakers. However, revisions and cuts on sexual 
and politically sensitive contents are normal (Shao, 1993: 128). In addition, the 
The number of prints therefore was the only indicator with some 'market' sense before 1993, in spite 
of some transactions of politically specific films are only following the instructions from 'the higher 
level'. 
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studios also have their own internal censoring procedures before a film project is sent 
to the Film Bureau for examination. Many projects are rejected at this level, by the 
directors of the studios (Interview No. 10). 
There is still no Film Law until now. Regulations have been developed in 
accordance with administrative commands and instructions. After 1979, many 
filmmakers suggested the legislation of film regulation and the Authority also replied 
positively. However, the Temporary Rules of Film Censorship proclaimed in 1993 
and the ever- comprehensive Film 4dministrative Regulations of 1996 continued to 
have the status of administrative rules. 
Formally, no matter what specific function it carried out, every aspect of the film 
system in China was inextricably bound up with the whole political and cultural state 
apparatus. Government took full responsibility for as well as full control of the 
operation and maintenance of every sector of the system. Film was run as a state 
organ. Market considerations played a minimal part. Consequently, when market 
dynamics started to be introduced into the system along with the CCP reconfirmation 
of move towards a 'socialist market economy' in 1992, chaos and panic ensued. 
7.3 Taiwan: Abandoning Film 
Since the late 1970s, every aspect of the authority and power of the KMT regime 
began to be shaken. In 1987, the KMT government abolished the Emergency Decree 
and introduced an accelerating process of liberalisation and democratisation (see 
Chapter 5). The state basically followed the mainstream economic ideology of 
globalisation- neo-liberalism - and pursued deregulation policies and reduced state 
intervention in public affairs. This new direction was not good news for the film 
industry, which had been under strict state control for a long period. 
7.3.1 Everything becomes marketised 
In 1983, the first Motion Picture Law was approved in the Legislative Yuan defining 
the film industry for the first time as a 'cultural industry'. Although the film 
censorship regulations in the Law remained ideologically arbitrary its implementation 
signaled that the state was beginning to reduce the importance attached to the 
ideological function of film. In 1988, when martial law was lifted and the goVemment 
liberated the restrictions on press publishing the age of media liberalisation could be 
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said to have arrived in earnest. The most representative act of liberalisation was the 
deregulation of the quota system in 1986, (which has been discussed in Section 6.3.4). 
Another crucial action was to lift the propaganda duty from the state/party owned film 
companies. In the 1970s, the CMPC, the China Film Studio and Taiwan Film Studio 
produced over dozen of 'patriotic films', mostly depicting the heroism of ROC 
soldiers in the anti-Japan War. These representations were partly a response to a series 
of failures in the international political arena (see Chapter 5). Benefiting from both the 
macro political atmosphere and the government's active mobilisation, some of these 
productions enjoyed popular and market success. Yet, at the same time, Taiwan was 
transforming into a 'consumer society' propelled by twenty-years of rapid and 
successful economic development. Consequently, when the political atmosphere 
changed, the conservative, rigid, and pedagogical messages transmitted in these films 
were soon rejected by the audience, particularly the younger generation who made up 
the majority of cinema audience, in the mid-1980s. All three companies faced serious 
financial losses and successively transformed themselves into market-oriented 
corporations responsible for their own profits and losses'. The director of CNTC said 
in 1984, 
CNVC is not a pure profit-pursuing enterprise. Except from social education, it also 
has the great duty in encouraging morale and supporting anti-communism and 
restoration. So its production direction cannot follow that of private companies. 
However, film is ultimately a sort of entertainment commodity. Film production 
institution cannot overlook the economic principle otherwise its existence will be 
in difficulty. In that case, it can carry out no duty (CMPC, 1984: 10). 
The strict film censorship was also relaxed. In 1982, the GIO canceled the pre- 
examination of screenplay before film companies start filming. It also invited 'public 
impartial figures' to be film censors. The new film classification system was also 
implemented in 1985. It was a two-class system (restricted and universal) in the 
beginning but added an intermediate category in 1988. The loosening-up of film 
censorship applied both to violent and sexual content and sensitive political messages. 
9 Taiwan Film Studio was renamed as Taiwan Film Corporation in 1988. China Film Studio changed 
into Hanwei Film Corporation in 1989. Both companies tried to participate in feature film market more 
actively but were almost 
disappeared since the mid-1990s. CMPC was better in transformation and 
165 
In 1983, one of the pioneer works of New Taiwanese Cinema, The Sandwich 
ManlErzi de Dawanou, (directed by Hou Yjaoxian, Zeng ZhUan9xiang, and Wan 
Ren), was criticised by conservative film critics before its release for depicting 
backward aspects of Taiwan's society. The production company CMPC made some 
cuts itself but these were disclosed by the press and raised public criticism. Finally the 
film was released without any cuts or alterations. Six years later, The City of Sadness 
(directed by Hou Xiaoxian, and analysed in Chapter 9) which deals with the 228 
incident, the most sensitive political taboo in Taiwan, was also reported to be facing 
cuts. However, again it eventually was shown in its completed version. For 
filmmakers, there seemed to be no more restriction on freedom of expression. 
However, this optimistic conclusion conveniently ignored the fact that control was in 
the process of moving from the political sphere to the market imposing new restraints 
on (progressive' filmmaking. 
The loosening-up of film censorship and the implementation of film classification 
primarily benefited the film companies that 
intended to provide more violent and 
sexual content to boost profits. This trend prompted concern however, and the most 
active lobbyists asking reforms 
in film censorship were film distributors worried 
about public reactions rather than film creators. From 1989 to 1994, the proportion of 
films classified as 'restricted' increased from 37 percent to 46 percent, while those in 
the universal' film fell from 32 percent to 23 percent. 
Since the late 1980s, the government has gradually reduced the taxes on the film 
industry. The taxes on the importation of filming facilities were reduced by 2.5 
percent to 10 percent in 1991 and to 
5 percent in 1993. Yet, according to a senior 
filmmaker by then local film companies were already in severe recession and could 
not afford to purchase many advanced 
facilities (Rao, 1993). The tax reduction was 
evidently too late to help a shrinking production sector. 
The enormous taxes on 
cinemas were also substantially cut. 
The stamp duty was abolished in 1984 and the 
entertainment taxes on 
domestic film exhibition and on foreign film exhibition was 
reduced to 6 percent and 25 percent respectively 
in 1987. By 1993, the tax rates were 
further reduced by 0.5 to I percent and by I to 2.5 percent respectively and the 
business tax was lowered to 5 percent. However, these tax reductions were irrelevant 
to the production sector and only benefited the cinemas, which were already mainly 
became the production centre of New Taiwanese Cinema in the 1980s. Nevertheless, Cmpc was also 
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engaged in showing films from Hong Kong and Hollywood. The government cut 
taxes without making the necessary distinctions between different sectors of the 
industry made no attempt to introduce effective measure to direct profits from 
exhibition back to local production. 
General speaking, none of the major liberal measures adopted by the government 
in the 1980s and 1990s did much to encourage more diverse and innovative national 
film making. Like the sorcerer's apprentice, the state had summoned up the forces of 
the market but found that it could not control them. Nevertheless, it did make some 
attempt. 
7.3.2 Saving the film industry? 
The output of Taiwanese film industry decreased substantially in the early 1980s. 
Only 58 films were produced in 1984, the lowest figure in ten years. In response, the 
serni-official Film Industry Development Foundation (FIDF)" founded the 'Division 
of Film Loan and Finance' to offer low-rate loans for film production. The measure 
was not effective and stopped three years later. 'Me output of domestic film 
production slowly increased after 1985 and jumped to 158 in 1988. This increase 
however was not attributable to the government's actions but to the sudden rise in 
deinand from the rapidly expanding videotape market. As mentioned above, the 
loosen-up of film censorship stimulated productions containing more sex and violence 
and many small film companies were involved in producing low-cost soft core 
pornographic films in the late 1980s (F. Lu, 1998: 323-4). The output of film industry 
fell again in 1989, to 101 (57 less than the previous year) and the tendency seemed 
unstoppable. In that year, the GIO announced the most important supportive measure 
in the Taiwanese film industry's history, the Programme of Supporting Fund for 
Domestic Film Production. 
The first year of the Programme offered a total 30 million NT dollars to support 
ten selected films. The producer, director, screenplay writer and main actor and 
actress had to be nationals. Since then, the amount of money has been continually 
seriously in debt for many years (also see Chapter 8). ' 
10 The FIDF was founded by the GIO in 1975. The GIO offered 75 percent of its finance and the 
director of GIO also served as the chairman of the Foundation. Other members were the representatives 
of major film companies. Its main functions were operating Film Archive and holding some film 
awards. After 1989, the GIO withdrew from the operations of the FIDF and major film companies took 
the control. 
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increased and some of the detailed regulations have also been altered. In 2000, the 
total amount in the support fund was 80 million NT dollars, five selected films 
obtained 10 million each and six further films were awarded 5 million each. In the 
past thirteen years, the Programme has supported over one hundred domestic films 
including many of Taiwanese films that have attracted significant international 
attention. But, this aid has not prevented the Taiwanese film industry from declining. 
There are at least three problems with the Programme. 
The first problem is timing. Since the film industry was already in decline before 
the scheme was launched with many companies moving their capital to the Hong 
Kong film industry and other new businesses (see Chapter 8), the supporting fund has 
: ftmctioned as a minimal guarantee for domestic film making rather than a strong 
incentive to increase production. Consequently, the output of the local industry has 
continued to decrease and is very close to the number of supported films. 
Secondly, the allocation of the supporting fund was improper. The Programme did 
not distinguish between larger companies (who normally owned both production and 
distribution interests , or even exhibition sectors) and independent companies, even 
though it was the latter who most needed support. Moreover, the money the 
programme offered to individual film projects was not enough to cover the whole of 
their production costs. As a result, many independent companies could not complete 
or even start filming without additional investment from major companies. 
Thirdly, due to lack of other coordinated measures, even if independent 
companies completed films, they usually could not secure proper distribution and 
exhibition. Without exhibition outlets and marketing initiatives however, local films, 
no matter how excellent they are, cannot make any significant impact on the market". 
The unfavourable situation of independent producers is further enhanced by an 
already existing tendency. Since the 1980s, 
local companies have found that making 
'art films' for the international art film market is one, and sometimes the only, viable 
option open to them. Whether the film is popular or not at home was a secondary 
concern. Consequently, film companies and 
directors, once awarded money from the 
supporting fund, tended to make the films oriented to 
international film festivals and 
art film markets. Indeed, in the first 
four years of the implementation of the 
programme, 10 out of the forty supported films won awards in international film 
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ff festivals. However, only one out of the forty ever reached the top ten box-o ice list of 
domestic films in this same period". 
Since the possibility of a levy on imported films for supporting local production 
had never been effectively pursued (see Chapter 6), the money going into the 
supporting fund came totally from the government's general budget. For some 
members of the public, the Programme was inappropriate because it used their money 
to support films made only for foreign art film audiences. Nevertheless, even though 
the Programme continues to attract criticism, the state still insists on maintaining it, 
mainly because the fund can support films that function as vehicles for 'national 
display' (see the discussion in Chapter 4), which remains important to the state of 
Taiwan. In this respect, art films that find favour with overseas audiences represent a 
political bonus. 
Since The City ofSadness won the Golden Lion Award at the Venice Film Festival 
in 1989 the government has started to actively support local film companies' 
participation in international film festivals. In 1992, the GIO instituted the 
, programme for Rewarding Domestic Film and Professionals Participating in 
International Film Festivals', establishing the amounts that could be granted and the 
rules governing their distribution. When The Wedding Banquet (1992, directed by 
Ang Lee and analysed in Chapter 9) was nominated for the Best Film and other two 
films were also invited in Berlin Film Festival in 1993, the government for first time 
sent a delegation headed by the vice-director of the GIO to attend the festival". At the 
Cannes Film Festival in the same year, The Puppet Master / Xi Mong Ren Sheng 
(directed by Hou Yjaoxiang) was nominated as Best Film and the GIO again 
dispatched a delegation to attend. At the end of 1993, The Wedding Banquet was 
nominated for the Best Foreign Film in the 1994 Oscar Academy Awards In response, 
the GIO sent its largest ever delegation to the US, an initiative which was strongly 
criticised by some American reviewers as 'political interventions'. Ironically, just as 
film was released from its ideological function at home it became a new propaganda 
machine for the country in international arenas. 
11 The GIO supported some cinemas to establish cinema chain for showing domestic films in 2000. Yet, 
it was clearly too late for the diminishing industry. 
12 That was Yi Yu (1990, directed by Zhu Yen-ping, produced by Xue Zhe Film Company). It was 
ranked the fourth place on the list of that year. 
13 At last, The Wedding Banquet together with Chinese film Xiang Huen Nu (directed by Xie Fei) won 
the Best Film Award (Golden Bear Award). 
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7.3.3 Completely giving up 
The state also has tried to save the film industry in other ways. The GIO convened an 
extensive National Film Conference in 1992, and invited many key figures in the film 
industry and academia to discuss the issues facing the film industry and to make 
suggestions. Subsequently, the GIO conducted a whole-year project named 'The Film 
Year', which included short-term training courses for film workers, film industry and 
history researches, and domestic and international promotions of Taiwanese film. 
These measures, as the Chinese phrase - 'loud thunders, little rains- puts it, had little 
significant effect on the declining film industry. The main structural problems, such as 
the flight of capital offshore and the domination of imported films in the exhibition 
market, had not been touched. In fact, at the same time as the government was loudly 
proclaiming its determination to revive the local film industry, it was also gradually 
lifting restrictions on the importation and exhibition of foreign films. 
After the latest rounds of the Taiwan-US bilateral trade negotiations were 
completed, the government revoked the importation quota system in 1986. The 
restrictions on the number of circulating prints of an imported film (the print quota) 
and on the number of cinemas showing same imported film (the cinema quota) were 
also increasingly relaxed from the early 1990s (see Table 6.6). 
Although the KMT handed over its fifty-year reign to the DPP in 2000, the new 
government has maintained its 
basic policy orientation. In October 2001, the GIO, on 
its own initiative and without any public discussion, proposed amending the Motion 
picture Law to delete the articles relating to the print and cinema quotas and to the 
levy on imported film for supporting local production. The Legislative Yuan approved 
the amendment rapidly without dissent. The director of the Division of Film of the 
GIO, Jiang Chuanching, argued that the changes were necessary for the entry into the 
WTO. 'Hollywood films have already dominated world market and local audience has 
shown no interests in 
domestic films for a long time', he said, 'it is useless at all to 
protect domestic film now' 
(China Times, 18/10/2001). Having come this far, the 
state has now almost given up all of 
its policy instruments to protect and support the 
local film industry. As a result, local film has been effectively banished from Taiwan 
at the beginning of the new century. 
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7.4 China: Film Moves towards the Market 
Recent reforms in the Chinese film system can be traced back to the late 1970s and 
the resulting debates and adjustments that continued though the whole the 1980s. In 
1979, in an attempt to revive a film system that had ' 
been seriously damaged during 
the Great Cultural Revolution, the Department of State decided to set aside 80 percent 
of distribution profits as a fund for developing and rebuilding film distribution and 
exhibition sectors. Later, the Ministry of Culture announced that transaction practices 
between studios and the CFC would change, from a fixed price (900 thousand yuan) 
for each film to a floating price in accordance with the number of prints sold. 
However, because the floating price was actually limited to a range between 1.08 
million and 900 thousand yuan, as Ni argues, it represented only a slight difference 
from the original system (Ni, 1994: 46). 
In 1985, the fixed cinema ticket price system was also changed to a floating system 
in some areas - although still within a range. The limited range of floating price of 
film prints was lifted in 1987. The price of each print also raised from 9,000 to 10,500 
yuan in 1989 (ibid.: 47-8). Yet, the centre of the old film system, the national 
monopoly of the CFC and the regional monopolies of local distribution units, was not 
touched until 1993. 
7.4.1 Reforms in the film system 
At the end of 1992, the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television (MRFT) convened 
over 20 conferences on the reform of film system. By January of 1993, a document 
titled 'Some Opinions about Deepening the Present Reforms of the Film Industry and 
Mechanisms' (the so-called No. 3 Document) was released. The key to the reform 
project was the introduction of market dynamics and the cutting edge was distribution. 
The Document abolished the monopoly of the CFC in distributing domestic films 
(although the distribution of imported film still remained the CFC's exclusive right) 
and allowed all studios to sell 
film prints either to the CFC or directly to 32 provincial 
and municipality distribution units (Ni, 1994: 
50-1; Shao, 1993). The change seems 
exceptional from today's perspective, 
but at the time it had a substantial impact on 
every sector of the film system. In practice, they 
did not know how to do business in a 
novel 'market'. 'Some provincial and municipality distribution units and small and 
medium-sized studios felt they were "losing gravity"', as Ni puts it, 'Having 
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experienced a fixed and united operation model for many years, they were suddenly 
shocked and lost their directions' (Ni: 1994: 52). However, after a short hiatus, the 
change activated an enormous chain reaction which proceeded at dramatic speed. 
Shanghai, one of the cities in the vanguard of the marketisation process, 
experienced the first reactions. In March 1993, the Shanghai Film Distribution 
Company responded to the new business environment by transforming itself into the 
first stock company in China's film industry, the Shanghai Paradise Corporation 
(SpC)14. The SPC signed a shared-profit contract with Beijing Film Studio (BFS) to 
distribute its co-produced (with Hong Kong and Taiwan companies) film, Once Upon 
a Time in China IIYShiwang Zhengba", in Shanghai. This was the first distribution 
arrangement that was not mediated by the CFC. The profit-sharing ratio was BFS 60 
percent and SPC 40 percent in the first four months and afterwards 42 percent and 58 
percent respectively. The BFS obtained over 900 thousand yuan in the Shanghai 
market in the first four months and its considerably enhanced many studios and local 
distribution units' confidence (Ni, 1994: 54). 
The distribution of Once Upon a Time in China III in Jiangsu Province introduced 
out another significant innovation. After the No. 3 Document was published, the 
Jiangsu Provincial Distribution Company planned to replace the CFC as the center of 
control for all second-tier distribution units. The action was opposed by some city 
distribution companies. Four of them, Nanjing, Suzhou, Wuxi, and Nantong, formed a 
coalition and signed a distribution contract of Once Upon a Time in China Iff directly 
with the BFS. This practice was already beyond the terms specified in the Document, 
but was accepted and affirmed by 'higher levels'. In response, the Jiangsu Film 
Distribution Company allied itself with seven other city distribution companies to 
establish another new provincial distribution company (Ni, 1994: 54-5). The 
distribution monopoly at provincial level had been broken and market competition 
had appeared. This so-called 'Jiangsu Breakthrough' event symbolised the way that 
rnarket pressure had become a significant factor in influencing, and sometimes even 
in forcing, changes in government film policy. 
In August 1994, the MRFT released a document titled 'Notice on Improving the 
Reforms of the Film Industry and Mechanism' (the so-called No. 348 Document). 
14 Shanghai Paradise Corporation has expanded and formed the largest media conglomerate in China in 
1996, Shanghai Paradise Film & TV Group. See more introductions in Chapter 8. 
15 The film is analysed in Chapter 9. 
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This allowed all production units to sell their films to every tier of distribution units 
and exhibition units (except from some special margin areas). The film distribution 
and exhibition market had in effect has been entirely opened (Mao, 1999). In the 
following years, two competing distribution units formed in many provinces, 
including Shandong Province, Sichuan Province and Shanxi Province. The Film 
Bureau also actively intervened and coordinated this trend (China Film Yearbook) 
1998/1999: 32). 
7.4.2 Reforms in film production 
In the field of film production, while the film authorities maintained the power to 
assign production indices, substantial changes also occurred. Firstly, the authority 
agreed that studios could seek financial resources for film production from domestic 
corporations and legal persons. Shanghai again was the most active in this practice. 
The Shanghai Film Studio (SFS) started to attract investments from enterprises and 
from directors in 1993. Among eight films completed by SFS in that year, four were 
co-productions with other companies and the other four had outside investments (Ni, 
1994: 81). 
Secondly, the authority actively encouraged studios to make co-productions; with 
non-domestic film companies though so far these arrangements have been mostly 
confined to Hong Kong and Taiwanese film companies. Before the 'major films' from 
the US were introduced in late 1994, co-productions proved to be better in generating 
profits than domestic productions (for more discussion on this see in Chapter 8). 
Thirdly, the No. 3 Document allowed studios to operate and develop post-film 
products and businesses, such as video tapes, video discs (VCDs), and cable 
television release, in their own right. In fact, since the 1980s, many studios have 
actively attempted to involve themselves in diverse businesses including shooting 
commercials, audio and visual products retailing, studio tours, travel, and even 
construction and estate development. 
Fourthly, the film authority also urged studios to introduce internal managerial and 
organisational reforms. First of all, the studios transformed themselves from state 
organs into corporation units and every department had to take full responsibility for 
their duties. Filming teams therefore acted as contractors rather than civil servants. In 
addition, most studios dismissed staff and downsized themselves. 
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In the late 1990s, the film authority introduced further liberalising measures. The 
first was to diversify film production beyond the 16 national film studios (Interview 
No. 3). The Film Bureau first allowed province-owned small-sized studios to make 
films in 1997. One year later, the franchise was extended to local distribution units, 
local television stations, and private corporations and persons. All these bodies can 
now apply for a single film production license by submitting their filming proposals 
to the Film Bureau (China Film Yearbook, 1998/1999: 33; Interview No. 3). 
Secondly, in line with policies in other industrial fields, the film authorities also 
fostered vertical and horizontal integration and conglomeration in the film industry. 
Shanghai again was the first place in which this policy achieved significant progress. 
in addition to the formation of the Shanghai Paradise Corporation, the Shanghai Film 
Studio also acquired some cinemas to transform itself into to the Shanghai Film and 
Television Group Corporation in the same year (1996). Another prominent example 
was the Beijing Forbidden City (Zijincheng) Film Corporation. This was established 
at the end of 1996 with participation from four state organisations, the Beijing 
Television Station, the Beijing Television Art Centre, the Beijing City Film Company 
(city distribution unit), and Beijing City Cultural, Art, and Audio-Visual Publications. 
The resulting corporation contains a wide range of sectors including film and 
television programme production, film distribution and exhibition (for more 
discussion see Chapter 8). The latest development has been the establishment of the 
China Film Group Corporation in 1998. The Group was headed by the CFC and 
composed of the Beijing Film Studio, China Film Co-production Corporation, China 
Children's Film Studio, China Film Equipment Corporation, Beijing Film Processing 
and Recording Factory, Movie Channel (CCTV 6) and Huayun Film And TV Laser 
Disc Company. This is now the largest vertically and horizontally integrated film 
conglomerate in China (Interview No. 5). 
Despite these extensive structural changes however, the system of guidance on the 
direction of production has been maintained. In 1994, in preparation for the 
celebration of the Fiftieth Anniversary of Nation in 1999, the MRFT announced the 
'9550 Project' of filin production, which intended to produce 10 main-melody films 
per year from 1995 so that there would be 50 works available in 1999. Yet, finding 
the finance to complete this 'top mission' was obviously problematic and so the film 
authority had to extend its permission of non-governmental investment in film 
production (China Film Yearbook, 1998/1999: 24). 
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7.4.3 Subsidy and protection 
The PRC government pursued five measures for supporting domestic film production 
after the reform in the film industry began: the special film finance, television-film 
cross subsidy, the levy on imported films, tax breaks, and special case subsidy 
application (China Film Yearbook, 1998/1999: 33; Interview 3). 
The Film Special Finance is a fund for supporting feature film production. It was 
first set up in 1988, with funds drawn mainly from the governmental budget. In 1991 
however, the MRFT formally released documents for the collection and management 
of a Special Fund for Developing the National Film Industry and switching the 
financial source to a levy on box-office revenues based on 0.05 yuan per ticket sold. 
In 1996, this was changed to 5 percent of total box-office revenues. The definition of 
'key films' eligible for subsidy were (Ni, 1994: 129): 
(1) The film presents significant events of the Party, country, and the People's 
Liberation Army (PLA), or recounts stories of the leaders of the Party, the 
govemment and the PLA. 
(2) The film presents an important historical story of revolutionary struggles since the 
opium War. Where the cost of such a film is higher than 1.8 million yuan, the 
subsidy is capped at 50 percent of the cost. 
(3) The film presents significant achievements of revolution, development, and reform. 
If the cost of is higher than 1.4 million yuan, the 50 percent ceiling for subsidy 
again applies. 
(4) The revenues of completed film with the themes described above are lower than 
the original cost after two-years of release. 
As these criteria make clear, the available finance is mainly to support main-melody 
films. However, the collection of funds ran into problems because of resistance from 
local distribution and exhibition sectors and bureaucratic conventions. The Film 
Bureau convened a meeting of national exhibition sectors to enhance the collection of 
morlies in May 1997. It had the desired effect. 
The Finance collected that year stood 
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at 33.57 million yuan, an increase of 122 percent from the amount of 1996, and three 
times higher than 1995 (China Film Yearbook, 1998/1999: 33) 11. 
To further increase the influence and revenues of 'key main-melody films', the 
MRFT and Ministry of Culture implemented a promotion plan in April 1997. The 
plan was designed to coordinate the CFC and major regional distribution companies 
and cinemas (about 300 nationwide) for the united release and promotion of key 
films.. The Film Bureau and the CFC also actively promoted domestic films exports. 
The objective however is not simply to secure the wider circulation propaganda as in 
the old times, but also to generate more profit from transactions. 
The television-film cross subsidy arrangements are designed to reallocate profits 
from a comparatively strong media (television) to a weaker media (film). The 
measure takes 3 percent of the annual revenues of television companies operating at 
provincial level and above. In addition, because the CFC still has the monopoly of 
film importation, a levy on imported film is taken from its revenues. Before 2001, the 
amount was 10 million yuan a year. 
Tax breaks include reducing taxes on imported blank negative film reels together 
with business tax and film print value-added tax on film studios (Interview No. 4). 
The average annual use of blank film in 1999 was about 60 million metres which 
attracts a tax break of 164 million yuan (China Film Yearbook, 1998/1999: 33). The 
Film Bureau also accepts application for special production project for special subsidy. 
Apart from the five measures listed above, the Film Bureau and local governnients 
also provide various subsidies and awards, such as screenplay awards and grants for 
improving film equipment. The government has selected the Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Changchun studios as key development bases for film and invested 32 million yuan in 
constructing new infrastructures at the three sites. In 1997, central government and 
local governments together spent 175.895 million yuan in supporting film productions 
and improving film facilities and technologies (ibid.: 3 1). 
Although the film authorities still prohibit foreign nationals from owning or 
holding stock in the film production and distribution sectors, they have accepted 
161t was estimated that annual box-office revenues were 1.4 to 1.5 billion Yuan in 1997 and 1998. If we 
take 1.4 billion as assumed data, the 5 percent of that should be 70 million Yuan. Although the Film 
Bureau argued that 33-57 million yuan was a great improvement, it actually only reached about half of 
the expected amount. This shortage may demonstrate two possible facts. The first is that many local 
cinemas' operations are in serious difficulties. The second is that the power of government and Party 
control in China is declining. 
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foreign investments in cinemas in special cases since the mid-1990s. The majority of 
these investments were from Hong Kong. The Hong Kong corporations, including the 
major film company Golden Harvest, have been involved in rebuilding several 
cinemas in Beijing and Shanghai. Capital from Singapore and Japan has also 
participated in the cinema business in Shanghai and Guanzhou (China Film Yearbook, 
1998/1999: 32). In the 1999 however, under the terms of the China-US WTO 
agreement, the Chinese government has agreed to generally open cinema ownership 
and operation to foreign investment. The proportion of foreign ownership however 
must be lower than 49 percent. 
Among the measures Protecting the domestic film industry, the most important 
initiative is the foreign film importation and screen quota system, which has already 
been mentioned in Chapter 6. The monopoly of the CFC in importing and distributing 
foreign film ensures firstly, the quantity and quality of films imported, and secondly, 
full control in allocating and using the profits made. However, the details of exactly 
how these profits are distributed remains confidential. The profits generated increased 
considerably after the 'imported major films' arrived in late 1994. China has agreed to 
increase the annual importation of 'major films' from 10 to 20 upon its entry into the 
WTO, and to 40 five years later. After China signed the WTO agreement with the US, 
in a public speech the current director of the Film Bureau, Liu Jianzhong, proclaimed 
three principles for 'Rifther opening up to foreign films' (Keshi, 200 1): 
(1) The screen quota system will be retained. The number of imported films shown 
cannot be more than one-third of the number of total films shown nationwide. 
(2) Allowing' the import of 20 films should not be equated with 'having to' import 
20 films. 
(3) Shared-profit films are not only confined to American film. They can also include 
European film and films from Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned in Chapter 6, the two-thirds screen quota for domestic 
film has been more of a formality than a reality. Not only because many cinemas do 
not obey the regulation or submit false screening schedules, but also because the 
'; major films' account for two-thirds of national box-office revenues. In addition, 
along with increased imports of shared-profit films and the business-oriented 
transformation of local distributors, the CFC is facing increasingly severe challenges 
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to its historic monopoly over importation rights 17 and plans fro releasing one or two 
distribution fi-anchises to other distribution bodies and introducing competition are 
now under active consideration. 
7.4.4 Changes in the definition of film 
In retrospect, it is clear that all the market-oriented reforms pursued since 1993 were 
aimed at solving the crisis of declining revenues from the national film industry. From 
1979 to 1991, annual audience admissions fell by 50 percent - from 29.3 billion to 
14.4 billion. The number of film exhibitions also decreased 20 percent. This persistent 
decline alarmed a government still committed to Lenin's notion of the centrality of 
film as a communicative apparatus. In 1992, attendance was 10.5 billion, 26 percent 
lower than the previous year. Box-office revenues and the number of films shown also 
decreased respectively by 20 percent and 16 percent from 1991 (Ni, 1994: 2,50). In 
response the 1993 No. 3 Document, for first time in a formal document in China's 
history, mentioned that evaluations of the film industry should consider 'social' as 
well as 'economic' effectiveness. The political function was no longer the dominant 
feature of film. 
As mentioned in section 7.2.1, the comparatively liberal CCP leader Zhou En-lai 
had argued on the early 1960s that political objectives should not override the other 
functions of film. 'The political criterion is not everything', he emphasised, 'the 
public watch movies for leisure and entertainment' (B. Chen, 2000). However, it was 
only after the organizational reform of the film system started in 1993 that this idea 
was considered seriously and debates around the commercial, artistic, political, and 
entertaining features of film have been going on intensely since then (see some of key 
literatures collected in the China Film Association, 1996). Some authors argue that 
commerce is the first and foremost characteristic of film, and has been neglected for 
too long in the history of contemporary Chinese film (i. e. Shao, 1996). They celebrate 
the Hollywood system as 'the most appropriate practice and artistic idea for the 
evolution of film' (Shao, 1996: 101). They argue that the orientation of film practice 
should be completely towards market and that this is the only realistic resolution for 
Vin 1997, the authority ever allocated three quotas of distribution of 'major films' to three major film 
studios, Changchun, Shanghai, and Beijing, one each as a kind of reward. But due to lack of 
distribution networks and experiences, three studios finally gave up the right and 'sold back' to the 
CFC. 
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the present crisis of the Chinese film industry. In contrast, other critics contend that 
the artistic and social features of film should remain primary. Worries about vulgar 
and bad-taste productions following a market-driven system are widely expressed (i. e. 
Xu, 1996). In this debate (as in the similar debate between market liberalism and the 
thoughts of the Frankfurt School) the only point of universal agreement is that the 
overt party political function of film should be reduced. 
Many authors however, have been trying to find a balance between the contending 
positions. (i. e. J. Li, 1996; Zhu, 1996). They affirm that the introduction of markets 
and commerce into the film production is necessary but insist that commercial 
considerations cannot be allowed to prevail over artistic principles. They also recall 
Zhou En-lai's idea, emphasing the entertainment value of film rather than its 
commercial potential. They are convinced that making films that fusing entertaining 
and artistic features is a task all filmmakers should pursue, and that this does not have 
to imply loss of quality. The argument seems to echo the No. 3 Document that both 
social and economic effectiveness should be considered. 
Yet, for the government, any definition of the 'social effectiveness' of film must 
still include political considerations, but in a significant concession to critics, the 
current official guideline for film production advocates the so-called 'three features in 
one': the ideological, the artistic, and the entertaining. This is the first time that the 
Chinese government has formally accepted entertainment as one of film's key 
features. As a result, official conceptions of the function of film have become 
complex. As the present vice-director of the MRFT, Zhao Shi, said, 
In film creation, we should attend to the relationship between 'exalting main-melody' 
and 'enhancing diversity'. We should insist on the highly unification of ideological 
content and artistic form, of obtaining market/audience and directing market/ 
audience, of considering artistic effect and social effect, of creating social and 
economic effectiveness. We should present significant historical events as well as 
magnificent real life, depict true stories as well as artistic fictions,... When dealing 
with some sensitive topics, we should gasp the policy and the propriety (China 
Film Yearbook, 1998/1999: 25). 
These new 'unifications' disclose many contradictions in film policy-making and 
difficulties in filmmaking. As in the general area of media policy-making, mentioned 
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in Chapter 5, the Chinese government has been trying to introduce advantages of 
market factors into the film industry 'Aithout taking the risks of ideological liberation 
and legitimation crisis. The unspoken rationale behind the 'three features in one' 
guideline is that when the three features contradict with each other, ideological 
correctness would be the only guideline. To this end, the film authorities still execute 
a strict censorship system. 
Since Red Sorghum (analysed in Chapter9) was awarded the Golden Bear at the 
Berlin Film Festival in 1988 and Chinese films and creators have increasing attracted 
international attention, the Chinese government has been particularly cautious in 
supervising the details and contents of films submitted to international film festival It 
forbids any film to be shown in an international film festival without pre-permission. 
Nevertheless, some young filmmakers have secretly attended international film 
competitions as a way to avoid censorship. If they win an important award overseas, it 
can becomes a kind of protection for their creations. The practice is risky however 
and can incur the wrath of Chinese government. 
one recent example was Gue Zi Lai Le (2000, directed by Jiang Wen). The film is 
about the interactions of Japanese soldiers and Chinese village people in the Second 
World War. Unlike the conventional representations (see the film analysis in Chapter 
9), the film does not depict the Japanese as devils (Gue Zi). On the contrary, both 
Japanese and Chinese find a communal humanity in the film and a special fiiendship 
is born. between them. Jiang Wen brought the film to the 2000 Cannes Film Festival 
without passing film censorship and the securing the agreement of the government. 
The government asked Jiang to withdraw the film from the festival but he refused. 
The film finally won the second prize (the Reviewers' Award) and the government 
was furious. 'The film content is not correct', said a senior official in the Film Bureau, 
'Chinese people are ignorant and ruthless while the Japanese are noble and proud in 
the film'. He stated firmly that Jiang, the producer, and investors would be severely 
punished, by being prohibited from making films for several years, and that the film 
must be cut and revised (Interview No. 16). Nevertheless, although the film is still 
banned in China, Jiang and the other staff involved have still not been formally 
punished. Does this imply that the CCP government has softened its stance towards 
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film content regulation? Or, has it gradually lost its power in dealing with civil society 
forces (represented by filmmakers)? " The answer remains to be observed. 
But, no matter how the CCP government changes their attitude to film censorship, 
one thing is sure. That is, 'entertainment films' with minimal political implications 
have become the safest form of production. This fact has not been lost on filmmakers 
and the majority of films produced by independent film companies, which obtained 
film production franchises from the government as a result of the reforms in the film 
industry, have been 'entertainment films' (see more details in Chapter 8). 
7.5 Powerless States? 
After the 1980s, the states of China and Taiwan have substantially changed both 
generally and in relation to film governance. In Taiwan, the state gradually lost its 
power to govem film. It took the direction of marketisation in the name of media 
liberalisation but contrary to the more optimistic projections, the film industry has got 
weaker rather than stronger, and the film production has not become significantly 
more diverse. Rather, the industry has been given to global competition and its 
residual value as a vehicle for national display is confined to a handful of art films. 
The computer, semi-conductor, and telecommunication sectors have assumed the role 
of strategic industries that the whole country's resources should be devoted to, leaving 
film stranded on the shores of history. In retrospect, although the actions of the state 
were strongly influenced by international and domestic economic forces it was not 
compelled to hand over its power to the extent that it has. It was presented with 
choices and the choices it made in turn restricted its subsequent decisions. 
In China, the state still maintains its dominant control over film policy-making and 
resources have mainly been allocated to the production and promotion of 'main- 
melody' films celebrating the Party's achievements. Nevertheless, market dynamics 
have become increasingly influential. Although 'ideological security' remains the 
primary concern, entertainment has been 
introduced and promoted in film production 
for its 'economic effectiveness'. On the other hand, civil society forces, such as 
There was another event worthy to be noted here. In May 2000, China Film Directors Association, 
the largest and most important professional organisation of Chinese film creators, held its third-year 
conference in Beijing. In its 
final report of the conference, the association issued a 'appealing letter' in 
which appealing the government to accelerate reform 
in film industry, to legislate the Film Law, and to 
loosen film censorship. The kind of collective action was still highly sensitive in today's China. The 
authority was quite unhappy and warned some 
leading directors personally. Yet, the authority did not 
give any real punishments (Interview 
No. 13; 16). 
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filmmakers and intellectuals, remain comparatively weak within the film policy- 
making process. The situation is still fluid. But, a special sort of coalition between the 
state and capital (newly risen at home, private and state-owned, and newly arrived 
from outside) has begun to form, in which the state and the Party can maintain its 
dominant position and the capital can make more profit. 
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Chapter 8 National Industries 
The development of China's film industry before 1949 was considerably restrained by 
political unrest. The first Chinese film was produced in 1905 when the Fengtai 
Photography Shop in Beijing shot a short of the famous Beijing Opera actor Tan 
Yinpei. Eight years later (1913), the businessman Zhang Shichan and playwright 
Zheng Zhengqiu, funded by an Italian businessman, together made the first Chinese 
feature film Nanfu Nanqi. However, substantial production only started in the 1920. 
By 1925, there were 175 film companies operating in major cities, of which 141 
were located in Shanghai. Most of these companies did not actually produce film but 
confined themselves to looking for profitable investment oppoftunities. From 1921 to 
1931, there were about 650 feature films produced. The majority consisted of 
comedies, sensational melodramas, and films featuring ancient swordplay, folklore or 
mythology. The original unregulated and chaotic market order was gradually 
transformed into an oligoplistic structure dominated by three major companies, 
Mingxing, Tianyi, and Lianhua. The scales of operations of these domestic majors 
however were still comparatively small because imported films dominated the market 
(Cheng, 1997; Du, 1972). 
From 1930 onwards, the extension of the Japanese military invasion, and 
intensifying struggles and conflicts between the ruling KMT and the CCP began to 
have a major impact on the film industry. The CCP literature and art workers actively 
intervened in major film companies' operations in an effort to produce what they 
called progressive films'. The KMT government responded by arresting CCP 
members, strengthening film censorship, intervening in private film companies 
themselves, and establishing state/party-owned film companies. The struggle 
continued after the end of the anti-Japan war and lasted until 1949. At the same time, 
American films again flooded into the market, and the local film industry, as one of 
the centres of the KMT-CCP struggle, remained underdeveloped. It is only after 1949, 
with the defeat of the KMT, that we see two 
distinct 'national' film industries starting 
to develop, one based in Taiwan and the other in mainland China. 
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8.1 A Structurally Distorted Industry 
As mentioned in Chapter 7, the state of Taiwan regarded the film industry as a 
propaganda organ and an entertainment business at the same time. In spite of forceful 
state interventions, the industry was, and still is, operating as an industry within a 
commercial market. Political rationales and commercial considerations sometimes 
coincided and sometimes contradicted with each other, but the film industry has never 
been established as a sound public cultural institution. 
As in mainland China and other later-developing societies, the Taiwanese film 
industry developed out of film exhibition. During the Japanese colonial occupation, a 
domestic film exhibition market had begun to form even though film production was 
restricted. After the KMT regime came to power on the island in 1945, the 
government and party took over all Japanese-owned film production facilities. 
Although film production was not prohibited, civil organizations lacked either the 
material resources or the skills to enter into production. At the same time, the film 
exhibition market experienced rapid growth. Between 1949 and 1954, the number of 
cinemas increased from 40 or so to 374 (S. Lu, 1961), but only 16 local films were 
made (all by state/party owned companies). The rising market demand was mainly 
fulfilled by imported films from Hong Kong and Hollywood. By 1955 however, civil 
film production had begun to pick up. 
In late 1955, a Fulao opera drama' club invited He Jiming, who had studied film 
production in Japan, to shoot one of their most popular performances, Xue PinggUe Yu 
Wang Baochuang. and the resulting film was released into cinemas the following year. 
This project enjoyed unexpected market success and it was reported that some 
cinemas were damaged by the enormous audiences who tried to crowd in. Its success 
attracted private investors into filmmaking and the number of Fulao films made rose 
abruptly in the subsequent five years. Between 1955 and 1959, a total of 178 Fulao 
films were produced, more than three times the number of Mandarin films produced 
in the same period. The majority of these indigenous films were opera dramas in film 
form. The main labour force for these productions also came from opera drama. 
Already-popular contents coupled with a novel artistic form guaranteed their 
1 1955, the first civil film Do caiz1xixiangfl was produced. Probably because the bad quality, it did not 
obtain significant attention. 
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profitability. The film industry suddenly became 'a paradise of speculators and 
adventurers' (F. Lu, 1998: 85). In 1958, there were 64 production companies 
operating in the industry. A few film professionals and entrepreneurs aimed to take 
the film business seriously and establish large-scale studios, but most producers were 
content to make easy money from low cost and low quality films within simple 
production environments. They were more like the growing sector of Taiwanese small 
and medium sized firms generally - except that they did not export. This basic 
industrial pattern established the essential structure of Taiwan's domestic film 
production sector. 
Between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s, attracted by the KMT government's 
film policies (see Chapter 7) and the comparatively low production and labour costs, 
some Hong Kong businessmen and local entrepreneurs who had close relationships 
with Hong Kong interests started to establish film studio systems in Taiwan for mass- 
producing Mandarin films. As a consequence, many skilled workers moved from 
Fulao film production to these newly established companies with the result that 
although the years between 1970 and 1974, saw 423 local films produced, only 61 of 
these were Fulao. As these figures suggest, Mandarin films gradually replaced Fulao 
films as the major force in the local market and in export markets of South-East Asia. 
These productions were in two main genres-romantic melodrama and swordplay 
movie, both of which were relatively apolitical and escapist. This development, which 
further extended the reach of the Hong Kong film industry, introduced an 
international division of labour within Taiwan's film industry. 
But, around the mid-1970s however, the dominant sector of production began to 
face severe difficulties. Firstly, the local production system was still not competitive 
with Hong Kong, which benefited from a more liberal capital and regulatory regime. 
This enabled it to upgrade its capacity and introduce independent producers and new 
directors, thereby increasingly extending the distance between itself and Taiwan's 
film industry. Secondly, in response to complaints that there was too much violence in 
swordplay movies, the Taiwan government introduced stricter censorship on films. 
Thirdly, some of the South-East Asian countries (which were major export markets) 
started to impose film importation restrictions. Faced with these disadvantages, these 
2 Fulao opera drama (Gezai Xi) is a sort of folk drama mixing Fulao folk songs and traditional Chinese 
opera drama. It developed within Fulao communities in Taiwan since the mid-term of the Japanese 
colonisation and became a popular folk culture. 
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highly mobile capital that had flowed into the island's industry quickly withdrew 
from Taiwan and left a still underdeveloped film production sector. 
In contrast, the distribution and exhibition sectors continued growing reinforcing 
the Taiwanese film industry's pattern of structural distortion. Between 1945 and 1970 
the number of cinemas increased from 40 or so to over 800. While in the same period, 
the population doubled. Annual attendance in cinemas grew from 94 million in 1961 
to 250 million, the highest in history, in 1981 (DGBAS, 1992). Although in the 
heyday of Fulao film, a few entrepreneurs tried to develop a viable production 
business they finally failed because the distributors refused to cooperate with them (F. 
Lu, 1998: 89-93). After the mid-1970s, when Hong Kong films became more popular 
than local productions, the structural advantages enjoyed by distributors increased still 
further. The sector became increasingly concentrated with a few major distributors 
gradually coming to dominate the market through their control over extensive cinema 
chains. The key to the major distributors' control was their ability to obtain the rights 
to popular Hong Kong films and sometimes violence and gang forces were used for 
achieving this. Major distributors also became the main investors in local productions 
from the 1980s onwards which is why they are often seen as the main 'betrayers' of 
Taiwan's film industry in the 1990s (see Section 8.4). However, they did not have the 
field entirely to themselves. 
Another important force in Taiwan's film industry were the state/party-owned film 
companies, particularly the Central Motion Picture Corporation (CMPC) whose main 
task was to make feature films. Because the CMPC was vertically-integrated it was 
not affected by the tensions and contradictions between production and distribution 
that beset the private sector. Furthermore, it used its abundant resources strategically 
and gradually became the pivotal production unit in Taiwan's film industry from the 
early 1970s onwards. In addition to patriotic and propaganda films, the CMPC also 
involved in producing big-budget romantic melodramas in the 1970s. In fact, the 
CMPC presented a paradox. On the one hand, because it undertook ideological tasks 
it was not able to produce progressive works which expressed real complexities and 
contradictions in the society. Consequently, it never functioned as a developing centre 
to facilitate civil film production sector. On the other hand, because it was one of the 
KMT party organs, it was, to some extent, insulated from the full impact of market 
forces. This relative independence created some 'free' space in film production. 
Although this space was initially used to serve the KMT's political interests, when the 
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authority of the KMT started to decline in the late 1970s, it became a supporting force 
in the birth of a new direction in film in Taiwan - New Taiwanese Cinema - and this 
development will be discussed next. 
8.2 The Fading Away of a National Film Industry 
Since the 1980s, the Taiwanese film industry has been substantially affected by two 
interconnected trends. The first has come from outside in the shape of accelerating 
globalising processes including the global spread of neo-liberal ideology, more freely 
mobile capital, the globalisation of cultural production and consumption, and the 
global extension of the use of new communication technologies (see discussions in 
Chapter 2). The second has been generated within Taiwan as the state has, 
unintentionally and intentionally, granted increasing autonomy to civil society forces. 
As a consequence, the film industry gained greater freedom of operations that it had 
ever enjoyed before. At the same time however, the state has also pursued neo- 
liberalist policies of deregulation, privatisation and marketisation, which have placed 
the film industry in an environment characterised by market domination and minimal 
public sector support (see Chapter 7). 
The interactions of these two trends has had several major consequences for the 
Taiwanese film industry. One, the overwhelming victory of Hollywood films in 
Taiwan, s film market, has been discussed in Chapter 6. The other four issues are 
introduced sequentially below. 
8.2.1 The birth and death of New Taiwanese Cinema 
in the late 1970s, the civil film production sector tried to find a solution in the context 
of already lost of overseas markets, the increasing domestic popularity of Hong Kong 
films, and the gradual relaxation of film censorship. What they offered was plenty of 
violence and sex. Between 1978 and 1983, there were 117 crime films released (F. Lu, 
1998: 261). Leading once critic to claim that film makers 'entirely indulged in gang 
crimes, gambling, fighting, YA film, slapstick film, and hodgepodge of 
mischievousness' (ibid. ). These efforts did not meet with box-office success and the 
situation of the commercial film industry worsened. 
At the same time, the CMPC was also trying out its new, more 'open', role by 
placing less emphasis on overt propaganda and more on educational and moral 
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guidance. In 1982, it came up with a four-episode suite film In Our TimelGuangying 
de Gushi directed by four new-generation directors, Edward Yang, Tao Dechen, Ke 
Yizheng, and Zhang Yi. The episodes relate incidents set in the process of Taiwan's 
modernisation ftom the 1960s to the 1980s and were characterised by a natural realist 
style. The film is now seen as marking the break that ushered in 'New Cinema' and 
distinguished it ftom 'old cinema'. Edward Yang's view of the film identified the 
main creative direction of New Taiwanese Cinema (NTC)I, 
[ ... ] the 
film probably was the first film in Taiwan's film history to consciously 
explore Taiwan's past. That is to say, it was the first film in which we began to ask 
ourselves questions about our history, our ancestor, our political situation, and our 
relationship with mainland China and so on' (quoted in K Chen, 1993: 4748). 
The CMPC subsequently produced Growing UPIMaobi de Gushi (1983, directed by 
Chen Kunhou, written by Hou Hsiaohsien) and The Sandwich Man (a three-episode 
suite also directed by a group of three new-generation directors, including Hou 
I-Isiaohsien). The former was regarded as the key work in kick-starting NTC because 
of its substantial market success. However, it was not only the CMPC who continued 
to make this sort of art film. The desperate, seeking solutions to the production crisis, 
private film producers and distributors were also involved. From 1982 to 1986, taking 
a narrow definition of NTC (and counting the outputs of the major directors), there 
were 32 NTC films produced, or taking a broader definition (by theme and style) 58 
(F. Lu, 1998: 277). 
Although most NTC works were recognised as having high social and artistic 
value, their form and style (see Note 3) ran counter to the mainstream audience's 
increasingly 'Hollywoodised' and 'Hong-Kongised' film tastes. Popular audiences 
gradually lost patience with having to work at 'interpreting' and after the few early 
successes most NTC works failed at the box-office. In addition, bad-quality filins 
produced by private companies which had jumped on the NTC bandwagon made the 
3 The basic characteristics of NTC were commonly rccognised as follows: (1) Most stories of NTC 
works were about the past or present of Taiwan's society; (2) Creators were more conscious in 
exploiting the possibilities of 
film form. Though choosing different aesthetic positions, they all rejected 
the formulas of traditional melodrama; (3) Creators believed that film audiences are active interpreters. 
They told the story in a polysemic and ambivalent way rather relying on simplistic and sensational 
devices. They thus kept a distance from film audience and just invited audience to experience (F. Lu, 
1998: 274-6; R. Chcn, 1993: 47-5 1). 
188 
situation worse. Since they were only interested in as long as the results proved 
popular, once the genre began to fail in the market they withdrew as quickly as they 
had joined in the beginning. 
Meanwhile, the CMPC also became hesitated to make fin-ther investments in NTC 
because it too had increasingly to take account of commercial concerns. The high tide 
of NTC production is commonly considered to have ended in 1987'. Although its 
productions (broadly defined) accounted for less than 14 percent of the total local film 
output during the five years from 1982 (F. Lu, 1998: 279), it had significant 
consequence for Taiwan's film industry. It is widely agreed that the NTC movement 
made a very significant contribution to Taiwanese film art by creating an art film 
tradition (or an art film genre), cultivating internationally famous directors (mostly 
Hou Hsiaohsien and Edward Yang), and helping to develop an art film audience. 
Nevertheless, the NTC movement had another, more significant but usually ignored, 
impact on Taiwan's film industry. It forged a new link between the Taiwanese film 
industry and the structure of contemporary global film production and consumption - 
a link very different from the structure established by film exportation to South-East 
Asian markets in the 1960s and 1970s. 
8.2.2 The internationalisation of art film production 
At an early point in the development of the NTC movement, some directors had found 
that attending overseas competition and selling products in international film festivals 
was an effective and helpful way to generate the revenues that would enable them to 
make their next film. Two early eminent examples were Hou Hsiaohsien and Edward 
Yang (Yang Dechang). According to a press report in 1989, from 1983 to 1988, eight 
films directed by Hou had clocked-up 113 showings at international film festivals 
while six films directed by Yang were screened 56 times. These films demonstrated 
that revenues from overseas sales could eclipse box office takings at home and 
sometimes push the film into profit (see Table 8.1). Moreover, once a film or film 
worker won a major prize in an international film festival, they could obtain rewards 
from Taiwan's government and increase their chances at the domestic box-office. 
Although overseas market performance has remained unpredictable, aiming at these 
4 In 1987, fifty NTC film workers and other key figures in cultural circles jointly signed and issued 
, Manifesto of Taiwanese Cinema'. It in effect announced the death of NTC and fostered a new start of 
'An Alternative Cinema'. 
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markets has become normal practice for some art film directors and also a profitable 
strategy for a few film companies, including the CMPC, since the late 1980s. 
Table 8.1 A comparison of overseas and domestic revenues of an film, in the cases of 
Hou Hslaohslen and Edward Yang (1983 - 1988)* in NT$ million 
Year Title Cost Domestic 
revenues 
Overseas 
revenues 
Profit Times attending 
film festivals 
184 The Boys from Fengkuei 6.0 3.3 7.4 4.7 15 
184 A Summer at Grandpa's 5.8 5.6 6.0 5.8 19 
185 The Time to Live and 
the Time to Die 8.0 8.0** 5.16 5.16 31 
'86 Dust in the Wind 8.0 9.34 5.22 6.56 23 
'83 One day on the beach 12.0 14.8** N/A 2.8 5 
185 Taipei Story 6.0 1.5 5.0 0.5 19 
186 The Terrorist 8.5 11.0 5.55 8.05 29 
* The data of revenues and times attending film festivals were accounted till the end of 1988. The first four films in 
the table were directed by Hou, and the rest three films were directed by Yang. 
The amount included rewards won at home. 
Source: independent Evening (in Chinese), 16/01/1989. 
From another perspective, this practice can be called the internationalisation of art 
fIlm production. For international film distributors, Taiwanese film companies which 
target overseas art film markets, function as overseas independent film producers or 
off-shore research and development (R&D) departments. Those who control 
international distribution outlets are the ones possess the majority of the exchange 
value of these films. One prominent example was The Wedding Banquet (1993, 
produced by CNPC, directed by Ang Lee). The film won the Best Film Award in 
1993 Berlin Film Festival and was popular in the Festival's exchange market. It was 
reported that it sold distribution rights to twelve countries and acquired revenues of 
about NT$ 39 million. The CMPC estimated that the total incomes, after adding the 
sales of distribution rights in the US and in Asia, should reach about NT$ 65 million. 
The box-office revenues of the film at home were about NT$ 120 million. In result, 
the total revenues the film generated for the local film industry should be over NT$ 
180 million (Wei, 1994: 45). Yet, according to reports in the American film trade 
journal Variety, The Wedding Banquet listed at 99th place in the top one hundred 
world box-office hits of 1993, generated total box-office receipts of over US$ 23 
million (NT$ 600 million). This means that there were over NT$ 400 million, 70 
percent of the total revenues, not going back to Taiwan's film industry (ibid. ). 
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Despite this unequal exchange however, the practice of 'internationalising' 
production continued throughout the 1990s down to today. It operates in several 
variants. One familiar form works like a subcontract. An internationally famous 
director obtains investments from foreign distributors and pre-sells distribution rights 
(domestic or international) to investors. For example, some Japanese companies have 
invested regularly in Hou Hsiaohsien's works since the 1980s and Edward Yang has 
attracted financial resources from the US, Japan, and France. Another art film director 
Tsai Mingliang (Cai Mingliang), who emerged later than the 'first wave' figures, 
obtained investments from a French company for his latest film, What Time Is 
There? lNi Nabian Jidian (2001). International distributors have even tried to 
participate in distributing art films in Taiwan. In 1994, the Hollywood major Time 
Warner (now AOL-Time Warner) announced that it was establishing Warner Asia to 
distribute Chinese films in Taiwan and other Asian markets. The first film it handled 
was The Confucian Confusion/Duli Shidai (1994), directed by Edward Yang but it 
was not successful in the market. After subsequent failures the initiative was 
terminated. 
Another trend is for film directors to be incorporated into international film 
corporations, particularly the major Hollywood studios. The most prominent example 
is Ang Lee. After The Wedding Banquet and his subsequent film, Eat, Drink, Man, 
Woman (1994) achieved widespread market successes, he was recruited to direct 
Hollywood art films. The first of these, Sense and Sensibility (1995, Columbia) was 
adapted from the English novelist Jane Austen's work. Although critics questioned 
whether a Chinese could completely understand a 'Western' story, the finished film 
was successful in the US and British markets and won a number of international film 
awards. Ang Lee subsequently directed two American set 
films for Hollywood, The 
Ice storm (1997, Fox) and Ride with the Devil (1999, Universal) having already 
moved the center of gravity of his career to Hollywood. In 2000, he got the chance to 
make a film based on a Chinese story, the swordplay movie Crounching Tiger, 
Hidden DragonliVo Hu Cang Long (Columbia). The film achieved great success in 
both US and overseas markets and won the Best Foreign Film Award at the Academy 
Awards and many other prizes. Yet, apart from Ang Lee himself and one of the 
screenplay writers, and a small proportion of the finance, the film had nothing to do 
with Taiwan's film industry. 
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The internationalised production of art film may be good for film directors, some 
local film companies, and the state (as a vehicle for displaying the country's 'heritage) 
but it has also had negative influences on local film culture. The modest market 
success at home of The Wedding Banquet was an exception. Most art films were 
regarded as minority art and rejected by local mass audience. As mentioned above, 
the tendency of art films to distance themselves from ordinary audiences which had 
appeared in the 1980s was further enhanced by the internationalisation of art film 
production, the inappropriate film subsidy policies (see Chapter 7), and the lack of 
advanced filming technologies and skills. In response, some directors paid more 
attention to the requirements of international markets than to the needs of local market 
creating a vicious spiral'. Consequently, major film directors continued to 'keep a 
distance' from local markets and audiences both in creation and in marketing. In 
inaking their movies, some were totally unwilling to compromise on matters of film 
form and style. They freely explored their own artistic objectives without considering 
how to communicate effectively with local audiences. Some made films where the 
story was nothing to do with Taiwanese society. Flowers of Shanghai / Hai Shang 
Hua (1998, directed by Hou Hsiaohsien and mainly financed by Japanese capital), for 
example, focuses on the love affairs between 
high-class prostitutes and their clients in 
Shanghai in the 19th century. Although the film was highly praised by local and 
foreign film critics and Hou was regarded bringing his artistic talent and individual 
style into full play in the film 
(see Huang and Cao, 1998), it was notably unsuccessful 
in the domestic market. In marketing, some art film creators passively deal with or 
even give up local release of their works. 
Edward Yang, for example, seemed 
reluctant to have his latest 
film, A One and A TwoM Yi (200 1, mainly financed by 
Japanese capital), released in Taiwan. Ironically, the film won the Best Director 
Award at the 2001 Cannes Film Festival and was reported to be popular in many 
European markets but has still not been shown in Taiwan at the time of writing. 
of course, there are film directors, such as Chang Zucji, Wang Xiaodi, and Lin 
Zhengsheng, who insist on making films that try to tell stories about the local society 
and try to communicate with 
local audiences. Yet, the conditions they face are now 
For example, Edward Yang emphasised 
(with some pride) that he was doing business like common 
Taiwanese small and medium-sized firms. Ile thinking apparently considers film as a pure commodity 
for exportation without considering 
local audience's need (see Young, 2001). 
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much more difficult than that in the 1980s. One of the main problems is the 
constraints imposed by local major distributors. 
8.2.3 Runaway capital 
in the early 1990s, local film companies invested in art film productions on a limited 
scale while continuing to produce low-budget and low-quality restricted-class films. 
These two types constituted the main output of the Taiwanese film industry at that 
time, a situation that has been described by some local critics as 'the polarisation of 
production' (see Huang, 1992; Chiao, 1991). It is an instance of what Garnham called 
the tendency towards 'two-tier markets' in capitalist society (Garnham, 1983a: 15-18; 
1983b: 325). He argues that both production and consumption within the capitalist 
cultural industries tends towards 'two-tier market structure' in which the distance 
between the material/cultural rich and the material/cultural poor is gradually extended. 
Nevertheless, in the case of Taiwan, this tendency was not simply the result of 
internal dynamics. It was substantially affected by international factors. 
Because Hollywood and Hong Kong films, with their advanced production 
technologies and comprehensive marketing practices, already accounted for the 
rnajority of the entire local market, these two directions of production seemed to be 
the only alternatives the weak film production sector could take. The only common 
ground between them was that they were both in low cost. In fact, local major 
distributors had already allocated the majority of their resources in Hong Kong. 
In the early 1990s, many Hong Kong films enjoyed great market success in 
Taiwan and major distributors were involved in intense competition to purchase 
distribution rights. Sometimes the distribution rights were pre-sold, which was in 
effect a sort of investment. As a result of this competition prices became unreasonably 
high. At the end of 1992, for example, major distributors competed in pre-purchasing 
the distribution rights to two expectedly lucrative Hong Kong films. The Longxiang 
Film corporation finally defeated its opponents by paying over NT$ 100 million (the 
original floor price for both 
distribution rights was about NT$ 60 million). This 
amount would have funded a dozen Taipei Stories or four The Wedding Banquets! In 
addition, major distributors made 
large investments directly in Hong Kong film 
companies in an effort to further control the market. Another major, the Scholar Film 
Corporation, for example, invested NT$ 100 million in Hong Kong popular star Andy 
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Lau's independent studio to make The God of War in 1992. Even the CMPC 
participated in this trend. In the same year, it invested in popular Hong Kong director 
Tsui Hark's swordplay film 'New Dragon Inn' and enjoyed good returns. 
Ironically, Taiwan's film industry found itself in the paradoxical situation where 
foreign distributors paid money to local filmmakers to make art films targeting 
foreign markets, while local distributors paid money to foreign filmmakers to make 
commercial films targeting the local market. However, because the major distributors 
dominated local distribution outlets and gave preferential treatment to their own 
investments and other commercial films, some art film creators who targeted on the 
local market could not obtain proper distribution and exhibition. Many of their works 
could only be shown in one cinema for less than one week. Recently, some art film 
directors, such as Wang Xiaodi and Tsai Mingliang have begun to rent independent 
cinemas themselves in order to achieve longer release. 
However, runaway the surge of commercial investment and once the Hong Kong 
industry entered recession in the mid-1990s (also see Chapter 6). The mobile 
Taiwanese capital rapidly withdrew from Hong Kong and changed the objective of 
their investments. They did return to Taiwan, but not to invest in local production. 
They found another lucrative business - cable television'. 
8.2.4 When film meets the new communication technologies 
Television, home video, and cable television are three significant 'newer2 
communication technologies that have significantly influenced the transformation of 
the film. industry (see Wasko, 1994). 
Taiwan's television industry developed in the 1960s when three state/party-owned 
television companies were established sequentially in 1962 (TTV), 1969 (CTV) and 
1970 (CTS). During this same period, the penetration of television sets in households 
rapidly increased to 32.2 percent. By 1975, the coverage of 
black-and-white television 
had reached 72.9 percent and colour television 13.3 percent while annual cinema 
attendance decreased from 180 million 
(1970) to 134 million (DGBAS, 1992). The 
film industry's first reaction to television was rather hostile. The industry even 
prohibited contracted movie stars from appearing 
in television programmes. In 1970, 
6 Some major distributors turned to distribute non-Hollywood-maj ors' American films and Japanese 
films. Except from a few successful cases, such as The English Patient (distributed by Era Corporation 
in 1998), they apparently cannot compete with Hollywood blockbusters and Hollywood branch offices. 
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CTV presented a domestic feature film Chang Xiang, prompting serious protest from 
major interests in the film industry (F. Lu, 1998: 148-9). 
Nevertheless, the sector most affected by television was Fulao film and the small- 
sized film companies that produced it. TTV started to present Fulao drama 
programmes and Fulao opera drama within the first three years of its establishment. 
By 1966, it was reported that the audience for Fulao film in South Taiwan had 
decreased by 30 percent (ibid.: 148). In addition with the bias of the government's 
film policies (see Chapter 7), it is not surprising that Fulao film rapidly diminished at 
the end of the 1960s. In contrast, the favourable policy treatment and lager industrial 
scale meant that the direct impact of television on Mandarin film was not so great. 
Unlike the US and Hong Kong where the film industries eventually cooperated with 
the television industry after disputes in the initial stages, the film and television 
industries in Taiwan remained separate until the appearance of cable television. 
As early as the mid-1970s, another threat - home video - appeared in the market. 
By the early 1980s, it was estimated that there were already over 8 thousand 
videotape rental stores in Taiwan (Fan, 1991). But it was only in 1985 that the 
government introduced regulations about 'rental right' into a Copyright Law which 
governed the videotape rental business. It was reported that local film companies had 
lost enormous amounts of revenue during the launch period of home video when 
pirate copies dominated the market. But it was also acknowledged that the majority of 
rented videotapes were of Hong Kong, Japanese and American films and programmes 
(Fan, 199 1; Feng, 1995). Indeed, the establishment of the Copyright Law was mainly 
a response to the immense pressure from American majors and the US state. The new 
regulations therefore ensured that the home video market became a profitable 
additional outlet for foreign as well as domestic film companies. 
All local major film distributors (including the CMPC) were also engaged in the 
videotape distribution business in the early 1990s. The tiny market share possessed by 
local companies was almost entirely accounted by sales of low-budget restricted-class 
films. However, the video boom was short-lived. The number of videotape rental 
stores decreased to 2,400 or so in the late 1980s and to 1,750 in 1994 (F. Lu, 1998: 
244; Feng, 1995: 14). Cable television rose instead and this was the most important 
change in Taiwan's media environment in the 1990s. 
As early as in the end of the 1970s, cable television services had appeared in some 
areas of Taiwan. The so-called 'the fourth channel' service (differentiated from the 
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three state/party-owned channels) rapidly grew and spread all over Taiwan. By 1985, 
there were 230 thousand households linked to cable television service and this figure 
increased to 540 thousand in 1991 and 1.5 million in 1993 (Feng, 1995: 37). On the 
other hand, there were over 2 million households had set up receiving discs to watch 
foreign satellite television programmes in 1994 (Feng, 1995: 14). After the mid- I 990s 
however, most satellite television channels have been transmitted via cable system 
and incorporated into cable television services boosting subscriptions to over 3 
million (Guang, 1997; Liu, 1997). Today, most cable television systems provide an 
average of 100 channels and include four Mandarin movie channels (mostly showing 
Hong Kong movies) and eight foreign movie channels (mostly showing American 
movies). 
Again, in the early growing stages of cable television, the film industry 
experienced considerable financial losses because of unauthorised broadcasts of films 
and from 1984 onwards, conflicts between film exhibitors and cable system operators 
were increasingly frequent. In 1991, film exhibitors claimed that the annual revenues 
of cable television business NT$ 13.2 billion, almost equaled to their estimated loss, 
although the cable system operators estimated the figure as 3.2 billion. The film 
industry even aligned with their 'old enemy', the videotape rental stores, to mount a 
protest demonstration in the same year (Feng, 1995: 13). Yet, the decisive pressure to 
force the government to legitimatise cable television came, again, not from local 
interests but from the US state and the transnational media capitals based in the US 
(also see Chapter 6). 
After the Cable Television Law was approved in 1993, major local film companies 
started to get paid for selling their products to cable operators. However, as F. Lu 
points out (1998: 377), the price of cable rights to a film was only about NT$ 600 
thousand which, in comparison with the price of videotape rights which could reach 
NT$ 3-4 million, was comparatively insignificant. Major film companies (again 
including the CMPC) also directly participated in, actually moved the majority of 
their resources to, the cable television industry. As well as opening their own movie 
channels, some of them also established more various sorts of cable television 
channels. The Era Corporation, for example, after producing and distributing some art 
films (including The City of Sadness) in the late 1980s and early 1990s, cooperated 
with Hong Kong TVB (the largest wireless television company in Hong Kong) to 
establish a comprehensive entertainment channel TVBS in 1993. Today, TVBS has a 
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total five cable television channels. However, the Era Corporation's success is an 
exception. 7. Because of the intense competition in the television market, other major 
film companies either maintained their own movie channels with great difficulty, or 
withdrew from operating channels on their own in the late 1990s. Whether they were 
successful or failed in the cable television market, simply continue to re-play films 
they already owned the broadcasting rights. Except from investments in a few film 
projects from independent film companies, which had already obtained government's 
supporting funds, major film companies have almost completely retreated from film 
production. 
In retrospect it is clear that the changing relations between the film industry and 
the new conununication businesses has followed the same basic pattern as in the US, 
with the film industry temporarily threatened by newer communication technologies 
but eventually cooperating with them (see Wasko, 1994). What makes the case of 
Taiwan different from that in the US (and other advanced capitalist societies) however, 
is that every time the film industry accommodated to a new communication 
technology its strength was whittled down substantially, rather than enhanced. 
Because of the inadequacies of film policies, the immense threats posed by 
transnational. corporations, and the sector's relatively small scale and limited 
resources', the strategies adopted by a shrinking 
film industry were more like searches 
for possible ways out a long recession rather than efforts to extend their operational 
scale. As a result, local film production never 
benefited from these changes. Instead, it 
was abandoned again and again (see figures in Chapter 6 for the decrease in local film 
production). 
8.3 A New Film Industry for a 'New China' 
When it was clear that the victory over the KMT in the civil war was inevitable in the 
late 1940s, the CCP began to take control of various goverrunental institutions, 
7 in fact, Era Corporation is not regarded as 'traditional' film company. It started its business 
distributing videotapes of Hong Kong television drama since the late 1980s. Film business was only 
one of its diversified operations. 
3 Calling Taiwan's film companies 'majors' is just a relative use. Since the 1970s, the scale of 
Taiwanese film industry gradually fell behind its Hong Kong counterpart. Let alone Hollywood 
transnational conglomerates. Take the largest film company Era Corporation as example, its capital 
value was NT$ 100 million 
in the beginning and increased to 2 billion in 1996 after it successfully 
involved in cable television industry. The scales of other major distributors are smaller. In comparison, 
when Time Warnerjust completed merger 
in 1989 that its capital value was US$ 14 billion. Viacom 
and CBS merged in the late 1990s with capital value of US$ 35 billion. 
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including the film industry. In April and October 1949, the Beijing Film Studio and 
Shanghai film Studio were established respectively. Together with the Dongbei Film 
Studio (literally 'north-east', established in 1946 and later transformed into the 
Changchun Film Studio) these became the three development centres of the new film 
industry in its early stages. The first central regulatory body for film, the Central Film 
Administrative Bureau, was also set up in April 1949. One paragraph of instructions 
the CCP sent to regional cadres in August 1949 revealed the importance of film in its 
concems: 'film art has the largest popularity and the best propaganda effects. Hence, 
we must enhance the industry for effectively promoting the propaganda of the Party 
and our new democratic revolutionary movement and development' (quoted in Cheng, 
1997b: 401). 
In line with this view the CCP constructed a huge and comprehensive national film 
system including state-owned studios and the Central Film Corporation (for national 
film distribution), local cinemas and projection teams, and a hierarchical film 
regulation system (see Chapter 7). The national film industry was constructed as a 
centrally planned industrial mechanism. The number and themes of film to be 
produced was decided by the central government. The CFC then bought films from 
studios at a fixed price and distributed film prints, also sold at a fixed price, to 
regional distribution units and arranged simultaneous film exhibition in local cinemas 
and projection teams. Although audiences bought tickets to see films, the ticket price 
was quite low (0-2 - 0.35 yuan before the mid-1980s) and in many cases the public 
was requested or ordered by their directors to see a film. In addition, the importation 
of foreign films, except films from the former Soviet bloc and other Communist 
countries, was generally prohibited and competition 
from television was also 
relatively delayed (Ni, 1994: 
41). Therefore, the whole industrialised film system was 
maintained in a self-reliant and comparatively stable condition throughout the 1950s 
and 1960s (Tarn and Dissanayake, 
1998: 4). 
From the late 1940s, the CCP's film institutions were involved mainly in making 
documentaries and newsreels and the production of documentary remained the central 
task of studios until the late 1990s (see Table 8.2). The production of feature films 
developed relative slowly not only because the skills and resources were relatively 
scarce in the 1950s, but also 
because feature films were always a matter of serious 
concern to the CCP leaders. 
As mentioned in Chapter 7, film content were a site of 
continuous political struggle. In the 
first two years of the new country film production 
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started to grow and over twenty films were produced. The CCP government even held 
a domestic film exhibition activity in March 195 1. The activity released 26 features 
films produced by state-owned studios in 21 major cities nationwide for a month and 
prompted enthusiastic public responses (Beijing Cultural Bureau, 1995). The 
production of feature films however was not swept along on this rising tide. 
Table 8.2 Changes in China's film industry (1952-2001) 
Films Produced Total Release Exhibition Units* Attendance" Documentary Produced 
'52 4 N/A N/A N/A 157 
'57 40 N/A N/A N/A 272 
'62 34 N/A N/A N/A 133 
'65 52 N/A N/A N/A 378 
'75 27 N/A N/A N/A 313 
'78 46 375 110 N/A 202 
'79 65 139 122 29.3 317 
'80 82 116 125 N/A 242 
'81 105 143 130 N/A 276 
'82 112 155 140 N/A 259 
'83 127 170 162 N/A 299 
184 144 181 178 26.9 337 
'85 127 179 182 21.7 419 
'86 134 192 172 21.8 417 
'87 146 195 163 21.3 347 
'88 158 227 162 18.7 350 
189 136 217 152 16.8 259 
990 134 199.5 145 16.1 296 
191 130 189.5 141 14.4 283 
'92 170 195 134 10.5 307 
'93 154 222 113 N/A 300 
194 148 213 109 N/A 22 
'95 146 204 94 N/A III 
196 110 174 69 N/A 39 
197 88 N/A 69 N/A 95 
198 82 N/A 69 N/A 54 
199 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
100 91 N/A N/A N/A 10 
101 88 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
* In Thousand; ** In Million. 
Sources: China Statistics Yearbook 2001; Xue, 1994; Ni, 1994; Website: www. stats. gov. cn. 
In May 195 1, Mao Zedong personally led a nationwide political criticism 
movement by attacking a 
film Wuxun Zhuan. After that film directors became 
extremely cautious and prudent. 
Film production was also continuously blown by 
changing political winds and struggles. 
In 1959, to celebrate the tenth anniversary of 
the nation, and under the promotion of the relatively liberal Zhou Enlai, film 
production enjoyed a second tide. 
The Cultural Bureau held the second domestic films 
exhibition activity which released 
35 films in major cities. Audience attendance 
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increased form 3 billion in the previous year to 4 billion (B. Chen, 2000: 11) and the 
annual output of films was estimated as 80 (Beijing Cultural Bureau, 1995: 51). Again, 
this second tide was not sustained and film production faced the most severe 
condition a few years afterwards. 
in the first half of the 1960s, the Gang of Four rose to power and political struggles 
became increasingly intense. Jiang Ching, the head of the Gang of Four, personally 
led a series of criticisms of several films and labeled them as 'Big Poisonous Plants' 
(B. Chen, 2000: 14). By 1966 the Great Cultural Revolution began and the production 
of feature films almost completely stopped for ten years (see Table 8.2). Only some 
'Standard Dramas' (Yangban Xi) were produced in plan (Beijing Cultural Bureau, 
1995: 78-82). After the havoc was over in 1976, 'the culture imprisoned for ten years 
eventually revived' and audiences were eager for new cultural experiences (Ni, 1994: 
44). Along with an increase in new productions plenty of formerly forbidden films 
were released, and by 1979, both annual attendance and average the amount of movie- 
going per person had reached historical highs of 29.3 billion and 28 (ibid. ). 
Annual feature film output started to increase after 1981 and was maintained at 
over 100 until the late 1990s (see Table 8.2). Nevertheless, while political relaxation 
brought back mass demand for film, the external conditions of film industry were also 
changing profoundly. As Ni points out, 
The public was excited and confused by the high record of cinema attendance in the 
early 1980s and thought that it signaled the reappearance of the prosperity of the film 
industry in 1950s. But they did not perceived clearly that the coming 1980s in fact 
would be an age of door-opening, international cultures exchanging, ideological 
liberation, film technologies innovating, and various audio-visual media rising. 
Thus, the task of reviving the film industry after a ten-year destruction by the Gang of 
Four was in effect unavoidably connected with the necessary reform in the film 
industry later (Ni, 1994: 44). 
8.4 Crisis and Opportunity 
The government had attempted a few slight reforms in the film system in the 1980s 
(see Chapter 7) before more substantial reform came in 1993. And the emergence of 
the Fifth Generation sent a clear signal that China's film. industry was going to enter 
into a new epoch. 
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8.4.1 The Fifth Generation and political relaxation 
The term Fifth Generation refers to a group of Chinese film directors (including Chen 
Kaige, Zhang Yimou, Tian Zhuangzhuang, Zhang Junzhao, Wu Ziniu, and Huang 
iianxing), who graduated from the Beijing Film Academy around the same time. They 
successively got chances to make their first work in state-owned studios in the early 
1980s. Their early works were consciously differentiated from previous productions 
in both form and style and were widely regarded as heralding a 'new wave' of Chinese 
cinema. As Chiao argues, the most significant revolution the Fifth Generation cinema 
presented was that it overthrew the melodrama tradition embodied in previous 
Chinese films and concentrated on exploring cinematic elements, such as colours, 
sound and editing (Chiao, 1998: 21). In terms of narrative they tended to choose the 
realist stories that inquired into and reflected on Chinese history and society. 
Eight and One (1983, directed by Zhang Junzhao, and photographed by Zhang 
yimou) was the first work of the Fifth Generation. But the film had not passed 
censorship and was not released until 1985. Consequently, Yellow Earth (1984, 
directed by Chen Kaige, photographed by Zhang Yimou) is now commonly 
considered as the debut of the Fifth Generation. The film won two Best 
Cinematography Awards, at the Nantes Film Festival (in France) and the Hawaii Film 
Festival, and attracted great international attention. In the subsequent years, Tian 
Zhuangzhuang directed On the Hunting GroundlVechang Zhasa (1985) and Horse 
ThieflDao Ma Zei (1986), Hunag Jianxing directed The Black Cannon Incident 
lHeipao Shyian (1985). They were all regarded as representative works of the Fifth 
Generation cinema. Because both the external conditions of production and the 
character of the main creators' works changed later on, Dai argues that the Fifth 
Generation cinema, as a film art movement, ended in 1987 with the output of Red 
SorghunzlHong Gaoliang (directed by Zhang Yimou) and The King of ChildrenlHaizi 
Wang (directed by Chen Kaige) (Dai 1999: 70,249). 
In interpreting the emergence of the Fifth Generation, some argue that it was 
mainly the result of political relaxation since the late 1970s. 'In this newer atmosphere 
of liberalism', Tam and Dissanayake state, 'the film industry began to show signs of 
health and vitality' (1998: 5). Others regard the Fifth Generation movement as a 
cultural / historical reflection on and response to the experiences of the Cultural 
Revolution (Dai, 1998: 52). And some others stress the fact that the major directors of 
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the Fifth Generation started their careers in relatively distant and small state-owned 
studios (Guangxi and Xian) where the ideological burden was not as heavy as in the 
larger studios (Chiao, 1998: 19). However amidst these competing explanations, the 
economic factors underpinning the emergence of the Fifth Generation are usually 
ignored. 
In fact, after a short period of prosperity in the late 1970s and the beginning of the 
1980s, the number of cinema admissions started to decline by one billion per year (Ni, 
1994: 156). Between 1979 and 1985 there was a 17 percent decrease in the number of 
screenings and a 43.5 percent decline in attendance (Berry, 1991: 115). The main 
cause of this recession could be the increase in recreation options and the spread of 
television set ownership, but whatever the truth of the matter it alarmed the studios 
that prompted them to recognise a need to reduce didacticism and search for new 
directions in production. This motive should be considered as one of significant 
factors in fostering the birth of the Fifth Generation. Once this is recognised, then 
another phenomenon, the entertainment-oriented films produced around the same time, 
can be also interpreted properly (I will come back to this issue later). 
Although many works of the Fifth Generation cinema were criticised by political 
conservatives for their realist depictions of Chinese society, economic pressure has 
been much more influential in the movement's development since the mid-1980s. 
Most of the Fifth Generation films were unsuccessful in the marketplace. A film sold 
on average 100 prints at that time, Yellow Earth sold only 30 prints and many others 
sold even less. Tian Zhuangzhuang's 
On the Hunting Ground sold only two prints and 
Horse Thief seven (Berry, 1991: 118). The poor record not only prompted the studios 
to reduce their interest in offering production opportunities it also raised public 
criticism. As Berry puts it, 'if 
failure to serve politics has become a poor position 
from which to attack the Fifth Generation or any other group of filmmakers, failure to 
serve the immediate needs of the 
broad audience clearly commanded broader support' 
(ibid.: 119). 
The first two-third of the 1980s was a period in which, for the first time, political 
and ideological controls, artistic principles, and market 
factors entered into contention 
within the field of film in China. The mutual relationships among these forces and the 
results of their interactions and vicissitudes were not 
however clear at that time. The 
Fifth Generation was born. within this temporary mix of contingent conditions. 
However, it gradually became clear that as market factors became increasingly 
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influential the domestic situation moved in a direction unfavourable to the Fifth 
Generation directors. Red Sorghum was one of the answers to this difficulty given by 
Zhang Yimou. The film achieved considerably success in domestic market (see the 
analysis of the film in Chapter 9). But, when the film won the Best Film Award at the 
Berlin Film Festival in 1988, it suggested another way out - production aimed at an 
international market. A parallel process happened to Taiwan's new directors which 
has been discussed previously. However, the prominence given to the Fifth 
Generation in western critical commentary has obscured the fact that they were not, 
but the state-owned studios, the most influenced by the new econon-dc pressures. 
8.4.2 Reform and the state-owned studios 
In 1984, the CCP government decided that the film industry should become a state 
owned enterprise, generating profits and paying taxes, rather than a state organ. This 
change made the situation of state-owned studios much worse given the continuing 
decline in cinema audiences - the annual attendance sharply fell to 5.2 billion in the 
next year (Ni, 1994: 47). Meanwhile, the Film Bureau still required the studios to 
maintain an annual output about 120. The state-owned studios therefore faced severe 
difficulties. 
Take 1991 as an example. In that year the film market rose after successive falls 
and had its highest box-office for ten years (the figure fell again after 1992). National 
box-office revenues stood at 2.36 billion yuan and the state-owned studios obtained 
179 million yuan. After deducting costs and taxes, the net profits were about 12.6 
million yuan. This figure had to support film production across sixteen studios. Given 
that the average budget for making feature films was I to 1.3 million yuan, the 
amount could only under right 10 small-medium budget films. Yet, the task the 
studios' assigned quota was 120 feature films a year (Ni, 1994: 75). Although the 
government provided special subsidies for the production of main-melody films, all 
the studios were faced with serious finance shortages. 
Another problem lay in the studios' internal organisation. To be established as 
official and comprehensive film production organisations, all state-owned studios had 
enormous staffs and paying their salaries became an increasingly heavy burden in the 
new environment. Three major studios (Beijing, Shanghai, and Changchun), for 
example, had an average over 1500 online staff and over 500 retired staffs. In 1993, 
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the personnel costs of Changchun Film Studio (CFS) was 40 thousand yuan a day 
Furthermore, many studio employees were old and did not participate in production. 
Facing these challenges, the studios introduced changes, sometimes without the 
government's instructions. First of all, all studios introduced reforms in their 
organisation and management, including implementing subcontract systems and 
downsizing personnel. Beijing (BFS) and Shanghai Film Studios (SFS), for example, 
required directors or independent producers to subcontract production and share 
profits with the studios (Ni, 1994; Xue, 1994: 105). Secondly, the studios started to 
develop diversification. BFS, for example, established Beijing Audio-Visual 
Publishing Company and studio theme park in the early 1990s. Probably because of 
bureaucratic inertia, these reforms however need more time to prove their effect. 
Thirdly, under the goverriment's promotion, major studios also tried to transform 
into conglomerates. The two most prominent cases are SFS and BFS. SFS integrated 
the Shanghai Film Company (distribution unit), some cinemas (constituting the 
Dongfang cinema chains), and television production units to transform itself into the 
Shanghai Film and Television Group Corporation in early 1996. The Corporation then 
produced 10 feature films, which was the highest output among state-owned studios, 
and 8 TV drama serials (100 episodes) in that year (Wenhui Film Times, 11/01/1997). 
In 1998, BFS was integrated into a much larger group - the China Filin Group 
Corporation. It is headed by the CFC and composed of the BFS, China Film Co- 
production Corporation, China Children's Film Studio, China Film Equipment 
Corporation, Beijing Film Processing and Recording Factory, Movie Channel (CCTV 
6), and Huayun Film and TV Laser Disc Company. The resulting organisation will be 
the largest vertically and horizontally integrated media conglomerate in China 
(Interview No. 5; Wenhui Film Times, No. 637). According to one production director 
in BFS, after the merger, BFS only had a3 million yuan production budget per year 
from the group and still has to find additional financial resources itself (Interview 
No. 8). Hence, this merger was basically a framework construction which in practice it 
has not yet demonstrated the advantages of synergy. 
In contrast with slow pace of internal reforms, the studios seemed more active in 
looking outward for financial support. Since the early 1990s, some studios have 
started to introduce investments 
from private enterprises and legal persons and these 
sources have gradually became 
increasingly crucial in production. All productions of 
SFS in 1993 and of BFS in 1995 contained some proportion of external finances (Ni, 
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1994: 81; Interview No. 8). The Beijing Film Studio, for example, produced sixty or 
so films with external investments but there were over forty investors. In August 1997, 
it obtained an investment of 20 million yuan, (which was the largest amount the 
practice allowed), from Nande Corporation. The investment was planned for 
producing three feature films and sixty episodes of TV serials (Wenhui Film Times, 
No. 616). 
Because the government still prohibited foreign capital from investing directly in 
film production in China, private investment was confined to domestic sources. But, 
for the last two years transnational capital has stepped up its efforts to enter the 
market. In 2000, the American cable television giant HBO, whose parent company is 
AOL-Time Warner, had tried to put together a co-operative venture with BFS. BFS 
recruited a dozen young directors (aged 25-35) to make low-budget films. HBO 
provided finance and would possess the television broadcasting rights of these films. 
productions could start only after the screenplays and production projects had been 
agreed both by BFS and HBO. However, the plan eventually was cancelled for 
unknown reasons at the end of the year (Interview No. 8; 12). 
Another more frequently adopted way of attracting external finance is in the form 
of co-production. To deal with the many foreign film and television companies who 
wanted to shoot programmes in China following the open-door policy, the Film 
Bureau established the China Film Co-operation Corporation (CFCC) in 1979. Before 
the mid-1980s, most cooperative projects were making documentaries. In 1986 
however, the CFCC assisted Italian and English companies to make The Last 
Emperor. The following year, American Warner Brothers and director Steven 
Spielberg came to shoot The Sun Empire. These two cases however were in fact 
associated productions, no Chinese capital, 
labour or services were involved (F. 
Zhang, 2000). Since then, cooperation with Western companies has remained rare 
while investment from Hong Kong and Taiwan 
has increased and become rather 
crucial. 
Since 1983, co-productions with Hong Kong and Taiwan (HK&T co-production) 
have accounted for the majority, and sometimes all, co-produced films. This type of 
production reached its high tide 
in the period of 1993 to 1995. During that period, 
HK&T co-production accounted for between one-third to one-fourth of the total film 
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output in China (see Table 8.3). About 80 - 90 percent of HK&T co-productions 
were commercial swordplay and kung-fu movies". Before the importation of foreign 
6major films' started in 1995 (see Chapter 6), these films generally enjoyed better 
returns than domestic productions in the market which finther stimulated the practice 
(Ni, 1994: 87-8). 
Table 8.3 The number of co-production films (1980-1998) 
Total Films Co-production HK&T Co-production Associated Production 
1980 82 2 1 N/A 
1981 105 4 2 N/A 
1982 112 1 N/A N/A 
1983 127 4 4 2 
1984 144 3 3 2 
1985 127 3 3 N/A 
1986 134 10 10 1 
1987 146 2 2 1 
1988 158 12 10 N/A 
1989 136 12 11 8 
1990 134 22 21 3 
1991 130 9 8 9 
1992 170 24 21 6 
1993 154 51 51 6 
1994 148 35 35 3 
1995 146 38 36 5 
1996 110 23 22 6 
1997 88 22 21 3 
1998 82 7 6 N/A 
Source: F. Zhang (2000); Xue (1994). 
In the HK&T co-production practice, the Participating Chinese studios normally 
offer filming equipment and settings (fixed capital) and labour and services as joint 
investment. Financial investment is minimal. Nonetheless, they can have the 
exclusive distribution right at home. Because most of these co-production films 
achieved success in the market, the practice generated significant returns for them. 
particularly after the reforms in distribution implemented since 1993, the studios 
could obtain more profit from distribution. Once upon A Time in China IIIIShi Wang 
Zheng Ba (1993), a co-production between Beijing Film Studio, Tsui Hark Film 
Studio in Hong Kong, and Longxiang Film Company in Taiwan, is the best example 
9 The amount was counted in the final output of co-production, cases. If counting by the number of co- 
production applications to the CFCC, there were total 185 applications from 1979 to 1991 and 90 in 
1992, in which HK&T co-production accounted 87 (Ni, 1994: 87). 
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, (also see Chapter 7). Because both the Taiwanese and Hong Kong film indust es k"L ri 
entered recession in the mid-1995, the amount and scale of HK&T co-production has 
gradually reduced since then (Wenhui Film Times, No. 667). Even so, as F. Zhang 
argues, they have profoundly influenced local filmmakers. They introduced the theory 
and practice of commercial film including the idea of the entertainment film, efficient 
production procedures, cost management, and marketing and promotion strategies 
(2000: 207). 
Recently, the CFCC and studios have also been actively looking for co-production 
plans with Western and Asian countries. However, such initiatives remain constrained 
by the CCP governments continuing concerns about the themes and ideology of co- 
production films (Wenhui Film Times, No. 667; 701). The Shanghai Film and 
Television Group did enter into a co-production deal with a South Korean company in 
1999. This was the first time in China that the budget was as high as 20 million yuan. 
However, the film (Fei Tian Wu) was still an ancient swordplay movie. 
8.4.3 Changes in the direction of production 
As mentioned above, before the state led the reforms in film system were introduced, 
the studios had tried to introduce their own changes in the direction of in response to 
successive falls in box-office revenues in the early 1980s". In contrast with the 
marginal studios that gave birth of the Fifth Generation, the major studios (Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Changchun) chose to make entertainment-oriented works. To this end, 
from 1980 to 1983 they released several kung-fu movies, such as The Mysterious 
BuddhalShenmi de Dafo (1980) and Wu Dang (1983), which obtained great popularity. 
After the mid-1980s, many small and medium-sized studios joined in producing 
entertainment films. Some directors commonly regarded as members of the Fifth 
Generation, such as Zhou Yjaowen, Zhang Junzhao and Li Shaohong, were also 
involved in entertainment films production. From 1987 to 1991, the proportion of the 
entertainment films, mostly kung-fu, action, and crime, 
in total films produced by 
state-owned studios increased from 20 percent to over 55 percent (Lu, quoted in Ni, 
Another significant co-production type was art film, but the investors were not limited in Hong Kong 
and Taiwan but also from 
Japan and Western countries. The issue will be further discussed later. 
" Although the substantial reform in film system started in 1993, the way of obtaining revenues of 
studios had changed 
in 1980. Originally, studios sold film to the CFC in fixed price per film. In 1980, it 
was changed to sell the film 
in the price of the amount of prints sold - the price of each print remained 
fixed. In other words, the studios had stronger incentive to produce commercialised film. 
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1994: 165). In comparison with the Fifth Generation art films which normally sold less 
than 30 prints, the top ten box-office entertainment film generated over 200 prints 
(ibid. ). 
Entertainment film not only won popularity among audiences, it also obtained 
support from film critics. The leading film theory journal Contemporary Film 
IDangdai Dianying produced a series of special issues on entertainment film in 1987. 
It also convened a conference on entertainment film the following year. The vice 
minister of the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television (MRFT) at that time, Chen 
Haosu, attended the conference and stressed the importance of film's entertainment 
value. Interestingly, about the same time, the CCP also instructed filin authorities to 
improve and increase the production of 'main-melody' films. 
The government's support for entertaining cinema was, as always, tempered by 
political considerations however. In 1985, the Film Bureau required studios to limit 
the proportion of kung-fu and crime films to under one-seventh of their total output 
and to produce more films reflecting the achievements of the Reform (Ni, 1994: 120). 
After the 1989 Tian'anmen Square Incident, ideological control tightened again. The 
theory and practice of commercial entertainment film was repressed and Chen Haosu 
was transferred away from the MRFT (Xue, 1994: 62-3). 
There were many big-budget 'main-melody' films produced between 1989 (the 
fortieth anniversary of nation) and 1991 (the seventieth anniversary of the Party), 
particularly films depicting the history of nation-building, such as Kai Guo Da Dian 
(1989, cost 6.9 million yuan), Da Jue Zhan (1991), and Kai Tian Pi Di (1991). In 
1991, the government launched a Special Fund for supporting the production of 
'inain-melody' film and devoted considerable effort to promoting these films (see 
Chapter 7). However, these efforts could not alter the increasingly unpopularity of 
, main-melody' film in a commercialising market. Some local exhibitors began to 
complain about the official promotion of 'main-melody' films since the early 1990s, 
arguing that a film that had no economic effectiveness had no social effectiveness, 
too, (Ni, 1994: 141). As Berry noted in 1991, the unpopularity of main-melody films 
was already an open secret in China. Once the government did not give instructions, 
main-melody film usually sold less than 30 prints, the same as some art films (Berry, 
1991: 122). 
Today, the CCP leaders still emphasise the importance of main-melody films 
whenever they speak about film. Yet, entertainment film has profoundly changed and 
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effectively shaken the official definition of film. The guideline of 'three-characters-in- 
one' (the ideological, the artistic, and the entertaining, see Chapter 7) illustrates that 
the government has compromised and acknowledged the significance of entertaining 
character in film. If the state-owned studios still had to produce an instructed amount 
of main-melody' films because of their special position, some private or semi-private 
/ semi-official film companies which have risen since the mid-1990s have become the 
centre of entertainment film production without constraints. 
8.4.4 The rise of 'private'film companies 
Since the mid-1980s, private film companies have appeared in China, most 
established by directors and their investors. Before the 1993 reform in the film system, 
these companies were engaged in film production but because the film production 
franchise was not open yet, they had to cooperate with state/owned studios. In most 
cases, the studios sold part of their quota to independent production Companies. For 
the studios, the practice in effect resolved both their financial shortage and their duty 
in Production. 
One of the most prominent examples is director Zhang Gang's Nanchang Film and 
Television Institute. The company was established in 1985. By 1993, it completed 17 
filins and sold an average of 120 prints per film. The company also cooperated with 
the Fujian Film Studio to produce TV serials such as Liao Zhai (60 episodes). The 
Fourth Generation director Teng Wenji opened the Genesis Film and Television 
Company in 1993 (Ni, 1994: 102). His company produced the action movie 
Hurricane ActionlAfong Xingdong (1986) which sold 370 prints and became the 
bestseller in that year (Chiao, 1998: 214). 
Since the 1993 reform, hundreds of private film and television companies have 
registered without proper regulation. Most are small-sized and engaged in making 
television programmes, commercials, and MTV video productions (Dai, 1998: 430; 
Wenhui Film Times, No. 707). Nonetheless, there are a few companies among those 
that appeared in the late 1990s that have larger capital and have gradually come to 
play an important role in the industry. They do not produce film by themselves and 
mainly function as distributors who invest in domestic independent production 
companies making films that are expected to be profitable. The Huayi Film and 
Television Entertainment Corporation in Beijing, for example, obtained the domestic 
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distribution rights to Zhang Yimou's Keep Cool/You Rua Haohao Shuo (1997, see the 
analysis of the film in Chapter 10) and the action movie Mai Fu (1998) and achieved 
great success. It also invested in the 'greeting movie' Sorry BabylMei Wan Mei Liao 
(2000, Zijincheng Film Corporation's third greeting movie, see below), Ang Lee's 
Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (2000), and Jiang Wen's Guizi Lai Le (2000) 
(Wenhui Film Times, No. 720; 734). In comparison with the small-scale investments 
of the early 1990s (see Section 8.5.2), today's investors are more capitalised. 
Furthermore, they prefer to invest in private film production companies who are more 
flexible and competitive in market rather than state-owned studios. 
For the state-owned studios and distribution companies, it seemed that they could 
not wait to join and compete with their private counterparts in the increasingly open 
market. Directly after the No. 3 Document was released, the Shanghai Film 
Distribution Company transformed its governmental identification into a stock 
enterprise with funds from its staff and private capitals in March 1993. In the early 
stages, the newly formed Shanghai Paradise Corporation was still engaged in the 
distribution business. The company directly dealt with Beijing Film Studio to 
distribute its co-production film Once Upon a Time in China Iff and acNeved great 
success (also see Chapter 7). That was the first regional distribution unit to release 
film without the mediation of the CFC. The company then started its business 
expansion including signing up its exclusive cinema chain, investing in film 
production, producing TV drarna programmes, and launching tourist business and 
other diversified businesses. By 1996, it had completed vertical and horizontal 
integration and transformed itself into the media conglomerate the Shanghai Paradise 
Film and Television Group Corporation (SPC) (Interview No. 22). 
Once the Film Bureau released film production franchises in 1997 (see Chapter 7), 
the SPC was immediately engaged in feature film production. It produced its first film 
The Soul OfSeal Hai Zhi Hun in 1998 and completed 10 films in the subsequent year. 
with the addition of 17 TV serials (324 episodes), it had the largest film and 
television production output among all film companies in 1999 (Wenhui Film Times, 
No. 726). The Soul of Sea became the fourth largest domestic box-office hit in 1998 
and another big-budget production The Legend of Yellow RiverlHuanghe Jue Lian (is 
analysed in Chapter 9) was ranked fifth in 1999. The market success of SPC products 
is underpinned by its control of Shanghai's cinemas (Shanghai is the largest market in 
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China). It has contracts with over sixty cinemas (90 percent of all cinemas in 
Shanghai City) and has an 85 percent market share (Interview No. 22). 
Another eminent example of a quasi-private film company is the Beijing 
Forbidden City (Zijincheng) Film Corporation (ZFC). It was established at the end of 
1996 with participation from four state organisations, Beijing Television Station, 
Beijing Television Art Centre, Beijing Film Company (city distribution unit), and 
Beijing Cultural, Art, and Audio-Visual Publications. The corporation contains 
sectors covering film and television programme production and film distribution. It 
also has a contracted cinema chain in Beijing City. In comparison with SPC, its 
operation is basically confined to audio-visual related businesses (Interview No. 17). 
However, the box-office record of ZFC is better than SPC. 
in 1997, ZFC released its first product (in cooperation with Beijing Youth Film 
Studio), The Day I Left LeifenglLi Kai Leffieng de Rizi. Ile film generated revenues of 
5.9 million yuan in Beijing and net profits of 4 million yuan in the national market 
(China Film Yearbook, 1998/1999: 33). ZFC subsequently produced three more films 
and all achieved market success. The comedy Seller and BuyerlXafang Yffiang was 
the first commercial production to particularly target the film market during the 
Chinese New Year holiday (and has been dubbed a 'greeting movie). It became the 
second largest domestic box-office hit of the year (the first was the 'main-melody' 
docudrama Zhou Enlai de Wayiao Fengyun). The cost of the film was 6 million yuan 
and net profit was 8 million yuan 
(Dai, 1998: 439). A Time to RememberlHongse 
Lianren was a big-budget (23 -30 million yuan), big-cast (with Hong Kong film star 
Leslie Cheung in the main role), and big-promotion (immense advertisements were 
everywhere in Beijing City) 'Chinese 
blockbuster' film. The film had 6 million yuan 
receipts and achieved third place 
in the domestic top ten box-office list but finally 
made a loss because of its high costs. 
The third film Beiqi Baba Shangxue was a 
family melodrama and reached the seventh place on the list. 
There are two aspects of significance in the cases of SPC and ZFC. The first is in 
their operational pattern. Both cases were the result of state organisations trying 
rapidly and effectively to avoid official and 
bureaucratic constraints and freely 
participate in market competition. 
Their internal Organisation is no different from a 
purely private enterprise. However, they 
have some advantages that private 
companies do not have, such as the control of cinemas and governmental assistance in 
promotion. As Dai argues, although the 
Reform in the film industry claimed to 
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introduce competition in a free market, ZFC (and SPC as well) demonstrate the 
competitive advantages of 'collaborating political powers transforming into 
corporation capitals' (1998: 431). 
The second is in the direction of production. The two companies were pioneers in 
two important types of production. The first is the pure commercial entertainment 
film, particularly the 'greeting movie'. During subsequent New Year holidays, after 
the success of Seller and Buyer, there were a total of seven greeting movies released 
nationally, including ZFC's second greeting movie, Be There, or Be Square (the 
bestseller of that year). The second is the mixture of main-melody film and 
entertainment film. ZFC's The Day I Left Leileng and A Time to Remember and SPC's 
The Legend of Yelloiv River were all labeled as key 'main-melody' films and highly 
praised by the government. Their stories are all about revolutionary themes (popular 
hero of the Party, the history of the CCP revolution, and the anti-Japan war) and their 
ideologies are clearly politically correct. However, their narratives and forms are 
entertaining and popular and their marketing operations were completely commercial. 
This tendency can be described as the 'entertainisation' of main-melody film or the 
(main-melodisation' of entertainment film (Dcng, 2000). The practice perfectly fits 
the two companies' semi-official nature. Indeed, the constitution of this sort of 
company was based, from the outset, on sharing 'ideology, market, capital, and 
interest' between government and private sectors (Dai, 1998: 432). 
8.4.5 New media: Another way out? 
No matter how the state-owned and private film companies struggle and compete in 
the increasingly open market, they cannot change a fact that China's film industry is 
in recession. In production, it was estimated that there were only 38 films completing 
re istration and censor procedures in 1998 (Dai, 1998) -although the government's 9 
data shows 82 (China Statistic Yearbook 2001: 717) 12 . In exhibition, although there is 
a lack of official data, informed estimates suggest that the annual attendance has 
declined on average by I to 2 billion per year. Admissions in 1992 were estimated at 
10.5 billion (Ni, 1994: 50). This figure increased in 1995 because of the importation 
11 When I interviewed with one official in Film Bureau in March 2000,1 got the same answer. The 
official also told me that the output in 1999 was increased to 102. Strangely, in 2001 China Statistics 
Yearbook, the data of 1999 output is not shown while 2000 output is 91 (p. 717). Ile lack of data only 
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of 'major films' but decreased again in subsequent years. The fall of attendance was 2 
billion in 1997,1.5 billion in 1998, and 0.7 - 0.8 billion in 1999 (Interview No. 17). 
As in many other countries, these falls are partly attributable to the rise of newer 
media, particular television and home video in China. 
The development of television in China was comparatively late probably because 
of the Cultural Revolution. But its growth now is extremely fast. The number of 
colour television sets owned per 100 urban households in 1985 was 17.21 and 0.80 in 
rural area (the figure for black and white TV set was 10.94). The figures grew to 
116.56 and 48.74 (B&W TV set 52.97) respectively in 2000 (China Statistics 
Yearbook 2001: 308; 330). Television reached 68.4 percent of the population in 1985 
and increased to 93.7 percent in 2000 (ibid.; 303). In 1993, there were 8 million home 
video players in mainland China a figure that kept increasing by I million every year 
(Ni, 1994: 223). In 2000,37 percent of urban households had videodisc (VCD) 
player -a more advanced form of equipment to watch visual products (China 
Statistics Yearbook 2001: 308). Enormous numbers of small video playing houses, 
equipped with videotape or VCD players and small screens, appeared in cities and 
towns. Some cinemas also set up their own video playing houses to compete. In 1993, 
there were about 100 thousand video showing houses nationwide (Ni, 1994: 223). 
Overall the growth of these newer media has not helped the declining film industry 
in China. The result so far is similar to Taiwan (discussed above), but it is the 
outcome of a different story. In the early stages of television, the exclusive owner of 
film distribution rights, the CFC, had to provide film to television station for 
broadcasting without charge. The broadcast screenings of many filins were even 
earlier than their premieres in cinemas. In 1979, recognising that the film industry had 
been transformed into an enterprise rather than a state organisation, the CFC decided 
to change the supply of film to China Central Television (CCTV) into a transaction 
rather than obligation (Ni, 1994: 213-5). Yet, as in other countries, television 
developed its own forms of programming and gradually replaced cinema as the most 
important source of popular visual information and entertainment. Consequently, 
although CCTV still screens film programmes, the film industry no longer obtains 
significant returns from this source. This is true even of the one dedicated film 
channel. 
appears before the late 1970s in the table. The truth is unknown. But the recession of Chinese film 
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In January 1996, the CCTV established its sixth channel, the Film Channel. This 
first and the only professional film channel in China provides eight films a day and 
two-third of showing time is reserved for domestic products. The channel started to 
make profits in 1999 and its viewing rating is now in second place among the eight 
CCTV channels (Interview No. 3). Because of the accelerating marketisation of film 
market, the Film Channel has become an important alternative outlet for domestic 
films. In 2000, two small-budget films, Nashan, Naren, Nago and An Ju, gave up the 
chance of cinema distribution and chose to have their premieres on the Film Channel. 
The prices were confidential but apparently were no higher than the standard price 
paid by the CFC before the 1993 film reform (900 thousand yuan). In fact, the 
Channel's average cost for purchasing domestic films is 200 - 300 thousand yuan 
(interview No. 17; 3). Hence, the Film Channel is more like the growing television 
industry that exploits the residual values of film rather than rescuing for a declining 
film industry. 
Video and laser disc technologies also did not give significant help to film industry. 
The first problem was piracy. The licensing, production, distribution and retailing of 
video products has been a relatively anarchic area since its appearance in China. In 
many cities, over 90 percent of the goods on the open shelves in normal audio-visual 
product shops are pirated - they usually look the same as the legitimate version. 
Because pirated versions are easily available, the price of VCD rights to domestic 
films is only about 200 thousand yuan or lower. Nevertheless, the majority (over 90 
percent) of available VCDs and of programmes shown in video playing houses are not 
domestic but imported products, particular Hong Kong and Hollywood films (Ni, 
1994: 226) 13 . In 
fact, tickets to enter video playing houses were two to four times 
higher cinema ticket in the early 1990s. The reason why people still flooded into these 
places was that they could see imported films which would not be shown in cinemas. 
Most of these are commercial entertainment films. As Ni points out, unlike what 
happened in Western countries, when Chinese audiences chose video products they 
were not merely choosing a different media but also different film contents (ibid.: 
228). Consequently, the spread of video products is gradually transforming the 
industry is for sure. 
13 In my own experiences, in fact, it is very difficult to find the VCDs of many domestic films in the 
shops in major cities, no matter 
legal or pirated. To be sure, for businessmen, the economic 
effectiveness of issuing VCDs of most of 
domestic films is too little to even do it. 
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audience's viewing taste and squeezing, rather than expanding, the available market 
for domestic film. 
The latest development of newer media is in cable television. It was estimated that 
there were 15 million households subscribing to cable television service in 1993 (Liu, 
1994). The figure has been increasing rapidly and reached 88 million in 200 114. 
However, as with the Film Channel, cable television is still owned and run by local 
governments and seems not to give significant help to domestic film industry. Also, 
because the television industry remains controlled by the state, capital from the film 
industry is unlikely to move out into this newly developing area (as it did in Taiwan). 
On the other hand, because the television industry remains closed to foreign capital 
and imported products are still restricted, it still has immense potential to lead the 
development of the Chinese audio-visual industries in the global context. This 
transition however needs to be closely observed. 
8.4.6 The dialectic of global and local 
As mentioned in Section 8.4.1, the Fifth Generation directors gradually looked 
beyond mainland China for financial support after the late 1980s. Taiwanese and 
Hong Kong capitals filled the financial gap in the early 1990s. Taiwan's Era 
Corporation backed Zhang Yimou to produce Raise the Red LanternlDa Hong 
Denglong Gaogao Gua (1991) and To LivelHuozhe (1994). Another Taiwanese 
company Tangchen Corporation invested in Chen Kaige to make Farewell My 
ConcubinelBawang Bieji (1993) and Temptress MoonlFeng Yue (1995). While Tian 
Zhuangzhuang obtained Hong Kong Changwei's investment to produce The Blue 
KitelLan Fengzheng (1993). In addition, Li Shouhong, Huang Jianxing, Zhou 
Yjaowen, Jiang Wen also had investments from Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
The motive behind this search for overseas financial aid was the same as the state- 
owned and private companies around the same time. Their common difficulty was a 
shortage of finance. The key difference was that while overseas companies invested in 
these art film creators mainly in order to target international art film markets, other 
investments were directed at the domestic markets of Taiwan and Hong Kong. From 
the perspective of the investors, the two investment strategies produced two distinct 
products for two different markets. 
14 Website: www. stats. gov. cn. 
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Zhang Yimou and Chen Kaige were the most 'internationalised' among the Fifth 
Generation directors. They also received investments from other countries and won 
the most international film prizes. Zhang Yimou's Judou (1990) and The Story of 
QiujulQiuju Da Guansi (1992) had investments from Japanese companies and 
Shanghai TriadlTao a yao, Yao Dao Waipoqiao (1995) was funded by a French film 
company UGC. Chen Kaige's Life on a StringlBianzou Bianchang (1991) had 
investments from the UK, Germany, Japan, Italy, and the Netherlands. A Japanese 
company also invested in his Xngke 0 Qinwang (1998). Qiuju and Farewell 
respectively, won the Best Film Awards in Venice and in Cannes. Judou, Raise, and 
Farewell were each nominated for the Best Foreign Film at the Academy Awards and 
all obtained great box-office revenues in Western markets. Accordingly, one author 
has dubbed the films of Zhang and Chen in the 1990s, 'transnational Chinese cinema' 
(e. g. S. H. Lu, 1997). 
Furthermore, many authors (mostly Chinese critics in mainland China, Taiwan and 
overseas) argue that because this reliance on transnational capital Zhang and Chen's 
late works 'are not made for the self-reflexive gaze of the Chinese but for the 
spectatorshiP of the other, the West' (S. H. Lu, 1997: 126). For example, in Raise the 
Red Lantern, Zhang Yimou created 'pseudo-folklore' elements such as lantern-raising 
and feet-tapping for the sole purpose of offering the Western viewers a chance to 
, gaze' at an exotic 'China' (ibid.; 128). The results have been widely criticised as 'a 
cross-cultural commodity fetishism' and 'an Oriental's orientalism' (Chow, 1995: 
170-71) which serve to reinforce the static images and wom stereotypes of 
Orientalism rather than deconstructs them (Liao, 1993; see also Dai, 1998)". 
This argument however needs Ruther examination. Firstly, to some extent, support 
from transnational capital did steer films towards a Western Orientalist expressions, 
particularly in the case of several works produced in the first half of the 1990s after 
Red Sorghum won the Golden Bear. Yet contemporary Chinese art films actually 
varied considerably in both style and theme. Take Zhang Yimou as an example. After 
15 The argument was further enhanced by the transformation of Chen Kaige's creations. His The King 
ofChildren, which maintained his exploration on Chinese history and society, was failed in the 
competition at Cannes Film Festival. By contrast, Zhang Yimou's Red Sorghum won the Best Film 
Award in Berlin. Many critics believe that the contrary results inspired Chen as well as the entire 
Chinese film industry very much (Dai, 1998; S. H. Lu, 1997). Chen changed his filming style 
substantially in Farewell My Concubine with more spectacular 'Chinese' characters (Peiking Opera, 
the Cultural Revolution) and commercial factors (stars, sensational episodes) and eventually, won his 
first top prize at where he failed before - the Palme d'Or at Cannes. 
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Judou and Raise, the two films criticised most often for 'culturally selling out', he 
made Qiuju and To Live, both of which are much closer to a social realist style. Qiuju 
is about a village woman who persistently appeals to local government officials 
asking for compensation for her injured husband. Zhang uses many documentary 
devices in the film. To Live traces a family's story during the Cultural Revolution and 
is also in a realist style. Zhang's 1998 work Shanghai Triad marked a return to 
spectacular expressionism (Chiao, 1998: 25). But his two latest films Not one 
Lesslylge Dou Buneng Shao (1999) and The Road HomelWuo de Fuqin Muqin (1999) 
have returned to stories set in rural China and are realist in style again. Therefore, to 
argue that art films represent a 'cultural sellout' because they are based on 
transnational capital is too simplistic. Rather, it is more accurate to say that 
international financial support, or the 'internationalised production of art films', has 
enabled Zhang and Chen to produce films more freely, though it has also brought new 
constraints. 
Secondly, the assumption that all their works have been unpopular domestically 
(e. g. S. H. Lu, 1997: 128) is not completely correct. This stricture certainly appears to 
fit Chen Kaige. Since Yellow Earth sold merely 30 prints, his works have successively 
failed in the domestic market and even his more commercialised productions, 
Temptress Moon and Jingke, have not proved popular in mainland China (Farewell 
being probably the only exception). Many critics attribute this market failure to 
Chen's strong artistic intellectual missionary personality and to the contradiction 
between this personality and commercial requirements (e. g. Chiao, 1998; Dai, 1998; 
Chow, 1995: 160-3). In contrast, Zhang Yimou seems to be popular in both the 
international and domestic market. Since Red Sorghum achieved great market success, 
none of the 14 films directed by him has made a loss in the domestic market and his 
last three films, Keep CoollYou Hua Haohao Shuo (1996), Not, and The Road have all 
entered the domestic top ten box-office list. For this achievement, the exhibitor's 
association in Beijing even gave him a Film Market Award in 1999 (Wenhui Film 
Times, No. 734). 
There are two possible explanations for this market difference between the two 
men. The first lies with their individual characters. Chen Kaige is indeed more like a 
traditional high intellectual. He obviously paid more attention to realising his artistic 
ideal and intellectual mission when he enjoyed the greater degrees of freedom offered 
by transnational capital. He therefore unintentionally kept at a distance from the 
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domestic audience. In this regard, his case is closer to Taiwan's Edward Yang and 
Hou Hsiaohsian rather than to Zhang. In contrast, Zhang is more flexible and more 
skillful in telling stories to ordinary people. 'I don't think we should speak something 
great and deep through screen', he said after he completed Red Sorghum, 'I do want 
to say something, but we should make it easy to be received' (quoted in Chiao, 1998: 
48). However, there are also Taiwanese directors who have wanted to communicate 
with local audiences and make a profit in the domestic market at the same time. But 
they failed. Why? This is clearly beyond individual explanation. 
The key point is the different conditions prevailing in the two domestic markets. In 
China, although Hollywood films have been shown since 1995 and have recently 
achieved an almost two-third market share, the state still insists on maintaining a basic 
exhibition space for domestic production. As mentioned in Chapter 7, the regulation 
assigning two-third of screen time for domestic film is more honoured in theory than 
in practice. Even so, it has given some space for the domestic industry to breathe. This 
is particularly true in comparison with the situation in Taiwan. For example, the CFC 
Group (after its transformation into a state-owned enterprise, see above) bought the 
domestic distribution rights to Zhang Yimou's Not One Less for 11.8 million yuan. It 
motivated its national cinema chain to release the film in April and had obtained box- 
office receipts over 30 million yuan by November (Wenhui Film Times, No. 734). In 
contrast, any Taiwanese director who wants to release a film, no matter whether is it 
better than Zhang's works, can never obtain that sort of opportunity from the 
relatively unregulated distributors and exhibitors. 
8.5 Market, State and the Film Industry 
In the first place, Taiwan's film industry represented a negative combination of state 
control and market operation. It was not only politically conservative but also lacking 
a solid industrial bases. When the power of the state gradually began to retreat from 
cultural spaces, including film, from the 1980s, local and international capital rapidly 
took over and announced that the industry was going to, and should, die. Although the 
state has tried to intervene in some ways, the results have been disappointing and 
ineffectual. There have been some 'sparks'-Taiwanese New Cinema -created by the 
temporary collisions between different social factors, but they could not invite lasting 
flames on the island before they were absorbed by international powers. 
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In China, market forces entered at a much faster speed and brought much disorder 
and change to the film industry. However, China has some advantages. First, the huge 
film industry has a strong infrastructure and high productivity. Second, international 
companies have not yet dominated many sectors of the industry. And last but not least, 
the state still has most relevant matters, particularly in film production, distribution, 
and newer media, under its control. Hence, although the power of capital has become 
increasingly influential, the industry still has opportunities to transform in its own 
way and is now at a turning point. 
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Chapter 9 Film Analysis: Re-imagining 
the Nation 
The analysis presented here aims to explore continuities and shifts in representations 
of national culture and national identity by examining the texts of selected recent 
films paying due attention to the contexts within which they have been produced 
These contexts operate at three levels which have been investigated in previous 
chapters: 
(1) Level I The macro contexts generated by the dYnamics of global and local 
political, economic, and culftu-al trunsitions; 
(2) Level 2The local contexts created by state interventions in cinema, particularly 
the alterations to national film policy in response to the changing domestic and 
foreign conditions of film production; 
(3) Level 3 The local contexts produced by the changes in the organisation. and 
practice of local film industries in response to shifts in film markets and film 
policy. 
The textual analysis is organised around four major and interconnected issues: 
(1) The (re-) identification of nation; 
(2) The memory of colonial powers and imperialist wars; 
(3) Constructions of tradition vs. modernity; 
(4) Contemporary visions of local societies. 
The analyses dealing with these first two issues is presented in this chapter whilst 
Chapter 10 takes up the last two themes. 
For each theme two films have been selected, one from Taiwan and one from 
China. They have been chosen to provide a cross section of movies that either 
achieved a positive critical reception as 'art house' production or performed strongly 
at the box-office or which represent specific trends in film production practice or film 
content. The close reading of the selected films is organised into three parts. The first 
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introduces the production contexts of the film. The second provides a plot summary. 
The last develops a thematic analysis of the film and explores its deployment of 
representations and film languages. 
9.1 The (Re-) identification of Nation 
Since the late 1970s, the CCP government in China has been pursuing a series 
policies of marketisation and internationalisation, known as the 'reform and open' 
policy. As a consequnce it has abandoned its former thirty year closure to the outside 
world and become progressively incorporated into the global economic and political 
system Taiwan, in contrast, had been actively participating in the world economic 
system since the 1960s, but again, policies of liberalisation and internationalisation 
pursued by the state since the 1980's has further incorporated it into the global system. 
As both of China and Taiwan have become influenced by international economic and 
political shifts so various movements to redefine the nature of both nations have been 
gathering momentum. 
in addition, the problem of political uniflcation/independence across the Taiwan 
Straits has become increasingly salient in the 1990s due to two changes. First, Hong 
Kong and Macau have been returned to China in 1997 and 1999 respectively. For the 
Chinese state, Taiwan is now the last 'separated territory' left to be 'liberated'. This 
task is central to the project of constructing a powerful and unified China to compete 
with other major countries in the global arena. Second, and partly in response to these 
developments, Taiwanese nationalism and the Taiwan independence movement 
became stronger after the 1980s. As a consequence debates around the problem of 
unification/ independence and national 
identity have become both more intense and 
more complicated in both Taiwan than 
in China. 
Coincidentally, or consequentially, two key films produced respectively in 
mainland China and Taiwan 
in the late 1980s, both directed by key figures in New 
Cinemas, and both winning top awards in major international film festivals, address 
the reconstruction of nation. 
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Red Sorghum: The Reconstruction of Nation Mythology 
introduction 
Zhang Yimou is commonly regarded as the centre figure in the 'Fifth Generation' of 
contemporary Chinese cinema. He was the cinematographer on the first major work 
this movement One and Eight (1983), and on the following two films, Yellow Earth 
(1984) and The Big Parade (1985). His cinematography made a major contribution to 
the formation of the distinctive aesthetic style of the Fifth Generation cinema. In 1987, 
he directed his first film Red Sorghum at the Xian Film Studio (see Chapter 8). 
Red Sorghum created two records at that time. It won the Golden Bear at the Berlin 
Film Festival, the highest award in an international film festival that a Chinese film 
had ever obtained. The next year the Taiwanese film City ofSadness won the Golden 
Lion in Venice. Secondly, it was the first Fifth Generation film to be a box-office hit 
in the domestic market following the commercial failure of previous productions. 
VAiile the precise figures for box-office revenues are not available, Zhang has claimed 
that cinemas showing the film in its first round release in major cities achieved one 
hundred percent occupation. Another indicator of its success was that ticket prices on 
black market were ten times the normal amount (Chiao, 1998: 53). Berry also notes 
that the legitimate tickets for Red Sorghum in Beijing sold at 60 to 70 cents, well 
above the average urban price of 20 or 30 cents (Berry, 1991: 123). 
In contrast with the triumph of Zhang Yimou and Red Sorghum in Berlin, The King 
of Children and its director Chen Kaige (another representative director of the Fifth 
Generation) failed at the Cannes Film Festival. Chinese film critic Dai Jinghua argues 
that contrasting fortunes of these two films in European film festivals was a revelation 
for contemporary Chinese filmniakers. They told people that for Chinese film to 
travel successfully 'it has to present otherness, alternatives, and exotic "Oriental" 
spectaculars' (Dai, 1998: 227). Another Chinese author Yi Hong also points out that 
whereas the popularity of Red Sorghum in international film markets was coincidental 
and unplanned, the intemational-oriented strategy of some later art films became 
active and conscious (Yi, 1999). Although as we saw in Chapter 8 the 
internationalised production of art films is more complicated than this Red Sorghum is 
undoubtably the 'unconscious' pioneer. 
It is because of its significance both nationally and internationally that the film is 
worth reading again. 
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Plot synopsis 
The film starts with the voice of 'the narrator recounting the legend of his 
grandparents in the rural area of northern China around the 1920s. A young girl Jiu'er, 
described as 'my grandma', has just been arranged by her poor father to marry a fifty 
something leprous distillery owner Li Datou (literally 'big head' Li) in exchange for a 
mule. Some sedan bearers and wedding orchestra men come to pick up the bride on 
the wedding day. All of them are workers in the distillery except for one hired 
professional sedan bearer, who becomes 'my grandpa' later, who leads the wedding 
procession. On the way to the distant and isolated distillery, a masked bandit emerges 
from a wild sorghum field and tries to rob and rape Jiu'er. Responding to the look of 
panic in Jiu'er's eyes, 'my grandpa' beats off the bandit with the help of the other 
sedan bearers and becomes a hero in Jiu'er's mind. 
Jiu'er resists consummation on her wedding night and returns to her father's home 
the next day, according to the local custom. On her way back to the distillery three 
days later, the sedan bearer catches her into the depth of wild sorghum field. When 
she discover that it is the sedan bearer kidnapping her, she allows herself to be taken 
by him without resistance (so that the act becomes more like making love). 
During Jiu'er's stay at her father's home, Li Datou has been mysteriously murdered. 
The narrator guesses that the sedan bearer, his grandpa is the murderer. Jiu'er 
becomes the owner of the distillery and persuades the head of workers, Brother 
Luohan, and the other workers to stay on and help her to run the plant. One day the 
seriously drunk sedan bearer comes and claims Jiu'er as 'his woman'. He is beaten 
and thrown into a wine vat by the workers. Meanwhile, the local gangster, Tu Sanpou 
kidnaps Jiu'er and asks for 3,000 pieces of silver coins as ransom. The sedan bearer 
goes to seek revenge and to find out that 'his woman' was not raped by Tu. He then 
reappears at the distillery moving huge vats of new brewed wine and pisses into them 
in front of workers to demonstrate his strength. He claims Jiu'er again without 
objections this time. The wine magically becomes better than ever before due to the 
addition of the secret ingredient, urine. 'My grandpa' becomes the distillery owner 
legitimately while Brother Luohan leaves. 
Nine years pass and the location of distillery becomes a prosperous market and 'my 
father', Dokuang, is nine years old. Japanese troops come to the village. They round- 
up the village people and drive a bulldozer through the sorghum field to construct a 
road for military purposes. One day the Japanese force the villagers to witness two 
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local people being cruelly whipped as a warning against anti-Japanese activities. One 
of them is the local gangster Tu Sanpou. The other is Brother Luohan who has 
become a Communist and organised local guerrillas to fight the Japanese occupying 
troops. The grieved and indignant Jiu'er and the distillery workers decide to revenge 
Brother Luohan by anibushing a Japanese truck. They fight bravely and bum the truck, 
but most of them are killed and Jiu'er is shot dead by machine gun. 'My grandpa' and 
(, my father' are the only survivors. 
The vitality of the people 
The rural people depicted in the film are vigorous, optimistic, magnanimous, and 
fervent, although they may also look vulgar, rude, dissolute and even indulgent. They 
represent the vitality of ordinary people and its various manifestations are celebrated 
and eulogised in the film. The first aspect of popular vitality expressed in the film is 
pleasure. People in the film follow their desires and look for pleasure, sex, drinking, 
singing and dancing, freely and easily. This spirit is expressed with particular force in 
the pivotal scene of Jiu'er and the sedan bearer making love in the wild sorghum field 
(see Figures 9.1). 
This six-minute-and-six-second-long sequence starts with Jiuler and her father on 
their way home and the father-the representative of the old order-advising her that 
she must go back to her husband's home and never resist him again. She gets annoyed 
and whips her mule and ends up far ahead of her father-a preparation for the chance 
for the sedan bearer to kidnap her and metaphorically, for her to escape from the 
constraints of the old order. Then the ritual-like scene of making love in the wild field 
begins. When she recognizes her seducer as the sedan bearer, Jiu'er allows him to 
carry her in his arm into the depths of the wild sorghum field. The drumbeat on the 
soundtrack is quickening. The sedan bearer tramples down wild sorghum to make a 
flat circle on the ground-like an altar. Jiu'er closes her eyes and lies down 
slowly Mer face is held in a large close up which then switches to a high angle long 
shot, Jiu'er opens her arms and lies down in the center of the altar. When the sedan 
bearer gets down on his knees in front of her we hear the sharp sound of Chinese 
clarinets blowing, the traditional signal for the start of a festive rite. The scene then 
changes to a series of shots of swaying sorghum moving from close up to medium 
shot and to long shot. The festive music continues playing but the camera doesn't 
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Figures 9.1 Creating a new nation: the ritual-like making love sequence in Red Sorghum 
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return to the two main characters until Jiu'er reappears to ride the mule on the trail 
again. The music fades away. The sequence ends with the sedan bearer singing a 
vulgar love song inside the sorghum field and a close up shot of Jiu'er smiling on the 
mule. 
Another key sequence of pleasure and celebration appears after the old boss of the 
distillery, Li Datou-the representative of another old order and set of conventions 
(who is never shown in the film), dies. Jiu'er takes over the distillery and persuades 
all the workers to stay. They start to clean the whole area and all the buildings-to 
completely purge the 'bad' things left by the dead boss. It is hard work but is also 
presented as a festivity. Jiu'er and the workers are laughing, frolicking, and playing 
with each other. The materials they use to disinfect the area, red sorghum wine and 
red burning fire, also help to create festive atmosphere. 
The second major aspect of popular vitality the film wants to express is 
transgression. In the wedding sequence, although the over-voice of an elder woman 
warns Jiu'er that if the veil is taken then something bad will happen, she pulls down 
the veil anyway to show her anger about marrying a sick old man. She even brings a 
pair of scissors in case she will need to defend herself. To resist an arranged 
marriage-the symbol of the old social and conventional order-places her with the 
local people who are seen by their 'betters' only in negative terms, as immoral, 
unconventional and dissolute. 
However, it is the sedan bearer, 'my grandpa', who represents the incarnation of 
transgression in its most concentrated form. He behaves dissolutely and speaks 
vulgarly. He kidnaps the bride, kills the old owner of the distillery, and occupies the 
place of the murdered husband. When he comes to claim Jiu'er the second time, he 
urinates into the vats of new wine in front of her and all her workers. He demonstates 
both his strength and his right to Jiu'er by mischievous and blasphemous behavior. 
These actions however are affirmed and eulogised in the film. The occupation of 
Jiu'er and the distillery, the transformation of the wine into a vintage of 
unprecedented good quality and the consequent prosperity of the business are 
achieved through mischief. 
The film depicts rural people living in an isolated paradise and uses many elements 
of music and colour to create a festive atmosphere. In their analyses of Red Sorghum, 
Zhang (1994) and Wang (199 1) rightly emphasise this theme and both use the concept 
of carnival' proposed by Bakhtin to 
interpret the film. Both of them also mention that 
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the representations of carnival are related to the search for national roots. The authors, 
however, do not lay sufficient emphasis on the links between primitive vitality of the 
people the re-imagination of the nation. 
Reconstructing the nation 
In the film, the old orders are not completely destroyed but replaced and improved. A 
set of negative qualities (old, ill, pedantic, and conservative) represented by Li Datou 
and Jiu'er's father is displaced by the more positive characteristics (vigorous, 
optimistic, magnanimous, and fervent) represented by Jiu'er and the sedan bearer. The 
old people try to maintain the traditional order by relying on their'inherited social 
authorities while the young defeat them and create new orders through their own 
efforts, strength, and ability to improvise. The transgression of Jiu'er and the sedan 
bearer is the means rather the end. They do not simply resist the old they also create 
something better-better wine, a better wine business, and a better life-by way of 
transgression and the liberation of their vitality. 
Nevertheless, the story is primarily concerned not with the general process of 
cultural reform or cultural substitution but the with the reconstruction of a nation- 
China. The turning point is in the second half of the film. The isolated and timeless 
village suddenly and unexpectedly switches to a specific place in China under the 
japanese invasion in the Second World War. As Dai argues, this switch in the time- 
space context 'presents the village as a "nation" in microcosm (Dai, 1999: 63). 
In the process the 'ordinary' people who have previously been eulogised for their 
vitality and good nature are transformed into heroes fighting the enemies of the nation. 
After Brother Luohan is tortured to death, the narrator says, 
According to the people in my hometown, my granduncle Luohan became a Communist 
after he left the distillery. He was 
instructed to organise local military forces to fight the 
Japanese troops. I have read the official history of my county, it says, 'The Japanese 
troops captured four hundred thousand people to construct the Pingzhang highway. 
Uncounted harvests have been destroyed, thousands ofpeople have been killed Liu Lohan, 
was flayed by Japanese troops in front of the residents in Qingsha Gate. During the 
torture, Liu didn't show the slightestfear and kept on cursingfill he died. 
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These words, not only confirm the bravery of local people and the cruelty of the 
Japanese invaders, but also create a new national hero--a Communist. When the 
distillery workers decide to seek revenge for Louhan's death , 'my grandpa' leads the 
workers in kneeling in front of a bowl with wine-representing Louhan-and singing 
the 'Wine God Song'. The last time the song appears in the film is during a sequence 
celebrating the new wine and thanking to the Wine God. This time, Louhan becomes 
the god--one of the secular gods of new nation. 
This is not the only sequence in the film to create a national hero. The scenes in 
which 'my grandpa' leads the workers to destroy the Japanese truck and to bravely 
fight the Japanese troops bravely provide another important instance. After Jiu'er is 
shot and the hand-made bombs do not work, my grandpa leads the workers to fight 
Japanese troop by their bodies. The music-which is the same as for the wedding day 
of Jiu'er-increases in volume. It is a disastrous battle but it is also a festive battle. It 
is festive because the people win the battle honorably with their primitive vitality. As 
6my grandpa' stands in front of the dead body of 'my grandma', a close up from a low 
angle represents him in the classical pose of a national hero. 
When we look back to the scene of the making-love between Jiu'er and the sedan 
bearer they are like Adam and Eve in Eden. They are the father and mother of a nation. 
The nation is reconstructed through developing selected traditional virtues and 
qualities and abandoning negative aspects of the past. As Dai argues, this scene 
reconstructs the mythology of the birth of the nation (Dai, 1999: 58). As the film's 
success suggests, the theme of national re-construction resonated strongly with the 
dominant popular sensibility in China in the late 1980s. When after ten years of 
reform and openness, the country was ready, as an innovating nation, to participate 
more actively in international competition in both economy and culture. 
The invention of tradition 
To accomplish this task, the most important character contemporary Chinese should 
have, as the film emphasises is vitality and fervor. Zhang Yimou mentioned in an 
interview that the Chinese ancestors of the nation in Red Sorghum do what they want 
to do and live joyfully and freely, and that this fervor is exactly what contemporary 
Chinese lacks. He said, 
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I feel we descendants are getting worse when compared with the ancestors and I 
really feel our "race" is degenerating ... Let me speak straightly. I think if a nation 
wants to go forward, becomes powerful, and develop its cultures, the people of the 
nation rnust have the burning fervor and vitality of lives ... Even if the country is poor, 
and the people are poor, and many problems and difficulties are in front of us, we still 
have to live gloriously and fervently' (quoted in Chiao, 1998: 43-51). 
This emphasis on fervor, vitality, confidence, and determination struck a chord in 
China in the late 1980s. Red Sorghum expresses a strong wish of reform but does not 
challenge the current CCP regime or question the idea of a greater and stronger China. 
Rather, it reflects the expectations and worries increasingly expressed by 
commentators and intellectuals in the mid-1980s. The accelerating processes of 
commercialisation and intemationalisation were accompanied by the vast importation 
of foreign products and cultures. The shock of these new cultural encounters and the 
crisis of national identity they provoked crystallised into the question, 'how can China 
go forward'. Red Sorghum offers an answer which the domestic audience related to as 
indicated by its high box-office receipts. 
However, the film is by no means a simple recovery Of Past Practices. On the 
contrary, some of the 'lost' good traditions it shows were actively 'invented' in 
Hobsbawn's term, in order to dramatise the vitality and fervor of an idealised people. 
For example, the wedding sequence and the 'tossing-sedan-dance' are regarded as 
typically Chinese (Zhang, 1994: 31). Yet, it is interesting to note what the director 
accounts of how he came to develop the sequence: 
Talking about brewing sorghum wine, everything is modernized now, who knows how 
sorghum wine was made fifty years ago? Mo Yan (the author of the original novel) doesn't 
know either. So we created it by ourselves. The sequence of the tossing-sedan-dance is 
similar. I asked Mo Yan how the sedan was tossed? He doesn't know. So I created by 
myself I also added a song with the dance. I wrote the lyrics as well. Many people said 
this is good to preserve folk cultures after they saw the movie. What folk cultures? I made 
them (Chiao, 1998: 57). 
The film doesn't completely invent these 'traditions, without any references to prior 
accounts, but it does engage 
in an active process of selection and reconstruction. 
interestingly, the results of these shaping processes seemed to exactly match what 
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some Western audiences imagined or liked to imagine China and Chineseness are. 
They may include an Oedipus story, rigid feudal orders, exotic folk customs, yellow 
earth and red-tile towers, and more recently, Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution 
(Yi, 1999: 219). It was precisely this coincidence between domestic resonance and 
overseas corientalism' that made Red Sorghum the most important pioneer in 
developing practices for internationalising the production of Chinese art films. 
City of Sadness: The Transformation of National Identity 
introduction 
Just as Zhang Yimou is arguably the most important director with the Chinese Fifth 
Generation, so the director of City of Sadness, Hou Hsiaohsien (Hou Hsiaohsien) is 
the most representative figure in the 'Taiwanese New Cinema' (TNC). Key works of 
TNC directed by him, include The Boysfrom Fengkuell Fenggui Laide Ren (1983), A 
Summer at Grandpa'sl Dongdong de Xaq! (1984), A Time to Live and a Time to Diel 
Tongnian wangshi (1985), and Dust in the Windl Lianlian Fengchen (1987), all of 
which attracted considerable attention and won awards both domestically and 
internationally'. The realistic aesthetics and nativist themes in these films exerted a 
considerable influence on many Taiwanese art films and filmmakers after the 1980s. 
Most of his early works were produced with the Central Motion Picture 
Corporation (CMPC), the semi-official film organisation owned by the KMT. In 1989 
however, he obtained financial support from a major private film company, Era 
Corporation, to make his first relatively big-budget film, OtY of Sadness, which won 
the Golden Lion at Venice Film Festival. This was the highest award that any 
Taiwanese film had ever achieved. As Taiwanese film critic Chiao Hsiungping argues, 
among the new generation directors, Hou probably is the one most engaged in 
recording the modem history of Taiwan. For Hou, this is a sort of 'quest' and City of 
Sadness exemplifies this search particularly clearly (Chiao, 2000: 52). 
The story of City of Sadness centers around the February-twenty-eighth Incident 
(228 Incident) which happened in 1947. This topic was an untouchable political taboo 
in Taiwan until the late 1980s. In 1945, the Nationalist Government in mainland took 
over Taiwan after the Japanese colonial government withdrew. Partly because the 
I For analysis on themes of these earlier works, see Tay (1994). 
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fifty-year separation and the misdeeds and corruption of some Nationalist officials 
and soldiers, there were increasingly distrust and conflict between the new Nationalist 
government and local people. In the late evening of the twenty-seventh of February 
1947, during a seizure of smuggled tobacco, a woman who peddled cigarettes was 
seriously injured and a male spectator was killed by police in Taipei City. A 
demonstration was organised for the next morning and was met with violence form 
the Nationalists with many petitioners and spectators being shot down by machine 
guns in front of the Governor General's Office. Violent conflicts between local people, 
the officials, and new immigrants from mainland spread rapidly throughout the island 
and was met by terrible suppression and massacres which continued for several 
months. These events cemented a strong the literal and social psychological 
distinction between the 'natives' (people who moved from mainland to the island 
before 1945, mainly Fulao from south Fuchian province and Hakha from Guangdong 
province) and the 'mainlanders' (people moved to the island after 1945) which 
became a highly crucial and continually sensitive problem in Taiwan. 
By 1987, martial law has been lifted and democratisation and liberalisation 
processes were accelerating in Taiwan. The opposition party and some civil groups 
requested that the KMT govemment re-investigate the 228 Incident and apologise to 
the people. City of Sadness was one of the pioneer cultural works to deal with the 
Incident. It generated wide public attention and controversy not only because it broke 
a long lasting taboo but also because it won the Golden Lion at Venice Film Festival. 
To widespread surprise, the censorship board of Film Bureau of Government 
Information Office approved the film's showing in its complete version and it became 
the second largest box-office hit among domestic films released that year.. 
plot Synopsis 
It is 1945. The Japanese colonial government has just left and KMT government is 
arriving to take over Taiwan. On the northern coast of Taiwan (a relatively prosperous 
area in the early 20th century), 
lives a family with an old father and four sons. The 
family owns a nightclub and shipping business handled by the eldest son, Wenxiong. 
The second and third sons have been called up to join the Japanese troop in the 
Second World War. They constitute the first main story line of the film. The youngest 
son named Wenqing, a deaf-mute and the most highly educated member of the family, 
who works as a photographer in a neighboring town, provides the second story line. 
231 
Wenqing and his friend Kuanrong, a young and progressive local upper-class 
intellectual, meet with other local intellectuals to read Leftist books and share their 
disappointment and resentment with the Nationalist government. Kuanrong's younger 
sister, Kuanmei, comes to the town to work in a local hospital and fall in love with 
Wenqing. Directly after the 228 Incident, Wenqing and Kuanrong travel to Taipei to 
observe the situation. They witness the violent conflicts between the 'natives' and the 
tmainlanders'. at first hand. Because of their friendship with Sir Lin a local intellectual 
who was also a leading member of the Settlement Committee for the Incident, 
Wenqing is arrested while Kuanrong is injured and escapes to the mountains. 
Meanwhile, the third son Wenliang comes back from the Japanese army and joined 
with his elder brother to operate the family business (The second son never comes 
back in the film). He is secretly cooperating with a group of Shanghai gangsters in a 
smuggling operation but it falls apart. In revenge, the Shanghai Gang report Wenliang 
to the authorities as a traitor and he is inimediately arrested without any investigation. 
Later, after his released from the prison he is mentally broken. The family business is 
forced to close because the upheavals in the family as well as in the society after the 
228 Incident. Wenxiong is increasingly disturbed and indulges in gambling. He is 
killed in a fight with the Shanghai Gang and local gangsters. 
Wenqing is released after experiencing horrible fears in prison marries Kuanmei. 
At the same time, Kuanrong and other young people establish a small communist 
society in a remote mountain area. The KMT military police force eventually find and 
attack the settlement. Kuanrong is killed. Wenqing gets the message and knows he 
will be arrested again shortly. He and Kuanmei settle their affairs and take one last 
photo for themselves and their newly bom son. The Lin family have only the idiot son 
left at the end of the film. By 1949, the Nationalist government has been finally 
defeated on the mainland and has moved completely to Taiwan. 
The Birth of Nation 
The opening sequence of the film shows Wenxiong's second wife giving birth to their 
son who is named Lin Guangming (literally bright and promising). %en the child is 
born, the caption says, 'The fifteenth of August 1945, Japan Emperor declares 
unconditional surrender. Taiwan becomes independent after fifty-one years of 
Japanese colonisation. The birth of the child symbolises the rebirth of the nation. 
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However, the happiness accompanying the new baby/Taiwan soon fades away 
because the coming upheavals in the family/Taiwan. 
In the official discourse of the KMT, the collapse of the Japanese colonial regime 
marked the restoration of Taiwan to the motherland with the Nationalist government 
representing the return to Chinese sovereignty. In contrast, advocates of Taiwanese 
independence see the end of Japanese colonisation as a brief window of opportunity 
for the achievement of national autonomy which was immediately slammed shut by 
the onset of another period of colonisation by 'Chinese' from the mainland. 
Although it does not openly advocate political independence for Taiwan the film 
resonates strongly with the pro independence view that Taiwan should be an 
autonomous country not because the natives are naturally different from mainlanders 
but because there is no other way to end the political oppression of the regime from 
the mainland. In the film, Kuanrong and his intellectual friends express the mixture of 
disappointment and indignation generated by this view several times. Once in a 
restaurant, the group is talking about the current situation of Taiwan. 
Sir Lin: The war is over, so how do you think of Taiwan now? 
Friend: of course it's good. Of course it's good. Now we are back to the arms of the 
motherland. We can see the national flags everywhere although some people hang 
the flag in the wrong direction. We are under the motherland's shelter. It's nice. 
It's warm. 
Kuanrong: But, to be honest, given that an official like Chen Yi (the KMT governor of 
Taiwan at that time who was criticised corrupt and dictatorial) could be 
appointed and trusted by motherland, means we cannot expect too much from 
the Nationalist government. 
On another occasion, they are talking about the corruption and discriminatory 
practices of the Nationalist government 
in Taiwan. One of them mentions that the 
Chen Yi government diverts rice and sugar from Taiwan to the mainland generating 
profit for themselves but causing severe 
food shortages among the people and 
producing a worse situation than during Japanese colonisation: 
Friend 1: At the worst time during the war, we still had rationed food. But after 
Chen Yi came here less than one year ago, the price of rice has risen 
twenty-five times. How much did our salaries increase? None! 
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Friend 2: To be honest, can it be called a government? It is a corporation, isn't 
it? A corporation owned by Chen Yi himself. 
(Friend 1: Many local people's jobs are taken over by the mainlanders) 
Friend 2: It's reasonable for them, because people like you have been 'enslaved' 
by Japanese you have to be replaced. Shit! What 'enslaved'? Did we 
volunteer to be enslaved? Are we bom to be lowly? 
Friend 1: Exactly. It was the Qing Dynasty government that sold Taiwan to Japan long 
a time ago. Did anybody ask us Taiwanese for our opinion about that at that 
time? 
Sir Lin: In short, if the Nationalist government won't change their policies, 
even now the war is over, people will still be suffering for a long time. 
Kuanrong: If this is the case, how long should we wait to see an improvement? 
Sir Lin: In my view, waiting is not a way out. The suffering people should stand 
up on their own bravely. If the Nationalist government allow Chen Yi 
to staying in place, there will be a upheaval sooner or later. 
This conversation not only points to the causes of the coming 228 Incident but also 
affirms the legitimacy of Taiwan's independence in the future-if the motherland 
government refuses to respect the Taiwanese people's will and need. 
The Sadness of the Taiwanese 
However, the path Taiwan must travel to become a nation is fall of obstacles and 
pains, just like the baby born at the beginning of the film who is always shown crying 
or ill. This sad and oppressive atmosphere through out the whole film is a sharp 
contrast to the positive representation of the birth of a nation in Red Sorghum (see 
Figures 9.2). Nevertheless it is no less effective as a way to construct a national 
mythology. The central focus for the 'imagined community' is the experience of 
suffering and oppression. Sadness is shown as a shared fate in the past which must be 
overcome by 'standing up on our own' to build a new future. 
The film develops this central image through the main two story lines mentioned 
in the plot summary. The story of Wenxiong represents at a micro level of the lives of 
Taiwanese people, their families and businesses, and their hates and fears. Wenxiong 
is murdered and Wenliang contracts a mental disease because they cannot find a way 
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Figures 9.2 The Taiwanese people from celebration to frustration in City of Sadness 
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to deal with the Shanghai Gang (who represent mainlanders in general)'. In contrast, 
the second story line, about Wenqing, articulates to the macro context at that time. He 
witnesses the upheaval of the society, experiences the suppression by the Nationalist 
government, and becomes involved with local opposition forces. Ironically, he is a 
deaf-mute. He is the incarnation of the ordinary Taiwanese people who experienced 
oppression but remained helpless and unable to speak out. The enforced silence of 
Wenqing is a particularly poignant metaphor for the cancellation of legitimate dissent. 
Music is another crucial element employed to create the film's sad and tragic aura. 
After the opening sequence of childbirth, the title of the film appears and the signature 
theme rises simultaneously'. The scene then switches to a wide high angle shot of the 
northern coast of Taiwan which lasts for fourteen seconds. The sky is grey and cloudy 
and the melody is solemn and sorrowful. The main theme reappears frequently 
throughout the film. In addition, the songs sung by the singer in Lin family's 
nightclub--a supposedly entertaining place-are all sad. 
The unfortunate fate of the Taiwanese people is articulated most forcefully by 
Wenxiong in the film. After Wenliang is arrested as a traitor, Wenxiong sighs and 
furiously repeats a Fulao saying: 'We natives are the most miserable. The Japanese 
just left, the Chinese come in. "Everybody bullies, everybody oppresses, nobody 
loves"'. The analogy here between 'Japanese' and 'Chinese' and the distinction drawn 
between the 'natives' and 'Chinese' imply the uniqueness of the Taiwanese and 
naturalise the idea that they have a unique national identity. 
Although the film 's atmosphere of melancholy is directly contrary to the dominant 
mood in Red Sorghum, Hou's underlying intention is similar to Zhang Yimou's. As 
he later noted; 
I hope that a renewed understanding of the 228 Incident will help everyone to 
finally cast away its dark shadow and to go on living with energy and vitality. 
What I most desire is for audiences who see my film to leave the theatre not only 
with tears in their eyes, but with a new sense of pride, of empowerment, and with 
the determination to move towards the future ... (emphasis added, quoted in Yip, 1997: 
152). 
2 ironically, the name of Lin family's nightclub is 'Little Shanghai'. 
3 Interestingly, the author of the theme melody is a Japanese composer. 
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Colonisation and communication 
The effort to reconstruct Taiwanese national identity evident in that quotation can also 
be seen in the comparison between the portrayals of Japanese and mainlanders in the 
film. There is an episode in the first half that focuses on the friendship between 
Wenqing and Kuanrong and a Japanese brother and sister. They had become close 
friends before the end of the War. It also seems to imply that there was a relationship 
between Kuanrong and the Japanese girl, Jingzi. All of them feel sorry that Jingzi's 
must return with the withdrawing Japanese colonial government. Jingzi comes to the 
hospital to say goodbye to Kuanmei before they leave. She gives some memorial 
presents including a piece of Japanese calligraphy written by her brother, a bamboo 
sword, and a piece of Kimono (traditional Japanese cloth)-all of them representative 
artifacts of Japanese culture. The two girls then make commitment to never forget 
each other. This sequence depicts the experience of Japan colonisation as not 
completely negative showing the bonds between some Japanese and some 'natives. 
In addition, Kuanrong (in common with other Taiwanese young people at that time) 
tends to identify with Japanese values. The Japanese calligraphy written by the 
Japanese Young man is a poem: 'I will always remember you, just go ahead and fly 
away. I will follow behind. We 
have the same fate'. When Kuanrong reads the poem, 
he expresses admiration and says, 'Japanese esteem the spirit of cherry blossoms 
(Sakura) most. They wither and fall onto the earth when they are blossoming in most 
beautiful and plentiful'. He explains to Kuanmei and Wenqing that this kind of tragic 
and glorious spirit was the most 
important driving force behind the Menji Innovation 
Movement in Japan at the turning of 20th century which successfully transformed 
Japan into a modem country. The sequence implies that Kuanrong has been inspired 
by this example of creative destruction and that is forms an important model for his 
later devotion to a revolutionary movement aimed at constructing an ideal motherland. 
in contrast to the harmonious friendship and communication between Kuangrong, 
Wenqing, and their Japanese hiends, the interaction between the natives and the 
mainlanders is full of 
distrusts, conflicts and misunderstandings. Apart from the 
violent conflict in the 228 
Incident at the societal level and between Lin brothers and 
the Shanghai Gang at the local level, language is another important factor generating 
tensions. 
The first example is Governor Chen Yi's island-wide broadcast speeches after the 
228 incident. The reception of thess broadcasts is shown three times in the film The 
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first two occasions are set in a hospital. The hospital staff struggle to listen to the 
speech in Mandarin spoken with a heavy Zhejiang accent but they experience great 
difficulties because they usually use Japanese or Fulao in daily conversation. The 
frequent signal interference stands as a metaphor for the communicative obstacles 
between the Nationalist government and the local people. As a result, there is nobody 
in the scene listening to the third speech by Chen Yi. Despite his efforts to convey 
sincerity and mercy his voice just sounds cold, remote, and strange. 
The second example of communication breakdown occurs when Wenxiong and 
his fellows meet the Shanghai Gang to negotiate Wenlian's rescue from the prison. 
The arrogant and crafty Shanghai people (which are how they depicted in the film) are 
obviously reluctant to help. Because the two sides use different languages and dialects, 
Wenxiong has to speak Fulao to his companion Agha, who speaks both Fulao and 
Guangdong. Agha then speaks in Guangdong to one of the Shanghai people who 
understands it and translates into Shanghai to others. This complicated chain of 
communication produces immense misunderstandings between them and partly 
causes Wenxiong's later death. 
of course, there were serious conflicts between the Japanese colonial government 
and local people during the period of colonisation. The Japanese also forced local 
people to learn and speak Japanese in an effort to persuade them to transform their 
identity. Although City of Sadness does not try to deny this, it chooses to present 
some positive aspects of the colonisation experiences and to contrast it with a 
negative construction of 'Chinese colonisation'. The film does not advocate a pro- 
Japanese national identity for the Taiwanese, it rather implies that there are more 
similarities between the Japanese and the Taiwanese than between the Taiwanese and 
the Chinese. This ambiguity in national identity expressed in the film was a 
breakthrough in the late 1980s. 
City of Sadness and Real Identity Politics 
Indeed, the huge public response to the film took some commentators by surprise 
when City of Sadness was released in 1989. Although some critics argued that the 
film remains uncritical because it does not present the Incident more directly, City of 
Sadness does offer a powerful reflection on the key period of Taiwanese history (Lin, 
2000). The story is about a long-lasting political taboo and the ideology of the film is 
apparently opposite to the official discourse of the ruling KMT. A film like this could 
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never have been made a decade before, let alone been passed by the film censorship 
without any revision. However, its positive reception becomes more understandable 
when we look more closely at the shifts in politics in Taiwan in the 1980s and 1990s 
(see Chapter 5). From the late 1970s, due to a series of diplomatic failures, the KMT 
regime lost support from abroad for its legitimacy in ruling Taiwan. As a come-from- 
outside regime, it had to regain support from inside the island. Meanwhile, economic 
development facilitated the development of an embryonic civil society including 
political opposition forces. Taiwan was experiencing a political transformation 
process, which mixes localisation, Taiwanisation, democratisation and liberalisation. 
It has been a long time since the KNIT tried to establish official Chinese identity 
and to repress local cultural identity and any presentation of local history. In response 
to the legitimacy crisis, the KMT empahsised localisation and Taiwanisation. It was 
not only accepted the local political and economic elite, it also set out to 'Taiwanise' 
the national identity. These efforts became clearer and more active when the first 
(native' president Lee Teng-hui came to power in 1988. Although the opposition from 
the 'mainlanders' within the KMT remained strong, Lee insisted on his localisation 
policy. The victory of the pro-independence opposition party DDP (Democratic 
Progressive Party) in the presidential election at the beginning of 2000 marks the 
completion of this shift. 
Although declaring that he opposes Taiwanese independence, Lee has 
successfully established a sort of Taiwanese identity and Ideas such as 'Taiwan first' 
and 'New Taiwanese' are now widely accepted and shared among different groups 
and parties. Interestingly, Lee personally used 'The sadness of born to be Taiwanese' 
as the title of an interview with a Japanese writer in 1995. He attributed the sadness to 
Taiwan's colonisation experiences. Lee also writes in his book The Proposal of 
Taiwan, 'Born to be Taiwanese, we had a kind of sadness because we could not do 
something specific for Taiwan. Look at the history of Taiwan, it had been a long time 
that Taiwanese could not govern Taiwan by themselves. I have also experienced the 
pain that a Taiwanese could not do anything for the people. ' The central argument of 
City of Sadness then, was closely related to a political ideology that was rapidly 
4 Lee resigned Chairman of the KMT after the party failed in the presidential election. He was critised 
by many KNIT members about the failure and his increasingly pro-independence position. 
Paradoxically, two years after the DDP President Chen Shuibian came to power, Lee established a new 
party Taiwan United Party (TUP) for realising his political ideals. In the political spectrum of 
independence and unification today, TUP is the most pro-independence. 
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gaining ground at the time of the film's first release and which would become the 
mainstream position in later years.. 
Both Red Sorghum and City of Sadness were pivotal works in expressing new 
political argurnents at key turning points in the political and economic transitions of 
China and Taiwan. Although one of them presents a carnivalesque portrait of change 
while the other shows sadness and pain, they were both engaged in reconstructing 
national images. Other films also made a significant contribution to this project, 
particularly through their reworking of the experiences of colonialism and 
imperialism. 
9.2 The Memory of Colonial Powers and Imperialist 
Wars 
Both China and Taiwan had experiences of being invaded or colonised by the 
imperial powers in the late 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. These 
experiences had and still have powerful impacts on the constitution and construction 
of national identity. Among the imperial powers, Japan has exerted the strongest 
influence on contemporary Chinese history. The Japanese invasion and massacres in 
China in the 20th century have left an indelible scar on the collective memory of the 
mainland Chinese. In contrast, the experiences of the Japanese colonial reign in 
Taiwan has left a more complex and ambiguous influence on Taiwan's society and 
culture. 
After China's final victory against Japan in the Second World War and the end of 
Japanese colonisation in Taiwan, the US became and remains the dominant foreign 
power in relation to China and Taiwan influencing every. aspect of their national 
development. The US, the world's most powerful country and arguably its only 
6empire', is also the primary promoter of both China and Taiwan's links with the 
global political and economic system. Consequently, in any discussion or inquiry 
around the issues of China and Taiwan from unification / independence to 
participation into the global system 
it is impossible to ignore its central role. 
How do the present films represent past imperial powers, particularly the Japanese? 
How do they present the Americans? And what is the difference between these 
representations in the films made in mainland China and Taiwan? These questions are 
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central to a full exploration of the transformation of national culture and national 
identity in the global era. 
The Legend of Yellow River. Memory and Reality 
introduction 
The Legend of Yellow Riverl Huang He Jue Lian G 999) is one of the representative 
examples of what I earlier called the 'main-melodytised entertainment film' made in 
China in the late 1990s. It was probably the first film about the Anti-Japanese War 
which was not made by state-owned studios after the CCP established its 
comprehensive film system. The production company, Shanghai Paradise Corporation, 
is one of the largest new 'private' film companies in China today. By 1996, it had 
undertaken both vertical and horizontal integration and transformed itself into a media 
conglomerate (see 8.4.4). However whist the operation of the company is definitely 
commercial it is not completely 'private. It originally developed out of the 
governmental unit, the Shanghai Distribution Company , and has enjoyed immense 
state resource and support. Accordingly its production strategy set out to match both 
the requirements of government and the popular market and to maintain a balance 
between political ideology and economic interest. 
The Legend of Yellow River was the first product of this strategy and proved to be 
very successful achieving fifth place among the domestic box-office hits in 1999 with 
a combination of major stars (the actress Ning Jing and her real-life husband, 
American actor Paul Kurse), spectacular war scenes and special effects, international 
romance, and a sensational love story. 
plot synopsis 
The story is told in the first person, by an American air force pilot Owen. He and his 
team mate reconnoitre the Japanese factories along the coast line of north Mainland 
China during the Second World War. They happen to discover a Japanese warship 
and engage in combat with it. The warship is destroyed and the fighter is wounded. 
Owen's companion dies and he, badly injured, makes a forced landing on a hill close 
to the Great Wall. He is then secured by a four-person team from the Chinese 
Communist army ---- 'the Eighth Row Az-zny' (Ba Lu Jun). The team is instructed to 
delivery him to the military post of the Eight Row Army in a village in the 
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demilitarised zone because he is carrying important intelligence and photos of 
Japanese troop positions. 
Owen feels good to be with the only female in the team, Anjie (Owen calls her 
Angel), who speaks English and is responsible in taking physical care of him. But he 
seems not to like the leader of the team, Heizi, and often argues with him.. The team 
is not able to complete its mission because Japanese troops have just destroyed the 
village and massacred the residents. Heizi changes the plan and leads the team back to 
his home town and asks his father for help to cross the Yellow River to Yan'an, the 
main base of the CCP military force. 
In fact, Angel is also from the same village but has never told Heizi before. Her 
father is the lord of the village and coincidentally a family foe of Heizi's. He used to 
operate a shipping business and now 
has arrangements with the Japanese troops who 
control the landing place. His supporters catch and 
imprison Heizi and Owen. Angel's 
father decides to kill Heizi for his family and hand over Owen to the Japanese for his 
business. Angel resists her father and rescues Heizi and Owen. They hide in a remote 
temple and look for a chance to cross the river. Heizi tries to get Angel's father to 
help by persuading him that the Japanese are the common enemy and by revealing 
that Angel was raped by the Japanese soldiers before she joined the army. At the same 
time, the relationship between Angel and Owen is becoming closer and Owen wants 
Angel to go with him. 
Angel's father promises to help them cross the river but the Japanese troops have 
already set a trap to catch 
Owen. Angel's father kills the Japanese commander in a 
skirmish but is also 
killed. At the same time, a large number of Japanese soldiers 
come to capture Owen. 
Under Heizi's machine gun cover, Owen and Angel carrying 
Heizi's young daughter swim across the river. Heizi is killed and Angel gets shot in 
the middle of the river. Owen fmally reaches the other side of the river but Angel dies 
and is swept away by the torrent of the 
Yellow River. 
Remembering the Second World War 
The film presents an 'official' version of memories of the Second World War and the 
Japanese invasion. It shows the Chinese people suffering from Japanese outrages but 
fighting back bravely to protect their homes and win the war. In an early sequence in 
which Owen and the Chinese soldiers arrive at their destination village, they discover 
that the village has experienced an attack by the Japanese troops and that no residents 
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have survived. The film flashbacks to the massacre and details the cruel and animal- 
like behaviour of the Japanese soldiers. They kill a powerless old woman, bum a 
young woman, crush a baby into pieces, and shoot dozens of unarmed residents lined 
up in a row. Accompanied by the sensational pictures, sound, and music, the village is 
portrayed as hell and the Japanese soldiers as devils (see Figures 9.3). In the personal 
lives of the main characters, the situations recalled are often tragic and never less than 
harrowing. Heizi's Nvife and son were sacrificed in a poison gas experiment conducted 
by Japanese troops. Angel was raped by Japanese soldiers when she was a university 
student. Both of these incidents are typical of the widely remembered Japanese 
outrages in mainland China during the Second World War. 
In contrast, the Chinese people shown in the film are dignified and innocently 
sacrificed. The shepherd boy shown in the beginning of the film who saves Owen' life 
from the edge of a cliff, for example, behaves bravely to help an unknown foreigner 
without fears. But he dies in the subsequent Japanese bombing. But, it is Heizi, a 
Chinese Communist soldier, who is presented as the primary representative of the 
bravery of the Chinese people. He is a man with a 'dark face and of few words, (in 
Owen'swords) and displays great determination and courage in trying to accomplish 
his task - delivering Owen to the military base safely. When Owen is sleeping, he 
shows his tenderness by putting a coat over him. When Owen mindlessly picks fruits 
from a farmer's land, he leaves money on the tree in compensation. When Owen's leg 
is injured, he shows surprisingly strength in carrying him on his back. At the end, he 
sacrifices himself (by the heroic action of stopping the Japanese machine gun with his 
body) to keep Owen alive. He is perfect. 
The memories of war presented in the film are a mixture of personal sufferings and 
national miseries, creating an epic picture of dignified nationals bravely fighting 
against the imperial invaders, and 
heroes / heroines battling villains. Interesting 
however, these memories are not narrated by a Chinese man /woman but by an 
American -- Owen. The film's construction of memory is presented as truer, because 
it is spoken by a third party rather than by one of the main protagonists. More 
particularly the narrator is from the largest power in contemporary world, the US. 
Thus the salient contrasts that define nationals and 'nationality' are developed not 
only between the Chinese and the Japanese but also between the Chinese and the 
Americans. 
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Figures 9.3 The memory of the Japanese invasion in The Legend of Yellow River 
3 
2 
4 
6 
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The American and the Chinese 
The contrast between the Chinese and the Americans is represented in the tensions 
between Heizi and Owen. Heizi is a quiet and introverted man while Owen is 
outgoing, and sometimes breaks the rules. Heizi is very prudent in military actions 
while Owen often takes adventurous decisions. However, the key opposition between 
them develops after their capture by Angel's father. It is about life, dignity, and duty: 
Owen: Angel, I am going to see the Japanese. 
Angel: What? 
Owen: I will surrender to them. It is all about me. Both of you are good people, I will feel 
upset if you die because of me. All of us have done our best to obey the duty of a 
soldier. We are disarmed now. We can give up resisting without regret. Angel, 
the Geneva Convention has talked about the prisoners of war 
Heizi: You cowardl 
Owen: As a soldier without weapons, we can choose to surrender honourably. What 
the Japanese want is me, both of you may then get your freedom. 
Heizi: Are the Japanese really so reasonableas you say? Didn't you see what they did to 
our people? 
Owen: They are ordinary people, but I am a soldier. 
Heizi: I am a soldier, too. The instruction I had is to delivery you to the base safely. I 
won't let you surrender without new ordersl 
Angel: Mr Owen, I know you Americans see life as the most important thing. You 
don't see surrender after endeavour as a shame. But in our country, we 
are willing to give up lives rather than losie our dignity. 
Owen: if I still have one last bullet, I won't give up fighting. But for now, we cannot 
lose our lives meaninglessly! 
Heizi: Life? Is your life the only real life? Do you think the lives of my companions 
who died securing your life are not real lives? 
In this conversation, life and freedom are presented as the most important things to 
Americans while the Chinese will give up their lives to maintain their dignity and 
accomplish their duties. The contrast emphasieses the difference between the 
individualism in the American culture and the collectivism in the Chinese culture. 
However, unlike the extremely negative portrayal of the Japanese, the difference is 
not built around a contrast between good and bad or hero and villain. Owen is never 
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depicted as a negative character in the film. On the contrary, he is also a hero - but a 
different kind of hero from Heizi. He is a foreign friend who comes to China to help 
the Chinese people. He shows R" and compassion when he witnesses the outrages 
the Japanese comit against the Chinese people. He also risks his life to save Heizi's 
daughter at the end of the film. At last, he even wins the heart of the main female 
character in, Angel. 
If the hostility displayed towards the Japanese derives from the experience and 
memory of the Second World War, the ambiguous attitude to the American reflects 
the current complicated international situation. In fact, the US was not only one of the 
imperial powers that invaded China in the past, it also fought with China during the 
Korea War directly after the CCP established PRC. Yet, although today the US is still 
the most significant potential enemy of China in terms of national security strategy, 
its strength and power is also the goal that China wants to catch up with. The 
ambiguous and contradictory feelings of the Chinese people towards the US were 
articulated in the tide of the anti-America and nationalistic publications in the late 
199os (see 5.2-1). As Dai argues, on the one hand, the Chinese government and 
people believe that the US, as an agent of the new imperialism, restrains the 
development of China and that China remains relatively backward in comparison to 
the advanced Western countries. On the other hand, they demand to be respected by 
the US and constantly remind the US that China will become an equivalent power in 
the international arena and should never be ignored (Dai, 1999: 135-66). 
Orientalism for what? 
From the first shots, the film is filled with the magnificent scenery of mainland China 
and with various Chinese cultural elements. The shepherd boy and the plateau in 
northern China shown in the 
first quarter of the film are an obvious copy of the 
character and background in the internationally famous director Chen Kaige's well- 
known work Yellow Earth., The later shots of the Great Wall, the Yellow River, 
precipitous cliffs, and Buddhist temples present China as a beautiful and majestic land. 
At the same time, the folk songs, the Chinese medical skills (scorpions as medicine), 
the traditional drama, and the beheading rituals represent Chinese culture as a special, 
mysterious, and profound . These intentional and superficial presentations of 'China' 
and 'Chinese culture' conform to the orientalist vision embedded in Western 
perceptions. 
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At the end of the sequence when Owen is first saved by Heizi and Angel, the 
camera switches to a bird-eye shot on the Great Wall. The five of them are walking on 
the Wall. Owen says, 'I could not believe I was crossing the Great Wall of China. One 
of the greatest wonders of the world, would lead me to this fascinating land'. When 
Owen and Angel stay in a remote temple, he expresses similar feelings again: 
Within the walls of temple, the war seems far away. I was lost in the mysterious 
atmosphere of Oriental culture. The birds and the evergreen trees are our 
companions ... Angel told me much of the 
long-standing Oriental culture. The stories of 
illusion, romance, war, and love are all magnificent. 
in the film, it seems that Owen is completely fascinated by and identified with this 
'Oriental culture'. But this version of the Oriental realises its value and obtains 
affirmation only through a Westerner's gaze and feelings. The imagery of China in 
the film corresponds to the domainant Western image of China. The Legend of Yellow 
River, as a commercial production, brings these Orientalism into play within a popular 
commercial film format and formula. As Dai points out, 'it is ridiculous that Owen's 
aircraft damaged like that could still move over such a long distance from the coast 
line to the Great Wall in real geography. There is also no evidence that a small and 
beautiful river exists in the area. All of these arrangements have no other aim but to 
present a particular kind of imagery of China' (Interview No. 6). 
Since the works of 'the Fifth Generation', and particularly after the early films of 
Zhang Yimou and Chen Kaige obtained international attention, the dominant imagery 
corresponded with Western audiences' imagination of China. This practice has in turn 
influenced subsequent films produced in China (see the discussion in Chapter 8). 
I4owever, this trend was mainly in evidence within art house film productions which 
aimed to achieve international market success. In contrast, The Legend of Yellow 
River is primarily aimed at the domestic popular film market. Its adoption of this 
production strategy and the success that greeted it within the domestic market seems 
to suggest that the trend towards intemationalisation has not only affected art film 
production but also domestic film audiences' viewing taste. If some works of the Fifth 
Generation directors present an 'Oriental's Orientalism' (in Rey Chow's word), the 
commercialised variant deployed in The Legend of Yellow River demonstrates that 
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the popular Western view of China has increasingly influenced how Chinese people 
themselves see their own country. 
Buddha Bless America: From Japanese imperialism to 
American imperialism 
Introduction 
The director of Buddha Bless America, Wu Nianzhen, is the long time working 
partner of Hou Hsiaohsien (Hou Xiaoxien). Together with Zhu Tienwen he wrote 
many of the screenplays for Hou's early films, including, A Time to Live and a Time 
to Die (1985), Dust in the Wind (1987), and City of Sadness (1989). In 1995, he 
obtained a government grant under the Supporting Fund scheme and directed My 
Fatherl Do Sang. Buddha Bless America was his second film as director. It was also 
partly funded by the government who contributed ten million NT dollars (about L200, 
000 pounds). It represents an attempt to balance artistic quality and economic 
considerations in the post-NTC (New Taiwanese Cinema) era. It however was not 
successful. 
The film is about the American military force that came to Taiwan to coordinate 
with the KMT to defend the island from possible invasion from Communist China in 
the 1950s. When the Korean War started US international strategic considerations saw 
Taiwan as the pivotal shield in the Asia Pacific region preventing Communist 
expansion. The American government thus offered both military and economic 
support to Taiwan to achieve this strategic project. The KMT regime, for its part, was 
pleased to accept this aid as a way of helping it rebuild and maintain its legitimacy, 
both within Taiwan and in the international arena more generally. 
In terms of economic support, the US government offered Taiwan an average of 
US$ loo million per year between 1951 and 1965. In the area of military support, the 
US and KMT governments signed the 'Sino-US Mutual Defense Treaty' (MDT) in 
1954. The USA military including army, navy and air forces established garrisons in 
many places in Taiwan. The largest manoevures ever held by the USA and the KMT 
armies took place in March of 1960 and covered one fourth of Taiwan (almost all of 
the southern part). Buddha Bless America is set during this event. 
The Sino-US MTD was terminated in 1979 with the normalisation of the 
relationship between the US and China. Up until then however, the US military 
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garrisons and economic support had been the main planks in the US's domination of 
Taiwan's political, economic and cultural development. This process of 'support', 
incorporated Taiwan into the international political and economic system led by the 
US and strongly shaped the formation of the island's political economy. In addition, 
at the level of ordinary people's daily lives, the experience of contact and interaction 
with American soldiers and cultures had deep influences and consequences. Buddha 
Bless America is the first Taiwanese film to deal with this crucial history in a comedy 
style. Nevertheless, it did not achieve a major resonance in the domestic market and 
the box-office returns from the film were less than ten million NT dollars. The film's 
theme, coupled with this moderate performance in market make it a particularly 
interesting case to analyse. 
plot Synopsis 
The film is set in a rural village in southern Taiwan in the 1950s. Being the only 
highly educated person in the village, Ah-Sheng (people call him Shen-eh which in 
Fulao, literally means someone with magic power and knowledge) is respected by the 
residents. He used to be a teacher in the local primary school but was dismissed 
because he mentioned something 'politically incorrect' in the classroom. Now he just 
stays at home doing nothing in particular. 
His younger brother, Ah-Xien, also stays at home because three fingers of his right 
hand were cut off by a machine in a Japanese owned factory. He is desperately 
looking for any advanced surgical technology that might 'reconnect, his severed 
fingers which he has preserved in salt water. One day this chance comes. Troops 
belonging to the coordinated American military force are coming to the village to 
hold a military manoeuvre. So is their highly skilled surgeon. 
For security and secrecy reasons, the commander of the American army has asked 
the village residents to move into the local primary school and stay there during the 
manoeuvres. The army also promises that they will compensate the residents for any 
damage. Aftaid that their fields will be destroyed by the troops and their tanks and 
sUSP icious of foreigners, the majority of residents oppose the project. Being the only 
person who knows about the 'Americans, Ah-Sheng struggles to persuade them to 
accept the conditions and let the Americans come in. So the Americans come and a 
newly built, exclusive, nightclub opens in the village. This novel place and its music 
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arouse the village children's curiosity and often attracts them to peep inside through 
the windows. 
The conflicts and arguments between the residents and the American army start 
with the manoeuvre. The tanks run over the cultivated fields and the cemetery 
arbitrarily. The village children are shocked by the 'giant' vehicles and 'huge' foreign 
soldiers. The residents turn on Ah-Sheng and isolate him and his family. Ah-Sheng 
endures the abuse and takes Ah- Men to the American army base to see the doctor. 
Because they do not speak English, the army surgeon cannot understand what they 
want. He thinks that they are begging for money and expels them from the base. 
Some of the residents start to steal military resources from the army. A 
disappointed and shamed Ah-Sheng decides to steal something valuable with Ah-Xien 
to maintain his dignity. They bring back two heavy metal cases triumphantly. 
However, they discover that the cases are coffins containing two American soldiers' 
bodies. Again, the brothers become the targets of public criticism. 
At the end, the American army is gone. The village is back to normal. The 
residents are happy to receive plenty of money in compensation. When the village 
head plays a record of popular dance music which has been left by the American 
soldiers through the village's public broadcasting system, the children start to dance 
in a way they learnt from the American soldiers in the nightclub. 
The Intellectual and the Americans 
In the film, Ah-Sheng represents the highly educated intellectuals of post-War Taiwan. 
He worships America's modem civilization. In the opening sequence of the film, he is 
reading an article from a Chinese magazine (which specializes in introducing new 
knowledge and information from the Western world) and talks with Ah-Xien: 
you know what is in the latest issue of Todays World.? The article says that 
a sort of 'micro-surgery' has been invented in America. It's marvelous. You know 
what they did with the rabbit in the experiment? They cut the rabbit's ears off 
then use a microscope to make surgery for reconnecting them back. It's amazing! 
After the surgery, the rabbits' ears swing vividly as usual. The Americans are 
really brilliant! Don't you believe it? Take the magazine and have a look. 
Another intellectual, the female teacher at the primary school, shares the same 
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views. The day before the school suspends classes, she announces the news and 
reminds her pupils that 'the Americans always help our country a lot, they are our best 
friends. There are many Americans coming, so what should we doT 'Be polite, be 
friendly', answer the pupils. The teacher then teaches the pupils one English word- 
'Hello, -where they can use 
in case they meet an American. 
For Ah-Sheng (and other intellectuals), the US and her technological civilisation 
are not only to be his family's salvation but also the objective the whole country 
should learn from. Even though he and his 
brother are humiliated by the US surgeon 
and the Chinese translator and fail to get the chance to take advantage of the 'micro- 
surgery', he still reminds his wife that they should try their best to send their children 
to study in America, because 'the American is absolutely brilliant'. The film also 
implies that this admiration represents a transition in identification from the 'old' 
Japanese colonial power to the 'new' American world power. 
In the film, the fact that Ah-)Gen's fingers are cut off in a factory owned by the 
Japanese seems to symbolise the pain of the old colonialism. Ah-Sheng tells his 
brother that he should never go back to the Japanese factory, because the Americans 
are now the strongest 
in the new 'aerospace era'. 'When the Japanese see the 
Americans', he says, 'they will be shocked and timid as mice'. Seeking the American 
army surgeon to reconnect 
Ah-Men's fingers implies the expectation of a new and 
stronger power to 
help heal the old colonised scars. They fail however and are 
disappointed. The Americans in the film show no understanding of the brothers' 
request and just give them money. 
The new imperial power comes in, advanced and 
rich, and wearing a 
ffiendly mask and seduces the local intellectuals with its glittering 
surfaces. 
The ordinary people and the resistance 
in contrast the ordinary village people in the film are much more distrustful of the 
6new' foreign power. Despite the officials and intellectuals efforts to convince them 
that the American is 'good' and 'different' they feel that the arrival of the Americans 
will be another invasion and threat to their property and safety. Their 'coMMon-sense' 
worries are ridiculed by Ah-Sheng as 
ignorant, 
Village people 1: The American army bomb and shoot everyday, while our fields are 
prohibited zone, I arn really worrying whether my field will be damaged. 
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Village people 2: Yes, I also want to know is my field , which located by the riverside, 
going to be alright? 
Ah-Sheng: No problem at all. What are you worrying about? The American government 
takes very good care of people from their birth to their death. The American 
technology is also excellent. If they want to target the airplane, the bomb won't 
hit the warship. How come they will bomb people's field. It is impossible. 
Village people 3: How can you be so sure? The bullet has no eye. 
Ah-Sheng: Don't you read? You should read books sometime. Now the American 
technology is superb. It is already in the aerospace era. Don't you know that? 
An American rocket has reached the moon! 
Village people 3: 1 don't care. If they damage my field, I will definite claim the loss from 
them. 
The villagers are proved right. The American army destroys their tillage and their 
ancestors' graves. They feel cheated and try to resist. 
An old widow takes the first stand to prevent her dead husband's grave being 
rolled over by the tanks and 
her action prompts conflicts with the American and local 
soldiers. Most of the village people 
follow her example in an effort to protect their 
fields. They protest and throw stones at the soldiers in front of the forbidden line. 
They are, of course, expelled and gain no positive response from the army. The 
village people then turn to stealing military materials, such as canned food, cigarettes, 
and army uniforms, to 
'compensate' themselves. In general, these actions are 
disorganised and individual and more like a kind of harassing resistance. 
The village people, however, finally accept the situation and get used to the arrival 
of the Americans. They recognise that the materials they steal 
from the American base 
are of really good quality. 
The men are proud to smoke American cigarettes. They 
learn the brands' names like Lucky Strike and Camel and can even pronounce them. 
This contrasts strongly with two scenes earlier in the film. In the first, the local 
carpenter and painter are erecting the signboard on the wall of the new American 
soldiers' bar. Following the conventions of 
Chinese writing, they reverse the sequence 
of English letters so that the sign reads 
'EMOCLEW' instead of 'WELCOME' and 
are blamed by the supervisor. 
In the other scene, several women are discussing and 
admiring the quality of materials of the army uniforms. They decide to do some 
revisions and make them suitable 
for families to wear. 
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The process of getting used to the 'new' foreign power is most obviously 
represented by the village children. They often go to the bar ftirtively, stand outside 
the window, watch the American soldiers dancing with bar girls, listen to the 
American popular music, and learn to dance like them (see Figures 9.4). In the second 
half of the film, some of the children are called onto the base to perform manual 
services for the American soldiers. They are proud to be the Americans' little servants 
and look down upon other children who cannot get into the base. The process of 
incorporation is also a process of differentiation. 
American imperialism 
The film sets out to represent the initial process of American (cultural) imperialism in 
Taiwan after the Second World War (Lin Wenqi, 1997). The state (represented by the 
army commander) combines with the intellectuals (Ah-Sheng, the principal of the 
primary school, the teachers, and the village head) to introduce a whole set of foreign 
institutions and cultures into local society and to persuade ordinary people (the village 
people) to accept and live with them. The people can only resort to inefficient and 
useless resistance under these structural restrictions and finally get used to the new 
conditions. 
This process brings to mind a passage of Herbert Schiller's which is often quoted. 
, Cultural imperialism is', he says, 
the sum of the processes by which a society is brought into the modem world system and 
how its dominating stratum is attracted, persuaded, forced, and sometimes bribed into 
shaping social institutions to correspond to, or even promote, the values and structures of 
the dominating center of the system (Schiller, 1976: 9). 
In contrast with the extreme hostility to the Japanese and the ambiguous stance 
towards America presented in the Chinese film, The Legend of Yellow River, 
Taiwanese films selected here seem to imply that Taiwanese people are more 
ambiguous in theoir feelings towards the Japanese PtY OfSadness) and either nafvely 
admire or reluctantly comply with America's Political and cultural ascendency 
(Buddha Bless America). The creators of Buddha Bless America try to present the 
audience with this forgotten history of American domination. At key turning points in 
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Figures 9.4 The American soldiers'bar and Taiwanese children outside of it in Buddha Bless America 
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the story, they use silent captions to remind and guide the audience to think and 
reflect on the processes. These captions are 'The American is coming', 'The 
American comes', 'The American products come, too', and at the end, 'Is the 
American really gone? ' 
Actually, there were several serious incidents of conflict between local people and 
the Americans over the period the American military force was stationed in Taiwan. 
The most important example was the 'Liu Zi-Ran Incident' in 1957. One American 
sergeant, Reynolds, shot a male typist Liu Zi-Ran dead. The American Military Court 
pronounced Reynolds 'not guilty' because his action was legally, defensible. The 
result caused public discontent. A protest was held in front of the US Embassy the 
next day. Almost six thousand people gathered and violent clashes ensued. The 
Embassy was seriously damaged and many people were injured. Finally the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs apologised formally to the US government and forty-one protestors 
were accused. The KMT government also used repressive measures to prevent 
subsequent opposition. 
As the first film to deal with this history, Buddha Bless America chose not to 
represent the experiences in a serious way. There was some financial support for the 
project from the government 
but the major funding came from a private film company 
(Lien-Den). Partly because of box-office pressure and partly because of personal 
aesthetic choices, the story 
is told in an ironic comedic way. Despite these 
adjustments or compromises 
however, the film still did not achieve success in the 
domestic market. It seems to fail both in an artistic sense and in popularity. At the 
same time as the film was 
first released (the summer vacation of 1996), the 
Hollywood blockbuster production, Independence Day - JD4, caught the attention of 
movie-goers and became the 
box-office hit of the year. The market failure of Buddha 
Bless America therefore represents an ironic confirmation of precisely the historical 
process the filin wants to reveal and prompt reflection on. 
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Chapter 10 Film Analysis: Re-connecting 
the Global and the Local 
10.1 Tradition vs. Modernity 
The process through which both China and Taiwan have been increasingly 
incorporated into the global system has been accompanied by, or paralleled with, the 
process of Imodemisation' -a movement from traditional to modem structures which 
adopted central features of Western capitalist modernity without losing distinctive 
national features and concerns. 
The introduction and adoption of modem Western technologies is at the center of 
this modernization process and the site of the most intense conflicts between Western 
cultures and the tradition. These conflicts present particular challenges to established 
relationships of generations and gender. The tensions between generations are 
typically represented in films through the relationships between parents and children 
and teachers and students. While shifting depictions of women are used as an 
important indicator of 'progress' and modernisation. 
Accordingly, the analysis that follows focuses on three aspects of the way the 
rnovement from tradition to modernity 
is represented: (1) attitudes to Western 
technologies and to the maintenance of traditional cultures; (2) the conflictual 
communication between the older generation and the young; and (3) the 
transformation of the social status of woman. All three themes may be presented 
together and interconnected in a single film. 
once Upon a Time in China, Part Ill: Chinese Tradition vs. 
Western Modernity 
Introduction 
Tsui Hark (Xu Ke) is one of the best known 'New Wave' directors in Hong Kong and 
one of the most successful commercially. 
He addresses questions of Chinese identity 
in most of his works, often employing martial arts scenarios as the primary carriers 
for relevant themes (see Teo, 1997). In 1987, he and three other film-makers co- 
produced and co-directed 
SwordsmanlXiaoao Xanghu, which is now generally seen 
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as the founding work in the 1990s renaissance of the 1970's martial arts genre. It was 
a major box-office hit. 
Four years later, Tsui made his own 6new' martial arts movie, Once Upon a Time 
in Chinal Huang Feihong, acting as director, co-producer and co-scriptwriter. The 
film is centred on the legendary folk hero and the martial arts expert Huang Feihong 
who was active in the late 19th century (during the last days of the Qing Dynasty)'. 
The action takes place at a time when the Chinese sense of self had already been 
marked indelibly by bruising and humiliating experiences of Western expansion and 
colonialism. It had lost two Opium Wars in 1840-1 and 1856-60, and Britain and 
France had penetrated into Chinese territory followed by the empires and Russia and 
Japan. Young Chinese, like Huang Feihong (who is from Guangdong, one of the areas 
with the most frequent interactions with foreigners), are experiencing the full force of 
western civilisation for the first time and trying to do something to save traditional 
Chinese virtues from perishing while forging a new modernity with Chinese 
characteristics. 
Huang Feihong's patriotism is firmly rooted in his own experience of witnessing 
the corruption of the Manchu government, the violence of foreigners, and the 
suffering of ordinary people. At the same time, he is experiencing the progressive side 
of western civilisation at first hand through his distant relative Aunt Yee (who 
although his aunt is of a similar age to him and finally becomes his lover in a later 
sequel). She has been educated in Britain. Through her, he learns about both modem 
machinery (trains and cameras) and western civilisation (typified by dining etiquette). 
As a consequence, he comes to realise that Chinese culture has to adapt and change if 
it is to take its full place in an altered world. 
The film employs the familiar conventions of the martial arts genre. It has a 
narrative structure based on the good hero beating the villains through martial arts; 
smooth, fluid visual rhythms with plenty of quick parallel editing and camera 
movement; dance-like kung fu action design; and a popular star. This revivified mix 
of ingredients proved highly popular 
both in Hong Kong and Taiwan (where it was 
one of the top ten box-office hits of the year). Its success lead to almost ten further 
films about Huang Feihong directed by Tsui himself and by others and co-financed by 
Taiwanese film companies. The film selected for analysis here, Once Upon a Time in 
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China, Part Three [Huang Feihong zhi San: Shiwang Zheng Ba], directed and co- 
scripted by Tsui, was the first one of the series produced in cooperation with film 
workers and studios in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and mainland China. The capital mainly 
came from Taiwan (Long-Hsiang Corporation) and Hong Kong (Golden Harvest). 
The creative team was from Hong Kong (Tsui's Film Workshop). And the studio and 
human resources were from the mainland (Beijing Film Studio). It is therefore 
representative of the increasing three-way cooperation between the Mainland, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, a type of production dubbed 'Three Locations, Two Sides', in the 
I 990s. The film was a major commercial success in all the three markets. It was also 
the first film distributed in mainland China following the reforms in distribution 
practice after the 1993 reform of China's 
film industry (see Chapter 8). 
plot synopsis 
In the film, Huang Feihong continues his adventures with Aunt Yee and his disciple 
Leung Foon. They travel to Beijing to meet his father who is also a martial arts expert 
and who is starting a modem pharmaceutical 
factory manufacturing traditional 
Chinese medicine. Meanwhile, the Empress Dowager instructs Premier Li Hongzhang 
to organise a martial arts competition, the 'Lion King Competition', based around the 
traditional lion dance. This is part of a wider strategy designed to demonstrate China's 
traditional strength and to ferment dissent among the foreign powers. The Guangdong 
Association, a martial arts club of which Huang Feihong's father is a senior member, 
has a big team of lion dancers and comes to Beijing to join the competition. 
However, the main martial arts clubs in Beijing also aim to win the tournament and 
the rival teams engage in vicious combat before the competition. A local gangster, 
chiu Tinba, who owns both an oil factory and the biggest lion dance club (called the 
Taiping club), using every dirty trick to eliminate rivals in advance. The Taiping club 
orders the Guangdong 
Association to resign from the competition and Huang's father 
is hurt during the ensuring skirmish. Huang Feihong assumes charge of the club but 
decides not to join the contest because in his view, it is not worthy putting members at 
risk to win the nonsensical title. 
Meanwhile, Aunt Yee happens to meet an old friend from Russia, Tomansky, who 
was her classmate when she studied 
in Britain and is now working as a translator in 
I It was basically a remake of famous the 
Cantonese film series Huang Feihong (Wong Fei Hung in 
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the Russian Embassy in Beijing. Tomansky is pursuing Aunt Yee and gives her a 
motion picture camera as a present which annoys Huang Feihong. Tomansky is also 
involved in a plot to assassinate Premier Li when he presides over the 'Lion King 
Competition' to prevent him from signing a treaty ceding the Liaodong Peninsula to 
Japan, thus giving the Japanese a strategic advantage in their war plans against Russia. 
Aunt Yee discovers the secret plan. Huang Feihong changes his mind and joins the 
tournament to stop the Russians from assassinating Premier Li. He believes this is the 
only way to protect the Premier because nobody in the central government will 
believe him, an ordinary person, if he discloses the Russians' plan. After an intense 
combat in lion dance form among a hundred lions, Huang Feihong finally beats Ciu 
Tinba, wins the competition and foils the Russians, plan. Tomansky is killed during 
the ensuing fracas. Huang Feihong returns his champion's medal to Premier Li to 
demonstrate his anger over the ridiculous nature of the competition and to ask Li to 
think about more suitable ways to restore China's positions and sense of self. 
Representing the nation 
In the Huang Feihong series (at least the first three parts), Tsui Hark sets out to 
portray China as a country of enormous potential strengths which remain constrained 
by both domestic and external factors. on the one hand, the corrupt and ignorant 
Manchu rulers are unable to formulate effective policies to improve the country. On 
the other hand, the closed-minded ordinary people are unable to generate sufficient 
momentum for change within civil society. At the same time, the Western empires are 
using their advanced military 
forces to invade China, competing with each other to 
exploit as many resources as possible. 
They have a vested interest in retarding China's 
national development. 
in the film selected here, the Empress Dowager and Premier Li Hongzhang are 
shown to be totally out of touch with events 
in believing that organizing a mass 
activity like a 'Lion King Competition' might 
be an adequate means to combat the 
foreigners' invasion. Meanwhile, the people (represented here by the martial arts 
clubs members) are also shown to 
be foolish in spending so much energy competing 
for the championship title. The competition not only wastes lives and money but is 
completely ineffectual 
in strengthening national power. In the mean time, the 
Cantonese). Ile series ran to almost 90 episodes produced in the 1950s (see Li, 2001). 
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imperialist forces are penetrating China in every possible way and securing a position 
from which they can assassinate the most powerful politician in the country. As 
Huang Feihong; says to Premier Li in the last sequence of the film, 'In front of the 
people, actually, we are the losers'. 
The China depicted in Once Upon a Time in China, however, is a country with 
tremendous latent strength and a glorious cultural heritage. It finds itself in crisis 
because it cannot find a way through its present difficulties. In Huang Feihong's view, 
the most important thing is to educate and train the people with modem ideas and 
knowledge and to combine strength of intelligence with strong bodies. An alternative 
strategy, no less important, is to unite the people and all social forces and to cooperate 
with a reformed government to restore the nation. In other words, the imperial threat 
can only be countered by a united China. 
L-1 the sequence where Huang Feihong discovers that there is serious internal strife 
between the martial arts clubs in Beijing, he stops the street fight among the members 
of the three clubs by his owm brilliant kung fu skills. He then invites the club leaders 
to a conciliatory meeting. Huang is adamant that all Chinese are brothers and should 
not fight with each other in front of foreigners. This idea is also pursued in Once 
Upon a Time in China, Part YWo when Huang realises that his two newly met friends, 
Sun Yet-Sen (the historical leader of the republican revolutionaries and the founder 
of Republic of China) and Luke Hao-Tung (Sun's commde), are promoting 
revolutionary movements. He argues with Luke asserting that while China is facing 
both internal and external strife, 'I do not care who did what, we do not need any 
n1ore trouble now'. 
Facing the foreigners and western modernity 
in the once Upon a Time in China series the experiences and feelings of the Chinese 
as they come to terms with foreigners and western modernity is a central continuing 
theme. Tsui Hark presents Huang Feihong as emblematic of these encounters and 
employs the western educated Aunt Yee as an intermediary between East and West, 
tradition and modernity. 
In the series, foreigners are often portrayed as predominantly arrogant and cruel 
invaders. Yet, the observation of film critic Steven Teo, that Tsui 'goes as far as he 
can to depict arrogant, uncouth and bellicose Westerners' in the films is not correct 
(see Teo, 1997: 170). Tsui Hark in fact allows some foreigners to demonstrate their 
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goodness or intelligence. Western modernity therefore emerges as not so much a 
matter of black and white as of yin and yang. In contrast, the ordinary people are often 
depicted as superstitious and xenophobic, unable to recognise the merits of foreigners 
on the one hand, and capable of behaving more cruelly and selfishly than foreigners 
when considering their own interests. 
The Russian Tomansky, for example, although an actor in the assassination plot, 
tries to help Aunt Yee and Huang Feihong when they are in danger, and is pleased to 
help Leung Foon fix a steam engine. At the same time, the leaders and members of 
the martial arts clubs exhaust their energy in internal strife. Similarly, in the Part Two, 
the xenophobic White Lotus Sect cheat their followers with mystic and false 
performances and run amok, killing foreigners and burning their property. In contrast, 
the British Consular officials try their best to protect the Chinese pupils of the Foreign 
Language School from the threats of the White Lotus thugs. 
Huang Feihong is the exception to this stereotype of Chinese popular reaction. He 
treats foreigners rationally. As a man well endowed with the traditional virtue of 
benevolence, he protects innocent foreigners as well as Chinese when they are in 
danger. Thus the organising binary opposition is not, as what Teo argues (ibid. ), 
between Huang Feihong as the personification of ren (a mixture of nobility and 
benevolence) and the negative image of foreigners. Rather, it is between Huang 
Feihong and the ignorant, selfish, and xenophobic Chinese people depicted in the 
series. 
This key organising opposition can also be seen in the struggle between Huang and 
his main rivals. Interestingly, in all three parts of the series, his main enemy is always 
a Chinese rather than a Westerner. It 
is local ruffian (Chiu Tinba) in the film under 
discussion here. It is the kung fu expert (Yan Zhendong) who wants to win the fame 
and is used by foreigners in Part 
One, and the false master of the )White Lotus Sect in 
part Two. Huang Feihong never fights with foreigners directly. Even when the 
Russians are planning to assassinate Premier Li, he opts to fight with Chiu Tin-ba in 
the lion dance competition in order to destroy the Russians' plan indirectly instead of 
seeking to stop their plan in advance. The 
foreigners may be the enemies of China in 
general, but the local villains are always the real rivals of the hero. 
We can see the same basic organising principle at work when Huang Feihong 
experiences modem western civilisation. This theme repeats again and again in the 
series and a representative artefacts of western material culture are introduced in each 
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part. It is gun in Part One, a train and a camera in Part two, and a motion picture 
camera and a steam engine in Part Three. For Huang Feihong, these modem 
technologies are new things worth knowing about and learning from. Unlike most 
ordinary people, who regard these western inventions with fear, hatred, and repulsion, 
he would like to understand them and use them if they are good for China. In an 
earlier sequence, showing Huang arriving in Beijing city, he even tells Leung Foon 
that they should start to learn English when he hears a foreigner speaking Chinese. 
At the same time, core elements of Chinese civilisation, the martial arts, Chinese 
medical science, and traditional wisdom and virtues are presented as a precious 
heritage that must be preserved. But it must also be adjusted and changed to combine 
with the advantages of Western civilisation. This position is developed within the film 
when Huang's father buys a stearn engine to establish a modem Chinese medicine 
factory and tells Huang that traditional ways of making medicine are 'useless. When 
they are visiting the factory, Aunt Yee (in her assigned role as the intermediary 
between Chinese and western culture) teaches Huang that 'British industry became 
the pioneer of the world because Mr Watt invented this steam engine'. In other words, 
if China wants to strengthen itself and carry forward its precious traditions in the 
modem world, it must take full advantage of western advanced technologies. 
The role of Aunt Yee in the process of adjustment is worth further discussion here. 
Casting a woman, rather than a man as the intermediary between the Chinese and 
Westerners is seemingly a conventional use of femininity to 'soften' and 'ease' the 
tension of adaptation. All the things Aunt Yee introduces to Huang Feihong are either 
utilities (such as trains, cameras and stream engines) or marks of new styles of 
behaviour and self-presentation (such as dinning etiquette, or Western suits). The way 
she convinces Huang to accept them 
is by mixing rational advice and considerate 
affection. As the Hong Kong 
film critic Kwai-Cheung Lo argues, what Aunt Yee 
represents is 'the affable, 
feminine aspect of this threatening technology, which is 
ultimately accepted along with 
love'. This in marked comparison with the aggressive, 
masculine side of technology, represented 
by the western imperialists and slave 
traders (Quoted in Lin, 2001: 540). Nevertheless, although Aunt Yee is a highly- 
educated modem woman, she 
is not an independent person in her own right. She 
accepts western values without reflection, while at the same time she remaining 
compliant with the traditional subordinate gender relation to her would-be husband 
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Huang Feihong. The path to modernisation that the film suggests is therefore still 
masculine centred. 
China stands up 
The notion of a 'great' China playing a central role in the modem world is the basic 
lietmotif of the Huang Feihong series. However, this desired identity is not 
constructed by belittling foreigners and foreign countries or by the Chinese beating 
back foreign invaders (as noted earlier, Huang Feihong never fights with foreigners). 
Rather, although China is depicted as a nation with superior characteristics 6we9 
Chinese have to acknowledge that we are falling behind the advanced world and need 
to strengthen ourselves and our nation. 
Thus the version of national identity presented is not absolute but relative - China 
is equal to, not better than, the West. The underlying ideology of the films is clear. 
The Chinese should not waste energy competing internally (the Lion King 
Competition) but should enter the international arena. China will stand up, reaching 
its full height in the modem world, by competing with other countries not by 
defeating them militarily. To use the contemporary free-market terminology, the main 
task is to increase 'national competitiveness' and join the global economic system. 
This central task is expressed repeatedly by the theme song of the series, 'Man Should 
Self-Strengthen/ Nan'er Dang Ziqiang'. As the lyrics puts it, 
With pride I face thousands of waves, 
My blood is hot like the red sun, 
My courage is as strong as iron, 
My bones are refined as steel, 
My bosom is boundless and generous, 
My vision is outreaching, 
I strive to strengthen myself, 
Be a hero, 
To be a hero, I must exercise everyday, 
Be a hot-blooded hero, hotter than the sun. 
The song and the accompanying music is heard at the beginning of the films, at the 
end, and when Huang Feihong is about to fight with his rivals. 
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By urging the Chinese people to stand up, the films express a confidence that 
China will be able to compete successfully with other countries if the right way is 
taken. This position is forcefully cemented in the sequence following the argument 
between Huang Feihong and Tomansky when Tomansky comes to help fix the steam 
engine in his father's factory (see Figures 10.1 and the subtitles below). 
Tomansky (in a low angle shot): 
You are too out of date. Don't despise this steam engine. It's motivated [sic] the 
industrial Revolution in Europe. It substituted labor force to produce industrial 
products and to raise economic standards. So someone predicts that, its appearance... 
(switching to Huang in a high angle shot) 
will create new nobles [sic) of the world. They will take over the status of the Emperor and 
rule over the world... 
(tilting upwards to a normal angle shot of Tomansky) 
The Russian Empire is like the Qing Dynasty, we can't escape from the change of history. 
Huang (in a normal angle shot): 
Since we can't escape, let's not escape. Who will be the new leader, just see who can 
defeat the steam enginel 
The dialogue and the camera movements combine to express the idea that China will 
stand up and take on the task of competing with other advanced countries in the future. 
China would not be looked down on by superior competitors (the high angle shot of 
Huang). Nor will it look up to Western countries (the low angle shots of Tomansky). 
It will look its competitors squarely in the eye on level terms (the final frame). 
A different hero: Huang Felhong vs. Bruce Lee 
It is interesting to compare this 'soft' and 'flexible' attitude to national regeneration 
and development in the Huang Feihong series in the 1990s with the 'hard' and 'rigid, 
attitude shown in another set of famous and popular kung-fti films, those of Bruce Lee 
in the 1970s. 
In two of his most famous films, Fist ofFuryl Jingwu Men (197 1) and The Way of 
Dragonl Meng Long Guo Jiang (1972), Bruce Lee fights with Japanese and 
Americans respectively. The foreigners are all depicted as evil people. They are cruel 
and rude. They cheat and oppress Chinese people and treat them as animals. In the 
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Figures 10.1 A dialogue between Huang Feihong and Tomansky in Once Upon a Time in China /// 
3 4 
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films, Bruce Lee like Huang Feihong, plays the role of a patriot imbued with 
traditional Chinese virtues. But unlike Huang Feihong, who argues that the Chinese 
should stand up and compete with foreigners on an equal basis, Bruce Lee urges them 
to fight back and take revenge when foreign bullying is no longer endurable. 
In Fist of Fury, Chen Zhen (a Chinese martial arts student played by Bruce Lee) 
fights with the Japanese villains for a cause which combines personal and national 
resentments-the members of a Japanese martial arts school have killed his master 
and humiliated all Chinese by dismissing them as the 'sick man of East Asia'. He 
defeats the Japanese and proves that the Chinese are not 'sick men' but dies at the end. 
The national identity constructed in these films and shared with audiences in the 
cinema, portrays foreigners as 
devils and their eventual defeat as a necessary step to 
national advancement. The mission of the 
hero is to defeat foreigners and save his 
brothers and sisters. In contrast, the task of the hero in the Huang Feihong series is to 
eliminate domestic thugs and unite all people 
in a project to restore the nation and to 
go on to compete with other advanced nations as a strong and united China. Huang 
Feihong also shows prudent interest in, rather than hostility to, Western modernity. As 
Li notes, 'while Bruce Lee ostensibly sets up oppositions between China and the West, 
the oppressed and the oppressor, the good and the bad, Tsui Hark resorts to a naYve 
synthesis of the East and the 
West' (Li, 2002: 535). 
We can relate this difference of perspective to the different political economic and 
social contexts in which the two sets of 
films were made. In the early 1970s, the Cold 
War structure was still stable and the ex-colonies had only recently achieved political 
independence and started to face the brute facts of economic and cultural dependence 
on the First and Second 
(Soviet) Worlds. The enemy of the emerging nation is clear 
and definite. Authentic national and cultural 
identity can only be constructed on the 
basis of mass mobilisation against the dominant countries. Not surprisingly, the films 
of Bruce Lee place 
international or inter-racial conflict within a simple 'us-others' 
framework and promote direct confrontation as the most viable route to resolution. 
in contrast, by the 1990s when the Huang Feihong series was made, there were no 
absolute enemies. 
The Cold War was over. The Soviet world had collapsed and the 
global market economy 
had been massively consolidated and extended. Regional 
racial and religious conflicts take 
the place of large scale wars. The main task of the 
state is to pursue national advantage 
in the new global economic competition. Against 
this changed background, states and politicians tend to remobilise and reconstruct 
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popular identification with the nation. More specifically, the political situation 
between the Taiwan Straits has moderated. Although deep disagreements around 
national unification still exist between China and Taiwan, concrete economic 
exchange has been accelerating for some time. Various sorts of cooperation using the 
advantages of both sides to strengthen competitiveness in international markets are 
also being attempted. In fact, the co-production of Once Upon a Time in China, Part 
III is itself an excellent instance of this new sort of cooperation. This may partly 
explain why conflict between nations is downplayed and replaced by internal strife in 
the Huang Feihong series. 
However despite these differences, there is one major similarity between the two 
sets of films we are discussing here. Since all were produced by the major film 
companies and aimed to achieve box-office success, their main ideology corresponds 
closely to mainstream ideology. Because this is the world view most consonant with 
common sense commercial films are obliged to work with rather than against the 
grain of prevailing audience assumptions. Consequently, neither series presents the 
possibility of different cultural identities. In Bruce Lee's films, fighting is the only 
way to solve the problems between nations and races. In the Huang Feihong series, a 
unified nation is urged to compete with other nations. Huang Feihong, a man who has 
realised the corruption and weakness of the government, insists on saving the country 
in a conservative way. He asks fourteen martial arts clubs to collaborate in writing a 
letter to Premier Li asking him to cancel the 'Lion King Competition'. When he fails, 
after he has won the competition he throws the medal back at Premier Li to 
demonstrate his anger, but still decides to risk his own life to protect the Premier from 
the Russians- His words to the revolutionary Luke Hao-tung in Part Two, perfectly 
express the mainstream ideology of the new Chinese middle class; and are worth 
quoting again, 'I don't care who 
did what, we don't need any more trouble now'. In 
the end Huang Feihong stands for the conditions that allow business to proceed as 
usual. 
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Cultural Encounters and Generation Conflicts: Three films of 
Ang Lee, Pushing Hands, The Wedding Banquet, and Eat 
Drink Man Woman 
introduction 
Ang Lee is perhaps the best known of the 'Migrant Chinese directors' working in 
Hollywood in the 1990s (a group which also includes John Woo, Stanley Tong and 
Tsui Hark). However, Ang Lee is the only one from Taiwan. He stayed in New York 
after he got his degree in film directing at New York University. He was incorporated 
into the Hollywood system after he directed The Wedding Banquet (1993), which 
became both a box-office hit in its year of release (being ranked 99th in the world 
rnarket and first in the Mandarin film market at Taiwan) and a top award winner (with 
the Golden Bear at Berlin Film Festival). The Hollywood other productions directed 
by him include, Sense and Sensibility (1995), The ke Storm (1997) and Ride With the 
Devil (1999) (see discussion in Chapter 8). 
Before he joined Hollywood however, Ang Lee was financed by the Central 
Motion Picture Corporation (CMPC) in Taiwan and the Film Support Fund to direct 
his first three films. Nevertheless, the main production team of all three films came 
from his independent film studio (Good Machine) which employs both Taiwanese 
film workers who live in New York as well as American film workers. They thus 
became a sort of international productions. Pushing Hands was Ang Lee's first 
feature film, made two years before The Wedding Banquet. The film won the best film 
award in the Asian-Pacific Film Festival and performed strongly in the domestic 
Inarket, although is not as well as The Wedding Banquet, achieving third place among 
the Chinese film box-office hits in 1991. Eat Drink Man Woman (1994) was also 
successful both overseas and in the domestic market. Indeed, Ang Lee is the only one 
of the new generation Taiwanese directors to obtain both artistic recognition and 
market success. 
His first two films deal with the encounters between Chinese and American culture 
through the lives of Chinese immigrants in the US. This focus on conflicts between 
different cultures intersects with another central aspect of the contradiction between 
the old and the new, the traditional and the modem explored through the gap between 
parents and children. 
This theme runs through all three films, but is particularly 
salient in Eat Drink 
Man Woman. 
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plot synopses 
pusilingHands MrZhu is a Taiji masterwho used to live in Beijing buthas moved 
to New York to join in his son's family after his retirement. His son, Alex Zhu, has 
been living in the US for over ten years. He works as a computer engineer and has an 
American wife, Martha, and a son, Jeremy. Martha is a novelist who works from 
home. Mr Zhu also stays mostly in the house and practices his kung-fu and 
calligraphy. He teaches Taiii at sessions organised by the local Chinese community 
school every Saturday. While Alex plays basketball and Jeremy learns Chinese there. 
Mr Zhu meets Mrs Chen, a retired -Aridow who has moved from Taiwan to New 
york to her daughter's home and teaches cooking at the same school. They share the 
similar backgrounds and experiences of adjusting to the new environment and 
therefore establish a rapport. Their relationship, however, cannot develop because 
Mrs Chen later moves to teach at another Chinese community school. 
Mr Zhu is upset by this. One day, he goes for a walk but gets lost. Alex is 
extremely anxious when he cannot 
find him. He gets angry with Martha and blames 
her for not taking better care of his father. Mr Zhu is brought back home eventually 
by the police. Alex decides to ask his father to move to a rest-home in order to save 
his family from what is becoming an impossible situation. He then arranges a picnic 
with Mrs Chen's daughter to match their parents and 
in the hope that the two old 
persons will move 
in together. They however, discover secret plan and an 
embarrassed Mr Zhu 
leaves home to live on his own. Alex desperately searches for 
his father but in vain. 
Mr Zhu works as a dish-washer in a Chinese restaurant and rents a small apartment 
in Chinatown. The boss of the restaurant constantly complains that Mr Zhu washes 
dishes too slowly and humiliates him without any concern. One day, he asks Mr Zhu 
to quit and abuses him again. Mr Zhu gets annoyed and swears that if the boss can 
move his two feet one 
inch he will go. Mr Zhu shows his Taiji skills and the police 
are called finally to arrest 
him. A television news channel reports the incident. Alex 
sees the report and rushes to the 
jail to beg his father's forgiveness and ask him to go 
home with him- Mr Zhu refuses and asks Alex to rent a better apartment for him. As a 
result of the incident 
Mr Zhu becomes famous and organises another Taiji session by 
himself in a community school where he meets Mrs Chen again. 
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The Wedding Banquet Weitong is a young Taiwanese immigrant who becomes an 
American citizen and works in New York. He is a homosexual and lives with his 
partner Simon, a white American. He hides the secret of his sexuality from his parents 
(Mr and Mrs Gao) who are constantly urging him to get married and produce a 
grandson for them. 
To avoid hurting his parents' feelings, Weitong and Simon decide to arrange a 
false marriage. Their friend, an illegal Chinese immigrant girl Weiwei, who rents 
Weitong's house and is looking to achieve legal status through marriage is an ideal 
partner to their plan. Weitong's parents decide to come to New York and prepare a 
traditional Chinese wedding'banquet for the young couple forcing Weitong, Simon, 
and Weiwei to continue the charade 
On the wedding night, both of Weitong and Weiwei get drunk and have sex 
without much consciousness. Weiwei later finds that she is pregnant. Things are then 
getting out of control. The three of them 
have a serious quarrel in English in front of 
Weitong's parents who are supposed not understand English. In fact, Weitong's father 
does speak English and gets light apoplexy suddenly after he discovers the truth. 
Weitong decides not to tell his mother the truth so as not to cause his father additional 
stress. Weiwei makes up 
her mind to keep the baby and Weitong and Simon promise 
to be the baby's fathers. Weitong's father accepts Simon to be his other 'son' without 
revealing the arrangement to 
his wife and goes back Taiwan with her at the end. 
Eat Drink Man Woman Mr Chu is a Chinese master cook who works as a chef in a 
big hotel's restaurant in Taipei. He and his three daughters live in a large old house at 
the city center. Mrs Chu died sixteen years ago and he falls in love with a young 
divorced woman, Jingrong, who is a friend of and just a bit older than his eldest 
daughter, Jiajane. He is planning to announce his love affair at the regular Sunday 
family dinner. However, the announcement is perpetually delayed by a series of 
surprising 'announcements' provided 
by his three daughters. 
Bachien, the second daughter, works as a manager in an airline company. She has 
just bought a new house and is about to move out of the family home. A few days 
later, she is appointed by the president to take over a position in the branch in 
Amsterdam. At the same time, she happens to find that her old father seems to have 
serious health problem and this makes 
her hesitate to leave home. 
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Jianing, the youngest daughter who studies Russian at University, meets a boy, 
Kuolung who was originally the boyffiend of her friend and they fall in love with 
each other. At traditional Sunday family dinner, she announces this relationship and 
that she is having his baby. Kuolung comes to pick her up and together they leave the 
family. 
Sufferring from a past relationship, JiaJane devotes herself to religious activities 
and her job as a high school teacher. The family and her friends are always trying to 
introduce someone to her but sheshows no interest. Surprisingly, she meets a new 
teacher, Mingdao, and falls in love with him. She becomes the second member of the 
family to announce major news at the Sunday family dinner declaring that she is 
already married to Mingdao. She is also going to leave home as soon as the family 
have met her husband. 
Bachien is therefore the last one still living at home and she decides to reject the 
offer of the position in Amsterdam to stay with her old father. However, she and her 
sisters are really surprised when their father finally announces that he is going to sell 
the old house and move to a new one with Jingrong. 
cultural confrontations 
In pushing Hands, Ang Lee sets up a series of events and elements to underline the 
conflicts between Chinese and Western culture, represented by Mr Zhu and Martha 
respectively. In the opening sequence, Mr Zhu is shown practicing Taiji in the house 
in the morning dressed in his traditional kungfu clothes, then the camera, switches to 
Martha uses a thoroughly modem device-a computer-to type her novel. 
Throughout the day, they keep on doing different things at the same time but 
separately. Mr Zhu watches Beijing Opera videotapes, smokes, writes calligraphy, 
and eats rice and fried dishes. Martha types up her work, goes jogging, and eats 
healthy food like wheat cookies and vegetable salad. They do not talk to each other 
and the wall dividing the room, shown from outside, implies a barrier between them 
cannot be crossed. 
Alex is their intermediary and the one who embodies the outcome of these cultural 
conflicts. He tries to take care 
both of his father and his wife., just as he tries to find a 
balance between the two cultures. On the one hand, he still practices some traditional 
Chinese virtues, such as filial piety, and respects some Chinese cultural activities, 
such as calligraphy. He also tries to convince Martha to accept them. On the other 
271 
hand, he marries an American and lives a typical American urban life style. He also 
accepts Western education principles to educate Jeremy. He wants to be a mediator 
between his father and Martha but is unable to make both of them happy. The 
pressure is increasingly intense and the conflict reaches crisis point after Mr Zhu gets 
lost and Alex breaks down. The situation seems to force him to choose one side or the 
other. 
Similarly, in The Wedding Banquet, Weitong has been living in New York for ten 
years and has becomes almost a normal New Yorker. Even his homosexuality is 
normal in US society. However is still an abnormal in Chinese societies. 
Consequently, he cannot bring himself to violate the most important virtue in the 
Chinese tradition-filial piety-and tries instead to find a way to make his parents 
happy while maintaining his own chosen life. Again, the attempt to find a balance 
fails in the end. His father Mr Gao, the representative of the traditional culture, has no 
other choice but to acknowledge the truth and accept his son's relationship with 
Simon. 
The confrontation between Oriental and Western cultures seems to be a problem 
that has no easy solution in these films. In Pushing Hand, although kindhearted, 
neither Mr Zhu and Martha are open-minded enough to extend their understanding 
and sympathy to each other's culture and they both refuse to learn each other's 
language to improve communication. In Mr Zhu's view, Martha (the American 
culture) is too utilitarian. By contrast, Mr Zhu (the Chinese culture) is old, outdated, 
obstinate, and less cultivated in Martha's view. The only common ground between 
them is the will to maintain the family. After Alex loses his temper and makes the 
kitchen a mess, they clean it together and bring the house back to normal without 
saying a word. But they still cannot live together at the end. 
Nevertheless, Western culture is always shown as stronger. To maintain his sense 
of self the Chinese old man must not only adjust to but must also isolate himself from 
his Western surroundings. Similarly, after his realisation of his son's sexuality and 
relationship, a disappointed and upset Mr Gao goes back to Taiwan with his wife. The 
final scene of the film, showing Mr Gao raising his arms in front of the American 
inspector at the airport, seems to imply a surrender to the West, the new, and the 
modern. 
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Generational conflicts 
In these these films however, this general cultural conflict is also intimately bound up 
with the tensions between generations. . The parents in the films are not only 
representing Oriental or Chinese culture but also tradition. The young generation by 
contrast represents Western or the Westem-influenced culture and the modem. This 
theme is explored most fully in Eat Drink Man Woman which is set in one of the most 
rapidly changing cities in contemporary Chinese societies. 
In the film, the Chu family lives in an old single-floor house located in the center 
of modem Taipei City. In contrast with the highly mobile and busy traffic and tall 
buildings outside, the space within the house is relatively stagnant, old-fashioned, and 
somewhat vulnerable. Mr Zhu is trying to maintain the family by cooking sumptuous 
meals. His skill in preparing classic Chinese cuisine, which features prominently in 
the film, functions as both a representative element of tradition and a spectacle to 
attract Western audiences. This conspicuous mastery of traditional ways, however, 
becomes steadily less attractive to his daughters (the younger generation) who are 
more familiarwith modem/ Western cultures. Thecontrast between the complicated 
and elaborate processes involved in making Chinese food and the simple and easy 
techniques of American fast food is pointed up when the youngest daughter, Jianing, 
takes a part time job in an American fast food restaurant. She shows the least 
appreciation of her father's cuisine among the daughters. 
On the other hand, the young generation is always trying to follow the basic tenets 
of modem life. The second daughter, Rachien, the representative of the modem, 
young career woman, is planning to buy a new flat in a modem building in order to 
escape from the old house and its stuffy atmosphere. She has arguments with her 
father whenever both of them appear together in the film. This clearly represents the 
conflict between the tradition and the modem. Even the eldest daughter Jiachen, who 
is shown as a more old-fashioned character in the film, gives up the family for her 
new family and leaves the traditional duty of taking care of her father, which she 
assumed since her mother died, to her sister. 
At the same time, the young also experience intense internal conflicts as they 
struggle to adjust to the new modem world. Jiachien in this film, like Alex in Pushing 
Hands and Weitong in The Wedding Banquet, embodies the contradiction between 
oriental/ traditional culture and Western/ modem culture. Their efforts to find a 
balance between two cultures are characterised by sufferings, hesitations, and 
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struggles. Jiachien is the member in the family who is most eager to escape from the 
old house. But after thinking long and hard she decides to give up the position in 
Amsterdam and to stay with her father Yet, she feels frustrated in the end because her 
father is going to sell the old house and get married to a younger woman, an action 
which is not traditional at all. For her, everything is shifting and even the will to 
balance the new and the old fails eventually. 
In fact, the presence of daughters instead of sons in the family has a special 
significance. In Chinese society until very recently, a daughter was a marginal figure 
in the family and had little power in deciding her marriage. The ruling assumption 
was that someday she will leave the family and become a member of another family. 
As the Chinese saying puts it, 'the married daughter is like spilling water'. Therefore, 
Ang, s decision to embody the tensions between tradition and modernity in the lives of 
three women makes the tensions between these conditions even stronger. Weiwei in 
The Wedding Banquet also represents this tension in an intensified form. Her 
pregnancy seems to be an immense price for her liberal and free-spirited personality 
to pay in order to secure a residency permit. These young women appear to be 
independent persons actively striving to create their own futures, but they are 
subjected to even heavier and more complicated pressures than the male characters as 
they become enveloped by modernity (Wei and Fung, 1997). 
The films do not set out to evaluate traditional and the modem values or to 
adjudicate between them, but they do seem to imply that the withering away of the 
tradition is unavoidable. For the older generation, the only choice for them, if they 
still want to survive and maintain their relationship with the young, is to compromise 
and adjust themselves. In 
Pushing Hands, Mr. Chu chooses to live on his own. Mr. 
Gao accepts his son's true sexuality and returns home in The Wedding Banquet. The 
old family collapsed in the 
face of change in Eat Drink Man Woman' (see Figures 
10.2). 
This sense of a world in the process of passing can also be seen in the conversation 
between the hotel manager and Mr Chu when he decides to retire. He explains to the 
n-lanager, who wants 
him to stay, about the unavoidable transformation in 'authentic' 
traditional Chinese food: 
2 Shih holds a different view. She argues that in all three films, the resolutions return the credit to 
traditional patriarchy which 
is now seen as even more capable of containing challenge and difference, 
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Figures 10.2 The youngest daughter announces her'breaking news' and leaves home with her 
boyfriend in Eat Drink Man Woman 
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Manager: Please reconsider it. Master Chu, the hotel needs you. 
Mr. Chu : [Sigh] There are many young chefs. You can easily find a successor. 
Manager: But a chef like you, who is good at Sichuan, Yangzhou, Chaozhou, and Zhejiang 
cuisine, is hard to find these days ... your whole life has been devoted to this, it is 
really waste if you retire... 
Mr Chu : [Sigh] Today, people's hearts have become rude. It is in vain to eat delicately. 
After 40 years of mainland Chinese cuisine coming into Taiwan, cuisine from 
everywhere has merged like various rivers running into the sea. Everything 
tastes the same. Even a slop can pretend as 'Joy Luck Dragon Phoenix", what 
more can I say? 
This conversation also mentions the process Of cultural mixing and combination 
arising from the diaspora experience within the immigrant community. This theme is 
also central to these three films. 
The Diaspora and Real Structural Pressures 
Recent discourse around diaspora and cultural hybridity has tried to describe the 
changing cultural conditions of widely spread immigrant groups in the global age. 
The proponents empbasise the complexity, diversity, and fluidity of immigrant 
identities. They argue that the diaspora experience is neither a simple encounter 
between two clearly defined cultures, nor is an original culture assimilated by another 
culture. Rather, it is a distinctively hybridised and ever-changing cultural formation 
out of which the migrant community constructs a distinctive and hybrid identity. 
However, whilst this discourse celebrates the mixture of cultures it ignores the 
unavoidable conflicts among ethnic groups and classes generated by this process and 
the social and economic pressures which condition them. These two problems can be 
flirther illuminated with reference to some of the episodes in Pushing Hands. The 
Chinese immigrants in the film are making a considerable effort to maintain their 
conventional beliefs and cultural traditions in a foreign place. They organise 
community schools to teach the young generation the language, traditional cultures 
and skills of China. Traditions and beliefs are never of course entirely 'authentic' and 
are always to an extent invented. Nevertheless, they are genuinely rooted in these 
while renewing its validity through 
flexible negotiations and 'well-intentioned' duplicity when 
necessary (Shih, 2000). 
However, I think it is a comproMiSe rather than a negotiation. 
3A deluxe Chinese dish, which contains lobster (as dragon)and abalone (as phoenix). 
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immigrant's minds and bodies and deeply affect their emotions and behavior. 
Consequently, their encounters and adjustments with the 'stronger' culture are always 
full of conflicts, compromises, and struggles. These tensions are embodied in the 
character of Alex in the film (as well as Weitong in The Wedding Banquet). 
In addition, the conflicts are enhanced, and sometimes determined, by the social 
and economic conditions which structure immigrant life. They have to assimilate 
themselves into the society in order to live as well as the natives. They speak a foreign 
language and accept alien cultural values and practices. Even the businessmen and 
women in Chinatown (a re-established imagined homeland) have to accept the 
consumption preferences and habits of native customers. Their efforts to achieve 
economic success are not simply a matter of survival and advancement they are also a 
way of proving to themselves (and others) that their decision to leave the homeland 
was justified. In The Wedding Banquet, Weiwei, is the bearer of these difficult 
conditions. She is an illegal immigrant and (like countless other migrants) enters into 
a false marriage in order to get a Green Card which will allow her to stay legally. 
Likewise, in Pushing Hands, when Alex meets his father in the jail, he is crying and 
expresses the longing of all immigrants, 
Dad, we separated for a long time. I left home to study and work hard here. All I wish 
is to establish a home. I wish someday I can reconcile you to the US and you can live well 
for the rest of your life ... Dadl 
The identity formation of the immigrant may be a hybrid, but the discourse of 
hybridisation cannot properly gasp the complicated process of this cultural encounter. 
The process is full of conflicts, struggles and pain arising from by concrete I social 
and economic factors. The hybridity of the diasopra experience is not formed equally 
by all cultural elements the immigrants ever experience. Rather, it is the outcome of 
struggles between cultural, political and economic forces with unequal weights. 
Ang Lee expresses a pessimistic view of the cultural encounters of human 
immigration. This emerges clearly when Alex begs his father to go home with him. 
Mr Zhu asks his son 'go home? whose homeT and chooses to live on his own in the 
rest of his life- The despair of never 'returning home' not only expresses the sadness 
of diasopra groups but also implies that indigenous traditions and cultures will 
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disappear in time. Only Alex and his son, the ones who have adjusted best to the new 
world, live full lives. 
Ang; Lee Is own career demonstrates this reality. After he made the three films for 
Taiwan's CWC with low budgets and poor filmmaking conditions, he joined the 
Hollywood production system. Since then he has obtained many more resources and 
attracted much more attention because of Hollywood's tremendous industrial power 
and comprehensive global distribution system. It is a situation that many film makers 
dream of. However, his engagement with the global Chinese community disappeared 
with the changes in production conditions and as a result Taiwan lost a film creator 
who was seriously exploring the problems of contemporary Chinese cultures. 
10.2 Contemporary Visions of Local Societies 
The emergence of the global city is recognised as one of the most important features 
of the process of globalisation. Taipei in Taiwan and Shanghai and Beijing in 
mainland China are now joining in the established group of 'global cities' which 
includes Tokyo, Los Angeles, London, and Paris. These cities or areas all have close 
connections with the global political and economic system, present a high mobility 
and fluidity of various people and goods, and enjoy a very similar cultural ambience 
to other global cities. However, the 'globalising' contexts of Taipei, Shanghai and 
Beijing each displays its own unique features which differentiate them form each 
other as well as from major cities 
in the advanced capitalist countries. 
VAiile major cities' links with the global economic and cultural system are 
incessantly celebrated, the inequalities and separations among different groups within 
them and between the cities and the other areas are increasingly widened. Some 
groups and areas may be disconnected 
from the global system, or be connected only 
through deprivation. As locations experiencing rapid development and desperate to 
link with the global system, these contractions are arguably more intense in Taiwan 
and mainland China than that 
in the central capitalist countries. 
Contemporary films, no matter whether the stories are set in the cities or in rural 
areas, present local vision of the process of globalisation and its domestic 
contradictions. Hence, a close analysis of this theme will be helpful in understanding 
the shifting dialectic between the global and the local. Relevant questions include; 
'how are global cities are portrayed in films? ', 'how are the contradictions and 
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differences between urban and rural areas presented T, and 'how do local people in 
different social positions situate themselves within a changing societies T 
The two films selected here are directed by Zhang Yimou and Hou Hsiaohsien 
respectively. Two earlier films (made in the late 1980s) by these two important 
directors, Red Sorghum and City ofSadness, have already been discussed in Chapter 9 
in our analysis of the theme of reconstruction of national identity. In the late 1990s 
however, both decided to direct a contemporary film depicting present-day Chinese 
societies. These works are particularly 
interesting because they allow for several sorts 
of comparisons; between two major 
film creators, between their earlier works and 
later works, and between contemporary Taiwan and mainland China. 
Cooll You Hua Haohao Shuo: Modern City and Collapsed 
Values 
Introduction 
Following a series of historical films which were mainly funded by foreign companies 
and targeted at the international art 
film market in the first half of the 1990s, Zhang 
yimou turned to directing a film dealing with contemporary urban themes. Keep Cool 
(1996) was a domestic production, financed entirely by the state-owned Guangxi Film 
Studio. 
In the film, Zhang aimed to introduce new elements into both the story and 
aesthetics of his creations. 
Keep Cool is an urban comedy, a genre Zhang had never 
worked with before. Its Chinese title, 
You Hua Haohao Shuo, which literally means 
, if you have something to say, say it nicely', hints at the constant threat of disorder 
and chaos that the modem city presents to the people who 
live in it. In terms of film 
form, Zhang uses more varied camera movements and more subjective shots in 
comparison with the relatively steady and objective 
film language employed in 
previous works. The rhythm of the narrative 
is also faster. Indeed, the main actors in 
the film were required to speed up their speech (see Chiao, 1998: 89). The resulting 
style was regarded by some critics as an 
imitation of the Hong Kong film director 
Wang Kar-wai. 
These innovations proved successful in the domestic market and the film entered 
the list of top ten domestic box-office hits in 1996. However, the film is not as well 
known as Zhang's previous works in international market. This is probably because it 
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focuses on contemporary China society and has fewer of the 'exotic' and 'Oriental' 
cultural elements, which Western viewers identify with Thineseness'. The fact that 
the film was a domestic production enabled Zhang and his production team to explore 
local themes and experiment with a new film style, but it also reduced Western 
audiences' interest in it. This may partly explain the choice of stories for Zhang's next 
two films after Keep Cool, Not One Less and The Road Home Both were funded by a 
Hollywood major, Columbia, and set in remote rural areas containing more 'Chinese 
characters'. 
plot Synopsis 
It is Beijing in the late 1990s. A young and reckless bookseller (Zhao) is desperately 
pursuing a gorgeous modem and fashionable girl (Anhong). She lives in a modem 
high-rise building and the bookseller waits outside to catch sight of her every day. 
Anhong however is now with another man, a rich nightclub owner (Liu). As a 
warning to Zhao, Liu together with his fellows beat him on the street. In the fight, 
Zhao gets seriously injured and breaks a laptop computer which is being carried by 
one of the street spectators. T'he man (Zhang) keeps on asking Zhao to buy him a new 
computer. Zhao refuses and argues that it is Liu who should pay for it. Meanwhile, he 
is looking for revenge. 
Zhang goes to Liu seeking satifaction. Liu in turn, wants a reconciliation with 
Zhao and promises big money to both him and Zhang. However, while the two men 
are in a restaurant waiting for their meeting with Liu, Zhang discovers that Zhao has 
not yet given up his thoughts of revenge. He prepares a big Chinese chopper to cut off 
Liu's hand. A scared Zhang tries his best to persuade Zhao give up his plan but Zhao 
insists that he must go through with it. Zhang makes up his mind to stop the possible 
crime by wrecking the restaurant. Finally however he loses his temper and cuts 
Zhao's hand. A couple of years later, Zhang is released from jail and receives a new 
laptop computer from Zhao- 
Value disorder 
The Beijing depicted in Keep Cool is a hotchpotch and chaotic space. Indeed, Zhang 
yirnou mentions that the moving and swinging shots used in the film are specifically 
intended to capture this chaos. 
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It is a hotchpotch because it mixes the old and the modem. Enormous bicycles pass 
by Benz Mercedes. Aged flat houses are located beside modem tower-like buildings. 
Just past a wide, new avenue, you can easily walk into some dirty small alleys. The 
newly rich spend their easy money while homeless and immigrant workers wait for a 
daily job. Young people dressed in international branded clothes pursue their love 
affairs , while workers 
from rural are wearing farming leaf-hats and collecting 
rubbish. The city is crowded, busy, highly mobile, and contains plenty of 
contradictions. 
It is also chaotic because everything seems in order while at the same time is 
potentially disordered. Traditional values seem to have collapsed. The young man 
Zhao represents this new disorder. He does not believe in traditional ways in dealing 
with things, whether crucial or trifling. For him, the traditional way is ineffectual and 
only wastes time. He prefers a straightforward solution driven by instinct, such as 
cutting off Liu's hand in revenge. He has none of the traditional virtues, such as 
politeness and benevolence and consequently has not the slightest intention of 
compensating Zhang for his broken computer. In contrast, Zhang; (who is a little older 
than Zhao) believes that the traditional way is still the best way to solve problems. He 
believes that all difficulties can be overcome by peaceful negotiation and considerate 
kindness. He seems to be an old-fashioned intellectual in the film, in marked 
comparison with Zhao who sells books but does not read them. Their conversation 
about a waitress in the restaurant underlines their differences: 
Zhao: How about that girl? 
Zhang: About what? 
Zhao: I give her 90 points. 
Zhang: [Sigh] To judge a person, the most important thing is to see her personality and 
cultural cultivation. 
Zhao: Don't you know the saying 'a woman who has no talent is a virtue'? 
Zhang: Virtue? Tell me what virtue is. 
Zhao: The virtue is firstly face, secondly breasts, and thirdly bottom. 
Zhang: You don't really understand what virtue is. Do you know who says this 
sentence? 
Zhao: The saying says... 
Zhang: Bullshit. Confucius says it. Let me tell you what is virtue. They are knowledge, 
thought, cultivation, and sentiment. 
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The conversation seems to demonstrate the sharp contrast between a rude man and a 
well-cultivated man. Nevertheless, these two very different men switch roles in the 
pivotal scene. Zhang loses his temper as well as all the traditional virtues -- politeness, 
tolerance, and good sentiment. He changes into a barbarian-like man and uses the 
most uncultivated way to ask for an explanation from the restaurant staff. Here the 
film intends to express the truth that Zhao and Zhang are not really as different as they 
appear to be. They are in fact same kind of people (see Figures 10.3). 
Adjustment Into the modern 
The major similarity between Zhao and Zhang is their obstinacy. Both of them 
tenaciously pursue their goals -a girl, a compensation, a revenge, and a persuasion of 
no revenge. Although they present different cultural faces, one is rude and reckless 
and the other is knowledgeable and polite, they are in fact both traditional Chinese' 
in this regard. The homeless worker who is hired by Zhao to recite a poem loudly to 
Anhong also displays this quality of obstinacy. Indeed, although these people live in a 
modernising env , 
ironment and want to catch up with modem things, their thoughts and 
behaviours; remain stubbornly traditional and unchanged. 
This obstinacy is in contradiction with modem society in two aspects. Firstly, they 
do not believe in the modem way of dealing with disputes - the legal system. They 
prefer their 'normal' but sometimes 'extreme' ways of solving problems (in Zhang 
yimous, words, see Chiao, 1998: 89). For example, Zhang, although he uses a 
modern device - laptop computer follows a traditional way to ask for compensation. 
The first time he goes to Zhao's house he expresses his wish to solve the problem 
privately and peacefully: 
people have suggested to me that I report you to the police. I say, I don't want to bring 
extra trouble to you. I believe only one thing. I explain the reason by myself. Having a 
reason, I can go anywhere. 
Secondly, both experience difficulties in coping with the rapid changes in modem 
society. In comparison with Zhang, Zhao may be 'more modem' and eager to keep up 
with the latest thing. He tries every way he knows to pursue Anhong, who represents 
the height of contemporary fashion. He dresses fashionably himself, writes modem 
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Figures 10.3 The irrationality in contemporary China in Keep coo/ 
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poems, goes to a disco pub with Anhong, and prepares a candle light dinner before 
they make love. However, the modem girl, like the modem world, is always changing. 
The lyric of the song Zhao sings in one of early sequences of the film, 'it is not 
because I am stupid, it is because the world is changing too fast' (by the well-know 
Chinese rock and roll singer Cui Jian), expresses this anxiety. His failure in pursuing 
Anhong implies the general failure of many ordinary people in pursuing the modem. 
From hot red sorghum to keep cool 
About ten years ago, Zhang Yimou expressed his intention of reviving the 'authentic 
vitality, of the Chinese people 
in Red Sorghum. Since then China and her people have 
partly fulfilled his wish 
by showing a strong vitality and momentum in facilitating the 
country, s modernisation. 
The economic achievements are remarkable (see 
introduction in Chapter 5). Yet, the long repressed desire for material goods, once 
unleashed, has also 
been a destructive force. As Zhang puts it, 
The Chinese major cities in the 1990s present a general restlessness and irritability. They 
are full of desire. Everybody feels impulsive, judges things irrationally and subjectively, 
and makes quick decisions before the things develop ... Money, material stuff, and desire 
all converge-they are full of competitions and opportunities. All people desire is to live 
better and be richer (quoted in Chiao, 1998: 89). 
The new economic policy of openness and development has fostered both materialism 
and opportunism, 
but state control over cultural creation remains tight. Although Keep 
Cool is a clearly an urban comedy and less overtly political than Zhang's previous 
works, the PRC government still 
forbids it to travel to the Cannes Film Festival in 
order to 'reducing 
its effect' (Chiao, 1998: 86). The general utilitarian orientation of 
the society, coupled with the continuation of authoritarian regulation, has apparently 
disappointed Zhang. His passion for change presented in Red Sorghum seems to have 
cooled after witnessing ten-year rapid 
development of China. 
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Good-bye South, Good-bye: Purposeless Society and Despairing 
people 
Introduction 
After finishing his 'Taiwan trilogy' on Taiwan history, City of Sadness (1989), The 
puppet Master (199 1), and Good Man Good Woman (1993), Hou Hsiaohsien turned 
to direct a film about contemporary Taiwan. Unlike his earlier works which attracted 
investments from domestic companies and government finance aid, the majority of 
the funding for Good-bye South, Good-byel Nanguo ZaYian Nanguo (1996) came 
from a Japanese film company, Shochiku. The company also backed Hou 
I-Isiaohsien's independent production studio to make The Flower ofShanghai (1998). 
The film was not the first time Hou had dealt with contemporary Taiwanese 
society. The Daughter offile 
(1987) was his first attempt to depict the present rapidly 
changing society and the experiences of the young people living through it. However, 
Good-bye was made after Hou had obtained significant international attention. Once 
City of Sadness won the Golden Lion at the Venice Film Festival, international 
companies showed an 
interest in investing in his films. Good-bye was the first film 
directed by Hou as a fully 'intemationalised' production (see the discussion in 
Chapter 8). At a personal level, Hou also expressed a strong desire to tackle the 
current changes in Taiwanese society after three productions set in historical Taiwan. 
I-Jowever, to his disappointment, the film was not successful in the domestic 
market. And local 
film critics, who were basically supporters, felt confused and 
unable to grasp the 
logic of his shift of focus (see Lin Wenqi et al, 2000). In fact, ever 
since City of Sadness 
had achieved its notable success in the home market, the 
domestic box-office performances of Hou's films had been in crisis. At the same time, 
foreign film critics remained interested in his films and international companies 
continue to give 
him finance support. This context is particularly relevant to his 
subsequent production, 
The Flower of Shanghai, which tells story which has nothing 
to do with Taiwan. Good-bye therefore marks a moment of transition in Hou's career. 
plot Synopsis 
It is Taiwan in the late 1990s. Gao is a thirty something man with two personas. He 
runs a small restaurant 
in Taipei but the business is not very successful. He also takes 
responsibility for taking care of 
his aged father and the whole family but often feels 
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incapable in that role. Following the trend of local businesses to move to mainland 
China, Gao wants to go to Shanghai looking for better opportunities to make money. 
This plan however is discouraged by his girl friend, whose family has immigrated to 
the US. 
Gao together with his fellow, a reckless young man Flatty and Flatty's girlfriend 
Pretzel, also work for a local gangster Hsi, acting as lookouts for Hsi's private 
gambling house and as negotiators 
in illegal deals. Gao is actually not good in gang 
activities. Furthermore, 
Flatty and Pretzel, although loyal to him, never help him 
effectively but only 
bring him trouble. In fact, they play no significant role in the gang 
and just show up whenever 
Hsi wants assistance. 
one day they are instructed by Hsi to go to the south of Taiwan to handle an illegal 
deal. The government is going to condemn a farm to make way for an electicity 
company and to pay out substantial compensation. 
Hsi asks Gao to intervene in the 
negotiation process and obtain an 
interest. The task is surprisingly completed. 
However, the bad things start to happen. Gao's girlfriend comes down the south and 
tells him that she is going to move to the 
US with her family. In response Gao, insists 
on going to Shanghai 
because he is completely unfamiliar with the US and cannot 
speak English. At the same 
time, Flatty goes back his old home to ask for a share of 
the family inheritance but 
is seriously beaten by his distant cousin who is a policeman. 
FlattY is desperate to get revenge and asks Gao to help him. But they are caught when 
they are looking for some weapons. 
Hsi mobilizes some of his contacts and gets them 
released. On their way 
driving back home from the south, the car suddenly crashes 
into a rice field. The final long 
distance shot seems to imply that Gao dies in the car. 
A money-is-everything world 
The Taiwan in the late 1990s portrayed in Good-bye presents two different faces and 
Gao is moves between them. Automobiles, modem buildings, and superhighways 
constitute a modem 
Taipei, where he stays as a chef in his restaurant. The use of a 
green camera filter present aspects of 
this Taipei as a cold and emotionless space. It is 
cold but at same time also extravagant and 
indulgent. In a sequence showing Pretzel 
singing a soft song which was popular 
in Shanghai nightclubs in the 1930s, Gao sits 
on the bed and his girlfriend 
Ying lies beside him. They have supposedly just made 
love and seem to take some cannabis. This time the colour is soft yellow. This is a 
positively changed and modernised 
Taiwan. 
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In contrast, trains, old railways, small towns, and (naturally) green hills represent 
the rural south of Taiwan. The principle of living in the area is instinctive, physical, 
and masculine. People here are more friendly and straightforward than in Taipei. But, 
they are also more violent and forceful in dealing with matters. In the sequence in a 
private gambling house, for example, a forty something man invites Flatty to have a 
cup of tea. Because he called Flatty 'flat head', which is exactly the reason of the 
nickname Flatty is humiliated, becomes annoyed and assaults the man. Suddenly an 
initially friendly atmosphere changes into in scene of open conflict. The people of the 
south may be not as delicate and elegant as Taipei people, but they too are on their 
way of further modernisation. The condemnation of a pig farm to make way for 
electricity construction represents this development. This is a Taiwan currently in 
change and transition. 
These two faces of Taiwan have one thing in common. That is, it is a money-is- 
everything world. People living there are eager to pursuing riches and make money. 
Nevertheless, the Taiwan shown in the film has passed the heyday of its get-rich- 
quick period. Some people, perhaps the most enterprising, have moved to mainland 
China or to North America to look for new opportunities, while those who stay on the 
island are left with merely residual interests. Gao, as a thirty something man who 
takes major responsibility of his big family and bears the expectation of great 
achievement from his girlfriend, carries this overwhelming pressure. Although Flatty 
is still in his restless and wild years, his and Pretzel's desire to consume also forces 
bin, to make some money quickly. That is why he goes back to his grandfather's 
home and asks to share the inheritance. But today's world seems reluctant to give 
them a chance (see Figures 10.4). 
Unlinked people in the global age 
In fact, the movement of local businesses and industries overseas and to mainland 
China, and the immigration of rich people to North America and Australia, are central 
features in the recent development of Taiwan in the context of globalisation. A result 
of this process, which has been often ignored by the advocates of globalisation but is 
featured centrally in the film, is that there are individuals and groups who are 'left 
behind' and remain unlinked to the global system while the others are 'catching up 
with' the newest development. 
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Figures 10.4 The island in disorder in Good-bye South, Good-bye 
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In the film, people are continually taking about going to Shanghai and Zhenyang to 
do business. However, only a few are successful. Gao's investment in Zhenyang has 
failed but he still decides to go to Shanghai by himself. Meanwhile, other people have 
moved or are going to move to North America in search of a better standard of living. 
ying and her family are examples. Even gangster Hsi's wife and children have 
immigrated to Canada. But for Gao, America is too distant and uncertain. He believes 
that mainland China is a more obvious a better place to go. But even this choice 
seems difficult to realise. 
Staying at home is however no easier. The elder generation, represented by the 
gangster Hsi, and by corrupt politicians and officials, 
have taken most of the resources 
generated by past rapid 
development. Gao as a thirty something man without support 
from his family, cannot even run a restaurant well. In a sequence where he gets 
seriously drunk in the 
South, he says in tears, 
I failed my father. Ying wanted me to open a restaurant. Fuck, the fortune-teller said I 
have some battles to fight. I am only running a restaurant. I am so fucking tired. And I 
have some battles to fight? I just want to open a restaurant! 
Gao finds himself somewhere in between these shifts in many aspects. He is between 
the north and the south, between the ordinary people and the gangsters, and between 
the people who have left and the people who can only stay. It is therefore not 
surprising that 
he 'has some battles to fight' or that he becomes the most tragic 
character in the 
film. Nevertheless, because he is in-between so he is not one of the 
truly marginal and unlinked people. 
Two groups represent this marginality in the film. 
The people in gambling house and karaoke parlour in the south and the old people 
living in rural villages are the first. Faltty and Pretzel, the representatives of the 
younger generation, are the second. 
Their dress presents a mixture of American and 
japanese fashion. Their daily lives display a sort of purposeless and an atmosphere of 
boredom and ennui. They are not worrying about whether to move to mainland China 
or to anywhere else. 
If anything interests them, it is consumption. Pretzel represents 
the extreme example of this type of 
life. She is always playing with something and 
never says anything meaningful. 
She spends over one million NT dollars in a 
nightclub and plunging 
Flatty into a financial crisis and indirectly causing the death of 
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Gao. In one sequence she is playing computer games and crying simultaneously, 
implying that her life is a ludicrous but ultimately tragic 
Towards the end of the film, a frustrated thirty something man and a reckless and 
purposeless twenty something youngster decide to take a meaningless and 
unnecessary revenge. The only thing they have in common is masculine ffiendship, 
but sadly and ridiculously, they cannot even accomplish their act of revenge. The 
whole world betrays them. When Gao summons his residual dignity and says good- 
bye to the south, he says good-bye to his no-way-out life, too. Flatty and Pretzel live 
on, but aimlessly. 
From city of sadness to Island of purposeless 
Seven years before Good-bye was made, like Zhang Yimou, Hou wanted to recall the 
lost vitality and courage of the people living on the island in City of Sadness. The 
contemporary Taiwan he presents is an altogether sadder place. If Zhang Yimou 
presents a kind of disappointment lurking behind the comedic surface of Keep Cool, 
what Hou Hsiaohsien expresses in Good-bye is despair. It is not only the characters in 
the film who despair but also Hou himself 
interestingly, despite of Zhang's disappointment in present society, Keep Cool 
enjoyed great success in mainland China and Zhang still enjoys support from local 
audiences there. Ile situation may not be as good as people had hoped for so far, but 
the struggle to adjust to the modem world is still going on and the opportunity to 
make a better future is still there both on film and in reality. in contrast, Hou 
experienced an embarrassing failure and both his artistic and market performances 
were in crisis. The Chinese title of Good-bye, Nanguo Zayian Nanguo, literally 
, farewell to a country in the south', implies that disappointed people are leaving 
Taiwan, a country situated to the south from the viewpoint of the major urban centers 
of mainland China. This became Hou's own choice at that time. He did what Gao 
always wanted to do but never got the chance to do chance in the film -- went to 
Shanghai to prepare his next film Flower ofShanghaP. 
414ou finally went back Taiwan to shoot Flower ofShanghal because he and his production team could 
not find a proper condition 
for making the film. His latest film Millennium Mambo (2001) is again 
about contemporary Taiwan. 
Yet, Good-bye and Hou's decision at that time still has crucial 
significance in the recent 
development of Taiwan's film industry. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has explored the relations between globalisation and national culture 
theoretically and has taken the film industries in Taiwan and China as a case study in 
order to examine in detail the impact of globalisation on the organisation and 
regulation of national cultural production and distribution. Some selected filins have 
been analysed to explore the uses of film in representing shifting conceptions of 
national culture and identity. The case of these two Chinese cinemas presents some 
elements that are shared by other 'developing' societies as well as elements rooted in 
the very specific histories of the shifting relations between the national cultures of 
China and Taiwan and general global transitions. 
Global Processes 
Globalisation is a slippery concept to grasp. Nevertheless, there are certain key factors 
that characterise its central dynamics. It involves movements, of trade, finance, labour, 
and culture, that transcend national boundaries and present challenges to the systems 
of control operated by nation-states. It is a multidimensional process that embraces 
social, political, economic, shifts which are complexly interconnected with each other. 
It is also a dialectic process in which overlapping sets of antonyms - universalisation 
and particularisation, connection and fragmentation, centralisation and 
decentralisation, conflict and balance - are at work simultaneously. Finally, it is 
asymmetric process in which the 
distribution of power and resources is increasingly 
unequal between different regions and groups. 
Communication is undoubtedly central to these processes. The global information 
network established by tramnational communication corporations helps propel the 
dynamics of the globalising economy, while at the same time the accelerating global 
exchange of information and cultural product transforms global and national cultural 
landscapes. Correspondingly, nation-states are facing mounting challenges in 
regulating and governing national cultural industries as well as in maintaining 
national identity. They must therefore take measures to adapt to the present wave of 
cultural globalisation. 
For some critics cultural globalisation is creating globally hybridised cultures and 
dismantling national cultural monopolies. Others, in contrast, regard the formation of 
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a global market and the rise of new communication technologies are more likely to 
consolidate the power of existing media giants and to squeeze the space in which local 
cultural production can thrive. The position taken in this thesis is closer to the latter 
position but argues that concepts of 'nation' and 'national culture' remain 
strategically useful in achieving global democracy and equality. The concrete 
situation however is much more complicated than the theoretical argument. 
Along with the crisis of the nation-state and national culture, the concept of 
national cinema is also in question 
in the context of globalisation. With the single 
exception of the US film 
industry, every national cinema is currently in severe 
difficulties both industrially and in culturally. Again, there are critics who assert that 
the concept and practice of national cinema is obsolete and celebrate an emerging 
diverse global film culture. The thesis presented here however, regards this argument 
as supporting (albeit unwittingly 
in some cases) the dominant position of Hollywood 
cinema in the global film market and argues that the concept and practice of national 
cinema should be critically maintained 
in order to ensure that culturally-specific 
cinemas not only survive 
but thrive, and are able to speak to the changing conditions 
of national life. 
National Responses 
Since they went their separate ways in 1949, Taiwan and China have followed very 
different trajectories in both their internal political economic development and their 
relations with the world system. 
However, their paths have increasingly converged 
since the late 1970s. 
In Taiwan, the authoritarian KMT regime activated a series of 
political and economic 
liberalisation reforms in response to its legitimacy crisis and 
the pressure for further economic growth. 
This reform process was underpinned by a 
new relationship 
between state and capital in which capitalists have overtaken the 
state to occupy the 
dominant position in structuring social processes. Accompanying 
this internal power shift, Taiwan 
has become fin-ther articulated within the global 
economic system. 
The new power network formed between the local state, local 
capitalists, major transnational capitals, and 
the major states in the new post- 
communist world order, 
has severely undermined the sovereignty of Taiwan. At the 
same time, it has also 
become increasingly subordinate to global political economic 
rules. 
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On the other hand, after its 30-year isolated experiment in building socialism with 
Chinese characteristics, China decided to re-establish links with the capitalist world 
market. This process however is much more complicated than that of Taiwan. The 
CCP state has introduced market forces into social processes while at the same time 
the leadership of the Party and the dominant power of the state has remained 
relatively solid. The new experiment is called a 'socialist market economy' but the 
concrete practice is a 'corporatisation' of state-owned institutions. It maybe premature 
to judge the long-term result of the reform, but two things are already clear. Firstly, 
although the state maintains the dominant position domestically, the transnationals 
and core capitalist states exert increasing influence on the state's decision-making. 
Secondly, a kind of cooperation between the state and domestic and transnational 
capital has been forming with the aim of securing each party's interests. Unlike the 
state of Taiwan, which functions in a subordinate role in its collaboration with capital, 
the state of China plays a more active role because of its dominance in the society. 
The transition in national identity has become a prominent issue in both locations 
along with the political economic transformations. The issue gets even more 
complicated because of the increasing interaction and exchange between the two 
societies in economic and civil arenas, which is also an outcome of global integration. 
In Taiwan, the old 'authentic Chinese identity' imposed by the KMT has collapsed, 
while the new 'Taiwanese identity' is still under construction. In contrast, 'traditional 
Chinese identity' has been undergoing a process of vigorous re-construction after the 
Great Cultural Revolution in China. National sentiments are again mobilised to 
support the new national development project in the globalising world. Nevertheless, 
the present dynamics of economic and cultural globalisation also tend to fragment the 
reconstruction of national identities in both societies. 
In parallel with these transformations, the conditions for China and Taiwan's film 
industries have changed or are in the process of changing. In Taiwan, foreign films 
(mostly from Hollywood) have dominated the film distribution and exhibition market. 
The government's film policies follow neo-liberalist thinking and prefer free-market 
deregulation. Local film production has therefore been in a state of crisis to which the 
film industry has responded in two main ways. Firstly, major capitalist interests in the 
industry have gradually withdrawn resources from film production and moved to 
overseas or to new media markets. Secondly, we see what I call the 
intemationalisation of art film production. A few selected art film creators function as 
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subcontractors to produce art films for foreign investors, works which are seldom 
popular in the home market. Except from this tiny and 'alienated' production, 
Taiwan's film industry has almost completely disappeared. 
In China, the situation is more complicated and ambiguous. The reform of the film 
industry started in 1993, mainly by introducing markets and competition into the old 
state-owned-and-run film system, with the aim of adjusting China's film industry to 
the new environment. At the same time, Hollywood's entry into the domestic film 
market has been increasing, and its popularity seems almost invincible along with 
China's entry into the WTO. Facing with novel market factors and the threat from 
foreign films, local film production has also been in crisis since the mid-1990s. The 
state has actively introduced private capital into the industry and the 
internationalisation of art film production has also supported a few film directors. 
Nevertheless, unlike the recent quick withdrawal of the state of Taiwan from 
regulating market, the Chinese state maintains strong intervention in film importation, 
production, and distribution. This has prompted contradictory consequences. On the 
one hand, some originally state-owned organisations have used their privileged 
resources to transform themselves into major 'private' film companies. In the process 
they have developed a conservative-entertaining orientation to production and in 
effect entered into an ideological collaboration with the state, making films that offer 
no political provocations. On the other hand, the preservation of some space and 
resource for local productions prevents the local film industry and market from 
becoming completely globalised. Whether the industry will grasp the opportunity to 
produce a more 'ideal' national cinema however, remains to be seen. 
As we have seen, explorations around the issue of national identity appeared in 
many films in both Taiwan and China in the late 1980s. A strong intention to 
reconstruct a new national character adapted to the new global system is expressed in 
a number of significant films. Some films were engaged in depicting the changing 
societies by presenting the contradictions between tradition and modernity. The need 
to adjust, or even give up, tradition in order to catch up with the modem world order 
is also addressed. Generally speaking, these films were not far from mainstream 
ideology. However, due to the flu-ther commercialisation and globalisation of the 
industries and markets, serious films on similar themes gradually lost public attention. 
As a consequence, issues around national identity have become much less significant 
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in more recent films. Instead, mixed sentiments of disappointment, despair, loss, and 
purposeless are articulated through portrayals of increasingly materialistic societies. 
Reflections on Theory 
Today's processes of cultural globalization involve three major trends: 
(1) the global expansion of transnational communications conglomerates; 
(2) the global implementation of market-oriented cultural policies; and 
(3) the global diffusion of new communication technologies. 
These processes have set in motion complicated consequences and prompted a range 
of national responses. In the case studies presented here, we see several prominent 
and inter-linked shifts: 
(1) The global imposition of the ideology of neo-liberalism, through global media and 
international economic negotiations, leads to the widespread implementation of 
market-oriented cultural policies, which in practice take the form of marketisation 
and deregulation. In the case of cinema, the state reduces or abolishes importation 
and screen quotas, corporatises originally state-owned film orgnisations, and 
emphasises the entertainment and commercial features of cinema. These measures 
in effect ease the reins on local and transnational capitals and eliminate barriers for 
them. This does not mean that the state is increasingly irrelevant or insignificant in 
the context of globalisation, as some critics argue. It remains significant and 
pivotal and the key change is in its relations with capital and with civil society. 
(2) The global expansion of large communications corporations aims to create a 
global film production and consumption network. Their first strategy is globalism. 
They have been trying to undermine national boundaries and compress time and 
space in order to construct a synchronised global market and provide the same 
products everywhere. The second strategy is localisation, used here in a specific 
sense. There are two practices here. They incorporate local cultural factors into 
mainstream productions by adapting local stories and themes and recruiting 
already-famous talents from everywhere in the world. Secondly, some major 
transnational film companies as well as some second-rank Western and Japanese 
295 
film companies invest in selected local film creators to produce art films with 
exotic and unique cultural elements to supply international art film markets. This 
process of so-called 'glocalisation' is far from a project to foster diverse and equal 
cultural exchange. Rather, it is a business strategy to control the global market. 
(3) New communication technologies, particularly home video, cable and satellite 
television, have had a profound impact on the film industry. In the US and a few 
other Western countries, the major corporations involved in the cinema or general 
communications fields have transformed themselves into multi-media 
conglomerates by merger and integration. The resulting synergies enable them to 
be even more powerful in international competition and expansion. In contrast, for 
the film industries in most other countries, including Taiwan and China, which 
lack historic competitive advantages in capital and markets, the diffusion of new 
communication technologies implies a re-allocation of scarce resources. Local 
investors are very likely, if there is no state intervention, to move their money 
from increasingly unprofitable film production to more lucrative new media 
sectors. They tend to distribute relatively cheap imported programmes or 
redistribute old products from their libraries. These business strategies finther 
weaken local film production and help mainstream imported materials to expand 
their reach. 
(4) Faced with the three conditions mentioned above, local film industries found 
themselves unavoidably in crisis, particularly in the film production sector. The 
market share of local production is also severely threatened. There are however 
some possible developments in response to the crisis. Firstly, an art film 
production industry remains and continues to operate by depending on state 
subsidy or/and foreign investments. These productions aim to target the 
international art film markets or/and to display officially sanctioned national 
images. They tend to ignore the demands of local audiences, particularly when the 
state does not intervene in reserving distribution and exhibition space for local 
production. 
Secondly, mainstream film production, when it does have access to resources to 
some extent, as in China, pursues more market-oriented practices and concentrates 
on more entertainment-oriented production in order to compete with imported 
commercial films. This practice develops with the consent of the state because the 
results pose no threat to official ideology. 
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(5) The overall consequences for the development of national film culture are harder 
to grasp. But it is clear that it presents neither a prosperous scene of diverse and 
progressive cultural exchange nor the absolute dominance of American or Western 
culture and the resulting cultural homogenisation. There is some knitting together 
the dominance of Hollywood and the marketisation of the local film industries. 
Some instances of 'alternative' cinemas, in comparison with the old, traditional, 
mainstream, and often officially recognised national cinema, have appeared along 
with the political and economic transformations. Yet, they are all too readily 
incorporated into the already commercialised local film industry or into the 
international network of art film production. Otherwise, they would remain an 
unpopular minority in a Hollywoodised film market. State intervention is the key. 
A balance between art and entertainment, social concern and universal sentiment, 
artistic innovation and popular accessibility is still possible but can only be 
achieved by democratic state intervention. 
The Next Step 
The future for Taiwan's film industry looks bleak. The ideology of free market theory 
has become dominant and the capitalist character of the state is already established. 
The local film industry has been abandoned and only the distribution and exhibition 
sectors remain to serve as the outlets of the products of transnational film companies. 
This is one of the cultural costs for Taiwan being completely 'globalised'. 
China in contrast has the opportunity to develop a diverse national film industry 
and to adjust to the new global environment because of its strong insistence on state 
intervention. However, the state will remain authoritarian and civil society is unlikely 
to grow in a progressive direction in the near future. Thus, it is entirely possible that 
we will see a further commercialisation of the film industry and a market supported 
by a mutually beneficial collaboration between the state and capital rather than a 
democratic and vigorous film culture. 
297 
Reference 
English Literatures 
Ahmad, A. (1992) In Theory. ' Classes, Nations, Literatures. London: Verso. 
Aksoy, and Robins, K. (1992) Hollywood for the 21st century: global competition for 
critical mass in image markets. Cambridge Journal ofEconomics, 16 (1: 1-22). 
Aldcroft, D. H. (2060) Education and development: the experience of the four little 
tigers. In A. J. H. Latham and H. Kawakatsu (eds. ) Asia Pacific Dynamism 1550- 
2000. London and New York: Routledge. 
Amin, S. (1996) Capitalism in the Age of Globalisaion: The Management of 
Contemporary Society. New York: St. Martin. 
Amin, S. (1997) Reflections on the international system. In P. Golding and P. Harris 
(eds) Beyond Cultural Imperialism: Globalisation, Communication and the New 
international Order. London: Sage. - 
Anderson, B. (199 1) Imaged Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of 
Nationalism (second edition). London: Verso. 
Appadurai, A. (1990) Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy. in 
M. Featherstone (ed. ), Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalisation and Modernity. 
London: Sage. 
Balio, T. (ed. )(1985) The American Film Industry. Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press. 
Balio, T. (1990) Hollywood in the Age of Television. Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press. 
Balio, T. (1996) Adjusting to the new global economy: Hollywood in the 1990s. In A. 
Moran (ed. ) Film Policy: International, National and Regional Perspectives. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
Bauman, Z. (1996) From pilgrim to tourist-or a short history of identity. In S. 
Hall, & P. du Gay (eds. )(I 996) Questions of Cultural Identity. London: Sage. 
Beck, U. (2000[1997]) nat is Globalisation ?. Translated by P. Camiller. Cambridge: 
Polity. 
Bello, W. & Rosenfeld, S. (1990). Dragons in Distress: Asia's Miracle Economies in 
Crisis. London: Penguin. 
298 
Berry, C. (1991). Market forces: China's 'Fifth Generation' faces the bottom line. 
In Chris Berry (ed), Perspective on Chinese Cinema. London: BFI. 
Billig, M. (1995) Banal Nationalism. London: Sage. 
Binford, Mira Reym(1989). Indian Cinema introduction. Quarterly Review offilm & 
Video, 11: 1-9. 
Borchardt, K. (2000) The ABC of Community Law. Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities. 
Bordwell, David (2000) Planet Hong Kong: Popular Cinema and the Art of 
Entertainment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Bourdieu, P. (1993) The Field of Cultural Production. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Boyd-Barrett, 0. (1997) International communication and globalisation: contradictions 
and directions. In A. Mohammadi (ed. ) International Communication and 
Globalisation: A Critical Introduction. London: Sage. 
Boyd-Barrett, 0. (1998) Media imperialism reformulated. In D. K. Thussu (ed. ) 
Electronic Empires: Global media and local resistance. London: Arnold. 
Broad, D. (1995) Globalisation versus labour. Monthly Review, December, pp. 20-29. 
Bullard, N., Bello, W. & Mallhotra, K. (1998) Taming the tigers: The IMF and the 
Asian crisis. Third World Quarterly, 19(3: 505-555). 
Burton, J. (1986) Cinema and Social Change in Latin America. Austin, Texas: 
University of Texas Press. 
Burton-Carvajal, J. (2000) South American cinema. In J. Hill and P. C. Gibson (eds. ) 
World Cinema: Critical Approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Castells, M. (1992). Four Asian tigers with a dragon head: A comparative analysis of 
the state, economy and society in the Asia Pacific Rim. In R. P. Appelbaum and J. 
Henderson (eds. ). States and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim. California: 
Sage. 
Castells, M. (1996) The Rise ofInformation Society. (The Information Age: Economy, 
Society and Culture, Volume 1). Oxford: Balckwell. 
Castells, M. (1997) The Power of Identity (The Information Age: Economy, Society 
and Culture, Volume 2). Oxford: Blackwell. 
Castells, M. (1998) End of Millennium. (The Information Age: Economy, Society 
and Culture, Volume 3). Oxford: Blackwell. 
Chai, J. C. H. (1997) China: Transition to a Market Economy. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
299 
Chow, R. (1995) Primitive Passions: Visuality, Sexuality, Ethnography, and 
Contemporary Chinese Cinema. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Collins, R. (1990) Culture, Communication, and National Identity., The Case of 
Canadian Television. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Collins, R. and Murroni, C. (1996) New Media, New Policies. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Comor, E. A. (1997) The re-tooling of American hegemony: U. S. foreign 
communication policy from free flow to free trade. In A. Sreberny-Mohammadi et 
al. (eds. ) Media in Global Context. - A Reader. London: Arnold. 
Crofts, S. (1993) Reconceptualising national cinema/s. Quarterly Review of Film and 
Video, Vol. 14, No. 3, p. 50. 
Curran, J. and Seaton, J (1997) Power without Responsibility: The Press and 
Broadcasting in Britain, the fifth edition. London: Routledge. 
Dissanayake, W. (1994) Introduction: nationhood, history, and cinema: reflections on 
the Asian scene. In W. Dissanayake (ed. ) Colonialism and Nationalism in Asian 
Cinema. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Douglass, M. (1994) The 'developmental state' and the newly inclustrialised 
economies of Asia. Environment and Planning A, 26(4: 543 -566). 
Du Boff, R. B. and Herman, E. (1997) A critique of Tabb on globalisaiton. Monthly 
Review, November 1997, pp. 27-35. 
Elsaesser, T. (1989) New German Cinema. London: BFI/Macmillan. 
Elsaesser, T. (1993) Hyper-, Retro- or Counter- cinema: European cinema and Third 
cinema between Hollywood and art cinema. In J. King, A. M. Lopez and M. 
Alvarado (eds. ) Mediating Two Worlds: Cinematic Encounters in the Americas. 
London: BFI. 
Eun, H. C. (1996) State and Power in East Asian Development: The Case of 
Korea. Doctoral Thesis, Loghborough University, the UK. 
Fairbank, J. K. (1983) Introduction: maritime and continental in China's history. In J. 
K. Fairbank (ed. ) The Camhridge History of China, Volume 12. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Fairbank, J. K. and Liu, K. C. (1980) Preface. In J. K. Fairbank and K. C. Liu (eds. ) 
The Cambridge History of China, Volume 11. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
300 
Featherstone, M. (1990) Global culture: an introduction. In Featherstone, M. (ed. ), 
Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalisation and Modernity. London: Sage. 
Featherstone, A (1995) Undoing Culture: Globalisation, Postmodernism and 
Identity. London: Sage. 
Ferguson, A (1990a) Forward. In M. Ferguson (ed. ) Public Communication: The 
New Imperatives. London: Sage. 
Ferguson, M. (1990b) Electronic media and the redefining of time and space. in M. 
Ferguson (ed. ) Public Communication: The New Imperatives. London: Sage. 
Flitterman-Lewis, S. (1987) Psychoanalysis, film, and television. In R. C. Allen (ed. ) 
Channels of Discourse. Chapel Hill and London: University of North California 
Press. 
Fonoroff, P. (1998). Hong Kong cinema. In Y. Zhang and Z. Xiao (eds. ) 
Encyclopaedia ofChinese Film. London: Routledge. 
Fu, P. and Desser, D. (2000) Introduction. In P. Fu and D. Desser (eds. ) The Cinema 
ofHong Kong. History, Arts, Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gao, S. Q. (1996) China's Economic Reform. London: MacMillan Press. 
Garnham, N. (1983 a) Public service versus the market. Screen, 24(l): 6-27. 
Garnham, N. (1983b) Toward a theory of cultural materialism. Journal of 
Communication, Summer, pp. 314-329. 
Garnham, N. (1990) Capitalism and Communication: Global Culture and the 
Economics ofInformation. London: Sage. 
Gellner, E. (1983) Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Gellner, E. (1997) Nationalism. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 
Giddens, A. (I 981)A Contemporary Critique offfistorical Materialism (1995 second 
edition). London: Macmillan Press. 
Giddens, A. (1985) The Nation-State and Violence. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Giddens, A. (1990) The Consequences ofModernity. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Giddens, A. (199 1) Modernity and Self-identity., Self and Society in the Late Modern 
Age. Cambridge: Polity. 
Giddens, A. (1994) Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Giddens, A. (1999) Runaway World. London and New York: Routledge. 
301 
Gokulsing, K. Moti and Dissanayake, W. (1998) Indian Popular Cinema: A Narrative 
of Cultural Change. London: Trentham Books. 
Goldberg, D., Prosser, T. and Verhulst, S. (1998). EC Media Law and Policy. Essex, 
England: Addison Wesley Longman. 
Golding, P. and Murdock, G. (199 1) Culture, communications, and political economy. 
In J. Curran and M. Gurenvitch (eds. ) Mass Media and Society. London: Arnold. 
Golding, P. (1994) Telling stories: sociology, journalism, and the informed citizen. 
European Journal of Communication, 9 (4): 461 - 484. 
Golding, P. (1996) World wide wedge: division and contradiction in the global 
information infrastructure. Monthly Review, Volime 48, Number3, pp. 70 -85. 
Golding, P. and Harris, P. (1997) Introduction. In P. Golding and P. Harris (eds. ) 
Beyond Cultural Imperialism: Globalisation, Communication, and the New 
International Order. London: Sage. 
Golding, P. and Harris, P. (eds. ) (1997) Beyond Cultural Imperialism: Globalisation, 
Communication and the New International Order. London: Sage. 
Golding, P. (1998a) Worldwide wedge: division and contradiction in the global 
information infrastructure. In D. K. Thussu (ed. ) Electronic Empires: Global 
media and local resistance. London: Arnold. 
Golding, P. (1998b) New technologies and old problems: Evaluating and regulating 
media performance in the 'information age', in K. Brants, J. Hermes, and L. van 
Zoonen (eds. ) The Media in Question: Popular Cultures and Public Interests. 
London: Sage. 
Gramsci, A. (1971) Selectionsfrom Prison Notebooks, translated by Q. Hoare and G. 
Nowell-Smith. London: Lawrence & Wishart. 
Grantham, B. (2000) Some Big Bourgeois Brothel. Contexts for France's Culture 
Wars with Hollywood. Luton, the UK: University of Luton Press. 
Guback, T. (1969) The International Film Industry: Western Europe andAmerica 
Since 1945. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Guback, T. (1974a) Cultural identity and film in the European economic community. 
Cinema Journal, 14, Fall: 2-17. 
Guback, T. (1974b) Film as international Business. Journal of Communication, 24, 
Winter: 297-314. 
Guback, T. (1985a) Hollywood's international market. In T. Balio (ed. ) The American 
Film industry. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 
302 
Guback, T. (1985b) Non-market factors in the international distribution of American 
films. In B. A. Austin (ed. ) Current Research in Film, Volume 1. New Jersey: 
Ablex Publishing. 
Guback, T. (198 6) Shaping the film business in postwar Germany: The role of the US 
film industry and the US state. In P. Kerr (ed. ) The Hollywood Film Industry. 
London: BFI and Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Guback, T. (1987) Government financial support to the film industry in the 
United States. In B. Austin(ed. ). Current Research in Film, Vol. 3. N. J.: Ablex. 
Hall, S. (1990). Cultural identity and diaspora. In J. Rutherford(ed. ). Identity. 
Community, Culture, Difference. London: Lawrence & Wishart. 
Hall, S. (1992). The question of cultural identity. In S. Hall, D. Held & T. McGrew 
(eds. ). Modernity and Its Futures. Cambridge: Polity. 
Hall, S. (199 1) The local and the global: globalisation and ethnicity. In A. King, (ed. ). 
Culture, Globalisation, and the World-System (reprinted in 1997). Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2000) Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Hamelink, C. (1994) The Politics of World Communication: .4 Human Right 
Perspective. London: Sage. 
Harris, N. (1992) States, economic development, and the Asian Pacific Rim. In R. P. 
Appelbaum and J. Henderson (eds. ). States and Development in the Asian Pacific 
Rim. California: Sage. 
Harvey, D. (1989) The Condition ofPostmodernity. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Hayward, S. (1993) French National Cinema. London: Routledge. 
Hedetoft, U. (2000) Contemporary cinema: Between cultural globalisation and 
national interpretation. In M. Hjort, and S. Mackenzie (eds. ) Cinema and Nation. 
London: Routledge. 
Held, D. and McGrew, A.; Goldblatt, D. and Perraton, J. (1999) Global 
Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Held, D and McGrew, A. (2000) The great globalisation debate: An introduction. In 
Held, D and McGrew, A. (eds) The Global Transformations Reader. Cambridge: 
Polity. 
Helleiner, G. K. (1990) The New Global Economy and the Developing Countries: 
Essays in International Economics and Development. Hants, England: Edward 
Elgar. 
303 
Henderson, J. and Appelbaum, R. P. (1992) Situating the state in the East Asian 
development processes. In R. P. Appelbaum and J. Henderson (eds. ). States and 
Development in the Asian Pacific Rim. California: Sage. 
Herman, E. and McChesney, R. (1997) The Global Media. London: Cassell. 
Higson, A. (1989) The concept of national cinema. Screen, 30(4): 36-46. 
Higson, A. (2000) The limiting imagination of national cinema. In M. Hjort, and S. 
Mackenzie (eds. ) Cinema and Nation. London: Routledge. 
Hill, J. (1992) The issue of national cinema and British film production. In D. Petrie, 
(ed. ) New Questions ofBritish Cinema. London: BFI. 
Hill, J. (1993) Government policy and the British film industry 1979-90. European 
Journal of Communication, 8: 203-24. 
Hill, J. (1996). British film policy. In A. Moran(ed. ). Film Policy: International, 
National and Regional Perspectives. London: Routledge. 
Hill, J. (1997) British cinema as national cinema: production, audience, representation. 
In R. Murphy (ed. ) The British Cinema Book. London: BFI. 
Hirst, P. and Thompson, G. (1996) Globalisation in Question. Cambridge: Polity. 
Hirst, P. and Thompson, G. (1999) Globalisation in Question, the second edition. 
Cambridge: Polity. 
Hjort, M. and Mackenzie, S. (2000) (eds. ) Cinema and Nation. London: Routledge. 
Hobsbawn, E. and Ranger, T. (eds. ) (1983). The Invented Tradition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Hobsbawm, E. (1990) Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hong, J. H. (1998) The Internationalisation of Television in China: The Evolution of 
Ideology, Society, and Media since the Reform. London: Praeger. 
Hoogvelt, A. (1997). Globalisation and the Postcolonial World: The New Political 
Economy ofDevelopment. London: Macmillan Press. 
Hoogvelt, A. (2001) Globalisation and the Postcolonial World. The New Political 
Economy ofDevelopment, the Second Edition. Hampshire, England: Palgrave. 
Hopkins, T. K. and Wallerstein, I. (et al. )(1 996). The Age of Transition: Trajectory of 
the World-System (1945-2025). London & New Jersey: Pluto Press. 
Hoskins, C., McFadyen, S. and Finn, A. (1997) Global Television and Film: An 
Introduction to the Economics ofthe Business. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
304 
Hsing, Y. T. (1998) Making Capitalism in China: The Taiwan Connection. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Hsu, I. C. Y. (1995) The Rise ofModern China, the Fifth Edition. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Hurrell, A. and Woods, N. (1999) (eds) Inequality, Globalisation, and World Politics. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Jakel, A. (1996) European co-production strategies: The case of France and 
Britain. In A. Moran(ed. ). Film Policy: International, National and Regional 
Perspectives. London: Routledge. 
Jakel, A. (1997). Cultural cooperation in Europe: the case of British and French 
cinemagraphic co-productions with Central and Eastern Europe. Media, 
Culture & Society, Vol. 19: 111-120. 
Jarvie, I. (1992). Hollywood's Overseas Campaign: The North Atlantic Movie Trade, 
1920-1950. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Johnson, R. (1996). Film policy in Latin America. In A. Moran(ed. ). Film Policy: 
international, National and Regional Perspectives. London: Routledge. 
Kabir, Nasreen Munni (2001) Bollywood., The Indian Cinema Story. London: Channel 
4 Books. 
Kallas, C. (1996) The benefit and the cost of co-production. In S. Blind and G. 
Hallenberger (eds-) European Co-Productions in Television and Film. Heidelberg: 
Universitatsverlag C. Winter. King, J. (1990) Magical Reels: A History of Cinema 
in Latin America. London: Verso. 
King, J. (2000) Magical Reels: A History of Cinema in Latin America, New Edition. 
London: Verso. 
Lam, W. W. (1995) China after Deng Xiaoping. - The Power Struggle in Beying since 
Tiananmen. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons. 
Larrain, J. (1994) Ideology & Cultural Identity: Modernity and the Third World 
Presence. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Law Kar (2001) An overview of Hong Kong's new wave cinema. In E. C. Yau (ed. ) 
At Full Speed. Hong Kong Cinema in a Borderless World. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Lee, C. C. (1994a) Sparking a fire: the press and the ferment of democratic change in 
Taiwan. In C. C. Lee (ed. ) China's Media, Media's China. Boulder, Colo.: 
Westview. 
305 
Lee, C. C. (1994b) Ambiguities and contradictions: issues in China's changing 
political communication. In In C. C. Lee (ed. ) China's Media, Media's China. 
Boulder, Colo.: Westview. 
Lee, C. C. (2000) Chinese communication: prisms, trajectories, and modes of 
understanding. In C. C. Lee (ed. ) Power, Money, and Media: Communication 
Patterns and Bureaucratic Control in Cultural China. Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press. 
Lee, Leo Ou-fan (1999) Shanghai Modern: The Flowering ofa New Urban Culture in 
China (1930-1945). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Lent, John(I 990). The Asian Film Industry. London: Christopher Helm. 
Leung, La-Kuen G. (1993). The Evolution of Hong Kong as a Regional Movie 
Production and Export Centre. Master thesis, The Chinese University of Hong 
Kong. 
Li, K. (1997) Confucianism and Capitalist Development in the East Asian Newly 
Industrialised Societies. Doctoral Thesis, Loghborough University, the UK. 
Li, Siu Leung (2001) Kung Fu: Negotiating nationalism and modernity. Cultural 
Studies, 15 (3/4): 515-542. 
Li, W. (1999) Insights from the market phenomena of Titanic. Chinese Sociology and 
Anthropology, 32 (1: 58-69). 
Lo, D. (1999) The East Asian phenomenon: The consensus, the dissent, and the 
significance of the present crisis. Capital & Class, 67: 1-23. 
Lopez, A. M. (1997) An "other" history: The New Latin American Cinema. In M. T. 
Martin (ed. )(1997a) New LatinAmerican Cinema Vol. 1: Theory, Practices, and 
Transcontinental Articulations. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. 
Lu, S. H. (1997) National cinema, cultural critique, transnational capital: The films of 
Zhang Yimou. In S. H. Lu (ed. ) Transnational Chinese Cinemas: identity, 
Nationhood, Gender. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
Lull, J. (1995) Media, Communication, Culture: A Global Approach. Cambridge: 
Polity. 
Mackerras, C., Taneja, P. and Young, G. (1994) China since 1978: Reform, 
Modernisation and 'Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. New York: 
St. Martin's Press. 
Maltby, R. and Craven, 1. (1995) Hollywood Cinema. Oxford: Blackwell. 
306 
Martin, M. T. (ed. )(1997a) New Latin American Cinema Vol. 1: Theory, Practices, 
and Transcontinental Articulations. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. 
Martin, M. T. (1997b) The unfinished social practice of the New Latin American 
Cinema: Introductory notes. In Martin, Michael T. (ed. )(1997a). New Latin 
American Cinema Vol. 1: Theory, Practices, and Transcontinental Articulations. 
Detroit: Wayne State University Press. 
Marx, K. and Engels, F (1967) Communist Manifesto. New York: Penguin 
Books. 
Massey, D. (1994) Space, Place, and Gender. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
McChesney, R. W. (1998) Media convergence and the globalisation. In D. K. Tbussu 
(ed. ) Electronic Empires: Global media and local resistance. London: Arnold. 
McChesney, R. W. (2001) Global media, neoliberialism, and imperialism. Monthly 
Review, Vol. 52, Number 10, pp. 1-19. 
McGuigan, J. (1996) Culture and Public Sphere. London: Routledge. 
McGuigan, J. (1998) National government and the cultural public sphere. Media 
international Australia, Vol. 87, pp. 68-83. 
McGuigan, J. (2001) Three discourses of cultural policy. In N. Stevenson, (ed. ) 
Culture and Citizenship. London: Sage. 
McIntyre, S. (1996). Art and industry: Regional film and video policy in the UK. In 
A. Moran(ed. ). Film Policy: International, National and Regional Perspectives. 
London: Routledge. 
McNally, D. (1998) Globalisation on trial: Crisis and class struggle in East Asia. 
Monthly Review, September, pp. 1- 18. 
McQuail, D. (2000) Media policy: premature obsequies? In H. Tumber (ed. ), Media 
Power, Professionals and Policies. London: Routledge. 
McQuail, D. and Siune, K. (eds. )(1998) Media Policy: Convergence, Concentration 
and Commerce. London: Sage. 
Miller, T. (1996). The crime of Monsieur Lang: GATT, the screen and the new 
division of cultural labour. In A. Moran(ed. ). Film Policy: International, 
National and Regional Perspectives. London: Routledge. 
Miller, T., Govil, N., McMurria, J. and Maxwell, R. (2001) Global Hollywood. 
London: BFI. 
Monthly Review Editors (1992) Globalisation - to what end? Monthly Review, Vol. 43 
(9: 1-18; 10: 1-19). 
307 
Moran, A. (1996) Terms for a reader: film, Hollywood, national cinema, cultural 
identity and film policy. In A. Moran (ed. ) Film Policy: International, National 
and Regional Perspectives. London: Routledge. 
Morley, D. & Robins, K. (1995). Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic 
Landscapes, and Cultural Boundaries. London: Routledge. 
Mosco, V. (1996) The Political Economy ofCommunication: Rethinking and Renewal. 
London: Sage. 
Murdock, G. (1990) Redrawing the map of the communications industries: 
concentration and ownership in the era of Privatisation. In M. Ferguson (ed. ) 
Public Communication: The New Imperatives. London: Sage. 
Murdock, G. (1996) Trading places: the cultural economy of co-production. In S. 
Blind and G. Hallenberger (eds. ) European Co-Productions in Television and Film. 
Heidelberg: Universitatsverlag C. Winter. 
Murdock, G. (2000) Digital futures: The age of convergence. In J. Wieten, 
G. Murdock, and P. Dahlgren (eds. ) Television Across Europe. London: Sage. 
Naisbitt, J. (1994) Global Paradox. New York: The Easton Press. 
Neale, S. (198 1) Art cinema as institution. Screen, 22(1: 11-3 9). 
Nordenstreng, K. and Schiller, H. I. (1979) Introduction. In K. Nordenstreng and H. I. 
Schiller (eds), National Sovereignty and International Communication, New 
Jersey, Norwood: Ablex Publishing. 
Nowell-Smith, G. (1985) But do we need it? In M. Auti and N. Roddick (eds. ) British 
Cinema Now. London: BFI. 
Nyce, Ben(1988). Satyajit Ray., A Study ofH! s Films. New York: Praeger. 
Ohmae, K. (1990) The Borderless World. London and New York: Collins. 
Ohmae, K. (1995) The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies. 
New York: Free Press. 
O'Regan, T. (1996) Australian National Cinema. London: Routledge. 
Park, S. H. (2000) Structural transformation of the Korean film industry, 1988-1993. 
Asian Cinema, 11(l): 51-68. 
Pendakur, M. (1989) New cultural technologies and fading glitter of Indian cinema. 
Quarterly Review ofFilm & Video, 11: 69-78. 
Pendakur, M. (1990a) India. In Lent, J., The Asian Film Industry. London: 
Christopher Helm, pp. 229-252. 
308 
Pendakur, M. (1990b). Canadian Dreams & American Control. Detroit: Wayne 
State University Press. 
Pendakur, M. (1996). India's national film policy: Shifting currents in the 1990s. 
In A. Moran(ed. ). Film Policy: International, National and Regional Perspectives. 
London: Routledge. 
Pool, 1. de Sola (1990) Technologies without Boundaries: On Telecommunications in 
A Global Age. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Rajadhyaksha, A. and Willemen, P. (1999) Encyclopaedia of Indian Cinema, New 
Revised Edition. London: BFI. 
Rajadhyaksha, A. (2000) Indian cinema. In J. Hill and P. C. Gibson (eds. ) World 
Cinema: Critical Approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Raskin, C. (1987) China's Political Economy: The Questfor Development since 1949. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Rasky, B. and Perez, E. M. W. (1996). Cultural Policy and Cultural Administration in 
Europe: 42 Outlines. Vienna: Osterreichische Kulturdokumentation. 
Rawnsley, G. D. and Rawnsley, M. Y. T. (200 1) Critical Security, Democratisation and 
Television in Taiwan. Aldershot, England: Ashgate. 
Roach, C. (1997) The Western world and the NWICO: united they stand. In P. 
Golding and P. Harris (eds. ) Beyond Cultural Imperialism: Globalisation, 
Communication, and the New International Order. London: Sage. 
Robertson, R. (1990). Mapping the global condition: globalisation as the central 
concept. In Featherstone, M. (ed. ), Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalisation and 
Modernity. London: Sage. 
Robertson, R. (1992) Globalisation: Social Theory and Global Culture. London: Sage. 
Robins, K. (199 1) Tradition and translation: national culture in its global context. In J. 
Comer and S. Harvey (eds. ) Enterprise and Heritage: Crosscurrents of National 
Culture. London: Rouledge. 
Robinson, A. (198 9) Satyajit Ray. - The Inner Eye. London: Andre Deutsch. 
Rodriguez, H. (200 1) The emergence of the Hong Kong New Wave. In E. C. Yau (ed. ) 
, 4t Full Speed: Hong Kong Cinema in a Borderless World. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Schiller, D. (1999) Digital Capitalism: Networking the Global Market System. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
309 
Schiller, H. 1. (1969) Mass Communication and American Empire. Boston: Beacon 
Press. 
Schiller, H. 1. (1976) Communication and Cultural Domination. New York: 
International Arts and Sciences Press. 
Schiller, H. I. (1989) Culture Inc.: The Corporate Takeover ofPublic Expression. NY: 
Oxford University Press. 
Schiller, H. 1. (1991). Not yet the post-imperialist era, Critical Studies in Mass 
Communication, 8(l): 13-28. 
Schlesinger, P. (1991) Media, Stale and Nation: Political Violence and Collective 
Identities. London: Sage. 
Schlesinger, P. (2000) Sociological scope of 'national cinema'. In M. Hjort, and S. 
Mackenzie (eds. ) Cinema andNation. London: Routledge. 
schnitman, J. (1984). Film Industries in Latin America: Dependency and 
Development. N. J.: Ablex. 
Scholte, J. A. (2000) Globalisation: A Critical Introduction. London: Macmillan 
Press. 
Schram, S. R. (1971) The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung. Middlesex, England: 
Penguin Books. 
Sen, K. (1996). Cinema polic(ing)y in Indonesia. In A. Moran(ed. ). Film Poliqy. ý 
International, National and Regional Perspectives. London: Routledge. 
Shih Shu-mei (2000) Globalisation and minoritisation: Ang Lee and the politics of 
flexibility. New Formation, 40, Spring 2000, pp. 86- 10 1. 
Shibusawa, M., Ahmad, Z. H., and Bridges, B. (1992) Pacific Asia in the 1990s. 
London: Routledge. 
Smith, A. D. (I 990) Toward a global culture? In M. Featherstone (ed. ) Global Culture: 
Nationalism, Globalization andModernity. London: Sage. 
Smith, A. D. (1993) The nation: invented, imaged, reconstructed? In M. Ringrose and 
A. J. Lerner (eds. ) Reimagining the Nation. Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Smith, A. D. (1995) Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Sorbet, C. (1998) Debating national policy. In McQuail, D. and Siune, K. (eds. ) 
Media Policy., Convergence, Concentration and Commerce. London: Sage. 
310 
Steil, N. (1996) European film financing. In S. Blind and G. Hallenberger (eds. ) 
European Co-Productions in Television and Film. Heidelberg: Universitatsverlag 
C. Winter. 
Stokes, Lisa Odharn and Hoover, Michael (1999) City on Fire: Hong Kong Cinema. 
London: Verso. 
Swann, P. (199 1) The little State Department: Hollywood and the State Department in 
the postwar world. American Studies International, XXIX (2: 2-19). 
Sweezy, P. (1997) More (or less) on globalisation. Monthly Review, Volume 49, 
Number 4 (September), pp. 1-4. 
Tabb, W. K. (1997a) Globalisation is an issue, the power of capital is the issue. 
Monthly Review, Volume 49, Number 2 (June), pp. 20-30. 
Tabb, W. K. (1997b) Contexualising globalisation: comments on Du Boff and Herman. 
Monthly Review, November 1997, pp. 3 5-39. 
Tabb, W. K. (1998) The East Asian financial crisis. Monthly Review, June, pp. 24- 
38. 
Tabb, W. K. (2000) The World Trade Organisation? Stop world takeover. Monthly 
Review, Vol. 51, No. 8. 
Tay, W. (1994) The ideology of initiation: The films of Hou Hsiaohsien. In N. 
Browne et al. (eds. ) New Chinese Cinemas. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Taylor, R. and Christie, 1. (eds. )(1 994) The Film Factory., Russian and Soviet Cinema 
in Documents 1896-1939. London: Routledge. 
Teo, Stephen (1997). Hong Kong Cinema: The Extra Dimensions. London: BFI 
Publishing. 
Thompson, J. B. (1995). The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Thompson, K. (1985). Exporting Entertainment. ý America in the World Film 
Market 1907-34. London: BFI Publishing. 
Thussu, D. (ed. ) (1998) Electronic Empires. London: Arnold. 
Tomlinson, J. (199 1) Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction. London: Pinter. 
Tomlinson, J. (1997a) Internationalism, globalisation and cultural imperialism. In K. 
Thompson (ed. ), Media and Cultural Regulation. London: Sage / Open University. 
311 
Tomlinson, J. (I 997b) Cultural globalisation and cultural imperialism. In Mohammadi, 
A. (ed. ), International Communication and Globalisation: A Critical Introduction. 
London: Sage. 
Tomlinson, J. (1999) Globalisation and Culture. Cambridge: Polity. 
Turner, G. (198 8) Film as Social Practice. London: Routledge. 
Unesco, Unesco Statistics Year Book 1999. Paris: Unesco. 
Vanlicha, Kishore(1988). The Moving Image: A Study of Indian Cinema. Bombay: 
Orient Longman. 
Wade, R. (1998) The Asian debt-and-development crisis of 1997-?: causes and 
consequences. World Development, 26(8: 1535-1553). 
Wade, R. & Veneroso, F. (1998) The Asian crisis: The high debt model versus 
the Wall street-Treasury-IMF complex. New Left Review, 228: 3-23. 
Wallerstein, 1. (1974) The Modern World-System (1). California, San Diego: 
Academic Press. 
Wallerstein, 1. (1979) The Capitalist World-Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Wallerstein, I. (1990a) Culture as the ideological battleground of the modem world- 
system. In M. Featherstone (ed. ) Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalisation and 
Modernity. London: Sage. 
Wallerstein, I. (1990b) Reply to Boyne. In M. Featherstone (ed. ) Global Culture: 
Nationalism, Globalisation and Modernity. London: Sage. 
Wallerstein, 1. (1991) Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World- 
System. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wang, H. L. (2000) Rethinking the global and the national: reflection on national 
imaginations in Taiwan. Theory, Culture and Society, Vol. 17 (4): 93 -117. 
Wang, Yuejin(1991). Red Sorghum: Mixing memory and desire. In Chris Berry (ed), 
Perspective on Chinese Cinema. London: BFI. 
Wasko, J. (1994) Beyond the Silver Screen: Hollywood in the Information Age. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Waters, M. (1995) Globalisation. London and New York: Routledge. 
Wei Ming Dariotis and Eileen Fung (1997) Breaking the soy sauce jar: Diaspora and 
displacement in the films of Ang Lee. In S. H. Lu (ed. ) Transnational Chinese 
Cinemas: Identity, Nationhood, Gender. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
312 
White, M. (1987) Ideological analysis and television. In R. C. Allen (ed. ) Channels of 
Discourse. Chapel Hill and London: University of North California Press. 
Willemen, P. (1989) The Third Cinema question: Notes and reflections. In J. Pines 
and P. Willemen (eds. ) Questions ofThird Cinema. London: BFI Publishing. 
Williams, R. (1980) Base and superstructure. In Problems in Materialism and Culture: 
Selected Essays. London: Verso. 
Williams, R. 0 984) State culture and beyond. In Institute of Contemporary Arts (ed. ) 
Culture and the State. London: Institute of Contemporary Arts. 
Wood, E. M. (1997a) Labour, the state, and class struggle. Monthly Review, Volume 
49, Number 3 (July-August), pp. 1- 17. 
Wood, E. M. (1997b) A note on Du Boff and Herman. Monthly Review, November 
1997, pp. 39-43. 
Wright, W. (1975) Six Guns and Society A Structural Study ofthe Western. Berkerley, 
Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
Xiao, Z. (1998) Foreign films in China. In Y. Zhang and Z. Xiao (eds. ) 
Encyclopaedia ofChinese Film. London: Routledge. 
Yau, Esther C. (2001) Introduction. In E. C. Yau (ed. ) At Full Speed. Hong Kong 
Cinema in a Borderless World. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Yip, June (1997) Constructing a nation: Taiwan history and the films of Hou 
Hsiaohsien. In In S. H. Lu (ed. ) Transnational Chinese Cinemas: Identity, 
Nationhood, Gender. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
Young, E. (2001) Taiwan stories (Interview), New Left Review, Sep/Oct, pp. 129-136. 
Zhao, YZ (1998) Media, Market, and Democracy in China: Between the Party Line 
and the Bottom Line. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 
313 
Chinese Literatures 
Amako, (1994[1992]) China: The Great Socialist Country in Transition. Taipei: Yuei 
Dan. 
Beijing Cultural Bureau (1995) The History offilm Distribution and Exhibition Units 
in Beying, Vol. 1. Beijing: Beijing Cultural Bureau. 
Board of Foreign Trade (1998) The Impacts and Measuresfor Entering into the W70. 
Taipei: Board of Foreign Trade. 
Cai, Guorong. (1985) Research on Chinese Literature-Art Film. Taipei: National Film 
Archive. 
Chen, Bo (2000) Fifty years in exploration and innovation: The retrospect and 
assessment of New Chinese Cinema. In China Film Association (ed. ) Fiftyyears of 
New Chinese Cinema. Beijing: China Film Press. 
Chen, C. W. (2000) The Analysis on the Structure and Marketing of Hong Kong Film 
Industry. Hong Kong: The Movie Biweekly Press. 
Chen, Ruxiu (1993) Research on New Taiwanese Cinema: The Historical and 
Cultural Experiences ofNew Taiwanese Cinema. Taipei: Wanxiang. 
Cheng, J. (198 1) The History ofChinese Film, Volume 1. Beijing: China Film Press. 
Cheng, L. (1993) Distribution, exhibition, exportation and importation of film in 
China. In T. Li (ed. ) The Development and Future of China Film Business. Taipei: 
Research Report for Foundation of Exchange between Taiwan Strait. 
Chiao, Hsiungping (ed. ) (199 1) New Asian Cinemas. Taipei: Yuanliu. 
Chiao Hsiungping (1998). The Great Encounters: A Dialogue with Contemporary 
Chinese Cinema. Taipei: Yuanliu. 
Chiao Hsiungping (2000) In searching for Taiwan's identification: The nativist 
consciousness of Taiwanese New Cinema and Hou Hsiaohsien's City of Sadness. 
In National Film Archive, Hou Hsiaohsien (Translated from original French 
Edition, edited by Cahiers du cinema). Taipei: National Film Archive. 
China Film Association (ed. )(1996) Film Creation and Socialist Market Economy. 
Beijing: China Film Press. 
China Film Yearbook; 1995. Beijing: China Film Press. 
China Film Yearbook; 1996. Beijing: China Film Press. 
China Film Yearbook, 1997. Beijing: China Film Press. 
China Film Yearbook; 199811999. Beijing: China Film Press. 
314 
China Motion Picture Corporation (1984) Thirty Years of CMPC. Taipei. 
Culture Bureau (197 1) The Present and Future ofthe Chinese Film Business. Taipei. 
Dai, Jinhua (1998). Observing From the Slanting Tower: Chinese Film Culture 1978- 
1998. Tapei: Yuanliu. 
Dai, Jinhua (1999) The Map of the Mirrored City Studies and Writings on 
Contemporary Cultures. Taipei: United Literature. 
Deng, Guanghui (2000) The stories of box-office: Domestic films 1995-1999. Film 
Art, September, No. 5, pp. 15-19. 
DGBAS (1992) Investigation Report on the Distribution of Personal Income in 
Taiwan ROC. Taipei: DGBAS (Directorate General of Budget, Accounting, and 
Statistics), Executive Yuan. 
Fan, Baohou (1991) Research on the Operations of Videotape Rental Business in 
Taiwan. Master Dissertation. Taipei: Graduate Institute of Journalism, National 
Chengchi University. 
Fang, N., Wang, X. D., and Song, Q. (1999) The Road of China under the Shadow of 
Globalisation. Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press. 
Feng, C. S. (1995) The Political Economy ofthe Movement ofBroadcasting Capitals: 
Analysis on Changes of Taiwan's Broadcasting Media in the 1990s. Taipei: 
Taiwan Radical Quarterly in Social Studies. 
Feng, C. S. (2000) Communication and market socialism: The economic analysis of 
West European and China's media. Unpublished manuscript. 
Government Information Office (2000) The Republic of China 2000 (CD ROM 
format). Taipei: Government Information Office. 
Guang, Zhongxiang (1997) Analysis on the Role of the State in the Development of 
Taiwan's Cable Television. Master Dissertation. Taipei: Graduate Institute of 
Journalism, National Chengchi University. 
Hang-Zhi (1990) Toward the Civil Society in the Post-Formosa-Incident Era. Taipei: 
Tang Shan. 
Huang, Wenying and Cao, Zhiwei (1998) Flowers ofShanghai: The Image Aesthetics 
ofHai Shang Hua. Taipei: Yuanliu. 
Huang, Wulang (ed. )(1992) Contemporary Taiwanese and Hong Kong Cinema: 
1988-1992. Taipei: China Times Press. 
Keshi (200 1) The chronicle of 'major films'. 
http: //ent. 163. com/edit/OI0822/010822_98342(l). htm] 
315 
Li, D. (1995) The first chapter of the film history of Taiwan: 1900-1915. Film 
Research, No. 73: 28-49. 
Li, J. (1996) Perspective on film: thinking on market economy. In China Film 
Association (ed. ) Film Creation and Socialist Market Economy. Beijing: China 
Film Press. 
Li, Y. (2000) Analysis of Hollywood Majors in Taiwan: 1946-1999. Master 
Dissertation, Department of Radio and Television, National Chengchi University, 
Taipei. 
Liao, Pinghui (1993) Temporal, spatial, and gender disorder: On Farewell My 
Concubine. Chung-Wal Literary Monthly, 22 (1): 6-18. 
Lin, L. Y. (2000) The contradictions and transformations of the 'client press' under 
Taiwan's authoritarian regime: 1949-1999.. In L. Y. Chang (ed. ) Cultural Industry: 
The Structural Analysis of Cultural Production. Taipei: Yuan Liu. 
Lin Wenqi (1997) American army as Hollywood movie: The upset of Buddha Bless 
America to American cultural imperialism. Republic of China Film Yearbook, 
1997. Taipei: National Film Archive. 
Lin Wenqi et al. (1998) (eds. ) Studies on the Films ofHou Hsiaohsien. Taipei: Cite. 
Lin Wenqi (2000) Return, motherland, and the 228 Incident: The Taiwan history and 
national identity in City of Sadness. In Lin Wenqi et al. (eds. ) Studies on the Films 
ofHou Hsiaohsien. Taipei: Cite. 
Liu, Youli (1994) Research on Mainland China's Cable Television Programme and 
Regulations. Taipei: Mainland Committee in Executive Yuan. 
Liu, Youli (1997) Multi-channels Television andAudience: Research on Television 
andAudience Viewing Behaviors in the 1990s. Taipei: Shiying. 
Liu, Zhiyuan (2000) How the film and television industries to face the entry into the 
WTO. Research on Film and Television Arts, No. 3: 8-11. 
Lu, F. (1998) Taiwan Cinema: Politics, Economics and Aesthetics (1949-1994). 
Taipei: Yuanliu. 
Lu, S. (196 1) The History of Taiwanese Film and Drama. Taipei: Inhua. 
Lu, Y. N. (1999) Satellite Age: The Development and Challenge of China's Television 
Industry. Taipei: Shi Ying. 
Mao, Yu (1999) In searching for hard ways to reviving the Chinese film market. In 
China Film Association (ed. ) Chinese Cinema: Twenty Years in Open and Reform. 
Beijing: China Film Press. 
316 
Ni, Zhen (ed. ) (1994) Reform and Chinese Cinema. Beijing: China Film Press. 
Rao, Xiaoming (1993) How to elaborate film industry and train film professionals. In 
GIO, Record ofNational Film Conference, pp. 89-94. 
Sai, Ichikawa (1941) The manuscript on the history of Taiwan film business. 
Translated from Japanese by X. Li (1993). Film Review, 65: 109-117. 
Shen, Songsheng (1993) Two guidelines of Chinese film in recent period. In T. Li (ed. ) 
The Development and Future of China Film Business. Taipei: Research Report for 
Foundation of Exchange between Taiwan Strait. 
Shao, Mujun (1993) The film industry mechanism in China and its future of reform. 
In T. Li (ed. ) The Development and Future of China Film Business. Taipei: 
Research Report for Foundation of Exchange between Taiwan Strait. 
Shao, Mujun (1996) Long live cinema! In China Film Association (ed. ) Film Creation 
and Socialist Market Economy. Beijing: China Film Press. 
Tang, X. J. (1999) Newspaper Economics and Operation. Beijing: Sin Hua. 
Wang, C. (1998) American film in China during the period of Nationalist Government. 
Film Art, January, 57-64. 
Wang, C. H. (1993) Capital, Labour, and State: The Transitions of Taiwan's Politics 
and Society. Taipei: Tang Shan. 
Wang, W. (1994) Film Activities in Taiwan during Japanese Colonisation. Master 
Dissertation, Department of History, National Normal University. 
Wei, Ti (1994) The Political Economic Analysis of Present Taiwanese Film Industry 
(1989-1993), Master Dissertation. Taipei: Graduate Institute of Journalism, 
National Chengchi University. 
Xu, Zhuang (1996) Guarding the spiritual homeland of cinema. In China Film 
Association (ed. ) Film Creation and Socialist Market Economy. Beijing: China 
Film Press. 
Xue, Ting (1995) The Political Economic Analysis of Chinese Cinema (1979-1994), 
Master Dissertation. Hong Kong: Department of Communication, Hong Kong 
Chinese University. 
Ye, L. (1997) The Film History ofXimending. Taipei: National Film Archive. 
Yi Hong (1999) Chinese cinema in the context of internationalisation. In Ye Yueyu et 
al. (eds. ) Romance of Three Cities Studies on Chinese Cinemas. Taipei: National 
Film Archive. 
317 
Zhang, Wei (1993) The reform of the Chinese film system: Retrospect, assessment, 
and forecast. In T. Li (ed. ) The Development and Future of China Film Business. 
Taipei: Research Report for Foundation of Exchange between Taiwan Strait. 
Zheng, Dontia'n (2000) To be, or not to be: the analysis of the conditions of the 
Chinese film after entering into the WTO. Research on Film and Television Arts, 
No. 3: 12-16. 
Zhu, Huejun (1996) The film with 'three characters in one'. In China Film 
Association (ed. ) Film Creation and Socialist Market Economy. Beijing: China 
Film Press. 
318 
PAGE 
NUMBERING 
AS ORIGINAL 
Interviews 
No. Organisation Title and Name of Interviewee Topic(s) Date and 
Place 
I Beijing Film Film Scholar and Film Director, The current situation of 11/03/2000 
Academy Zheng Dongtian Chinese cinema after (Speech) 
China enters into the WTO Beijing 
2 Beijing Film Film Scholar and Film Director, The present condition of 13/03/2000 
Academy Xie Fei film production Beijing 
3 Film Channel, State Staff of Programme Production The development of Film 14/03/2000 
Administration of Centre, Channel Beijing 
Radio, Film &TV of Pan Jun 
China 
4 Film Bureau Director of Production Film policy and regulation 55/03/2000 
Department, since the 1980s Beijing 
Zhou Ban Dong 
5 China Film Group Staff of Merchandising & Rights Film distribution and the 1610V2000 
Corporation Licensing Department, reform of distribution Beijing 
Liang Hongyan system in 1990s 
6 Peking University Film Scholar, The condition of China's 17/03/2000 
Dai Jinhua film industry in the 1990s Beijing 
7 Beijing Film Film Scholar and Film The condition of China's 18/03/2000 
Academy Screenplay Writer, film industry after 1980 Beijing 
Ni Zheng 
Beijing Film Studio Director of Studio Office, The management policy 21/03/2000 
Li Xiaogeng and production strategies Beijing 
9 Sony China Executive Director, The introduction of Sony 23/03/2000 
Yang Hong China Beijing 
10 Beijing Film Lecturer in the Department of Personal experience in film 23/03/2000 
Academy Director and Film Director, production Beijing 
- 
Qiao Liang 
Fl Beijing Film Lecturer in Film Studies, The current situation of 28/11/2000 
Academy Hao Jian China's film industry Beijing 
12 Beijing Film Lecturer in the Department of The current situation of 01/12/2000 
Academy Director and Film Director, film production Beijing 
Qiao Liang (2nd time) 
13 Beijing Film Film Scholar and Film Director, Reform in the film industry 01/12/2000 
Academy Xie Fei (2nd time) a nd regulation Beijing 
318 
14 Beijing Film Professor in Film Theories, Globalisation and China's 04/12/2000 
Academy Wang Zhimin film industry Beijing 
15 Beijing Film Assistant Professor in Film Marketisation of China's 04/12t2OOO 
Academy Management film industry Beijing 
Yu Li 
16 Film Bureau Director of Production Film regulation and 04/12/2000 
Department, censorship Beijing 
Zhou Jian Dong (2nd time) 
17 Beijing Forbidden Vice General President, The organisation and 05/12/2000 
City Film Yan Yujing management of the Beijing 
Corporation company 
18 Fudan University Assistant Professor in Cultural consumption in 08/12/2000 
Journalism, present Shanghai Shanghai 
Lu Ye 
19 Shanghai Wen Hui Senior Reporter in Fibn production, 11/12/2000 
Bao Newspaper Entertainment, distribution, and exhibition Shanghai 
Group Zhou Zhen in Shanghai 
50 Shanghai Cinema Vice President, Reforms in film exhibition 11/12/2000 
Complex Wang Jiayen in Shanghai Shanghai 
21 Great Wall / Chang Executives and staff Film exhibition in 11/12/2000 
Cheng Cinema Xu Yunlong and Mr Wang Shanghai Shanghai 
Gust closed) 
22 Shanghai Paradise Vice president, The organisation. and 12/12/2000 
Film Corporation Jaing Ping management of the Shanghai 
company 
23 Shanghai Paradise President's secretary, The organisation of the 13/12/2000 
Film Corporation Wang Hongyio distribution sector of the Shanghai 
company 
24 Shanghai Culture, Executive in Art Sector, Governance in film 13/12/2000 
Radio, Film, and TV Wang Hongyan. production in Shanghai Shanghai 
Bureau 
25 Taiwan branch of UIP Executive manager, Distribution practice of 10/01/1998 
International Huang Shiwen Hollywood majors in Taipei 
Taiwan 
26 Senior Film Critic Huang Ren Distribution practice of 23/12/1997 
Hollywood majors in 
Taiwan 
319 
Filmography 
Title: Red Sorghum / Hong Gao Liang Year: 1987 
Director: Zhang Yimou 
Screenplay: Chen Jianyu, Zhu Wei, Mo Yan 
Cast: Gong Li, Jiang Wen 
Production: XPan Film Studio (China) 
Title: City of Sadness / Beiqing Chengshi Year: 1989 
Director: Hou Hsiaohsian 
Screenplay: Wu Nianzhen, Chu Tianwen 
Cast: Chen Songyong, Gao Jie, Leung Tony Chiu-Wai 
Production: Era Corporation (Taiwan) 
Title: The Legend of Yellow River / Huanghe Juilian Year: 1999 
Director: Feng Xiaoning 
Screenplay: Feng Xiaoning 
Cast: Ning Jing, Boer, Wang Xinjun 
Production: Shanghai Paradise Film Corporation (China) 
Title: Buddha Bless America / Taiping Tian Guo Year: 1996 
Director: Wu Nianzhen 
Screenplay: Wu Nianzhen 
Cast: Lin Zhengsheng, Yang Zongxian, Jiang Shuna 
Production: Lian Deng Corporation (Taiwan) 
Title: Once upon A Time in China III / Shi Wang Zheng Ba Year: 1993 
Director: Tsui Hark 
Screenplay: Tsui Hark 
Cast: Jet Li, Guan Zhilin 
Production: Film Studio (Hong Kong), Long Hsiang Corporation 
(Taiwan), Beijing Film Studio (China) 
Title: Pushing Hands / Tui Shou Year: 1991 
Director: Ang Lee 
Screenplay: Ang Lee 
Cast: Lang Xiong, Wang Bozhao, Debbie Snyder 
Production: China Motion Picture Corporation (Taiwan) 
Title: The Wedding Banquet / Xi Yian Year: 1993 
Director: Ang Lee 
Screenplay: Ang Lee, Feng Guangyuan 
Cast: Lang Xiong, Gui Yalei, Zhao Wenxuan 
Production: China Motion Picture Corporation (Taiwan) 
Title: Eat Drink Man Woman / Yin Shi Nan Nu Year: 1994 
Director: Ang Lee 
Screenplay: Ang Lee, James Scharnus 
320 
Cast: Lang Xiong, Wu Qianlian, Yang Guimei, Wang Yuwen 
Production: China Motion Picture Corporation (Taiwan) 
Title: Keep Cool / Yo Hua. Haohao Shuo Year: 1996 
Director: Zhang Yimou 
Screenplay: Shu Ping 
Cast: Jiang Wen, Li Baotian 
Production: Guangxi Film Studio (China) 
Title: Good-bye South, Good-bye / Nanguo Zayian, Nanguo Year: 1996 
Director: Hou Hsiaohsien 
Screenplay: Chu Tianwen 
Cast: Gao Jie, Lin Qiang, Yi Nengjing 
Production: Hou Hsiaohsien Film Studio (Taiwan), Shochiku (Japan) 
321 
